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Abstract
This thesis focuses on prediction in the social sciences. We begin by discussing the
“clinical efficiency” of prediction methods as defined by Meehl and Rosen (1955), and present
three equivalent conditions for assessing clinical efficiency: (1) a probabilistic inequality from
Meehl and Rosen; (2) an equivalent inequality given by Dawes (1962); and (3) a more flexible
and easily computed inequality that we refer to as the Bokhari-Hubert condition. The misuse
of the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) is discussed,
particularly when base rates are low. The biases associated with the AUC are examined with
a recommendation that the positive and negative predictive values deserve more emphasis
than typically provided in the literature. A thorough review is given for cross-validation, an
important but often ignored evaluation strategy in developing predictive models. The bias-
variance trade-off in prediction is explained, and several shrinkage estimators are examined.
To facilitate our discussion, illustrative examples using predictive methods in criminology are
provided and several are extensively examined. A detailed history of predicting dangerous
and violent behavior is also given. As a final conclusion, great caution should be exercised
when predicting outcomes with serious social justice consequences.
ii
To Katherine,
the only predictable thing about you is your constant support.
iii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost I would like to acknowledge my committee chairman and academic
advisor, Lawrence Hubert. Prof. Hubert provided me with thoughtful guidance and expertise
throughout the work of this thesis. He made an academic out of me, and for this I owe him
my utmost gratitude.
My committee members Profs. Carolyn Anderson, Steve Culpepper, Fritz Drasgow,
and Jim Rounds deserve great appreciation for all their insightful comments and sugges-
tions. I would like to especially recognize Prof. Drasgow for providing his expertise during
the preliminary work for the qualification exams and the two papers that were eventually
included in this thesis as Chapters 3 and 4.
A special thank you goes to Sungjin Hong who provided invaluable guidance during
his time as my advisor. It is unfortunate that he did not remain at the University of Illinois
to see me through my graduate school tenure, but I know that he has moved on to a fulfilling
career.
In addition to the academic support I received as a graduate student, I must also
acknowledge the professors in the Departments of Mathematics and Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Arizona; in particular, Lee Sechrest and David Sbarra for their mentorship. Their
support given to me in my final year at the U of A helped shape me into the future gradu-
ate student I became. I have been blessed with many influential and supportive educators
throughout my educational career. All the teachers who went above and beyond deserve my
appreciation.
Clearly I have been blessed with wonderful academic support, but just as important
iv
is the emotional support that I received from my friends and family. My friends from the
University of Illinois and from my childhood, particularly Noah and Cyrus, deserve much
appreciation for their encouragement throughout my academic career. My family—especially
my parents, my sister Adeela, and two brothers Jameel and Imraan—always supportive with
praise, deserve plenty of thanks and love.
I owe the deepest gratitude to my beautiful fiance´, Katherine. Her support began
from the moment we met and remained strong throughout. It would be cliche´ to say that I
could not have succeeded in graduate school without her, but I do know it certainly would
have been a lot more difficult if I did not have the love and support that she has given (as
well as some thorough editing of Chapter 2).
Finally, I would like to mention those who have suffered the injustices of the criminal
system and the victims of the heinous crimes committed by violent individuals. It is my
hope that the topics presented in this thesis will lead to better violence prediction methods
so that innocent people are not locked away and the lives of potential victims are saved.
v
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Statistical Toolbox: Definitions and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.1 Frequencies and Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.2 Statistical Discrimination and Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.1.3 Signal Detection Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.4 Decision Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Actuarial Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2 Static-99 & Static-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 Road Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.1 Chapter 2: A History of Violence Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.2 Chapter 3: It’s All About the Base Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Hiding Behind the AUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Lack of Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.5 Chapter 6: The Variance-Bias Trade-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3.6 Chapter 7: An Overview of Violence Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 2 A History of Violence Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Clinical Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.1 Capital Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.2 “Operation Baxstrom” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Statistical Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.1 Burgess Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.2 The Glueck Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Predicting Dangerous Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4.1 Negro v. Dickens (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.2 Preventive Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.3 The Difficulty of Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Mental Illness and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.5.1 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) . . . . . . . 63
2.5.2 Blackstone’s Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5.3 Mental Illness and Violence Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.4 Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
vi
2.6 A Second Generation of Violence Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.6.1 Rise of the Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6.2 Second Generation Risk Assessment Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6.3 The Prisoner Cohort Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Sexually Violent Predators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.7.1 Sexually Violent Predator Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7.2 “Likelihood” of Dangerousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7.3 Predicting Sexual Recidivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.8 New Generation, Old Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.8.1 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.9 Combining Prediction Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.10 Aggregate Versus Individual Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.10.1 Prediction Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.10.2 Credible Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.11 Predictors of Recidivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.11.1 Dynamic Versus Static Predictors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.11.2 Gender and Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.12 A Third Generation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.12.1 Structured Professional Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.13 Violence Risk Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.14 Determining the Accuracy of Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.14.1 Generalizability of Predictive Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.14.2 Authorship Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.15 Admissibility of Actuarial Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2.15.1 The Federal Rules of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.15.2 State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . 138
2.15.3 Probabilities and the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
2.16 Prediction Hits the Streets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
2.16.1 Stop-and-Frisk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.17 Neuroprediction of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.18 Where to Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2.19 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter 3 It’s All About the Base Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.1 Clinical Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.1.1 Meehl-Rosen Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.1.2 Dawes Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.1.3 Bokhari-Hubert Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.2 Predicting Violence and Dangerousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
vii
Chapter 4 Hiding Behind the AUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.2 The Area Under the ROC Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.2.1 The Wilcoxon Statistic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.2.2 Berkson’s Bias: An Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.3 Positive and Negative Predictive Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.4 AUC Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.4.1 Dawes (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.5 AUC: Misleading the Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.5.1 Predicting Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.5.2 Violence Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.5.3 Comparing All Cutscores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.5.4 Comparing Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.6 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.6.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Chapter 5 Lack of Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.1 An Introduction to Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.1.1 Cross-Validation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
5.1.2 Resampling Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
5.2 The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.2.1 VRAS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5.3 Main Effects Logistic Regression Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.4 Discriminant Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.5 Classification and Regression Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5.5.1 Misclassification Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5.5.2 VRAS CART Model in SPSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.5.3 VRAS CART Model in MatLab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
5.5.4 Ensemble Learning Methods for Decision Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Chapter 6 The Variance-Bias Trade-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.1.1 Variance-Bias Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
6.1.2 Brier Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
6.2 The Variance-Bias Trade-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
6.3 Shrinkage Estimators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
6.3.1 𝑛+ 1 Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
6.3.2 Kelley True Score Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
6.3.3 James-Stein Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
6.3.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
6.3.5 Ridge Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
6.3.6 Main Effects Ridge Logistic Regression Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
viii
Chapter 7 An Overview of Violence Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
7.1 The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
7.2 Validation Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
7.2.1 Monahan et al. (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
7.2.2 Snowden et al. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
7.2.3 Doyle et al. (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
7.2.4 McDermott et al. (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
7.2.5 Sturup et al. (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
7.3 Aggregation of Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
7.4 Sexual Recidivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
7.4.1 Static-99R & Static-2002R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
7.4.2 Validation Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Chapter 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
8.1 Prediction in Other Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
8.2 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Appendix A Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A.1 The Meehl-Rosen Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A.2 The Dawes Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A.3 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
A.4 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Relative Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
A.5 The Area Under the Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
A.6 Relationship Between Dawes’ Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
A.7 Reduction in Accuracy Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
A.8 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition: 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
A.9 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
A.10 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Diagnostic Likelihood Ratios: 𝑃 (𝐴) =
𝑃 (𝐵) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
A.11 𝑃 (𝐴) given fixed PPV and NPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
A.12 Lower Limit for NPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
A.13 Bias-Variance Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
A.14 Brier Score Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Appendix B Assessment Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Appendix C Analysis Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
C.1 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
C.2 Software Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
C.2.1 Preprocessing the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
C.2.2 Statistical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
C.2.3 Discriminant Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
C.2.4 Decision Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
C.3 Brier Score Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
ix
C.4 Kelley True Score Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
C.5 Ridge Logistic Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.”
— Niels Bohr
On September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis killed thirteen people and injured eight others
at the Washington Navy Yard in Southeast Washington, D.C. It was later reported that
Alexis was “delusional” and told police in Rhode Island that he was hearing voices (Botelho &
Sterling, 2013). On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza shot and killed his mother before killing
twenty children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut.
According to one report (Llanos, 2012) Lanza’s older brother claimed Adam had a “history
of mental problems” (para. 3). On July 20, 2012 in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes opened
fire in a crowded movie theater premiering The Dark Knight Rises, killing twelve and injuring
fifty-eight more. Following the shooting it was noted that Holmes had previously seen “at
least three mental health professionals” (Sallinger, 2012, para. 1). On January 8, 2011,
Jared Loughner killed six and injured thirteen outside of a supermarket in Tucson, Arizona,
including then-Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. Several reports followed suggesting that
Loughner was severely mentally ill (e.g., Cloud, 2011).
On November 9, 2012a, the magazine Mother Jones published an article on its web-
site entitled “Mass Shootings: Maybe What We Need Is a Better Mental-Health Policy”
(Follman). In the article, Follman noted that many mass shooting suspects have had mental
health issues: “Mass shootings generate sensational media coverage, yet most media have
failed to connect the dots with regard to mental health” (para. 5). “Connect the dots” is
exactly what Follman, Aronsen, Pan, and Caldwell (2012) attempted to do; on the Mother
1
Jones website the authors made data available regarding sixty-seven different mass shootings
in the United States since 1982, including the four mentioned in the opening paragraph (it is
continually updated following new cases). Among other details, they provide the number of
victims (fatalities and injuries), the suspect’s race and sex, the type of weapon(s) used and
if they were legally obtained or not, and whether the suspect had any prior signs of mental
illness. They concluded that forty-two of the killers—about 63%—may have displayed signs
of mental illness prior to their crimes.
Following the so-called Navy-Yard Shooting, Denise Grady from the New York Times
wrote an article entitled “Signs May Be Evident in Hindsight, but Predicting Violent Be-
havior Is Tough” (2013). She questions whether an incident such as the Navy-Yard Shooting
could be predicted. One of her interviewees was Dr. Jeffrey W. Swanson from Duke Univer-
sity’s Department of Psychiatry. When discussing the possibility of predicting such a mass
shooting, he commented, “I can tell you the common characteristics of people who engage
in mass shootings: It’s a picture of troubled, isolated young men that matches the picture
of tens of thousands of other young men who will never do this” (Grady, 2013, para. 2). In
other words, given these characteristics that may describe the “typical” mass-shooter, it is
more likely than not that such a person possessing these characteristics will not be violent.
But not everyone agrees with Dr. Swanson. Dr. Rachel Yehuda from the Mount
Sinai School of Medicine’s Department of Psychiatry said in the same article that Aaron
Alexis confessing to hearing voices and displaying uncontrollable anger were two warning
signs, and if there existed a mental health team that could be called when people like Alexis
displayed such behavior, such incidents could be avoided (Grady, 2013). Dr. Michael Stone,
a professor of clinical psychiatry at Columbia University, suggested the Navy-Yard Shooting
should have been prevented:
[Alexis] had a history of violence before . . . He slipped through the cracks because
people gave him way more breaks than he deserved. He told the police he was
hearing voices. The police are brain-dead. They have no clue. The police in this
2
generation are much more lenient about letting psychotic people get away than when
I was in training 50 years ago. (Grady, 2013, para. 18)
The Atlantic Wire posted an article the day after the Navy-Yard Shooting entitled
“There Will Be Another Mass Shooting. This Is What the Data Tells Us About It” (Bump,
2013a). The article went so far as to attempt to predict the next mass-shooting; using the
data collected by Mother Jones, Bump concluded,
The next mass shooting will take place on February 12, 2014, in Spokane, Wash-
ington. It will be committed by an emotionally disturbed, 38 year-old white man
who will kill seven people and wound six more at a place he used to work using a
semi-automatic handgun he purchased legally in the state. (para. 1)
The next day, Bump attempted to reassure the citizens of Spokane and surrounding ar-
eas, saying that he did not intend to scare them but rather the intention was to frighten
everybody. As he stated,
Anyone with a passing knowledge of the recent history of gun violence in America
should know by now that there will be another mass killing, somewhere, and soon.
Residents of Spokane need not be any more alarmed at the prospect of being gunned
down while shopping or eating at a restaurant or at their school or workplace than
any other American. (Bump, 2013b, para. 1)
On September 29, 2013, CBS premiered its 46th season of 60 Minutes ; the second
of its three segments was entitled “Untreated Mental Illness an Imminent Danger” (Kroft,
2013). Correspondent Steve Kroft reported on the Navy-Yard Shooting that had occurred
less than two weeks prior, noting it was the twenty-third mass shooting incident since 2008.
In the segment, Mr. Kroft interviewed Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, a well-known psychiatrist spe-
cializing in schizophrenia and executive director at the Stanley Medical Research Institute
and founder of the Treatment Advocacy Center. When Mr. Kroft asked Dr. Torrey about
a possible connection between mass shootings and mental health, Dr. Torrey responded,
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“About half of these mass killings are being done by people with severe mental illness,
mostly schizophrenia. And if they were being treated, they would’ve been preventable.”
Mr. Kroft then postulated that had Aaron Alexis been taken to a psychiatric ward, the
Navy-Yard Shooting may never have occurred.
Dr. Jeffery Lieberman, a psychiatrist at Columbia University who also specializes
in schizophrenia, was asked by Mr. Kroft about schizophrenia. Dr. Lieberman stated
that schizophrenia can develop in early adult life following a symptom-free childhood; this
prompted Mr. Kroft to ask if a “completely normal” 20 year-old who is a “solid citizen” could
become a twenty-one year-old “psychotic.” Dr. Lieberman quickly replied, “Absolutely.”
The 60 Minutes segment went on to discuss the struggles of people with schizophrenia stat-
ing, “[I]t’s estimated that half the seven million people in the country with schizophrenia and
other forms of severe mental illness are not being treated at all” (Kroft, 2013). Although Mr.
Kroft correctly noted that most people who have schizophrenia are not violent, the episode
continually suggested otherwise. They quoted a teenager with schizophrenia: “Basically all
my voices I have are just thought—just voices telling me to harm myself or harm other peo-
ple or kill people.” Another interviewee stated that her schizophrenic brother in an email
“said that someone was going to come to my apartment with an AR-15 and hollow point
bullets and spatter my brains all over my apartment.”
The episode concluded with Dr. Torrey stating,
We have a grand experiment: what happens when you don’t treat people. But then
you’re going to have to accept ten percent of homicides being killed by untreated,
mentally ill people. You’re going to have to accept Tucson and Aurora. You’re going
to have to accept [Seung-Hui] Cho at Virginia Tech. These are the consequences
when we allow people who need to be treated to go untreated. And if you are willing
to do that, then that’s fine. But I’m not willing to do that.
The link between violence and mental illness has long been controversial and heavily
debated. Even if such a link does exist, is it sufficient enough to warrant involuntary treat-
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ment in an attempt to prevent hypothesized violence? It is a reasonable question to ask;
as Dr. Swanson pointed out, it is more likely that someone possessing the characteristics
of a mass murderer will not embark on a shooting rampage. So the question becomes, is
it even possible to predict mass murders and other violent behavior with reasonable accu-
racy? As the epigraph states, prediction is not easy. Niels Bohr was a Danish physicist
who made numerous contributions within his field; he was awarded the 1922 Nobel Prize in
physics. Another physicist and influential figure in the development of quantum mechanics
was Werner Heisenberg who worked with Bohr. The Heisenberg principle, also known as the
uncertainty principle, refers to the limits in precision for physical properties of objects—the
more precisely the position of an object is known, the less precisely the momentum of the ob-
ject is known. Bohr and Heisenberg had a clear understanding of the uncertainty associated
with prediction.
Prediction in the natural sciences is widespread; some areas have shown marked
success (e.g., meteorology) whereas others have much room to improve (e.g., seismology).
Like the natural sciences, prediction is a common theme in the social sciences. Whether
it be prediction of tomorrow’s stock prices, the next election results, or graduation rate
among incoming undergraduate students, prediction in the social sciences is as widespread
and just as difficult as—or, arguably, more difficult than—in the natural sciences. There
will always be uncertainty involved in future events; perfection is not an attainable option
when it comes to prediction and this is more or less what Bohr’s message implies. The
notion of uncertainty is absent from many of the quotes in the previous paragraphs; this
is disconcerting. Prediction in the social sciences tends to affect the lives of many people;
it goes without saying that predictions of future behavior should not be made lightly and
proper methods for evaluating prediction techniques are necessary. If violent behavior is to
be predicted, it must be done with the utmost ethical considerations for everyone involved.
What follows are important considerations and concepts for constructing predictive
and diagnostic models in the social sciences. Although the primary focus is violence predic-
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tion, the underlying points of emphases can be generalized across many types of prediction
paradigms.
1.1 Statistical Toolbox: Definitions and Methods
It is necessary to introduce some terminology and techniques that will be used
throughout. First, important frequencies and probabilities will be defined; this is followed
by several important statistical techniques used throughout the chapters.
1.1.1 Frequencies and Probabilities
Suppose a diagnostic test is designed to determine whether a person has “it,” whatever
“it” may be. For example, we may be interested in predicting future violence; our test then
indicates whether the person will be violent in the future. Let 𝐵 denote the event that the
test is positive indicating the person has “it,” and ?¯?, the event that the test is negative
indicating that the person does not have “it.” Now, consider the events of whether a person
truly has “it” or truly does not have “it” and denote these two events as𝐴 and𝐴, respectively.
The events 𝐵 and ?¯? will be called the diagnostic test results and the events 𝐴 and 𝐴, the
states of nature.
Given the diagnostic test result and state of nature, a 2 × 2 contingency table can
be constructed, as shown in Table 1.1. This table provides the frequencies of marginal
events (e.g., 𝑛𝐵 is the number of people who test positive), or of joint events (e.g., 𝑛𝐵𝐴 is
the number of people who have “it” and tested positive). In terms of violence prediction,
𝑛𝐵 is the number predicted to be violent and 𝑛𝐵𝐴 is the number predicted to be and who
are violent. The frequencies within the table have familiar names worth noting: 𝑛𝐵𝐴 is
the number of true positives, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 is the number of false positives, 𝑛?¯?𝐴 is the number of
false negatives, and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 is the number of true negatives. Of particular importance are the
marginal frequencies 𝑛𝐴, representing the base frequency for those who have “it,” and 𝑛𝐴,
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the base frequency for those who do not. In addition, we may be interested in 𝑛𝐵 and 𝑛?¯?,
the base frequencies for positive and negative diagnostic test outcomes, respectively; these
are often called selection frequencies.
State of Nature
𝐴 (positive) 𝐴 (negative) Totals
Diagnostic 𝐵 (positive) 𝑛𝐵𝐴 𝑛𝐵𝐴 𝑛𝐵
Test Result ?¯? (negative) 𝑛?¯?𝐴 𝑛?¯?𝐴 𝑛?¯?
Totals 𝑛𝐴 𝑛𝐴 𝑛
Table 1.1: A general 2× 2 contingency table.
In addition to frequencies, various marginal, joint, and conditional probabilities can
be defined. For example, 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑛𝐴/𝑛; 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛; 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵; 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) =
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴; and so forth. These conditional probabilities are of general interest, and again it is
worth noting their names. Conditionalizing on the state of nature, we have the following:
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴 is the sensitivity or true positive rate (TPR) or recall ; 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴 is
the false positive rate (FPR); 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴 (= 1− sensitivity) is the false negative rate
(FNR); and 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴 (= 1−false positive rate) is the specificity or true negative rate
(TNR). Conditionalizing on the diagnostic test result, 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵 is called the positive
predictive value or precision; 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) = 𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯? is the negative predictive value (NPV). The
marginal probabilities represent the base rates for those who have “it” (𝑃 (𝐴)) and those
who do not (𝑃 (𝐴)) (also called prior probabilities); those who are predicted to have “it”
(𝑃 (𝐵)) and those who are not (𝑃 (?¯?)) (also called selection ratios).
It is important to note the dependency of frequencies (and, consequently, probabili-
ties). For instance, if we know the base and selection frequencies, then the distribution of
joint frequencies are subject to a single degree of freedom. As another example, given 𝑛𝐴
and 𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛?¯?𝐴 is not free to vary. Similarly, given 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴), the laws of probability determine
that 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 1−𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴). In other words, given the true and false positive rates, the true
and false negative rates are superfluous.
7
An Urn Model Approach.
To assist in the discussion of frequencies and probabilities, we can imagine two urns
containing a total of 𝑛 marbles; 𝑛𝐴 marbles are red and 𝑛𝐴 are blue. Of the 𝑛𝐵 marbles
from the first urn, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 are red and 𝑛𝐵𝐴 are blue; of the 𝑛?¯? marbles in the second urn, 𝑛?¯?𝐴
are red and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 are blue. These frequencies can be used to construct the 2× 2 contingency
table in Table 1.1.
If we randomly select a marble from the set of 𝑛 marbles, with replacement, various
“population” probabilities (or parameters) can be modeled by such a process. For instance,
the probability that we select a red marble from the set of 𝑛 marbles (with replacement)
is 𝑃 (𝐴); the probability that we select a blue marble, given that we are selecting from the
second urn, is 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?). The urn model can be explicitly operationalized using bootstrap
sampling methods.
Confidence Intervals.
If desired, confidence intervals can be constructed for the various “true” binomial
distribution parameters definable for the 2 × 2 contingency table. There are numerous
ways of calculating these intervals (e.g., normal approximation; Clopper-Pearson, Clopper &
Pearson, 1934; Agresti-Coull, Agresti & Coull, 1998; Wilson score, Wilson, 1927); depending
on the estimate, some may be more desirable than others. A demonstration is provided using
the most common method based on a normal approximation.
To construct a confidence interval estimate various conditional probabilities are as-
sumed to characterize an underlying binomial distribution. For instance, let 𝑝𝐵|𝐴 ≡ 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
be the estimated sensitivity of a test. Using the normal approximation to the binomial
distribution, a (1− 𝛼)× 100% confidence interval for the true sensitivity, 𝑝𝐵|𝐴, follows:
𝑝𝐵|𝐴 ± 𝑧1−𝛼/2
√︃
𝑝𝐵|𝐴(1− 𝑝𝐵|𝐴)
𝑛𝐴
,
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where for the cumulative standard normal distribution function, Φ(·), we have Φ(𝑧1−𝛼/2) =
𝑃 (𝑍 ≤ 𝑧1−𝛼/2) = 1 − 𝛼/2. Similarly, a confidence interval for the true positive predictive
value, 𝑝𝐴|𝐵 ≡ 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵), is given as
𝑝𝐴|𝐵 ± 𝑧1−𝛼/2
√︃
𝑝𝐴|𝐵(1− 𝑝𝐴|𝐵)
𝑛𝐵
.
For further discussion and demonstration using confidence intervals for conditional proba-
bilities, the reader is referred to Pepe (2003, pp. 22–23). Alternatively, bootstrap methods
can be used to construct confidence intervals (e.g., Jhun & Jeong, 2000).
Bayes’ Theorem.
From Table 1.1, it is readily seen that 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐴∩𝐵)/𝑃 (𝐵); or equivalently, 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩
𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵). Similarly, 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵∩𝐴)/𝑃 (𝐴) ⇔ 𝑃 (𝐵 ∩𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴). Because
𝑃 (𝐴∩𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵∩𝐴), we have the following equality: 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴); solving
for the first conditional probability gives a relationship between conditional probabilities:
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
.
This relationship between conditional probabilities is known as Bayes’ Theorem; it is one of
the most important—and useful—results in probability theory.
Because 𝑃 (𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴), Bayes’ Theorem can be rewritten as
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) .
In words, Bayes’ Theorem shows that the positive predictive value can be determined when
we know the sensitivity, specificity, and base rate. Similar relationships exist for the negative
predictive value and the sensitivity and specificity.
Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin (2007) suggest the use
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of natural frequencies over probabilities for conveying information. For example, if the posi-
tive predictive value is equal to .40, we would say that for every ten positive tests four people
truly have “it.” Gigerenzer et al. (2007) noted the ease of calculating conditional probabili-
ties using natural frequencies and Bayes’ Theorem, and showed that training physicians to
translate conditional probabilities to frequencies alleviates much of the confusion associated
with conditional probabilities.
Using an example similar to that provided by Gigerenzer et al. (2007), but now stated
in terms of five-year recidivism among sexual offenders, suppose one is told the following
facts: the probability a sexual offender will recidivate is .10; if a sexual offender will recidi-
vate, the probability he will be so predicted is .38; if the sexual offender will not recidivate,
the probability he is so predicted is .12. If asked to state the probability that a sexual
offender will recidivate given that he is so predicted, the answer can be found using Bayes’
Theorem; Gigerenzer et al. (2007) show that when stated in terms of frequencies, this prob-
lem is more likely to be correctly answered. For example, if the information is provided as
follows: out of 1000 sexual offenders, 100 will recidivate; of the 100 that will recidivate, 38
will be so predicted; and out of the 900 that will not recidivate, 108 will be so predicted.
The correct answer using probabilities is
(.38)(.10)
((.38)(.10) + (.12)(.90))
= .26;
for natural frequencies:
38
108 + 38
= .26.
1.1.2 Statistical Discrimination and Classification
Suppose one wishes to distinguish between two or more groups of observations or
individuals using a set of variables. Statistical discrimination methods usually find linear
combinations of the variables of interest that characterize and distinguish the groups. As
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an example, suppose we have two populations, 𝜋0 and 𝜋1; they could represent, respectively,
individuals who will not be violent in the future and individuals who will. For simplicity,
consider only one variable for classifying individuals and assume these individuals come from
one of the two populations. For convenience in the initial presentation, the distributions of
the two populations are assumed to follow normal distributions with the same variance, 𝜎2,
but with different means, 𝜇0 and 𝜇1 (without loss of generality, let 𝜇0 ≤ 𝜇1). The two normal
densities are denoted by 𝑓0 ≡ 𝑓0(𝑋;𝜇0, 𝜎2) and 𝑓1 ≡ 𝑓1(𝑋;𝜇1, 𝜎2), where 𝑋 is a random
variable (e.g., a randomly selected individual from the respective population).
Given an observation (or individual), say 𝑥, we wish to “classify” the observation into
one of the two populations. For example, our concern may be whether that individual will
be violent in the future. The true state of nature for the individual is whether he or she will
be violent; the decision is whether we classify the individual as someone who will be violent.
This decision is made based on a cutscore or criterion point, denoted 𝑥𝑐, for the variable of
interest. If 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑐 we allocate the individual to 𝜋0; if 𝑥 > 𝑥𝑐, 𝑥 is allocated to 𝜋1. Defining a
decision function with respect to 𝑥 as 𝑑 ≡ 𝑑(𝑥); 𝑑 = 0 if we allocate 𝑥 to 𝜋0 and 𝑑 = 1 if we
allocate 𝑥 to 𝜋1. For example, the variable might be an individual’s Psychopathy Checklist
(PCL) score; if the PCL score is above a specified threshold, 𝑥𝑐, he or she would be classified
as coming from the population committing an act of violence in the future. If that individual
has a PCL score less than or equal to 𝑥𝑐, he or she will be classified as coming from the
population not committing an act of violence. Given an observation, we again have a 2× 2
table, this time representing the error at the individual level as shown in Table 1.2; here, 𝛼
and 𝛽 represent, respectively, the false positive and false negative probabilities. Figure 1.1
gives a visual representation of the two distributions with the error probabilities highlighted.
Ideally, we would like to minimize both 𝛼 and 𝛽; but because the two distributions
overlap, these errors are intertwined and we cannot decrease one without increasing the
other. Instead, we focus on choosing a cutscore 𝑥𝑐 such that 𝛼+ 𝛽 is minimized. Figure 1.2
displays this situation; 𝑥𝑐′ represents the cutscore where 𝛼 + 𝛽 is minimized. It should be
11
State of Nature
𝑓1 𝑓0
Decision
𝑓1 1− 𝛽 𝛼
𝑓0 𝛽 1− 𝛼
Table 1.2: A 2× 2 table representing the error rates for a decision.
μ0 μ1xc
ß α
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f0(X; μ0, σ2) f1(X; μ1, σ2)
Figure 1.1: Two normal distributions representing two populations. For a given cutscore, 𝑥𝑐,
two types of error probabilities are present: 𝛼 represents the probability of a false positive,
and 𝛽, the probability of a false negative.
clear that 𝑥𝑐′ is the point on the horizontal axis at which the two distributions intersect;
that is, where 𝑓0 = 𝑓1 (or, equivalently, where 𝑓0/𝑓1 = 1). Therefore, our decision function
can be defined as
𝑑(𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
> 1,
0 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
≤ 1.
Generalizing, we can also assign prior probabilities to each of the population distribu-
tions, denoted 𝑝0 and 𝑝1, where 𝑝0+𝑝1 = 1; 𝑝0 is the probability that a given observation, 𝑥,
comes from the population 𝜋0 and 𝑝1 is the probability that the observation comes from the
population 𝜋1. In terms of nonviolent and violent populations and using previously discussed
definitions, 𝑝0 is the base rate for nonviolence (i.e., 𝑃 (𝐴)); 𝑝1 is the base rate for violence
(i.e., 𝑃 (𝐴)). To account for differing prior (base rate) probabilities, we want to chose an 𝑥𝑐
to minimize the total probability of misclassification, (i.e., 𝑝0𝛼+ 𝑝1𝛽). Our decision function
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Figure 1.2: Cutscore minimizing 𝛼+ 𝛽, denoted 𝑥𝑐′ , for classifying an unknown observation
into one of two population distributions.
now becomes
𝑑(𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
> 𝑝1
𝑝0
,
0 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
≤ 𝑝1
𝑝0
.
Finally, a cost function, 𝐶𝑘(𝑗), can be included that assigns a cost to allocating 𝑥 to pop-
ulation 𝜋𝑘 when 𝑥 actually comes from population 𝜋𝑗; 𝐶1(0) is the cost for allocating 𝑥 to
population 𝜋1 when 𝑥 really comes from population 𝜋0 and 𝐶0(1) is the cost of allocating
𝑥 to population 𝜋0 when 𝑥 truly comes from population 𝜋1. We now choose 𝑥𝑐 to minimize
the expected cost of misclassification, 𝐶0(1)𝑝0𝛼 + 𝐶1(0)𝑝1𝛽. Our updated decision function
becomes
𝑑(𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
>
(︁
𝐶0(1)
𝐶1(0)
)︁(︁
𝑝1
𝑝0
)︁
,
0 if 𝑓0
𝑓1
≤
(︁
𝐶0(1)
𝐶1(0)
)︁(︁
𝑝1
𝑝0
)︁
.
For the assumed normal distributions in this discussion and because
𝑓𝑘(𝑥) =
(︀
2𝜋𝜎2
)︀−1/2
exp
{︁
−
(︁
(𝑥− 𝜇𝑘)2
(︀
2𝜎2
)︀−1)︁}︁
,
the ratio 𝑓0
𝑓1
equals exp
{︁
((𝑥− 𝜇1)2 − (𝑥− 𝜇0)2) (2𝜎2)−1
}︁
. Taking the natural logarithm of
13
the above equation,
ln
(︂
𝑓0
𝑓1
)︂
=
(𝑥− 𝜇1)2 − (𝑥− 𝜇0)2
2𝜎2
=
𝑥2 − 2𝑥𝜇1 + 𝜇21 − 𝑥2 + 2𝑥𝜇0 − 𝜇20
2𝜎2
=
2𝑥(𝜇0 − 𝜇1)− (𝜇0 − 𝜇1)(𝜇0 + 𝜇1)
2𝜎2
.
Thus, using our criterion for the decision function based on minimizing the expected cost of
misclassification and taking the logarithm of both sides, 𝑑 = 1 when
ln
(︂
𝑓0
𝑓1
)︂
> ln
[︂(︂
𝐶0(1)
𝐶1(0)
)︂(︂
𝑝1
𝑝0
)︂]︂
2𝑥(𝜇0 − 𝜇1)− (𝜇0 − 𝜇1)(𝜇0 + 𝜇1)
2𝜎2
> ln
[︂(︂
𝐶0(1)
𝐶1(0)
)︂(︂
𝑝1
𝑝0
)︂]︂
𝑥 >
1
2
(𝜇0 + 𝜇1) + ln
[︂(︂
𝐶0(1)
𝐶1(0)
)︂(︂
𝑝1
𝑝0
)︂]︂(︂
𝜎2
𝜇0 − 𝜇1
)︂
≡ 𝑥𝑐.
Because 𝜇0, 𝜇1, 𝜎, 𝑝0, and 𝑝1 are assumed fixed, the cutscore, 𝑥𝑐, is dependent only upon the
cost functions 𝐶0(1) and 𝐶1(0). If 𝐶0(1) = 𝐶1(0), the cutscore is determined strictly from
the fixed parameters. Note that if we have a desired cutscore in mind, the cost ratio can be
determined given this cutscore.
The classification models can be extended to a multivariate framework. The popula-
tion 𝜋𝑖 (𝑖 = 0, 1) is characterized by an𝑚×1 vector of random variables, x ∼ 𝒩𝑚(𝜇𝑖,Σ). For
example, x could be a 4× 1 vector representing patients’ age, IQ level, number of previous
arrests, and PCL score.
Although we assumed the populations follow normal distributions with equal vari-
ances, these assumptions can be relaxed. The normal assumption can be relaxed to one of
a unimodal distribution. If variances are not assumed equal, a quadratic classifier can be
used.
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1.1.3 Signal Detection Theory
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is a framework for assessing uncertainty in deci-
sion making; it is also commonly used in evaluating diagnostic measures in psychology and
medicine, among other areas. SDT allows the researcher to quantify a diagnostic tool’s abil-
ity to distinguish meaningful patterns and known processes (called the signal) from random
patterns or chance processes (called the noise). Based on the given data, three important
parameters are estimated: the strength of the signal relative to the noise, called the dis-
criminability index (denoted 𝑑′); the decision criterion of the diagnostic measure, called the
cutscore (denoted 𝑥𝑐); and an indication of response bias (denoted 𝛽).
Given that the signal is truly present, a correct decision (i.e., stating that the signal
is present) is called a hit (or true positive); an incorrect decision (i.e., stating that noise is
present) is called a miss (or false negative). When noise is truly present, a correct decision
(i.e., stating that noise is present) is called a correct rejection (or true negative); an incorrect
decision (i.e., stating that the signal is present) is called a false alarm (or false positive).
Similar to our earlier discussion, these can be framed in terms of rates: the hit rate (true
positive rate; sensitivity) is the number of correct responses given the presence of the signal;
the false alarm rate (false positive rate; 1− specificity) is the number of incorrect responses
given the presence of noise. In SDT, these are the two rates of interest; the other two are
easily calculated from them and therefore provide no additional information.
Two distributions can be constructed; one represents the signal, the second repre-
sents the noise (see Figure 1.3). To simplify our discussion, they are considered to be normal
distributions with equal variances but differing means. Without loss of generality, the mean
of the signal distribution is assumed greater than that of the noise distribution. The differ-
ence between the two means of the distributions is indicative of the strength of the signal
in relation to the noise; this is the discriminability index, 𝑑′. Based on the hit and false
alarm rates, 𝑑′ is calculated as Φ−1(hit rate)− Φ−1(false alarm rate), where Φ(·) represents
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the cumulative standard normal distribution. We note that 𝑑′ requires several paramet-
ric assumptions regarding normal distributions; there are nonparametric alternatives, but
these are not discussed here (e.g., the measure commonly denoted as 𝐴′; Pollack & Norman,
1964). A 𝑑′ of 0 indicates that the diagnostic measure cannot distinguish signal from noise.
The criterion point distinguishing a positive response—with respect to the presence of the
signal—from a negative response is the cutscore, 𝑥𝑐. Given 𝑥𝑐, the area under the noise
distribution to the right of 𝑥𝑐 represents the probability of a false alarm (i.e., the false alarm
rate); the area under the signal distribution to the left of 𝑥𝑐 represents the probability of a
miss (i.e., 1 − hit rate). Another detail gathered from 𝑥𝑐 is the density (or height) of the
two distributions corresponding to 𝑥𝑐. These two densities represent the likelihoods of signal
(the height of the signal distribution at 𝑥𝑐) and noise (the height of the noise distribution
at 𝑥𝑐). The response bias of the test, 𝛽, is the ratio of these two: signal likelihood/noise likelihood.
If 𝛽 > 1, the diagnostic test favors (i.e., is biased toward) a positive decision (stating that
the signal is present) over a negative one (stating that the signal is absent); if 𝛽 < 1, the
diagnostic test favors a negative decision over a positive one; if 𝛽 = 1, there is no response
bias as neither decision is favored over the other. Another way of thinking about 𝛽 is that
when an observation 𝑥 is greater than 𝑥𝑐, then the ratio of the two likelihoods at the point
𝑥 is greater than 𝛽.
More realistically, the two distributions can differ not only in their means but in
variances as well. Furthermore, the prior probability of the noise distribution is not likely
to be equal to the prior for the signal distribution.
ROC Plots.
There are numerous (possibly infinitely many) different choices for a cutscore, 𝑥𝑐. At
each cutscore, we have a unique hit and false alarm rate and this can be plotted in a two-
dimensional plot with the hit rate (often labeled sensitivity or true positive rate) along the
vertical axis and false alarm rate (often labeled 1−specificity or false positive rate) along the
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Figure 1.3: Two normal distributions representing the distribution of the signal (right) and
the noise (left).
horizontal axis. This plot is referred to as a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
(see Figure 1.4).
The minimum along each axis is 0; the maximum is 1. The point (0, 0) corresponds
to hit and false alarm rates of 0; that is, a cutscore larger than any attainable score. This
is equivalent to stating that the signal is always absent. The other extreme is at (1, 1)
and corresponds to hit and false alarm rates of 1; that is, it is representative of a cutscore
that is smaller than any attainable score. In this situation the signal is always stated to be
present. Neither of the two extreme situations are useful—a diagnostic test is unnecessary
if we are consistently predicting one way or the other. What is of interest are the values
in between that correspond to meaningful cutscores. By moving along the curve one can
choose a cutscore corresponding to different hit and false alarm rates.
A 45∘ line is often placed on the plot, running from the point (0, 0) to (1, 1). This
line is called the line of no discrimination and represents a diagnostic test performing no
better than chance; ideally all points on the ROC curve are above this line. The discrim-
inability index, 𝑑′, is represented by the distance of the curve to the line of discrimination;
specifically, it is the orthogonal distance measured at the point (.5, .5) to the curve. As the
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Figure 1.4: A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot. The points along the curve repre-
sent the different hit and false positive rate combinations achieved using different cutscores.
The shaded green area represents the area under the curve.
two distributions are further spread apart, this distance becomes larger.
As a measure of diagnostic accuracy, the area under the ROC curve (AUC; also called
the concordance index ) is commonly used. The total area ranges from 0 to 1; however, an
AUC less than .50 is infrequently found because it represents a test that performs worse
than chance. The AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected
individual who has “it” will have a larger score on the diagnostic test than a randomly
selected individual who does not have “it.” There are ways to test whether two ROC curves
are different from each other (e.g., whether one diagnostic test outperforms another), or
when an ROC curve is different from a diagnostic test that is no better than chance (i.e.,
an ROC curve equal to the line of no discrimination). A final point is that the ROC curve
is independent of the base rates; this will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
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1.1.4 Decision Trees
Decision trees, commonly referred to as Classification and Regression Trees (CART;
Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984), are popular machine learning techniques gen-
erally used for prediction; decision trees have been constructed by several researchers as an
actuarial tool for predicting violent and dangerous behavior (e.g., see Steadman et al., 2000).
Consider an 𝑛 × 𝑝 data matrix, X, containing 𝑛 observations measured across 𝑝
predictor variables, and an 𝑛×1 vector y containing 𝑛 observations measured across a single
outcome variable, 𝑌 . The outcome variable contained in y is the variable of interest with
respect to prediction. If the outcome variable is continuous, regression trees are constructed;
if the variable is categorical, classification trees are constructed. In violence prediction, the
outcome variable is typically binary (i.e., categorical) representing the presence or absence
of an act of violence; because of this specification, our focus is solely on classification trees.
Classification trees are constructed by first splitting the data into two disjoint subsets
based on one of the 𝑝 predictor variables. Within each subset, further partitioning of the
data is done, and within the resulting subsets this process continues until some user-specified
stopping criterion is reached; the complete procedure is known as recursive partitioning. An
observation that falls into a subset with no further splits (called a terminal node) is classified
based on all the observations within that subset; typically this is the modal observation (i.e.,
the most prevalent outcome within the node).
The first split occurs at the root node of the tree; extending branches from the root
node lead to subsample nodes, called leafs. As mentioned, the splits continue until a specified
criterion is met, such as constraining the minimum number of observations in a given leaf or
based on significance testing (e.g., AID; see below). After a tree is created, it can be pruned
to reduce the number of branches, eliminating those that add less to the tree’s predictive
ability.
Given 𝐾 classes for the outcome variable 𝑌 , we can split the data into two groups
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based on the classes. The total number of possible splits is 2𝐾−1− 1. For a binary outcome,
this is equal to one unique split of the data. In regards to predicting violent behavior, there
are those who were violent and those who were not. A perfect split based on the 𝑝 predictors
classifies all those who are violent as violent and those who are not violent as nonviolent.
The goal is to come as close to a perfect split as possible.
There are several ways to measure a “best” fitting tree, one being the Gini index
(Gini, 1912). Given 𝐾 classes, the Gini index for the two groups is defined by the proportion
of the group coming from the 𝐾 classes. Let 𝑟𝑘, 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾, represent the proportion in
the group from the 𝑘th class. The Gini index is
𝐺 =
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑘(1− 𝑟𝑘) = 1−
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑟2𝑘.
The Gini index can be thought of as a measure of impurity. Note that if 𝑟𝑘 = 1, 𝑟𝑘′ = 0
for 𝑘′ ̸= 𝑘 and consequently, 𝐺 = 0. If 𝑟1 = · · · = 𝑟𝐾 = 1/𝐾, the index is maximal at
𝐺 = 1− 1/𝐾. Because there are only two groups, the Gini index is the same for both groups.
Decision trees are popular because they are easy to interpret, but they are not the
most powerful machine learning method in terms of predictive accuracy. Predictive accu-
racy can be enhanced by ensemble methods such as tree bagging, tree boosting, and random
subspace methods (i.e., random forests). Random forests are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Automatic Interaction Detection (AID).
Morgan and Sonquist (1963) proposed an algorithm designed to partition a sample
into disjoint subsamples where the means within the subsample groups explain more of
the variation than any other subsample. This method is known as automatic interaction
detection, or AID, and can be used to construct decision trees; at each level an optimal split
is found for a given variable among samples/subsamples in terms of variance-accounted-for.
If the outcome is binary, this involves splitting the sample into two subsamples such that
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each subsample is optimal in terms of misclassification. The splitting continues within each
subsample until an optimal split is not possible or a constraint is no longer met (e.g., a
minimum number of observations in a subsample).
One of the more popular AID techniques is the Chi-Squared AID, or CHAID (Kass,
1980). The CHAID algorithm selects predictor variables that yield the most significant split,
typically determined by a Bonferonni-adjusted 𝑝-value obtained using Pearson’s chi-squared
test (Pearson, 1900b), assuming the outcome variable is categorical. This is carried out until
no significant splits remain, using an a priori threshold set by the user (typically 𝑝 < .05).
1.2 Actuarial Tools
There are two actuarial tools given considerable focus in the subsequent chapters.
One is the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) to assess dangerousness; the second is
the Static-99 and Static-2002 for predicting sexual and violent recidivism.
1.2.1 The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR)
The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR; Monahan et al., 2006) is an assessment
tool developed from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS). The COVR is
a computer-implemented instrument designed to estimate the risk of violence in psychiatric
patients; given the appropriate credentials, it is available for purchase from Psychological
Assessment Resources (PAR; http://www4.parinc.com). The COVR assigns patients
into five risk groups defined by the “likelihood that the patient will commit a violent act
toward another person in the next several months” (Monahan et al., 2006, p. 728). Table 1.3
gives the five risk groups defined by their best point risk estimates and their 95% confidence
intervals.
The development of the COVR is detailed in Monahan et al. (2001; also see Steadman
et al., 2000, Monahan et al., 2000, and Banks et al., 2004 for less detailed reviews). The
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Category Risk Point Estimate 95% CI
5 Very High .76 [.65, .86]
4 High .56 [.46, .65]
3 Average .26 [.20, .32]
2 Low .08 [.05, .11]
1 Very Low .01 [.00, .02]
Table 1.3: The five risk categories for the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) diagnostic
test along with point estimate risks (in probabilities) and respective confidence intervals (CI)
(Monahan et al., 2006).
COVR was based on a sample of 939 recently-discharged patients from acute inpatient
psychiatric facilities in three locations within the United States: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Kansas City, Missouri; and Worcester, Massachusetts. Patients were restricted to those who
were white, African-American, or Hispanic; English-speaking; between the ages of 18–40;
and charted as having thought, personality, or affective disorder, or engaged in substance
abuse.
According to the original MacArthur study (Monahan et al., 2001), violence is defined
as “acts of battery that resulted in physical injury; sexual assaults; assaultive acts that
involved the use of a weapon; or threats made with a weapon” (p. 17). A second category
of violent incidents was labeled as “other aggressive acts” (Monahan et al., 2001, p. 17)
including non-injurious battery; verbal threats were not considered. The outcome variable
of violence is a dichotomous variable—either the patient committed an act of violence or
did not. It does not consider the number of violent acts or their severity. The patients were
interviewed once or twice during the twenty weeks after discharge. Of the 939 patients, 176
were considered violent; thus, the base rate for violence in this sample is 18.7 percent.
The authors identified 134 potential risk factors, listed in detail in Monahan et al.
(2001, Appendix C). Using SPSS’s CHAID algorithm (SPSS, 1993), the authors developed
a classification tree based on the given risk factors. The final classification model used an
iterative classification tree (ICT) approach; after an initial classification tree was developed,
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those who were still unclassified (i.e., those within .09 to .37 estimated probabilities of com-
mitting violence according to the model) were reanalyzed using the CHAID algorithm. After
four iterations, 462 patients were classified as low risk (less than .09 probability of commit-
ting violence), 257 were classified as high risk (greater than .37 probability of committing
violence), and 220 remained unclassified. The cutoffs of .09 and .37 were chosen because
they represent, respectively, one half and twice the base rate of violence in the sample.
The authors’ goal was to create an actuarial tool that was “clinically feasible”; thus, it
included only those risk factors that could easily be computed, eliminating 28 of the original
134 risk factors that “would be the most difficult to obtain in clinical practice” (Monahan
et al., 2001, p. 108) as determined by the length of the instrument measuring the risk factor
(more than twelve items was considered too long) or if the risk factor was not readily or
easily available to mental health professionals. After doing so, the same ICT method was
applied to the 106 remaining risk factors using three iterations.
The correlation between the predictions made by the clinically-feasible and original
ICT models was .52. The authors noted the low correlation:
The fact that these [two] prediction models are comparably associated with the
criterion measure, violence (as indicated by the ROC analysis), but only modestly
associated with each other [as indicated by the correlation coefficient], suggested to
us that each model taps into an important, but different, interactive process that
relates to violence. (p. 117)
The authors then constructed nine additional ICT models using the 106 clinically-feasible
variables; for each of the nine trees the authors “forced a different initial variable” (p.
118; i.e., the root node for each of the ten trees was distinct). The ten models led to ten
classifications for each individual (high, average, or low) and each individual was assigned
a score corresponding to their risk level (1, 0, or −1, respectively); the scores were then
summed to create a composite score ranging from −10 to 10. The authors remarked, “As
two models predict violence better than one, so ten models predict violence better than two
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(i.e., the area under the ROC curve was .88 for ten models compared to .83 for two models)”
(p. 122).
The authors questioned whether ten models were necessary; to determine this empiri-
cally they performed stepwise logistic regression and concluded that only five of the ten were
needed, leading to composite scores ranging from −5 to 5 (the area under the ROC curve
remained the same). The composite scores were divided into five distinct groups based on
the following ranges: [−5,−3], [−2,−1], [0, 1], [2, 3], and [4, 5] (these five groups correspond
to, respectively, the very-low, low, average, high, and very-high risk groups found in Ta-
ble 1.3; the probabilities represent the proportion of those violent within each group). The
authors did not cross-validate their model; they did, however, use bootstrapping to estimate
the confidence intervals provided in Table 1.3.
1.2.2 Static-99 & Static-2002
The Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 2000) is an actuarial assessment tool for esti-
mating the long-term risk of recidivism among male sexual offenders over the age of 18.
According to its website (www.static99.org), the Static-99 “is the most widely used
sex offender risk assessment in the world” (Static-99, 2013). The Static-99 is comprised of
two other risk assessment measures: the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offense Recidivism
(RRASOR; Hanson, 1997) and Thornton’s Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement scale
(SAC-J; Grubin, 1998). The Static-99 consists of ten items, nine items are dichotomous, one
is polytomous; the items are summarized in Appendix B. The scores across the ten items are
summed, with the patient falling into one of four categories based on total score: high (6+),
medium-high (4–5), medium-low (2–3), or low (0–1). The authors used survival analysis to
estimate the recidivism rates after 5, 10, and 15 years.
In 2003, Hanson and Karl developed the Static-2002, a revised version of the Static-99
developed for “increased coherence and conceptual clarity [and to] . . . improve the consis-
tency of the scoring criteria” (p. 1). According to the authors, the Static-2002 has a “level of
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predictive accuracy . . . similar [to the Static-99]” and “predicted any violent recidivism as
well as it predicted sexual recidivism, and predicted violent recidivism better than Static-99”
(Hanson & Karl, 2003, p. 17). Note that predictive accuracies are being measured by ROC
values (see Chapter 4). The coding for the Static-2002 can be found in Appendix B; the
maximum score is 14.
1.3 Road Map
1.3.1 Chapter 2: A History of Violence Prediction
Violence is wide-spread in American culture; it is a common theme in popular tele-
vision programming, movies, music, video games, and various media outlets. Dangerous
behavior and violent acts are usually the “newsworthy” stories and often take precedence
over less exciting but arguably more important topics. Because violence plays such a sig-
nificant role in our society, it is natural to want to predict dangerous behavior. Chapter 2
explores the history of violence prediction, particularly focusing on the use of actuarial
methods to do so. Statistical methods are commonly used in the judicial system and have
been developed to predict parole violations, juvenile delinquency, future dangerous behavior,
violent and sexual recidivism, and more recently, future crime in general.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: It’s All About the Base Rates
Some fifty years ago, Meehl and Rosen (1955) stated a condition under which a
diagnostic test would be “clinically efficient.” As they defined it, clinical efficiency refers to
a situation where prediction by a diagnostic test is better than prediction using only the
raw base rates. Although cited extensively, the actual importance of the Meehl and Rosen
condition for deciding on when to use a diagnostic instrument seems generally ignored in
the literature. Chapter 3 reviews the Meehl and Rosen condition and offers two equivalent
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others attributed to Dawes (1962) and Bokhari and Hubert (introduced in the chapter). The
relationships are developed between those various equivalent conditions for clinical efficiency
and several measures of association in a 2×2 contingency table (e.g., the Goodman-Kruskal
lambda coefficient, the odds ratio, and relative risk). Data collected in attempts to predict
dangerous behavior, such as the Classification of Violence Risk (Monahan et al., 2001), are
provided as illustrative examples.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Hiding Behind the AUC
The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) is a widely-
used measure for assessing diagnostic test performance. Despite this popularity, the AUC
is not a good measure of a test’s overall performance when applied to populations having
differing base rates for the characteristic being assessed. Chapter 4 presents several reasons
and accompanying illustrative examples in violence prediction as to why the AUC measure is
subject to bias and is a misleading indicator of clinical efficiency. As an alternative measure
of a test’s performance, we suggest the use of the positive and negative predictive values;
these incorporate base rate information and indicate whether a test will actually outperform
base-rate prediction.
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Lack of Cross-Validation
Cross-validation is an important aspect in building predictive models but it is com-
monly ignored. Chapter 5 discusses some general methods for cross-validation and its impor-
tance. Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (Monahan et al., 2001)
are used to develop logistic regression, linear discriminant, and decision tree models based
on cross-validation methods. The results are compared to the non-cross-validated results
presented in Monahan et al. (2001).
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1.3.5 Chapter 6: The Variance-Bias Trade-off
Chapter 6 looks at the variance-bias trade-off in prediction. The complexity of predic-
tive models determines the amount of variance associated with the model as well as its bias.
The variance-bias trade-off is called as such because bias generally increases as the variance
decreases. This phenomenon has major implications for the prediction in new samples, gen-
erally resulting in reduced accuracy or goodness-of-fit measures. Shrinkage estimators, such
as the Kelley’s True Score estimator (Kelley, 1923) or the James-Stein estimator (W. James
& Stein, 1961), will reduce the error associated with prediction, but at the cost of increasing
the bias.
1.3.6 Chapter 7: An Overview of Violence Prediction
Chapter 7 reviews several studies of violence prediction, and summarizes the different
diagnostic tools and their failure to predict violence with clinical efficiency. The chapter
examines the Classification of Violence Risk (Monahan et al., 2001) and Static-99 and Static-
2002 actuarial tools. The actuarial methods fail to meet the criterion for clinical efficiency
and thus we caution against their use in practice.
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Chapter 2
A History of Violence Prediction
“Violence does even justice unjustly.”
— Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present
Predicting violent and dangerous behavior has long been a part of American so-
ciety, and the methods, consequences, and ethical dilemmas associated with such
predictions are often cause of much debate. This chapter chronicles the history of
predicting violent and dangerous behavior. Particular focus is given to predictions
using actuarial methods, from Burgess expectancy tables and Glueck predictive ta-
bles to the Classification of Violence Risk and the Violence Risk Assessment Guide
to police jurisdictions predicting crime before it happens.
2.1 Introduction
On December 14, 2012, tragedy struck Newtown, a small Western Connecticut town.
Adam Lanza, a 20-year-old man, shot through the glass door of Sandy Hook Elementary
School after earlier killing his mother (S. Gray, 2012). Upon entering the school around
9:30 a.m. local time (Bryan, 2012), he proceeded to murder 20 school children and six
staff members of the school in a short period of time before eventually taking his own life
(Candiotti & Aarthun, 2012). The shooting was the second deadliest in the history of the
United States (behind the 32 Virginia Tech killings in 2007; Bratu, 2012).
In the previous decade, Newtown had one reported homicide (Candiotti & Aarthun,
2012); residents could not believe that such a devastating event would occur in their town
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with a population just under 30,000. Yet it did, and Newtown is not the only such place
to suffer from such a tragic event. As argued by Newman, Fox, Roth, Mehta, and Harding
(2005), the roots of rampage school violence are embedded within the communities in which
they occur. The authors define rampage shootings as shootings that “involve attacks on
multiple parties, selected almost at random” (p. 15). They argue toward preventive measures
aside from profiling and prediction, noting that “[t]he U.S. Secret Service determined that
it is impossible to profile school shooters . . . [e]ven when the cases are limited to rampage
school shootings, there is still too much diversity among them to predict which students
could become rampage shooters” (p. 268).
The mental health of Adam Lanza immediately came into question after the Newtown
shootings. It was reported that Lanza was diagnosed with sensory integration disorder (SID)
when he was a young boy and dubiously noted that “[t]here is no known link between SID and
violent behavior” (Breslow, 2013). SID, which is not recognized in the current Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013), is
marked by increased or decreased stimuli sensitivity.
On the day of the Newtown shooting, a Boise, Idaho blogger named Liza Long (a.k.a.,
“The Anarchist Soccer Mom”) wrote an article entitled Thinking the Unthinkable (Long,
2012). In her blog post, she discusses the difficulties of raising a mentally-ill 13 year-old
son who “terrifies” her. In the emotional article, she recalls a few weeks earlier when her
son threatened her with a knife and how her 7 and 9 year old children “knew the safety
plan” (run to the car and lock the doors). Her son is on numerous medication plans (e.g.,
antipsychotics), but as Long explains, she “still [doesn’t] know what’s wrong with [him].”
Her son displays an exceptional ability for mathematics and science and has an IQ that is
“off the charts.” Long states that her gifted son is in a good mood most of time, but “when
he’s not, watch out” and that it is “impossible to predict what will set him off.” Long shares
many details of her son’s episodic fits of rage and expresses her desire for help. She even
states “I am Adam Lanza’s mother,” implying that her son may be the next Adam Lanza.
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This quote quickly became viral in the Internet media. Her message is simple and she states
it explicitly: “it’s time to talk about mental illness.”
The social worker for Miss Long’s son provided an option to alleviate the fear she
lives in: “get [her son] charged with a crime.” Long quotes her son’s social worker: “If he’s
back in the system, they’ll create a paper trail. That’s the only way you’re ever going to
get anything done. No one will pay attention to you unless you’ve got charges.” Torrey,
Kennard, Eslinger, Lamb, and Pavle (2010) found that in the United States, there are three
times more mentally-ill persons in jails and prisons than in hospitals, with some states
(Arizona and Nevada) having a ratio of near ten to one. The United States Department of
Justice reported in 2006 that “more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental
health problem” (D. J. James & Glaze, 2006, p. 1). Liza Long’s son’s social worker and the
numbers cited point to a disconcerting belief that mental illness implies criminality. Miss
Long states that she does not want or feel her son should be locked away in prison; she
follows this sentiment with: “our society, with its stigma on mental illness and its broken
healthcare system, does not provide us with other options.”
Three days after the Newtown shooting and Liza Long’s blog post, the women’s
lifestyle website xoJane printed an anonymously-written article entitled “I am Adam Lanza’s
psychiatrist” (2012). The author notes that the field of psychiatry suffers from numerous
limitations in predicting violence from mental illness. The author asks, given a “ticking time
bomb” patient, “At what point [does the author] inform the authorities when no specific
plans to commit violence are mentioned to me, but the words start to become more terror-
inducing.” On January 15, 2013, legislators from New York State signed into law the New
York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) Act in an attempt to answer
that question. According to the SAFE Act, “mental health professionals [are required]
to report to their local director of community services or his/her designees when, in their
reasonable professional judgment, one of their patients is ‘likely to engage in conduct that
would result in serious harm to self or others’ ” (New York State, 2013). In other words, the
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State of New York now requires its mental health professionals to predict violence in their
patients.
2.2 Clinical Prediction
In 1915, the Los Angeles commanding sergeant of the Police Juvenile Bureau, Leo
Marden, conjectured a cause for crime. The Independent (1915) reports Marden “has made
careful study of the matter of juvenile crime”; continuing,
“By keeping an exhaustive record of such matters,” says Mr. Marden, “I find that
over ninety per cent of the boys under twenty-one years of age who are arrested
and brought to my office are cigaret smokers. The prisoners are almost without
exception stunted in growth and under-developed in mind. Therefore, cigarets must
[emphasis added] have something to do with crime, and it is my idea to treat the
cause of crime.” (p. 231).
2.2.1 Capital Punishment
Predictions of dangerousness1 by psychiatrists or other experts, henceforth referred to
as clinical predictions, were, and to some extent still are, an integral part of the legal system.
In the state of Texas the death penalty is imposed only after the defendant is found guilty of
a crime that warrants capital punishment (for the specific “qualifications” of Texas and all
other States that allow the death penalty, see http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/).
The State of Texas requires that, after the jury has determined beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a separate trial phase occurs where the jurors must determine
whether the defendant will receive the death penalty or life in prison without parole. In this
punishment phase, the jury must unanimously decide “whether there is a probability that the
1Megargee [1976] argues a more appropriate term instead of “dangerousness” is “dangerous behavior,”
as dangerousness implies the existence of an innate, rather than acquired, characteristic of an individual.
Although we agree, we will generally use the more common, albeit less appropriate, term dangerousness.
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defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society” (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 2013), where “society” includes the prison
society (i.e., guards and other inmates; Texas Defender Service, 2004; see also Estrada v.
State, 2010). In other words, the State of Texas requires that the jury predict dangerousness
in convicted criminals.
The constitutionality of Texas’s sentencing procedures was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas (1976). Justice John Paul Stevens stated in his
opinion,
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a determina-
tion is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction
of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant
to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction of the defendant’s
future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s
probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what pun-
ishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be
made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering
the statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice. (pp.
274–276)
This is a daunting task assigned to twelve laypersons, plus research has shown that capital
murder defendants may not be anymore a threat to prison society as any other prisoner (e.g.,
Sorensen & Pilgrim, 1999; Reidy, Cunningham, & Sorensen, 2001).
Typically, the jurors will have the help of an “expert” witness. In 1981, The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held,
Texas may not use evidence based on a psychiatric examination of the defendant
unless the defendant was warned, before the examination, that he had a right to
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remain silent; was allowed to terminate the examination when he wished; and was
assisted by counsel in deciding whether to submit to the examination. (Estelle v.
Smith, 1981, p. 461)
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled that psychiatrists are competent to give
their opinion on whether a defendant will commit crimes in the future or is a danger to the
community: “The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect
to a defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel”
(Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983, p. 896). The Court cited the Jurek ruling in its defense of clinical
predictions of dangerousness, saying,
[I]f it is not impossible for even a layperson sensibly to arrive at that conclusion,
it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe
of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the
subject that they should not be permitted to testify. (pp. 896–897)
But as Faigman et al. (2013) point out, the ruling assumes the Jurek decision was correct
in determining laypersons’ ability to predict violence and that experts are on the “same
constitutional plain” (p. 122). Furthermore, the Barefoot ruling was despite the American
Psychiatric Association’s amicus curiae brief:
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning the long-term
future dangerousness of a defendant in a capital case, at least in those circumstances
where the psychiatrist purports to be testifying as a medical expert possessing pre-
dictive expertise in this area. Although psychiatric assessments may permit short-
term predictions of violent or assaultive behavior, medical knowledge has simply
not advanced to the point where long-term predictions—the type of testimony at
issue in this case—may be made with even reasonable accuracy. The large body of
research in this area indicates that, even under the best of conditions, psychiatric
predictions of long-term future dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every
three cases. (p. 3)
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Dershowitz (1967) discusses the “the social costs incurred by the increasing involve-
ment of the psychiatrist in the administration of justice” (p. 370). As he recounts,
My own conversations with psychiatrists reveal wide differences in opinion over
what sorts of harms justify incarceration. As one would expect, some psychiatrists
are political conservatives while others are liberals; some place a greater premium
on safety, others on liberty. Their opinions about which harms do, and which do
not, justify confinement probably cover the range of opinions one would expect to
encounter in any educated segment of the public. But they are opinions about
matters which each of us is as qualified to make as they are. (p. 374)
One of the most infamous psychiatrists involved in predicting future dangerousness
was Dr. James Grigson, otherwise known as “Dr. Death.” Dr. Grigson, an “expert” witness
for the prosecution in both Smith and Barefoot, was a forensic psychiatrist practicing in
Texas and was notorious for his willingness to take the stand for the prosecution in capital
punishment trials and predicting whether the recently convicted defendant was dangerous.
Dr. Grigson claimed he could “predict with 100 per cent certainty that the individuals
would engage in future violent acts” (Biel, 1995). Dr. Grigson testified in over 150 capital
murder trials, typically testifying for the side of the prosecution (i.e., supporting the death
penalty). In 1995, Dr. Grigson was expelled from the American Psychiatric Association
and the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians for “alleged ethics violations” (Biel, 1995).
Often, Dr. Grigson’s opinions were given without interviewing the defendant; instead they
came in the form of responses to hypothetical scenarios. The documentary film The Thin
Blue Line (Lipson & Morris, 1988) is about a man named Randall Dale Adams who was
wrongly convicted of the murder of a Texas police officer. After the release of the film, which
included a confession from David Harris, Adams was released after spending twelve years in
prison. Dr. James Grigson served as an expert witness on Adams’ trial and predicted Adams
would kill again (Rosenbaum, 1990). Despite being exonerated a year earlier, Rosenbaum
reported that
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[Grigson] told me that, despite everything, he still [original emphasis] has no doubt
about it: the . . . confession by [David Harris] was a sham . . . [Grigson later] testified
not only that he believed Randall Dale Adams did the killing, but that he was certain
Adams “will kill again.” (p. 166)
Adams lived a quiet life until his death in 2010 (Martin, 2011).
Dr. Richard Coons is another notable Texas psychiatrist who testified in more than
50 capital murder trials (Kreytak, 2010). Like Dr. Grigson, Dr. Coons’s paid testimonies
provided the courts with “expert” opinion on the matter of future dangerousness for recently
convicted murderers facing the death penalty. Also like Dr. Grigson, Dr. Coons sided with
the prosecution more often than not. In 2010, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled
that Coons’s predictions of future dangerousness were not reliable (Kreytak, 2010). In
Coble v. State (2010), Dr. Coons “forthrightly stated that ‘he does it his way’ with his
own methodology and has never gone back to see whether his prior predictions of future
dangerousness have, in fact, been accurate” (p. 279). In Espada v. State (2008) he testified,
[H]e did not know his rate of error; . . . his opinion regarding a defendant’s future
dangerousness was ultimately based on his professional training and experience; . . .
his methodology was not based on any specific scientific study; . . . it is impossible
to conduct accurate scientific research regarding capital defendants’ future danger-
ousness because such defendants “go to death row”; . . . [and] it is impossible to
“get the same level of hard data reliability [about future dangerousness] that you
can [get] in [the] hard sciences.”
Regarding the admissibility of Dr. Coons’s testimony, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
said,
[W]e discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its admission
of Coons’s testimony. Given the arguments, information, and evidence before the
trial court at the time it ruled, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
psychiatry was a legitimate field of expertise, that predicting future dangerousness
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was within the scope of psychiatry, and that Coons’s testimony would properly
rely upon the principles involved in psychiatry. Coons testified that he was an
experienced psychiatrist, that psychiatrists are called upon to make predictions of
future dangerousness “all the time,” and that they do so utilizing such factors as he
set forth. . . . The fact that Coons did not know his rate of error is not dispositive.
(Espada v. State, 2008)
Reid (2001) summarizes his point well in commenting on psychiatrists providing ex-
pert testimony in capital punishment cases:
There are lots of appropriate places in which to voice one’s opinions about social,
moral, or political aspects of the death penalty, but if one has been asked to give
psychiatric expert testimony, concerning psychiatric characteristics of a defendant
or other people, the courtroom is not one of them. (p. 216–217)
2.2.2 “Operation Baxstrom”
In 1961, a New York convict named Johnnie Baxstrom, while in prison, was certified
as insane by a prison physician and shortly thereafter transferred to Dannemora State Hos-
pital for criminals with mental illnesses. After serving out his prison sentence, a petition
requesting that he be civilly committed was granted. Baxstrom was denied transfer to a
civil mental hospital and was kept at Dannemora without a jury review, denying him equal
protection of the law. In 1966, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Mr. Baxstrom
was “entitled to a hearing under the procedure granted all others by . . . the New York Men-
tal Hygiene Law to determine whether he is so dangerously mentally ill that he must remain
in a hospital maintained by the Department of Correction” (Baxstrom v. Herold , 1966, p.
383). (For a thorough description of the life of Johnnie Baxstrom and the trial proceedings,
see Steadman & Cocozza, 1974.)
Over a six month period following the Supreme Court ruling in Baxstrom v. Herold
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(1966), “Operation Baxstrom,” as it was called,2 involved the transfer of slightly less than
1000 patients from the Department of Correction to Department of Mental Hygiene institu-
tions (Hunt & Wiley, 1968). Cocozza and Steadman (1975; see also Steadman & Cocozza,
1974) followed 967 of the patients, all deemed dangerous, and observed that only 26 of
them “exhibited sufficiently violent behavior” that “justif[ied] their return to hospitals for
the criminally insane” (Cocozza & Steadman, 1975, p. 1093). Of the 98 patients that were
released into the community, only two reported cases were offenses the authors considered
to be dangerous (Cocozza & Steadman, 1975). The results of their study led the authors
to conclude the “inability of psychiatrists to accurately predict dangerousness” (Cocozza &
Steadman, 1975, p. 1093).
Using clinical diagnoses, Kozol, Boucher, and Garofalo (1972) determined that “dan-
gerousness [could] be reliably diagnosed” (p. 392). The authors, in summarizing dangerous
clinical diagnoses state,
The diagnosis of dangerousness is based on inquiry and examinations that exten-
sively pursue areas of concern not fully dealt with in routine psychiatric assessment.
There are no rigid criteria of dangerousness; there are only clues gleaned from a
meticulous inquiry into multiple aspects of the personality. We have developed
these clues out of painstaking years of trial and error, in the course of which we
have developed frames of reference for investigation of the personality. Out of these
investigations emerges our clinical prediction [original emphasis] as to the patient’s
future behavior. (p. 383)
Monahan (1973) noted that 65% of the patients Kozol et al. (1972) predicted as dangerous
were not dangerous:
When an extraordinarily thorough clinical examination by at least five mental health
professionals combined with an extensive social history and psychological test bat-
2In a memo on June 24, 1966, from Robert C. Hunt, MD., Assistant Commissioner, N.Y. State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene
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tery is inaccurate in two out of every three predictions of dangerousness, one cannot
conclude that ‘reliable diagnosis’ of dangerousness has been achieved. (p. 419)
Clinical (expert) prediction, which is based on memory, “gut” feelings, intuition,
personal judgment, and the like, should not be used for assessing and predicting future
dangerousness when actuarial methods are available; there is more than enough evidence
to support the notion that clinical prediction is inferior to or, at best, no worse than sta-
tistical prediction (e.g., Sarbin, 1943; Meehl, 1954; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 1979;
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Ægisdo´ttir et
al., 2006; with respect to predicting criminal behavior, see R. E. Thompson, 1952; Glaser,
1955; J. S. Carroll, Wiener, Coates, Galegher, & Alibrio, 1982; Holland, Holt, Levi, & Beck-
ett, 1983; Mossman, 1994a; Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1996a; G. T. Harris, Rice, &
Cormier, 2002; McMillan, Hastings, & Coldwell, 2004; Hilton, Harris, & Rice, 2006). As
Dawes (1986) says, “The fact that two dimensions are correlated in nature . . . does not
imply that they are not psychologically independent and distinct for the perceiver or judge”
(p. 14).
2.3 Statistical Prediction
Statistical (actuarial, mechanical) prediction eliminates the human judgment compo-
nent; predictions are based on empirically-informed relationships. Although some early pa-
pers focused on the relationship of intelligence and juvenile delinquency (Pintner & Reamer,
1918; Clark, 1920), statistical prediction in the legal/penal system really began by attempt-
ing to predict parole violations (Warner, 1923). In critiquing Warner’s research, H. Hart
(1923) put the author’s results through rigorous analyses (statistical significance testing)
while simultaneous laying the statistical framework for which parole prediction should be
analyzed.
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2.3.1 Burgess Method
Burgess (1928) was one of the first to suggest that empirical evidence should be
constructed and used in parole decision making. Burgess proposed 12 significant factors
to be used in predicting parole violations: type of offense, parental and marital status,
criminal type, social type, community factors, statement of trial judge and prosecuting
attorney, previous criminal record, work record previous to commitment, punishment record
in institution, intelligence rating, psychiatric personality type, and psychiatric prognosis.
He also noted the parole violation rate associated with the factors and examined how the
factors “might be combined so as to give more certainty of predictability than any factor
taken separately” (p. 247). This led to 21 factors on which a parole-eligible man would be
graded and compared to the average case, in turn leading to probabilities of failing parole;
the higher the score, the less likely to violate parole. These were charted in an “expectancy”
table; as Burgess states, “The prediction would not be absolute in any given case, but,
according to the law of averages, would apply to any considerable number of cases” (p. 246).
He also warns, “Although statistical prediction is feasible on the basis of data now accessible,
exclusive reliance should not be placed on this method” (p. 249). Tibbitts (1931), similar
to Burgess (1928), examined what factors could be used in predicting parole violations,
including several more factors (23 total) and three times the sample size (𝑁 = 3, 000).
Tibbitts (1931) concludes that methods for predicting parole violation “should enable the
work of parole administration to be placed on a scientific basis” (p. 49).
In his article Prediction of Criminality, Hakeem (1945) provides an extensive bib-
liography of prediction of criminality, a list that includes over 60 journal articles, books,
unpublished manuscripts, and technical reports. Just 17 years after Burgess’ paper, it was
clear that “considerable attention ha[d] been given to the problem of the application of pre-
diction techniques to criminological data and more especially to the possibility of predicting
success or failure on parole” (Hakeem, 1945, p. 31). By the 1940s, one state, Illinois, was
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using actuarial methods in its penal system (Hakeem, 1945).
Although much of the research discusses the numerous factors that may be associated
with delinquency or parole violations and encourages the use of predictive measures (e.g.,
Lanne, 1935; Monachesi, 1939), others were skeptical. From the beginning, criticism has
followed the use of actuarial methods in predicting future behavior. S. A. Rice (1928)
questions the assumed static variables, focusing on the factors used by Burgess (1928), and
also questions Burgess’s factor selection method. In his paper, Huff (1936) provides an in-
depth examination of previous parole prediction studies “to determine their sufficiency as
revealed by [the scientific method]” (p. 207). The first issue posed by Huff was the differing
opinions regarding the time period for parole violations; in noting the inconsistent views
he asks, “How can we secure comparable results if we do not have a common measure
of success?” (p. 208). Huff also questions the reliability of the data gathered (i.e., the
factors associated with parole violations) as well as their validity. He next questions the
generalizability of the associated factors: “Are the norms suitable in terms of a group which
is unrepresentative of the general population at the time of classification, and which is a
member of the general population during the time of testing?” (p. 211). His third issue,
similar to an issue posed by S. A. Rice (1928), regards the static measures used: “It should
be inconceivable that a known unfavorable fact would be allowed to remain uncorrected or
at least unmodified” (p. 211). His fourth and final—and arguably most important—question
focuses on the replicability of results: “We think the premise that [previous results] will be
repeated is not sufficiently established by the data offered” (p. 211). Huff concludes,
Before we can believe parole prediction is a science, we will need to see existing
studies applied to new and controlled situations. Adequate data must be much
more inclusive than at present. . . . Efforts to do so are praiseworthy, but, to date,
are not convincing. (pp. 212–213)
These four questions, posed in 1936, are still relevant in the present research regarding
prediction of future behavior.
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2.3.2 The Glueck Method
Two influential figures in the use of actuarial methods during the mid-20th century
were Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. During their long careers at Harvard Law School, this
husband and wife pair wrote numerous books on crime and delinquency based on four lon-
gitudinal studies; one of the more notable was entitled Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency
(1950). Their study included a group of 500 delinquent and 500 non-delinquent white boys
aged 9–17; each boy from the delinquent group was matched to a boy in the non-delinquent
group with respect to age, general intelligence, national (ethnico-racial) background, and
residence in (Boston-area’s) underprivileged neighborhoods (Glueck & Glueck, 1950). As
they defined it,
[D]elinquency refers to repeated acts of a kind which when committed by persons
beyond statutory juvenile court age of sixteen are punishable as crimes . . . except
for a few instances of persistent stubbornness, truancy, running away, associating
with immoral persons, and the like. (p. 13)
Glueck and Glueck (1950) chose five factors of social background (herein referred to as
the Glueck Social Prediction Scale [SPS]) that “differentiate between boys who are potential
delinquents and those who are not” (p. 259): discipline of boy by father, supervision of boy
by mother, affection of father for boy, affection of mother for boy, and cohesiveness of family.
Each of these five factors had subcategories and associated “failure” scores (e.g., overstrict
or erratic discipline of boy by father was given a weighted failure score of 72.5). The failure
scores are to be summed across the five factors; the range of possible scores is 116.7–414.
Glueck and Glueck (1950) developed predictive tables from these failure scores, reducing the
blocks of scores from 7 to 4, 3, and 2 allowing the reader to use his or her choice of the
score ranges to determine a probability of delinquency. For the two-block prediction table,
a score of 250 represents the cutscore or discriminative point for prediction: Those with a
score of 250 or greater represent a greater likelihood of delinquency than those scoring below
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250. Glueck and Glueck (1968) developed two other prediction tables; one was based on
five character traits of the Rorschach test, the other on five personality traits derived in a
psychiatric interview. In addition, they combined the data gathered from the three tables
to create bivariate comparisons (based on low and high chance of potential delinquency) of
the three tables. In terms of practicality, the five social factors held a large advantage. The
authors emphasized their prediction tables “should not be used mechanically nor substitute
judgment . . . [t]hey are designed to aid the clinician in the always difficult task . . . of
individualization” (p. 269).
The Gluecks followed up their study when the boys approached age 25, and again
when they approached 31 (Glueck & Glueck, 1968). Of the 1000 boys, the Gluecks were able
to collect data on 880 of them (438 delinquents and 442 nondelinquents); their followup book,
Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective, details these 880 cases (Glueck & Glueck,
1968). The main goal of their research was to determine if delinquency in childhood led to
criminality in adulthood. Glueck and Glueck (1968) determined that most nondelinquent
boys continued to live their lives as law-abiding citizens and, although many of the delinquent
boys committed crimes in their adult life, the percentage who committed crimes before the
first follow-up time was far more than the percentage before the second follow up (77.4%
versus 51.8%). The authors conclude this reduction over time “suggests the important role
of delayed maturation [original emphasis] in the abandonment of major crime” (Glueck &
Glueck, 1968, p. 151). The notion that age and recidivism are closely related is still extremely
relevant in today’s research (e.g., Hanson, 2002; Lussier, Tzoumakis, Cale, & Amirault, 2010;
Helmus, Thornton, Hanson, & Babchishin, 2012); an age-related variable is almost always
found in actuarial models for recidivism and dangerousness.
Following the publication of Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, several attempts were
made to validate the Glueck SPS. R. E. Thompson (1952) used the Glueck SPS to predict
juvenile delinquency and, in addition, to compare these predictions to that of three experts
(one psychiatrist and two social workers). The data were obtained from the Cambridge-
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Somerville Youth Study (CSYS; see Powers & Witmer, 1951). The CSYS included 782 boys
all rated by the three experts on an 11-point scale, ranging from −5 to +5 where a negative
score represents a boy more likely to become delinquent (labeled as “difficult”); a positive
score reflects not becoming a delinquent (labeled “average”). Of the original 782 boys, 650
were matched based on several variables forming 325 pairs; within each pair, one boy was
assigned to a treatment group, the other to the control group. Thus, some of the average
boys were assigned to the treatment group and some of the difficult boys were not (for
further details, see Powers & Witmer, 1951). R. E. Thompson (1952) “randomly” (see p.
457) selected 100 cases to be rated by Eleanor Glueck and used in the validation study. The
Glueck SPS showed to be far superior than any of the three judges, correctly classifying 91
of the 100 boys (48 of 52 of those in the control group; 43 of 48 in the treatment group). A
prediction was made from all four sources (Glueck SPS and the three experts) for 77 of the
cases; the best expert prediction was correct in 67.5% of the cases compared to the 89.6%
accuracy of the Glueck SPS. In a second validation study, R. E. Thompson (1957) used
the Glueck SPS for fifty delinquent boys and fifty delinquent girls, and correctly classified
forty-six of the fifty boys and all fifty girls. In the previous study, 20% of the sample was
delinquent; here, 100% was.
Black and Glick (1952), around the same time as R. E. Thompson’s article, published
a monograph entitled Recidivism at the Hawthorne-Cedar Knolls School. The Hawthorne-
Cedar Knolls (HCK) school is located in Hawthorne, New York; in 1952, it served as a
treatment and rehabilitation center for troubled Jewish boys and girls. From a sample
of 100 boys discharged at least five years prior, the authors applied the Glueck SPS. (It
should be noted that the authors’ main purpose was to examine how well the treatment
at HCK performed; they used the Gluecks’ Recidivism Prediction Scale [RPS; Glueck &
Glueck, 1934], and predicted that all 100 boys had at least a 50% chance of recidivating, an
indication that the treatment was a success.) Of the 100 boys, 91 would have been predicted
to become a delinquents. Similar to R. E. Thompson (1957), the rate of delinquency in the
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sample was 100%.
Two items are worth noting for all three validation studies. First, in all the studies
the authors received some sort of consultation from the Gluecks. Second, all “predictions”
were, in reality, “postdictions”; that is, the classifications of the boys as likely delinquent
were made after the fact. In addition to the three studies discussed, the Gluecks Unraveling
Juvenile Delinquency data were reanalyzed, and mostly confirmed, almost forty years later
(Laub & Sampson, 1988).
The Gluecks were not without their critics, especially among the sociologists (Laub
& Sampson, 1991). Their biggest opponent was Edwin Sutherland, “widely acclaimed as
the dominant criminologist of the 20th century” (Laub & Sampson, 1991, p. 1402). In
a Sutherland review of their book Later Criminal Careers, he questions their data and
methods, stating that “[t]here was no psychiatric examination of the offenders, with a few
exceptions, during the second five-year period. The authors do not explain specifically how
they secured this second psychiatric classification” (Sutherland, 1937, p. 186). The validity
of some of their measures were also called into question (Hirschi & Selvin, 1967). One
common criticism of the Gluecks is their atheoretical approach to criminology (e.g., Reis,
1951; Laub & Sampson, 1991). A more scathing critique of the Gluecks’ Unraveling Juvenile
Delinquency was Reis (1951), noting their and others’ failure to validate their predictive
tables (this paper was published prior to R. E. Thompson [1952] and Black and Glick [1952]):
“empirical research and critical evaluation of the Gluecks’ work have not shown their tables
to yield valid prediction” (p. 118). Reis also notes the rate of delinquency in the Gluecks’
sample is exactly 50%: “Unless this is the actual rate in a similar population for which
predictions are made, the tables will yield very poor prediction” (p. 118). Reis considers
hypothetical results for the Glueck SPS applied to a sample with a more reasonable estimate
of delinquency, 10%, and the results are far less convincing.
Shortly after the Gluecks’ first published book, 500 Criminal Careers (Glueck &
Glueck, 1930), two studies (Vold, 1931; Monachesi, 1932) compared the two prominent pre-
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diction methods at the time: the Glueck’s and Burgess’s. Vold (1931) found the two methods
comparable, but notes Gluecks’ method is more tedious than Burgess’s. In another study,
Monachesi (1945) used Burgess’s method to predict outcome (failure/success) of juvenile
probation cases with reasonable success. Ohlin and Lawrence (1952) compare Burgess’s
method with the method proposed by Laune (1936) based on a questionnaire measuring
inmates’ attitudes, leading to mixed results.
Predictions of juvenile delinquency and parole violations were becoming more preva-
lent around the middle of the 20th Century. Despite the Gluecks’ contributions, instruments
for predicting future criminological behavior were dominated by those in the sociological and
criminological fields. Previous research supported the notion that relationships between per-
sonality and criminality exist (e.g., using the MMPI, see Capwell, 1945; Monachesi, 1948;
Schuessler & Cressey, 1950; Monachesi, 1950a; Monachesi, 1950b; however, see Mack, 1969
for contrary evidence and Schuessler & Cressey, 1950, who question the conclusions of such
studies relating personality and criminal behavior). Weinberg (1954) notes that despite
the research, many of the early prediction instruments lacked personality and other related
factors relevant to theories of criminal behavior:
The findings of prediction are designed usually for administrative purposes and are
within the scope of applied theory. Theories of causation usually consider arrest
or detection as superfluous in understanding criminal behavior. The findings of
prediction—with the exception of work on potential delinquency—operate within
the policy framework of probation or parole. Hence detection or arrest may be
crucial. Also the predictive instrument does not always test personality dynamics
and social dynamics but becomes a function of empirical trial and error outcome
for specified items in terms of a given criterion, whether it be arrest or violation
of parole or other action. Frequently, these items are taken from records in the
files and have been recorded for purposes other than prediction. Hence these items
become direct or indirect indexes at best of the pertinent behavioral dynamics of
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criminality. On the other hand, there has been an increasing recognition of the need
to use items derived from a consistent theory and then applied to predictive tests.
(p. 422)
Hathaway and Monachesi (1951) further note that “[t]he majority of published studies under-
taken to discover the personality characteristics of young people who later develop behavioral
disorders have been based upon data collected after the individuals became deviant” (p. 469).
Hathaway and Monachesi (1951; see also Hathaway & Monachesi, 1952) used the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to measure personality on 4,046 ninth graders
(approximately aged 14; 1,994 boys, 2,052 girls) in the Minneapolis area (their research was
prior to the MMPI-A, the adolescent version of the MMPI, and the authors acknowledged
the limitations of interpreting juvenile results on an adult inventory). Three years later, the
authors determined, through the local correctional system, that 597 of the 4,046 adolescents
(442 boys and 155 girls) of the boys and girls had come into contact with the court or police.
They then compared the MMPI profiles of the delinquents and nondelinquents; the authors
conclude that “several scales of the MMPI differentiated significantly between delinquents
and non-delinquents” (Hathaway & Monachesi, 1952, p. 708).
Ohlin and Duncan (1949) looked at over a dozen studies with readily-constructed
data, focusing on a measure they called the percentage in the error of prediction (see also
Horst, 1941, pp. 258–259, under the section, The Principle of Maximum Probability). The
percentage in the error of prediction is the difference in error rates of the prediction measure
from prediction using total rates, or base rates, divided by the error using total rates. Using
their example, suppose that 40.1% of parolees violate the conditions of their parole. Then
prediction of a random individual suggests stating every parolee will be a success so that the
method is correct 59.9% of the time. Suppose a prediction method has an error percentage
of 32.5%; the difference between the method and total rates prediction is (40.1 − 32.5 =)
7.6% and the percentage in the error of prediction is 7.6/40.1 = 19.0%. The authors state,
In only two instances do the reductions in error [i.e., the percentage in the error of
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prediction] greatly exceed 25 per cent, and, of these two, one is based on a small
number of cases. . . . [I]t is quite clear that routine application of these techniques to
the types of data usually secured is in no sense a guaranty of substantial improve-
ments in prediction over the crudest method available—prediction from total rates.
(p. 445)
The research throughout the 1950’s and 60’s continued to support prediction methods
in penal systems and these methods became more sophisticated. Duncan, Ohlin, Reiss,
and Stanton (1953) discuss six rules previously suggested in the literature for optimizing
cutscores based on cost and utility, where cost is associated with false negatives and utility
with true negatives. Glaser (1955) uses one of Duncan et al.’s measures to compare actuarial
predictions to predictions made by criminologists and psychiatrists for parole success. His
results suggest that criminologists’ predictions are superior to those made by psychiatrists,
but actuarial methods outperform both types of clinical prediction. Kirby (1954) is the
first to develop a predictive model for parole violations using discriminant function analysis,
improving upon the methods of Burgess and the Gluecks. Mannheim and Wilkins (1955) use
multiple linear regression to predict criminal recidivism; it is the first such study conducted
in England. However, not all results were positive; for instance, in an application based
on results from previous literature, Schlesinger (1978) used previously-reported significant
predictors to predict dangerousness in juveniles but the results failed to support accurate
predictions of dangerousness.
With advances in prediction models, Rose (1966) questioned what one does—whether
it be an institution or a legal system—with a prediction for a specific individual. Rose (1966)
states,
[T]he prediction does not indicate . . . which form of treatment action is to be
more successful, and thus what [one] should actually do. . . . These are the kind of
questions which must be faced, and unless they are, the application of prediction
scores to individuals is not likely to be of much use. At the present moment our
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effectiveness at describing and identifying different treatment techniques is very low,
and we cannot, therefore, produce the kind of significant relationships which are the
basis of a prediction table. It may be that the criterion of recidivism also is too gross
for this type of operation, which should be much more based upon some measure of
personality change—something else which we are bad at measuring. (p. 30)
2.4 Predicting Dangerous Behavior
“It has been suggested that dangerousness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder”
(Shah, 1978, p. 224). Predicting dangerousness begins with defining dangerousness; in his
influential article, Shah (1978) defines it as follows:
a propensity (i.e., an increased likelihood when compared with others) to engage
in dangerous behavior. Dangerous behavior refers to acts that are characterized by
the applications of or the overt threat of force and that are likely to result in injury
to other persons. (p. 224)
Shaw (1973) states,
The problem of ‘dangerousness’ is its definition. There seems to be three terms
used synonymously: ‘dangerousness’, ‘aggression’, and ‘violence’. . . . ‘violence’ and
‘aggression’ denote action, while ‘danger’ denotes a relationship. (p. 269)
In State v. Krol (1975), the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the matter:
“Dangerous conduct is not identical with criminal conduct. Dangerous conduct involves
not merely violation of social norms enforced by criminal sanctions, but significant physi-
cal or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property” (p. 259). In
Overholser v. Russell (1960), the opinion of the Court stated,
We think the danger to the public need not be possible physical violence or a
crime of violence. It is enough if there is competent evidence that he may commit
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any criminal act, for any such act will injure others and will expose the person to
arrest, trial and conviction. There is always the additional possible danger—not
to be discounted even if remote—that a non-violent criminal act may expose the
perpetrator to violent retaliatory acts by the victim of the crime. (p. 198)
2.4.1 Negro v. Dickens (1965)
In 1944, a man named Joseph Negro was committed—pretrial—to Matteawan State
Hospital in New York; Negro plead not guilty for second-degree robbery, first-degree grand
larceny, second-degree assault, and felonious prison escape. He was declared incompetent to
stand trial and ordered to remain at the institution until “he [was] no longer in such state
of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charge against him
or of making his defense thereto” (Negro v. Dickens , 1965, p. 408). Negro spent 21 years at
Matteawan (an amount of time that exceeded the maximum sentence had he stood trial and
been convicted); the District Attorney of New York would have dismissed of the indictment
if the superintendent of Matteawan recommended the patient could be transfered to a civil
hospital. The superintendent would not recommend dismissal until the Department of Men-
tal Hygiene determined the appropriateness of transfer to a civil hospital. The Department
of Mental Hygiene, presiding over the New York civil hospitals, believed that Matteawan,
being under the Department of Correction’s jurisdiction, was the one to make the decision.
Upon hearing this, the superintendent of Matteawan, in a letter to Negro’s counsel, stated:
I would resent any member of our psychiatric staff at this hospital, making the deci-
sion that any patient is suitable for care in a civil hospital. This is a determination
that should be made and must be made by the Department of Mental Hygiene.
Our staff is working in a closed hospital and they cannot be the authority for the
open civil hospitals of New York State. . . . [R]efer this matter to the Department
of Mental Hygiene for a decision. (p. 410)
Neither side was willing to take a stance. The Court stated,
49
We are therefore confronted, upon this record, with a situation in which two offi-
cial agencies function within medical areas and each during a protracted exchange
disavows the responsibility of furnishing the District Attorney with a statement as
to whether petitioner’s transfer to a civil hospital would be in the public interest.
In his affidavit upon the motion the District Attorney equated the issue of “danger
to the community” with “the public interest” as a controlling factor as to whether
the indictment should be dismissed. Obviously, the District Attorney cannot decide
this issue without authoritative advice from men of medicine. (p. 411)
As Morris (1967) contends,
The . . . case of Negro v. Dickens aptly demonstrates the inability of Department
of Correction psychiatrists to formulate an expert opinion as to whether a patient
in a Department of Correction mental institution, who is not dangerous to that
institution, would be a danger if transferred to a Department of Mental Hygiene
hospital. (pp. 677–678).
Until the late 1960’s, criminal prediction primarily focused on juvenile delinquency
and parole violations. But expert predictions of dangerousness and violence, especially
following Operation Baxstrom and the subsequent research (e.g., Cocozza & Steadman, 1975;
Steadman & Cocozza, 1974), were losing credibility whereas predictions by actuarial methods
started to garner interest; however, few actuarial methods existed, and Wolfgang (1969)
criticizes the inability of these methods to distinguish violent and nonviolent prisoners. He
calls for improvements in the classification of violent criminals and argues this was necessary
so that appropriate treatments could be applied (e.g., sending an “essentially nonviolent”
criminal convicted of a violent offense to a minimum- or medium-security prison rather than
a maximum-security prison).
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2.4.2 Preventive Detention
Shortly after taking office, President Richard Nixon gave a statement regarding vio-
lence and crime in the country, and particularly in the nation’s capital. Nixon stated, “in
the midst of a crime crisis, immediate steps are needed to increase the effectiveness of the
police and to make justice swifter and more certain” (Nixon, 1969). Nixon proposed action
in 12 major areas to combat the so-called crisis; one such area was bail reform. Nixon stated,
Increasing numbers of crimes are being committed by persons already indicted for
earlier crimes, but free on pretrial release. This requires that a new provision be
made in the law, whereby dangerous hardcore recidivists could be held in tempo-
rary pretrial detention when they have been charged with crimes and when their
continued pretrial release presents a clear danger to the community.
What constituted a “clear danger to the community” was not discussed by Nixon.
Although predictive techniques were becoming more popular and widespread, others were
questioning the ethical implications behind their use. As Wenk, Robison, and Smith (1972)
note,
Concern about violence will inevitably lead to the development of special treat-
ment programs, but the majority of persons placed in such programs must be false
positives—persons who would not commit the act which the program is designed
to prevent. . . . Those who argue that treatment cannot harm the person who does
not need it and those who would warp the definition of “need” are obviously igno-
rant of the effects of social stigma and of the difficulty of administering corrective
interventions without social stigma as a result. (p. 402)
Many were opposed to the general idea of preventive detention (i.e., commitment of
individuals based on suspicion to commit a crime) that Nixon supported. Preventive deten-
tion, or what Dershowitz (1970) refers to as “the prediction-prevention strategy,” requires
an assessment of an individual and, thus, is based on some sort of prediction of whether
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the individual is likely to skip bail, commit a crime, pose a clear danger to the community,
and so forth. Dershowitz (1970) notes that the “two prediction-prevention devices employed
most widely in the United States today are: 1) denial of pre-trial release to persons charged
with, but not yet convicted of, crimes; and 2) involuntary hospitalization of the mentally
ill” (p. 29). Some contend that preventive detention is unconstitutional and specifically vi-
olates the Fifth and Eighth Amendments: “nor [shall a person] be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. V) and “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”
(U.S. Const. amend. VIII).
As Foote (1970b) argues,
[B]oth money bail, which in practice has amounted to preventive detention for the
poor, and preventive detention of the dangerous as explicitly authorized in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, should be held unconstitutional under the due process and equal
protection clauses. The same result should also follow under the Eighth Amendment
forbidding excessive bail, where the court will have to resolve the ambiguity of a
carelessly drafted clause. (p. 4)
Foote continues,
There is no plausible theory on the drawing boards of social science, let alone any
empirical evidence, which supports the simple-minded assumption that specific crim-
inality can be predicted in advance without error so great that its application would
be arbitrary in the constitutional sense. The required prediction cannot be achieved
by any existing clinical or scientific expertise, let alone by scientifically untrained
prosecutors and judges in the hurlyburly of our municipal courts. (p. 4)
In determining dangerousness analytically, Foote states there are distinct questions that
need to be answered:
(1) What kinds of anticipated criminal conduct are harmful enough to justify the
imposition of pretrial detention?; . . . (2) What are the probabilities that pending
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trial the defendant would engage in each kind of specified conduct?; (3) How is one
to combine the weight assigned to the harm which the defendant might do . . . with
the probability that he would do it . . . in order to rate him on a scale from most
serious risk to least serious?; . . . [and] (4) How high a risk is high enough to justify
jailing someone between arrest and trial despite the empirical proof that detention
adversely influences the outcome of the case? (p. 8)
Foote emphasizes this last point as the most crucial and notes the trade-off between degrees
of risks: detaining few defendants with a decreased number of crimes prevented (high risk)
or detaining many defendants with an increased number of defendants detained who would
not have committed a crime (low risk). Foote (1970a) argues that “[j]udges and psychiatrists
who support preventive detention assume that a mistaken identification of one actually safe
person who is predicted to be dangerous is much less serious than the release of one actually
dangerous person” (p. 53).
Another common argument among the opponents of preventive detention is concerned
with the number of false positives (i.e., detaining a nondangerous individual incorrectly
predicted to be dangerous). As Dershowitz (1971) claims,
[T]here is no evidence that there is any device or human being that can predict short-
term violence with 50–60 per cent accuracy. I cannot personally conceive, at least at
the present time, of any predictive criteria that would correctly spot any significant
number of violent crimes without requiring the confinement of at least twice—
probably far more—but at least twice as many false positives as true positives.
Accordingly, under any realistic preventive detention criteria, it will always be more
likely than not that a given detainee has been erroneously confined. (p. 564)
John N. Mitchell, U.S. General Attorney under President Nixon, arguing for the
constitutionality of preventive detention says, in defense of the Fifth Amendment, states
[T]he due process clause of the Constitution does not prohibit pretrial detention in
criminal cases. Its requirements are those of reasonableness—the restraints imposed
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on the liberty of an accused must be reasonable when balanced against society’s ac-
knowledged interest in preventing commission of further crimes while the defendant
is awaiting trial. (Mitchell, 1969, pp. 1234–1235)
In discussing the Eighth Amendment, Mitchell says,
[S]ince the [E]ighth [A]mendment when adopted clearly permitted pretrial detention
for capital crimes because of danger to the community, it should not today prohibit
pretrial detention for such dangerous crimes merely because they are no longer
capital for reasons completely unrelated to their dangerousnes. (p. 1230)
With respect to predicting dangerousness, Mitchell, rather definitively, states,
[T]he conclusion is inevitable that statistical evidence which permits predictability
with precise mathematical accuracy is not constitutionally necessary to warrant
confinement on grounds of dangerousness. Instead, it is sufficient to place reliance,
as is the practice in the law, on the insight and experience of trial judges applying
appropriate qualitative standards. (p. 1241)
In other words, the Honorable John N. Mitchell deemed trial judges capable of predicting
future dangerousness.
M. L. Cohen, Groth, and Siegel (1978) argue that clinical prediction of dangerousness
“is possible” (p. 34). They cite two articles to support this argument: the first being the
aforementioned article by Kozol et al. (1972); the second, an article by Hodges (1971) on
the effectiveness of Maryland’s indeterminate sentence law. The authors state that the two
studies were able to “predict[] not only dangerousness but also nondangerousness” (p. 35).
However, this argument was not generally accepted (e.g., Steadman, 1973; Diamond, 1974;
Cocozza & Steadman, 1978; for a particularly detrimental review, see Ennis & Litwack,
1974). Specific issues with respect to the Kozol et al. article were previously presented; Alan
Stone, in a discussion immediately following the Hodges article, succinctly summarizes his
54
opinion: “[T]his study presents no evidence that justifies its overblown conclusions or the ex-
istence of Maryland’s law” (p. 295). But despite evidence against of their ability, predictions
of future dangerousness were still commonly made by psychiatrists and psychologists. Even
the American Psychiatric Association advised that “[p]sychiatric expertise in the prediction
of ‘dangerousness’ is not established and clinicians should avoid ‘conclusory’ judgments in
this regard” (1983, p. 33). If expert psychiatrists fail to predict dangerousness with accept-
able accuracy, how can one expect a judge to fair any better, as John N. Mitchell suggested?
Mitchell brushed the issue aside stating, “due process of law requires fundamental fairness,
not perfect accuracy” (p. 1242).
Tribe (1970) disagrees with many of Mitchell’s (1969) arguments. With respect to
the fifth amendment, he says,
[President Nixon’s] proposal says absolutely nothing about the sort of harm the
defendant must be found likely to commit before he can be imprisoned pending trial
. . . [thus] confinement is authorized so long as the accused falls into any detainable
category . . . [and n]o tenable concept of due process could condone a balance that
gives so little weight to the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty. (p. 381)
Tribe also suggests that pretrial detention portrays the defendant as guilty before the trial
even begins. With regards to Mitchell’s defense of the pretrial preventive detention and the
Eighth Amendment, Tribe says,
Attorney General [Mitchell] properly concludes that the excessive bail clause can-
not be read to imply an absolute right to pretrial release for all defendants. This
conclusion implies only that some governmental interests may justify the denial of
pretrial liberty, and leaves open the question of which interests have this character.
It is plainly a non sequitur [original emphasis] to conclude, as does the Attorney
General, that the excessive bail clause leaves Congress entirely free to establish the
circumstances under which pretrial release may be withheld. (p. 399)
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On July 29, 1970, President Nixon signed the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act (1970) saying, “We want to make Washington, D.C., an example
of respect for law and of freedom from fear, rather than an example of lawlessness” (Nixon,
1970). Of particular interest are the provisions of pretrial preventive detention outlined
in 23 D.C. Code §§ 1322 and 1323, allowing the judicial officer to assess the defendant’s
dangerousness and authorize pretrial preventive detention of non-capital defendants (Rauh
& Silbert, 1970). The constitutionality of the preventive detention provisions of the District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act was put on trial in Dash v. Mitchell
(1965; the primary defendant, Mitchell, being the aforementioned Attorney General John N.
Mitchell). In addition to citing violations of the fifth and Eighth Amendments, the plaintiffs
also argued the act was in violation of the Sixth Amendment which states,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const. amend.
VI)
The case was eventually dismissed on grounds that “all of the plaintiffs in this case, for one
reason or another, fail[ed] to present a claim which c[ould] be reached on the merits” (p.
1303).
In addition, civil commitment began including juvenile offenders. For instance, in
regards to juvenile delinquents, the New York Family Court Law states,
The court shall not direct detention unless available alternatives to detention, in-
cluding conditional release, would not be appropriate, and the court finds that unless
the respondent is detained there is a serious [emphasis added] risk that he or she
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may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime. (§ 320.5(3)(a)(ii) New York Family Court Law, n.d.)
The provision was brought to the United States Supreme Court in Schall v. Martin (1984);
it was argued that the provision allows detention of juveniles without due process of the law.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision stating, “from a legal point of view
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct” (p.
278). Ewing (1985) took particular offense to this ruling:
In Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that, in the interest of crime prevention,
juveniles merely accused of crimes may be incarcerated before trial, indeed even
before a finding of probable cause, simply on the basis of judicial predictions of
criminal conduct. Empirical research indicates that such predictions are more likely
to prove wrong than right and suggests that this likelihood of error cannot be
reduced appreciably by the imposition of procedural safeguards. In light of this
research, it seems clear that many if not most juveniles detained on the basis of
predictions of criminal behavior will be erroneously identified as potential criminals
or recidivists and be needlessly incarcerated. (p. 225)
2.4.3 The Difficulty of Prediction
Monahan (1977) asks, “Can one . . . imagine a Human Subjects Committee approving
a study in which one third, or even one tenth, of the subjects may commit assault or murder
as a result of the experiment?” (p. 364). He then points out “that the current social policy of
confining mentally ill persons on the ground of an admittedly untested prediction of violence
is itself [original emphasis] an ‘experiment’ ” (pp. 364–365).
Scott (1977) states,
Prediction of dangerousness is particularly difficult because: dangerousness is the
resultant of a number of processes which occasionally may be synergistic amounting
to more than the sum of their parts, some within the individual and some in society;
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it is not static; key factors are the individual’s adaptiveness, resistance to change,
and his intention . . . a common mistake is to confuse recidivism with dangerousness,
they are not necessarily the same and may be combined in various patterns. (p.
128)
In discussing why clinicians’ predictions of dangerous behavior continue to be taken seriously,
Berger and Dietrich (1979) posit that “the attitude [is] that any formal procedure, no matter
how inadequate, is better than no formal procedure at all” and “that many persons do not
clearly understand some fundamental problems in such an endeavour” (p. 36). Scott (1977)
argues that “[p]rediction studies should aim not to replace but to complement the clinical
approach, and vice versa” (p. 129).
Megargee (1976) notes the difference and difficulty of prediction from postdiction:
[E]ven if the validity literature showed that our tests could accurately identify people
who have been violent in the past, it would not necessarily mean these tests could
predict who will behave dangerously in the future. The violent act itself may have
created feelings of guilt or relieved pent-up hostility. Also, people who have been
identified as having illegally engaged in such acts are inevitably exposed to a variety
of judicial and correctional procedures expressly designed to change their personality
structure and dynamics. And change they probably do, although the nature of these
alterations may be quite different from what was intended. (p. 10)
B. Rubin (1972) opines, “[I]t is unlikely that dangerousness can be predicted in a
person who has not acted in a dangerous or violent way” (p. 405). This idea lead Wenk
et al. (1972) to conclude that “[t]he prediction equations contain the seed of self-fulfilling
prophecy: those who have been noticed before will be noticed again.” In summarizing their
research, Wenk et al. says, “Our demonstration of the futility [original emphasis] of such
prediction should have consequences as great for the protection of individual liberty as a
demonstration of the utility of violence prediction would have for the protection of society”
(p. 402).
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Wenk et al. (1972) note the difficulties in predicting violence, even using more sophis-
ticated multivariate techniques, due to the low prevalence of violence and the fact that not
all violent acts are reported and the ones that are can vary dramatically. Megargee (1976)
also notes the issue of predicting a rare event. Because of the possibly low prevalence of
violence, the number of false positives would be high, as Stone (1975) notes:
[I]f dangerousness is the sole criterion for civil commitment or other preventive
detention, and if an empirical study demonstrates violence is a rare event (low base
rate), then even if we had a very good predictive technique or device, we would end
up confining many more false than true positives.
Shah (1978) argues this idea as well:
Invariably, such predictions [of low base-rate events] are accompanied by rather huge
rates of “false positive” errors; that is, the great majority of the persons predicted
as likely to engage in future violent behavior will not display such behavior.
Maden (2003) is more accepting; in his argument for the use of standardized risk assess-
ment methods (i.e., an assessment tool with established norms), he suggests, “Rather than
search for the Holy Grail of the perfect risk assessment instrument, there is a strong case
for accepting the flaws of an existing scale, which are often outweighed by the benefits of
standardisation” (p. 202). Underwood (1979) provides an optimistic viewpoint: “Perhaps no
available predictive method is sufficiently accurate to satisfy the high standard of accuracy
appropriate for the decision to incarcerate, but it may still be possible to develop one” (p.
1413).
An illusory correlation is, as the authors who coined the term define it,
the report by an observer of a correlation between two classes of events which in
reality (a) are not correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or
(c) are correlated in the opposite direction than that which is reported. (Chapman
& Chapman, 1967, p. 194)
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Sweetland (1973) surveyed psychiatrists and na¨ıve participants and found the existence of
illusory correlations between personality variables and dangerousness suggesting “that many
psychiatrists, and others engaged in making [judgments of dangerousness], are likely to hold
beliefs about the relationship between various personality characteristics and the likelihood
of dangerous behavior which are of unknown validity” (p. 42). Cunningham and Reidy
(1999) present several studies that provide counterintuitive results that lend themselves to
illusory correlations.
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) showed that intuitive predictions (e.g., clinical judg-
ment) are influenced by a judgmental heuristic that they called representativeness and that
this can lead to systematic errors in reasoning. For example, when a psychiatrist or judge
believes that a certain group of people are more violent than others, this belief is likely to
influence the prediction of future violence and lead to over-prediction for individuals in that
group. Diamond (1974) specifically hypothesizes why psychiatrists are likely to over-predict
dangerousness:
If the psychiatrist under-predicts danger, and clears a patient who later commits
a violent act, he will be subjected to severe criticism. If, on the other hand, he
over-predicts danger, he will suffer no consequence from such faulty prediction,
for his prediction might have come true had there been no intervention (such as
institutionalization). In general, if the psychiatrist predicts that there is no danger,
the feed-back from an erroneous prediction is real and immediate. If he predicts
that there is danger, there may be no feed-back, or, if there is, it may not be
possible to interpret it in ways which would improve the predictive ability of the
psychiatrist. Inevitably, this will result in all concerned doing the “safe” thing:
predicting dangerousness, if there are even the most minimal reasons to justify it.
(p. 447)
Monahan and Cummings (1974) found that psychiatrists’ over-predictions could be partly
attributed to the consequence of the prediction to the individual. Hypothetical predictions
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of dangerousness were made by two groups of psychiatrists: one group was told that dan-
gerous patients would be hospitalized; the other group believed that the patient would be
imprisoned. The psychiatrists were more likely to predict dangerousness if the prediction
led to hospitalization rather than imprisonment.
In their assessment of the validity of violence prediction, Monahan and Cummings
(1975) conclude, “The empirical fact of the invalidity of violence prediction suggests that
neither the interests of society nor the interests of the identified individual are being served
by social policies based on the prediction of violence” (p. 162).
2.5 Mental Illness and Violence
Baxstrom v. Herold (1966) brought forth concern over court-ordered treatment of
mentally-ill individuals accused—but not necessarily convicted—of a crime, otherwise known
as involuntary commitment. Involuntary commitment encompasses both criminal and civil
commitment; commitment to an institution via a criminal case is criminal commitment
whereas, in a civil case, it is referred to as civil commitment. Civil commitment commonly
occurs after an individual serves time for a convicted crime but is still deemed dangerous;
it is more common with sexual offenders. The alleged purpose of civil commitment is to
protect society from so-called dangerous individuals, and this does not necessarily include
treatment.
In the case of Donaldson v. O’Conner (1975), the plaintiff, Kenneth Donaldson, was
civilly committed in a Florida hospital for nearly 15 years, despite receiving little treatment
and not being considered dangerous. In Donaldson v. O’Conner (1975), the Court of Appeals
distinguished between two types of civil commitment: “police power” (used to commit those
who posed a threat of danger toward others) and “parens patriae” (when need for care
or treatment is the rationale for confinement). The Court stated, regardless of reason for
commitment, “that a person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has
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a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition” (p. 520).
In 1965, Congress passed the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act (HMIA) “[t]o protect the constitutional rights of certain individuals who are mentally
ill, to provide for their care, treatment, and hospitalization, and for other purposes” District
of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act (1965). One of the “other purposes” can
be found in Sec. 7: Hospitalization Under Court Order. As Cantor and Sherman (1965) put
it, “The heart of the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act is contained in its provisions
for hospitalization for an indefinite period pursuant to court order” (p. 212). This section
of the HMIA allowed “for the judicial hospitalization of any individual in the District of
Columbia” with a formal petition:
[petition needs to] be accompanied (1) by a certificate of a physician stating that he
has examined the individual and is of the opinion that such individual is mentally ill,
and because of such illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at
liberty, or (2) by a sworn written statement by the petitioner that (A) the petitioner
has good reason to believe that such individual is mentally ill and, because of such
illness, is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, and (B)
that such individual has refused to submit to examination by a physician. (District
of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 1965)
Similarly, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Mental Health Act (MHA) of
1983 (Mental Health Act, 1983) that allowed the detention of any patient provided,
(a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the
detention of the patient in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by
medical treatment) for at least a limited period; and (b) he ought to be so detained
in the interests of his own health or safety or with a view to the protection of other
persons. (Part II, 2.(2))
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Szmukler (2003) suggests that the act targets the intersection of two groups (men-
tally ill persons and potentially dangerous persons) and questions how a law can target a
small proportion of those who could be dangerous simply because they are mentally ill (i.e.,
ignoring those who are dangerous but not mentally ill). He states,
In the case of mental disorders, we are weighing the benefits to society as a whole
against costs that largely fall on a small segment of the population—those with
mental illnesses. Given society’s long history of prejudice against mentally ill indi-
viduals, the threat to this socially-excluded group is very worrying. (p. 206)
Many similar state statutes followed the HMIA, requiring the individual be mentally
ill and dangerous; furthermore, an absence of dangerous behavior did not preclude one from
commitment. In Matthew v. Nelson (1978), the three-judge United States District Court of
the Northern District of Illinois concluded,
[T]here are instances in which a psychiatrist can determine from a psychiatric clin-
ical examination that a mentally ill person is reasonably likely to injure himself or
another even though the person’s history does not include a recent overt act . . .
These cases may be relatively few, but they are not so insignificant that they can
be discarded in our evaluation. (Matthew v. Nelson, 1978, p. 711)
Determining dangerous behavior leading to civil commitment was primarily a respon-
sibility left for the state; in 1976, a court ruling would fault mental health professional for
failure to properly report potentially dangerous persons.
2.5.1 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976)
In September 1967, an Indian man named Prosenjit Poddar came to the United States
to attend the University of California at Berkeley as a graduate student; a year later, he met
a woman named Tatiana Tarasoff whom he befriended. Poddar developed feelings toward
Tarasoff that were not reciprocated, leading Poddar to become emotionally distressed. In
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1969, Tarasoff left for South America; Poddar sought psychological help during this time
and at one point confided to his psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, that he intended to kill
Tarasoff. Dr. Moore recommended that Poddar be civilly committed, feeling that Poddar
was a dangerous person. Poddar was detained but released shortly after because he did not
appear irrational.
In October of 1969, Tarasoff returned to the United States and on October 27, Pod-
dar fatally stabbed her. Poddar was convicted of second-degree murder but this charge was
eventually overturned, conditioned on his returning to India (People v. Poddar , 1974). Tara-
soff’s parents filed a lawsuit against Dr. Moore and the University of California (Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, 1976). The Court concluded that mental health pro-
fessionals are responsible for not just their patients, but any individual who may be at risk
of harm from their patient. In his opinion, Justice Matthew Tobringer stated, “[T]he public
policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communi-
cations must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.
The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins” (p. 442).
2.5.2 Blackstone’s Ratio
In discussing the use of presumptive evidence, Sir William Blackstone famously says,
“All presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously; for the law holds it better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party suffer” (Blackstone, 1794, p.
713). Many have used the latter part of the quote as an argument against civil commitment
and preventive detention; Monahan (1977) disagrees, saying,
[I]t may be possible ethically to justify short-term commitment even if the predic-
tions of imminent violence on which it is based are less accurate than the long-term
research indicates. Paraphrasing Blackstone, it may be better that ten “false pos-
itives” suffer commitment for three days than that one “false negative” go free to
kill someone during that period. (p. 370)
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Slobogin (2009) also disagrees,
The adage that ten murderers should go free before one innocent person is
convicted, although perhaps acceptable as an illustration of our commitment
to justice, is much harder to swallow when we know that a sizeable proportion
of the ten guilty persons will commit another murder if all of them are let go.
(pp. 67–68)
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1). The constitutionality of civil commitment was challenged in the case of Prochaska v.
Brinegar (1979). In the ruling, the Court stated,
[The appellant Stanley Prochaska] is being restrained of his liberty in that he is not
free to come and go at will but such restraint is not in the way of punishment, but
for his own protection and welfare as well as for the benefit of society. Such loss of
liberty is not such liberty as is within the meaning of the constitutional provision
that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.” (p. 872)
Laves (1975) argues that civil commitment based on psychiatric predictions of dangerousness
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because “psychiatric opinion does not rise to
the level of expert testimony” (p. 319).
This notion is not unrecognized; in Addington v. Texas (1979), Chief Justice Warren
Burger of the United States Supreme Court stated, in his opinion to the Court,
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and
is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning [original emphasis] of the facts
which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack
of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as
to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual
is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous. (p. 429)
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This was also noted in In re Stephenson (1977); the Supreme Court of Illinois said,
[We] believe that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an inappropriate standard for
use in involuntary civil commitment proceedings. Predictions of dangerousness can
hardly be beyond a reasonable doubt in the undeveloped framework of the science
of psychiatric diagnosis and prediction, for the subjective determinations therein
involved are incapable of meeting objective certainty. (pp. 555–556)
In Addington v. Texas (1979), the Court argued that “[i]t cannot be said . . . that it is
much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ than for a mentally normal person to be
committed” (p. 429) and concluded,
[T]he [proof beyond a] reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commit-
ment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may
impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier
to needed medical treatment. . . . To meet due process demands, the standard has
to inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases. (pp. 432–433)
Thus, the burden of proof required for civil commitment lies somewhere between
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, what is referred to as clear
and convincing. According to Stone (1975),
The predictive success appropriate to a legal decision can be described in three levels
of increasing certainty: preponderance of the evidence, 51 percent successful; clear
and convincing proof, 75 percent successful; beyond a reasonable doubt, at least 90
percent successful. (p. 33)
Monahan and Wexler (1978) in their article regarding the standards of proof in civil
commitment, state,
[M]ental health professionals (or actuarial tables) may well be able to prove “dan-
gerousness” beyond a reasonable doubt . . . if and only if “dangerousness” is viewed
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as a probability [original emphasis] statement, rather than as an absolute [original
emphasis] claim that violent behavior will occur. (p. 38)
The authors believe that a prediction of dangerousness consists of three distinct assertions:
(a) the person has specific characteristics; (b) these characteristics are probabilistically asso-
ciated with dangerous behavior; and (c) there is a probability of dangerous behavior assigned
to that person that warrants civil commitment. They claim it may be possible to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the probabilistic associations of given characteristics with dangerous
behavior. The last point, according to Monahan and Wexler (1978), “should be resolved not
by ‘proof’ but by process of legislative policy-making and constitutional ‘interest-balancing’ ”
(p. 39).
In 1975, Michael Jones was arraigned on charges of attempted petit larceny, punish-
able by a maximum sentence of one year in prison in the District of Columbia. The defendant
was acquitted by reason of insanity and hospitalized. After several release hearing where he
was declared a danger to himself and others, he remained hospitalized for more than a year.
In Jones v. United States (1983), the United States Supreme Court ruled that “not guilty by
reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the
purposes of treatment and the protection of society” (p. 366). The Court also dismissed the
clear and convincing criterion set forth in Addington v. Texas for civil-commitment cases
and concluded that preponderance of evidence was sufficient requirement of proof for the de-
fendant’s commitment due to the insanity defense; as the Court stated, “The preponderance
of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees”
(p. 368). In addition, the Court determined that the defendant’s commitment length need
not be predetermined by the maximum penalty if convicted, stating,
There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length
of time necessary for recovery. The length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal
sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. (p. 369)
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2.5.3 Mental Illness and Violence Link
Because the correctional system placed such importance upon predicting future dan-
gerousness (e.g., see Beis, 1983, for a state-by-state listing of involuntary commitment
statutes; see Monahan, 2006, for a thorough review of court cases), it was clear that al-
ternative methods were needed to do so. However, little research at the time (ca. 1970’s)
was devoted to successfully predicting dangerousness of the mentally ill; the research that
existed yielded unsatisfactory results. As Dix (1976) states,
[T]here is both need and justification for additional research concerning prediction
of the behavior of the mentally ill, even if these studies involve high risks. More
studies are needed utilizing carefully matched groups of persons whose commitment
has been sought, who have been “determined” to be dangerous, and who refuse
to voluntarily submit to treatment. Persons in one group must be subjected to
involuntary treatment, while those in the other must simply be left to their own
devices. (p. 332)
Although Dix’s proposal may be extreme, his point is clear: more adequate research
was necessary. An unfortunate common belief is that dangerous behavior and mental illness
often coexist; Bauer (1970) went so far as to proclaim that “[s]chizophrenia and criminality
(or delinquency) appear to be very closely related—two sides of the same coin” (p. 158).
Cocozza, Melick, and Steadman (1978) attempt to debunk this belief; looking at the rates of
crime among previously-released patients, they found that a small number were involved in
violent crimes and that little violent crimes involved those who are mentally ill. They also
found individuals who were younger and had a history of criminal behavior were the most
likely to be arrested for violent crimes.
In reanalyzing data from Operation Baxstrom, Cocozza and Steadman (1974) were
able to significantly differentiate dangerous patients from nondangerous ones based on age
(age 50 or older were more likely to be dangerous) and their score on the Legal Dangerousness
Scale (a score of 5 or more indicated a higher likelihood of dangerousness). The Legal
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Dangerousness Scale (LDS) was developed by the authors and only consists of four aspects of
a patient’s previous criminal activity (juvenile record, number of previous arrests, conviction
of violent crimes, and severity of offense that led to their most recent incarceration).
Stuart (2003) looks at the relationship between violence and mental illness, conclud-
ing that “mental disorders are neither necessary, nor sufficient causes of violence” (p. 123)
and that socio-demographic and socio-economic factors and substance abuse were major
determinants. Stuart also suggested that the strength of the relationship between mental
illness and violence is exaggerated. Quinsey (1979) looked at several types of prediction
methods of future dangerousness of mentally-ill patients based on clinical assessments, de-
mographic data, psychometric assessments (e.g., the MMPI), laboratory operant studies,
and behavior while institutionalized; he found that only age and diagnosis were important
variables in predicting dangerousness.
Swanson, Holzer III, Ganju, and Jono (1990) attempt to clarify the link between
mental illness and violence; in their research they analyzed responses of over 10,000 people
from Baltimore, Raleigh-Durham, and Los Angeles. The authors report that 368 (3.7%)
people admitted behaving violently within the previous year; in addition, they note that
more than half of those violent (55.5%) met a DSM-III criteria for a psychiatric disorder
(about 20% met these criteria in the overall sample). The authors reported that the risk of
violence increased with the number of psychiatric diagnoses and that those with a substance
abuse problem or dependence had the highest rate of violence (the next highest rate was
among individuals diagnosed as schizophrenic). Finally, the authors found an interaction
effect between substance abuse and mental illness.
E. Silver (2006) notes that research suggests that most mentally-ill individuals are
not violent but that the likelihood of violence is greater among the mentally ill and that the
risk of violence is greatly increased with substance abuse. In their meta-analysis, Douglas,
Guy, and Hart (2009) found that psychosis and violence were associated with each other;
however, they noted the effect is small with a lot of variability. Elbogen and Johnson (2009)
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found that violence was associated with severe mental illness (schizophrenia, bipolar, and
major depression), but only when co-occurring with substance abuse or dependence. Results
from S. Yang, Mulvey, Loughran, and Hanusa (2012) suggest that alcohol use, recent past
violence, and levels of affective symptoms, as measured by the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
(BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962), are associated with violence among depressed patients,
but not those with a psychotic disorder.
The (TAC; Treatment Advocacy Center, 2013) lists on its website “preventable
tragedies.” Their database consists of violent incidences since 1987 that involved individuals
with a “neurological brain disorder” that is often untreated. According to their website,
under the title “Fast Facts,” about 10% of homicides in the United States every year (well
over 1,000 a year) are committed by someone with a severe mental illness. One of the “so-
lutions” suggested by the TAC to prevent these crimes is the implementation of involuntary
outpatient commitment. In fact, Dr. E. Fuller Torrey and the TAC were largely influential in
the development of New York State’s so-called “Kendra’s Law” (N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law,
1999), which allows the state to force psychiatric treatment upon people meeting specified
criteria. The TAC website claims that two different studies “proved” that Kendra’s Law
helps the mentally ill, protects the public, and saves money.
2.5.4 Barefoot v. Estelle (1983)
The early 1980s produced two landmark cases regarding prediction of future danger-
ousness. In Estelle v. Smith (1981), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a forced
psychiatric evaluation intended for sentencing was a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. Two years later, in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983), the United States Supreme Court ruled
that psychiatrists’ predictions of future dangerousness were admissible. As previously men-
tioned, the American Psychiatric Association opposed the admissibility; the Court’s opinion,
however, differed:
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There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that psychiatrists, individually and as
a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a
particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future, and so represent a danger
to the community. To accept such an argument would call into question predictions
of future behavior that are constantly made in other contexts. . . . Nor, despite the
view of the American Psychiatric Association supporting petitioner’s view, is there
any convincing evidence that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable, and that
the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize,
and take due account of its shortcomings. (Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983, Syllabus, p.
882)
J. D. Bloom and Rogers (1987) advise that psychiatrists’ opinions in the legal setting
be limited, suggesting that psychiatry remain “only within the ethics of consultation and
the limitations of knowledge in [psychiatrists’] own field (Bloom & Bloom, 1985)” (p. 852).
They also advise against long-term predictions of dangerousness:
There are viable sentencing roles for psychiatrists that speak to issues of mitigation
(Bloom & Bloom, 1982) and rehabilitation without entering into the arena of long-
term prediction of dangerousness (p. 852)
Loftus and Monahan (1980) state, “The psychologist who is asked to present expert
testimony must face a variety of ethical and other considerations” (p. 276). They present
in detail five such considerations: trustworthiness of research findings, generalizability of
research findings, presenting both sides when there is no consensus, the probabilistic nature
of research findings, and the psychologist’s own personal values. This latter consideration is
particularly interesting; the authors provide several anecdotes regarding personal experiences
as expert witnesses. For instance,
Knowing how difficult it is to obtain convictions in rape cases, and know-
ing that the expert testimony is likely to help the defendant by reducing his
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chances of conviction, E. L. is faced with a personal dilemma. In this particular
example, the personal dilemma was resolved when she reasoned that although
obtaining convictions of actual rapists is of crucial importance, avoiding the
mistaken conviction of innocent people is equally important.
An additional anecdote recalls a case involving the death penalty:
[The death penalty] was predicated on an accurate prediction of violent behavior—a
prediction that [J. M.] believed to be scientifically impossible to make. Since he was
morally opposed to the death penalty, the testimony presented no moral problem.
If the research findings were otherwise, however—if some new technique allowed
violent behavior to be more accurately predicted—he would have refused to testify,
believing immoral ends to be no less immoral when pursued with scientific means.
The authors conclude, “The only thing worse than the law’s uncritical acceptance of psy-
chology would be psychologists’ uncritical rejection of the law as an arena worthy of their
participation” (pp. 281–282).
2.6 A Second Generation of Violence Prediction
John Monahan may be the most influential person in the area of violence prediction
and assessment. Monahan emerged in the 1970s and continues to publish research in the
field. Monahan is the primary investigator in the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study (Monahan et al., 2001) that led to the development of the actuarial instrument,
the Classification of Violence Risk. In his 1981 book entitled Predicting Violent Behavior,
Monahan discusses, among other topics, the issues surrounding future violence predictions
and statistical techniques for improving clinical predictions. With respect to accuracy of
predictions, he states,
No one insists that prediction be perfect. We do not, after all, require absolute
certainty for convicting the guilty, only proof beyond a “reasonable doubt.” This
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means that we are willing to tolerate the conviction of a few innocent persons to
assure the confinement of a much larger number of guilty criminals. It also means
that, when there is doubt, we would much rather release a guilty person than confine
an innocent one. (p. 34)
In noting the different consequences associated with predictions (e.g., denial of parole versus
a death penalty sentence), he says, “Far too often we treat predictions as if they were cheap
socks: ‘One size fits all’ ” (p. 40). With respect to actuarial methods, Monahan suggested
that clinicians emphasize base rates for violence, consider information for valid predictive
relationships, and do not overreact to positive associations. With respect to violence and
the mentally ill, he states,
Mental illness . . . does not appear to be related to violence in the absence of a history
of violent behavior. When one controls for demographic variables, prisoners do not
appear to have a higher incidence of mental illness than the general population.
Mental patients who do not have a record of violent arrests are, if anything less
[emphasis added] violent than the general population. (p. 127)
In an article that was originally presented at the Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association in 1991, Monahan (1992) again discusses the relationship between
mental illness and violence. Although he previously held the belief that the relationship was
non-existent, he states,
I now believe that there may be a relationship . . . , one that cannot be fobbed
off as chance or explained away by other factors that may cause them both. The
relationship, if it exists, probably is not large, but may be important both for legal
theory and for social policy (Monahan, 1992, p. 511).
2.6.1 Rise of the Machines
As computing ability became more powerful, analyzing large data sets using sophisti-
cated techniques became feasible. In his book Mathematical Criminology, Greenberg (1979)
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presents numerous quantitative methods for analyzing and predicting crime; these include
multivariate statistical methods (e.g., path analysis, time series analysis, principal compo-
nents analysis, factor analysis, discriminant function analysis, cluster analysis, and mul-
tidimensional scaling), probability theory and stochastic processes (e.g., the use of Bayes’
Theorem, Markov Chains, Poisson processes), and analytical methods (differential equations
and Laplace transforms).
Holland et al. (1983) use multiple discriminant analysis to predict violent and non-
violent recidivism using only prior violent and nonviolent convictions as separate predictors
and noting an attenuating effect of age, but with poor results; the authors conclude, “Vio-
lence is once again found to be minimally predictable” (p. 181). E. Silver, Smith, and Banks
(2000) compared iterative schemes (e.g., iterative classification trees) with non-iterative ones
and concluded that the iterative schemes were superior in terms of correct classifications.
Neuilly, Zgoba, Tita, and Lee (2011) use decision tree methods to predict recidivism among
homicide offenders released on parole and found these models performed well, outperforming
logistic regression. Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez (2014) use structural equation models
to show that shame is a direct effect of recidivism.
2.6.2 Second Generation Risk Assessment Instruments
Monahan (1984) declares that violence-prediction research was entering a second
generation, emphasizing the limitations and mostly disappointing results in the so-called
first generation. He notes the second generation of violence prediction would be marked by
improved predictive technology, calling for a focus on actuarial methods of prediction that
incorporate clinical information. In a different article, Monahan (1988) states,
To overcome the problems that have so far hobbled the scientific study of violence
among the mentally disordered, we must enrich our predictor variables, strengthen
our criterion variables, exploit natural variation in validation samples, and synchro-
nize our research efforts. If we do, it is possible that the next generation of risk
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assessment studies will yield results quite different than those to which we have
become accustomed. (p. 255)
The “second generation” of violence prediction indeed provided more research using
actuarial devices. The last two decades of the 20th century and the early 21st century
has seen the development of numerous prediction tools, including, among many others, the
Statistical Information on Recidivism (SIR; Nuffield, 1982), developed to predict criminal re-
cidivism; the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR; Monahan et al., 2001; Steadman et al.,
2000; Monahan et al., 2000), an actuarial tool based on an iterative classification tree method
and used to assess dangerousness in mentally-ill patients; the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
(VRAG; G. T. Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1993; C. Webster, Harris, Rice, Cormier, & Quinsey,
1994; Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 2006) and its revised version (VRAG-R; M. E. Rice,
Harris, & Lang, 2013), developed using multiple discriminant analysis and used for predicting
violent and sexual recidivism; the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980), the Psychopa-
thy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991), the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version
(PCL:YV; S. D. Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995), and the Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version
(PCL:YV; Forth, Kosson, & Hare, 2003), all developed with principal component analysis
and used for diagnosing psychopaths (not an actuarial assessment per se, but a psychological
one often associated with dangerous behavior); the Level of Service (Supervision) Inventory
(Andrews, 1988, LSI) and its revised edition (LSI-R; Andrews & Bonta, 1995) and screening
version (LSI-SV; Andrews & Bonta, 1998), designed to predict parole outcome and recidi-
vism; the Historical Clinical Risk–20 (HCR-20; C. D. Webster, Eaves, Douglas, & Wintrup,
1995; Version 2, C. D. Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997), consisting of ten historical,
five clinical, and five risk variables used for risk assessment; the Violence Screening Checklist
(VSC; McNiel & Binder, 1994a; McNiel & Binder, 1994b), a five-item actuarial tool used to
assess risk of future violence and the Violence Screening Checklist–Revised (VSC-R; McNiel,
Gregory, Lam, Binder, & Sullivan, 2003, the VSC with the fifth item omitted); the Sexual
Violence Risk–20 (SVR-20; Boer, Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997), an assessment instrument
75
used to determine an individual’s risk of committing sexual violence; the Rapid Risk As-
sessment for Sex Offense Recidivism (RRASOR; Hanson, 1997), used to screen sex offenders
to estimate risk of recidivism; the Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement scale (SAC-J;
Grubin, 1998); the Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 2000), the Static-2002 (Hanson & Karl,
2003), and their revised versions (Static-99R; Static-2002R; Helmus, Thornton, et al., 2012),
all being prediction measures for long-term risk of sexual and violent recidivism for male sex
offenders; the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool (MnSOST; Epperson, Kaul, & Huot,
1995) and its revised versions (MnSOST-R, Epperson, Kaul, & Hesselton, 1998; MnSOST-3,
Duwe & Freske, 2012), developed to estimate the risk of sexual recidivism in male sex offend-
ers; the Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG; Quinsey, Rice, & Harris, 1995), an
actuarial tool for predicting sexual recidivism among sex offenders; the Domestic Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide (DVRAG; Hilton, Harris, Rice, Houghton, & Eke, 2008), an actuarial
instrument assessing the risk of recidivism among (male) domestic assaulters; the Spousal
Assault Risk Assessment Guide (SARA; Kropp, Hart, Webster, & Eaves, 1994; Kropp,
Hart, Webster, & Eaves, 1999; Kropp & Hart, 2000), a structured professional judgment
(SPJ) tool consisting of twenty items for assessing risk of violence in domestic violent per-
petrators and developed for use in the criminal justice system; the Short-Term Assessment
of Risk and Treatability (START; C. D. Webster, Martin, Brink, Nicholls, & Middleton,
2004; C. D. Webster, Nicholls, Martin, Desmarais, & Brink, 2006), a SPJ tool for informing
risk in several domains such as suicide, substance abuse, and violence toward others; the
Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS; Copas & Marshall, 1998) and its revised ver-
sions (OGRS-2, R. Taylor, 1999; OGRS-2, Howard, Francis, Soothill, & Humphreys, 2009),
a twelve-item assessment tool for measuring risk of reoffense and harm; the Risk Matrix
2000 for Violence (RM2000V; Thornton, 2007), a three-item rating instrument for predict-
ing nonsexual violence in adult males; the Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form (LCSF;
Walters, White, & Denney, 1991), a fourteen-item screening instrument for identifying life-
style criminality; the Violence Risk Scale (VRS; Wong & Gordon, 1999) and the Violence
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Risk Scale–Sexual Offender version (VRS-SO; Olver, 2003; Olver, Wong, Nicholaichuk, &
Gordon, 2007), actuarial instruments for predicting (sexual and nonsexual) violence that
also measures treatment changes using the “Stages of Change” model; the Risk for Sexual
Violence Protocol (RSVP; S. D. Hart, Kropp, & Laws, 2003), an SPJ for assessing sexual
violence risk; the Risk Assessment Scale for Prison (RASP; Cunningham & Sorensen, 2006,
2007), a scale for assessing violence risk among prisoners; the Early Assessment Risk List for
boys (EARL-20B; Augimeri, Webster, Koegl, & Levene, 1998 Augimeri, Koegl, Webster, &
Levene, 2001) and the Early Assessment Risk List for girls (EARL-21G; Version 1, Levene
et al., 2001), gender-specific SPJ risk assessment tools for predicting juvenile delinquency;
the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY; Bartel, Forth, & Borum,
2003; Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2006; Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2005), designed to measure
the violence risk in adolescents (ages 12–18); and the Youth Level of Service/Case Manage-
ment Inventory (YLS/CMI; Hoge & Andrews, 2002), an actuarial risk/need assessment tool
designed to evaluate the risk and needs of troubled youth.
Many studies validating these instruments followed. For example, Grann, Belfrage,
and Tengstro¨m (2000) assessed the validity of the HCR-20 and VRAG in a mentally-ill
Swedish population. Monahan et al. (2005) validated the COVR in an independent sample
and Sturup, Kristiansson, and Lindqvist (2011) found the COVR predicted violence in a
Swedish population. Dolan and Doyle (2000) discuss the utility of the PCL, PCL-R, and
PCL:SV in predicting violence. Barbaree, Seto, Langton, and Peacock (2001) evaluated the
accuracy of the VRAG, SORAG, RRASOR, Static-99, MnSOST-R, and PCL-R for predict-
ing general, sexual, or serious (sexual and violent) recidivism. Buffington-Vollum, Edens,
Johnson, and Johnson (2002) studied the relationship between psychopathy (using the PCL-
R) and serious institutional misconduct in an incarcerated sex offender population. Doyle,
Dolan, and McGovern (2002) examined the validity of the PCL:SV, HCR-20, and VRAG
for predicting inpatient violence in an English hospital for the mentally ill. N. S. Gray et al.
(2003) looked at the efficacy of the HCR-20 and PCL-R, among others, for predicting self-
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harm and violence toward others. G. T. Harris et al. (2003) compared the VRAG, SORAG,
RRASOR, and Static-99 in predicting violent and sexual recidivism among four different
samples of sex offenders. Nicholls, Ogloff, and Douglas (2004) looked at the predictive va-
lidity for violence risk assessment among the HCR-20, the PCL:SV, the VSC in a sample of
involuntarily hospitalized males and female forensic patients. Worth noting is that one of
the items of the VRAG is the PCL; Edens, Skeem, and Douglas (2006) examined the incre-
mental validity (i.e., a measure’s improved predictive accuracy over another measure) of the
VRAG items (excluding the PCL score) to the PCL:SV and conclude that “the validity of
the modified VRAG was attributable primarily to 1 of its 10 items—the PCL:SV” (p. 371).
In addition, the second generation included several meta-analytic studies (although
some of these included research from the first generation as well). For example, Bonta, Law,
and Hanson (1998) conducted a meta-analysis on 58 studies from the years 1959–1995 and
found that predictors of recidivism among mentally-ill offenders were no different than those
in nondisordered ones. They also report that criminal-history variables displayed far larger
effect sizes than clinical variables. Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (2007) looked at 79 different
samples examining the predictive accuracy of actuarial, SPJ, and clinical predictions for sex-
ual, violent, or general recidivism; they found that, on average, actuarial measures perform
the best with SPJ next and clinicians the worst, but that the best overall measure was the
SVR-20, an SPJ device. Helmus, Hanson, Thornton, Babchishin, and Harris (2012) found
the Static-99R and Static-2002R to be “remarkably consistent” across the 23 samples of sex
offenders that they examined; they also found that the rate of sexual recidivism is quite lower
than most would believe and what previous research has shown. In one of the most exhaus-
tive meta-analyses in the research area, Singh, Grann, and Fazel (2011) examined nine risk
assessment measures (LSI-R, PCL-R, SORAG, Static-99, VRAG, HCR-20, SVR-20, SARA,
and SAVRY) from sixty-eight studies consisting of eighty-eight independent samples totaling
25,980 individuals from thirteen countries. The authors concluded the predictive validity of
the measures differed significantly; they found that the SAVRY performs the best, whereas
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the LSI-R and PCL-R performs worst. The authors suggest a reason the SAVRY may have
done so well is because it is used on populations it was designed to be for (i.e., adolescent of-
fenders). In a separate article, Fazel, Singh, Doll, and Grann (2012) looked at the same nine
risk assessment measures and found that the measures produce high sensitivities (median for
violent offenses: .92; for sexual offenses: .88) but low positive predictive values (median for
violent offenses: .41; for sexual offenses: .23). In another exhaustive meta-analysis examin-
ing nine risk assessment instruments used for predicting violence (PCL-R, PCL:SV, VRAG,
HCR-20, LSI-R, OGRS, SIR, VRS, and RM2000V), M. Yang, Wong, and Coid (2010) con-
clude that all nine instruments predicted violent recidivism “moderately well” and they were
not significantly different from one another. The authors also advise that “[b]ecause of their
moderate level of predictive efficacy, [the nine instruments] should not be used as the sole or
primary means for clinical or criminal justice decision making that is contingent on a high
level of predictive accuracy, such as preventive detention” (p. 761).
2.6.3 The Prisoner Cohort Study
The Prisoner Cohort Study (PCS; Coid et al., 2007) was one of the largest studies in
the field consisting of 1470 prisoners in the United Kingdom were interviewed; all prisoners
were serving a sentence that was a minimum of two years for a violent or sexual offense
and were to be released within a year. All prisoners were over the age of eighteen (mean
age 30.8; maximum age 75); 95% (𝑁 = 1396) were male; 79% were white, 15% black, 3%
Asian, and 3% were of another ethnic origin. Several predictive measures were used on the
sample: the VRAG, the HCR-20, RM2000V, and the OGRS-2 as well as the PCL-R. The
male sample was the sample used in the analyses. Follow-up time was within three years
after being released from prison. Of the 1396 male prisoners, 43 were not released in this
time period; 41% of the sample were reconvicted.
The predictive accuracy of the OGRS-2 was highest (as measured by AUC) for all
types of reconvictions (violence, robbery, theft, drugs, and any), but all measures were
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significant. In addition, the researchers were interested in prisoners with dangerous and
severe personality disorders (defined as having at least two personality disorders and a PCL-
R score less than 25); at least one personality disorder (excluding antisocial personality
disorder) and a PCL-R score between 25-29; or a PCL-R score of greater than 30); 212
prisoners (15%) fit the criteria. The DSPD prisoners who were released accounted for 27%
of all reconvictions, 25% if violent crimes, and 0% of the sexual offenses (recall that the
overall reconviction rate was 41%; for violent offenses it was 11.5% and for sexual offenses it
was only 0.5%). The authors concluded that the probability of reconviction was significantly
higher for DSPD prisoners than non-DSPD prisoners for any and violent offenses.
Using data from the PCS, M. Yang, Liu, and Coid (2010) compared the predictive
power of several classification methods: decision trees, neural networks, logistic regression,
and discriminant analysis. The authors found that the four methods performed comparably.
When predicting violent recidivism versus no recidivism (i.e., excluding nonviolent recidivism
as an outcome), their models performed well.
2.7 Sexually Violent Predators
Sexually violent predators3 are some of the most despised criminals; nonetheless. As
District Judge Terrence Boyle stated,
Sexual predators and child molesters are among the most villainous in our society,
and the government has a duty—within the bounds of the Constitution—to protect
its populace from these those people who are likely to harm others. Given the often
abhorrent nature of these individuals’ criminal backgrounds, courts may be tempted
to turn a blind eye to any due process violations. But the Courts have a duty to
protect the rights of even the most despised among us. (United States v. Edwards,
2011, pp. 996–997)
3A majority of states use this term, but some use less provocative terms such as sexually violent persons
or sexually dangerous persons/individuals (see Deming, 2008)
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By the 1950s “an increasingly large number of . . . states in the United States[] ha[d]
passed special statutes . . . dealing with so-called ‘psychopathic’ sexual offenders” (Hacker &
Frym, 1955, p. 766), commonly referred to as Sexual Psychopath Acts (SPA; for a historical
review of sexual psychopath laws, see Lave, 2008).
Under Washington D.C.’s Sexual Psychopath Act, a man named Maurice Millard
was committed until “restored to mental competence” (Millard v. Harris , 1968); in Millard
v. Harris (1968), Millard attacked the constitutionality of the D.C. SPA. Providing his
opinion to the Court, Chief Judge David Bazelon discussed civil commitment based on
dangerousness, stating,
[C]onstitutional issues of the gravest magnitude immediately appear. Substantively,
there is serious question whether the state can ever confine a citizen against his will
simply because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, as opposed to having
actually been dangerous in the past. . . . Predictions of dangerousness, whether
under the Sexual Psychopath Act or in some other context, require determinations of
several sorts: the type of conduct in which the individual may engage; the likelihood
or probability that he will in fact indulge in that conduct; and the effect such conduct
if engaged in will have on others. Depending on the sort of conduct and effect feared,
these variables may also require further refinement. Our evaluation of the ultimate
dangerousness of certain forms of behavior may vary with the frequency with which
they can be expected. If so, it will be necessary to evaluate not only the likelihood
that the individual will misbehave in such fashion, but also the probability that he
will offend with a certain frequency. And since the effect on others may depend on
who the victim is, an estimate of the likelihood that a certain sort of person may
prove the victim may also be necessary. . . . [A]n an examination of all aspects of
the problem is essential. (Millard v. Harris, 1968, p. 973)
In Cross v. Harris (1969), Chief Judge Bazelon again gave his opinion regarding the
issue:
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To be “dangerous” for the purposes of the Sexual Psychopath Act, one must be
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of
his desire. The focus of the statute is not on expected conduct, but on the harm
that may flow from that conduct. Commitment cannot be based simply on the
determination that a person is likely to engage in particular acts. The Court must
also determine the harm, if any, that is likely to flow from these acts. A mere
possibility of injury is not enough; the statute requires that the harm be likely. For
no matter how certain one can be that a person will engage in particular acts, it
cannot be said that he is “likely to inflict injury” unless it can also be said that the
acts, if engaged in, are likely to result in injury. (pp. 1099–1100)
2.7.1 Sexually Violent Predator Laws
In 1990, Washington State was the first to establish a sexually violent predator
(SVP) law that allowed sex offenders to be civilly committed—even after the completion
of a sentence—if the person was deemed a sexually violent predator. As of 2014, nineteen
more states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin), along with the District of Columbia, have
enacted similar laws (The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, 2014).
Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statute (Wis. Stats. ch. 980, 2013) outlines the civil
commitments of sexually-violent persons for the State of Wisconsin, defining a “sexually
violent person” as follows:
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not
responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease,
defect, or illness, and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in one or more acts of
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sexual violence. (§.01(7))
When the Court finds an individual to be sexually violent, it may order that person to be
committed until “no longer a sexually violent person” (§.06). In State v. Post (1995), the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the Chapter 980 does not violate the Constitutions
of Wisconsin or the United States.
Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)
The State of Kansas defines a sexually violent predator as one “who has been con-
victed of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence” (Kan. Stats. ch. 59, Art. 29a, 2012, §02(a)). The statute defines “mental
abnormality” as the “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree con-
stituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others” (§02(b)); it defines “likely
to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” as “the person’s propensity to commit acts of
sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others”
(§02(c)). The Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act of Kansas, enacted in 1994, allowed for
indefinite civil commitment for a convicted sex offender deemed a sexually-violent predator.
The first offender committed under the act was Leroy Hendricks, who was scheduled to be
released shortly after the act was passed. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the
commitment, specifically that it violated due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
clauses. The case reached the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)
and was the first SVP law to be challenged in the highest court. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the act 5–4.
Justice Clarence Thomas gave the majority opinion, with Justices Antonin Scalia,
Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and William Rehnquist joining. According to
Thomas,
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A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground
upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained
civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness
with the proof of some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental
abnormality.” These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary
civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering
them dangerous beyond their control [emphasis added]. The Kansas Act is
plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a
finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence
of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. The precom-
mitment requirement of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is
consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld
in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who
are unable to control their dangerousness. (p. 358, citations omitted)
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring statement, warned,
[C]ivil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deter-
rence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents
would not suffice to validate it. (p. 373)
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the dissent, with Justices David Souter, Ruth Ginsburg,
and John Stevens joining (note that Justice Ginsburg only joined on two of the three parts).
In the dissent, Breyer agreed with the Court that the Kansas law did not violate the due
process clause of the constitution (Justice Ginsburg did not join this part), but argued that
it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses. In particular, the feeling among
the dissenting judges was that the commitment of Hendricks was punitive, rather than civil,
and meant to further punish him.
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The Kansas statute appeared again in the United States Supreme Court in Kansas
v. Crane (2002), where the Court addressed the “emotional or volitional capacity” clause
in the Kansas statute. Particularly, the state of Kansas felt that the “Kansas Supreme
Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always [original emphasis] to prove
that a dangerous individual is completely [original emphasis] unable to control his behavior”
(p. 411), to which the United States Supreme Court replied, “We do not agree with the
State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the
type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any [original emphasis]
lack-of-control determination” (p. 412). The Court continued,
[In Hendricks,] we did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow
or technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at
issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical
precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior. (p. 413)
As Faigman et al. (2013) point out, in Kansas v. Crane the Supreme Court essentially
determined that “psychologists and psychiatrists can distinguish between mentally abnormal
[original emphasis] and dangerous sex offenders and mentally normal [original emphasis] and
dangerous sex offenders” (p. 182).
The Court ruled 7–2, with Justice Scalia dissenting and Justice Thomas joining.
Scalia stated,
There is good reason why, as the Court accurately says, “when considering civil
commitment . . . we [have not] ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes
among volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments.” We have not done so
because it makes no sense. It is obvious that a person may be able to exercise
volition and yet be unfit to turn loose upon society. The man who has a will of
steel, but who delusionally believes that every woman he meets is inviting crude
sexual advances, is surely a dangerous sexual predator. (p. 422)
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He continued,
I suspect that the reason the Court avoids any elaboration is that elaboration which
passes the laugh test is impossible. How is one to frame for a jury the degree of
“inability to control” which, in the particular case, “the nature of the psychiatric
diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality” require? (p. 423)
Scalia, in his concluding paragraph, suggests that when an individual is declared mentally
ill, it means that he is unable to control his behavior:
A jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent suffers from antisocial
personality disorder combined with exhibitionism, and that this is either a mental
abnormality or a personality disorder making it likely he will commit repeat acts
of sexual violence. That is all the SVP[ Act] requires, and all the Constitution
demands. (p. 425)
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, it has not been followed by many lower-level
courts; several states have adopted Scalia’s suggestion that mental illness and dangerousness
together imply lack of control (Pierson, 2011). For a thorough review and the implications
of the two cases, see Faigman et al. (2013).
Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006
In New Jersey, Megan’s Law requires all sex offenders to register with the state; the
law characterizes sex offenders along three risk levels:
The regulations shall provide for three levels of notification depending upon the risk
of re-offense by the offender as follows:
(1) If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the per-
son registered shall be notified;
(2) If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community including
schools, religious and youth organizations shall be notified in accordance with the
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Attorney General’s guidelines, in addition to the notice required by paragraph (1)
of this subsection;
(3) If risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified through means in ac-
cordance with the Attorney General’s guidelines designed to reach members of the
public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to the notice required
by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. (New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice,
2014, 8-3.(c))
As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz (1995),
We are aware of the uncertainties that surround all aspects of the subject of sex
offender recidivism and the effectiveness of preventive measures. Legislatures, de-
spite uncertainty, must sometimes act to deal with public needs, basing such action
on what they conclude, in a welter of conflicting opinions, to be the probable best
course. Our Legislature could reasonably conclude that risk of reoffense can be fairly
measured, and that knowledge of the presence of offenders provides increased de-
fense against them. Given those conclusions, the system devised by the Legislature
is appropriately designed to achieve the laws’ purpose of protecting the public
In July 2006, then-U.S. president George W. Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh
Child Protection Act of 2006 (AWA; H.R. 4472, 2006). The act was written “[t]o protect
children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child pornog-
raphy, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh4 and other child
crime victims” (p. 1). Under Section 302, the AWA permits the federal authority to civilly
commit an SVP for a possibly indefinite period of time, which is often the case (Prescott,
2009). In United States v. Comstock (2010), the United States Supreme Court determined
the Federal Government has the authority to civilly commit individuals in federal custody
as allowed by the AWA.
4Adam Walsh was a six-year-old Florida boy who was abducted and murdered in 1981.
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By 2002, Fitch (2003) reports that nearly 2500 SVPs were committed or pending a
commitment hearing in the United States; in states that allowed for SVP commitments to
move to outpatient treatment, there were only 69 such reported cases. He also notes that
“[Eighty-two] people committed as SVPs (nationally) had been released from confinement”
(p. 492). According to Deming (2008), by 2006 the number of civilly committed SVPs has
increased to over 3600.
2.7.2 “Likelihood” of Dangerousness
The Kansas statute—and many others like it—require that a person must be found
dangerous to be committed. Examining the different statutes for SVP commitment laws
leads one to note the differing risk thresholds required for commitment. Depending on the
state, the standard for commitment is usually defined as “likely,” or something similar.
Some states have formally defined standards for commitment; for example, Washington
State defines “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility” as the person that “more probably than not will engage in such acts” (Revised Code
of Washington, 2013; see also In re Brooks , Wash. 2001 or In re Hosier , Wash. 2010). The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided that the term used in their statute (Wis. Stats. ch.
980, 2013), “substantially probable,” meant “much more likely than not” (State v. Curiel ,
1999).
Sreenivasan, Weinberger, and Garrick (2003) note the differences or vagueness in state
definitions and suggests these definitions “are best conceptualized through a systematic and
structured approach to risk assessment in which the explanation for the opinion is clear” (p.
484) and give suggestions for doing so. But few states have quantified these terms (e.g., see
Doe v. Poritz , 1995).
In their report comparing the different state SVP laws (there were only 12 in 1998),
Lieb and Matson (1998) examined the differences between the processes, decision steps, and
costs. They report that most states detain SVPs for an indeterminate time (e.g., Arizona);
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that some states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., Iowa), whereas others require
only clear and convincing evidence (e.g., Florida); and that some SVP laws are applicable to
juveniles (e.g., Illinois). One of the more relevant details of their report considers the differ-
ing likelihood standards set by the courts to civilly commit an individual using previously
discussed terms such as “likely to engage in” or “substantially probable that the person will
engage in” in reference to “acts of sexual violence.” They also note that these probabilities
are commonly determined using actuarial methods, such as the Static-99.
As determined in Addington v. Texas (1979), civil commitment may require a less
stringent burden of proof. But as Faigman et al. (2013) point out, treatment is part of the
reason for commitment and “[l]aws that commit those who are allegedly sexually dangerous
persons promise no similar benefits and are drawn and defended on the bases of specific
deterrence and public safety” (p. 216). Nonetheless, the AWA states that if “the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence [emphasis added] that the person is a sexually dangerous
person, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General” (H.R.
4472, 2006, § 4248.(d)).
In United States v. Wooden (2012), the United States Court of Appeals noted that the
district court, who allowed the release of the appellee Walter Wooden, “erred by insisting that
the government prove Wooden’s ‘dangerousness,’ which the court believed required proof of
a greater-than-50% risk that Wooden would re-offend within five years” (pp. 460–461). The
district court concluded,
[B]ecause none of the actuarial risk-assessments models [used to assess Wooden’s
risk of recidivism] showed a five-year recidivism rate of 50% or more, ‘the actuarial
instrument scores alone cannot possibly satisfy the statutory threshold of clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Wooden would have serious difficulty refraining from
engaging in sexually violent conduct or child molestation. (p. 450)
The California Supreme Court made a similar statement in People v. Superior Court
(Ghilotti) (2002), saying that “ ‘likely [original emphasis] to engage in acts of sexual violence’
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. . . does not mean the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent” (p. 23). The Court
also said,
An evaluator’s conclusion that one does not meet the criteria for commitment or
recommitment is legally erroneous if it stems from a conclusion that, although the
person presents a serious and well-founded risk of reoffense if free without conditions,
the evaluator cannot say the risk exceeds 50 percent. (p. 6)
As Faigman et al. (2013) points out, the Court used a thesaurus, rather than a dictionary, to
define “likely” and defend their decision. This was also pointed out in the dissent by Justice
Katheryn Werdegar, who notes one dictionary defines likely as “having a better chance of
existing or occurring than not” (p. 35).
Additionally, predictions of future dangerous behavior do not dictate the time frame
of said behavior (Mossman, Schwartz, & Elam, 2011); in other words, the individual deemed
violent may not commit an act of violence in the immediate future, as noted in Purifoy v.
Watters (2010):
Nowhere in [Kansas v. ]Hendricks or [Kansas v. ]Crane did the Supreme Court
rule that there must be an imminent [original emphasis] danger presented by an
offender in order for him to be civilly committed as a sexually violent person within
the meaning of a state statute.
2.7.3 Predicting Sexual Recidivism
In a seven-year follow-up period, Song and Lieb (1995) report in a 1995 study of
Washington State sex offenders that the sexual recidivism rate was about 12 percent—43
percent of those rearrest crimes were worse than the original. In addition, they report the
average time of rearrest to be 4.6 years. For any felonious crime (sexual, violent, or other), the
recidivism rate was 23 percent. The authors note several factors significantly associated with
recidivism: age (younger more likely for any type of felonious recidivism), criminal history
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(repeat offenders more likely to recidivate for sexual or other felonious crime), race (non-white
more likely to recidivate for violent crime), conviction type (rapists more likely to recidivate
for sexual or felonious crime), and sentence length (offenders with longer sentences more
likely to be arrested for a new sexual offense). Focusing strictly of convicted extrafamilial
child molesters, Firestone et al. (2000) found the recidivism rates (after 12 years) were 15%,
20%, and 42% for sexual, violent, or any criminal offense, respectively.
There exists a myriad of research examining the usefulness of risk assessment in-
struments (RAIs) for predicting recidivism in sex offenders; some support their use, some
do not. Gretton, McBride, Hare, O’Shaughnessy, and Kumka (2001) found psychopathy
(as measured by the PCL:YV) was positively associated (as measured by correlations) with
total, violent, and nonviolent (but not sexual) recidivism in adolescent sex offenders. Us-
ing Chi-square tests and odds ratios, they found that offenders in the high psychopathy
category were more likely to recidivate than offenders with low psychopathy scores. Hilde-
brand, De Ruiter, and de Vogel (2004) concluded that the PCL-R was a significant predictor
of recidivism among convicted rapists in the Netherlands. Rettenberger, Boer, and Eher
(2011) found that the SVR-20 was an accurate predictor of sexual recidivism in an Austrian
sample, although they note some inconsistencies. Other studies providing results supporting
these measures for predicting sexual recidivism include, among others, the following: VRAG,
SORAG, Static-99, and RRASOR across multiple sites (G. T. Harris et al., 2003); PCL-R
among rapists (Hildebrand et al., 2004); VRAG, SORAG, RRASOR, Static-99, Static-2002,
and MnSOST-R across several previous studies (Langton et al., 2007); VRAG among rapists
and child molesters (M. E. Rice & Harris, 1997); RRASOR and Static-99 among Swedish
child molesters and rapists (Sjo¨stedt & L˚angstro¨m, 2001). All studies used AUCs to measure
predictive accuracy. Doren (2004b) suggests a multidimensional model for sexual recidivism
risk, suggesting two such dimensions might be “sexual deviance” and “criminal personality;”
Doren pointed to two different factor analytic studies supporting this idea (Butz-Whittaker,
Strassberg, & the Center for Family Development, 2001; C. F. Roberts, Doren, & Thornton,
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2002). Allan, Grace, Rutherford, and Hudson (2007) found a four-factor model that was
significantly correlated with sexual recidivism among child molesters and, when combined
with the Static-99, increased the predictive accuracy.
Bartosh, Garby, Lewis, and Gray (2003) looked at the effectiveness for predicting sex-
ual recidivism of four RAIs, the Static-99, RRASOR, MnSOST-R, and SORAG. The authors
found that only the Static-99 and SORAG showed significant predictive validity (based on
significant AUCs at a 𝑝 < .05 threshold). Specifically looking at offender types, the authors
note that the Static-99 and SORAG showed significant predictive validity with extrafamilial
child molesters; the Static-99 also showed significant predictive validity for incest offend-
ers. All four instruments failed to show any predictive validity for sexual recidivism among
rapists and “hands-off” offenders. Sjo¨stedt and L˚angstro¨m (2002) examined the predictive
accuracy (based on AUC measures) four risk assessment tools (RRASOR, SVR-20, PCL-R,
and VRAG) and found that the RRASOR was the only instrument able to predict sexual
recidivism better than chance among rapists. Sjo¨stedt and Grann (2002) determined the
accuracy of two tools for assessing sexual recidivism risk depends largely on the type of re-
cidivism the user is interested in; for instance, they report that the RRASOR and Static-99
do not discriminate intrafamilial and non-intrafamilial recidivists.
Bechman (2001) is particularly critical of the use of RAIs in SVP commitments,
stating, “[T]here is increasing support for the position that, not only are [A]RAIs not the
‘best science,’ they are not science at all” (p. 26). Janus and Prentky (2003) express their
sentiments regarding the use of RAIs with SVPs:
[I]t is logically incoherent to exclude evidence that presumptively improves upon the
reliability and accuracy of these judgments . . . if [original emphasis] courts deprive
people of liberty based on assessed risk, then [actuarial ]RA[Is] should be part of
the assessment. Courts should use [actuarial ]RA[Is] in part because it will improve
risk assessment. (pp. 1445–1446)
However, the authors caution a sort of catch-22:
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Improved ability to identify persons at high risk for violence may make expanded
preventive detention laws politically impossible to resist. New laws, in turn, may
demand better risk assessment, which may beget more aggressive and expansive
prevention laws, and so on. (p. 1445)
2.8 New Generation, Old Problems
The so-called second generation of research brought along many of the first generation
issues. Numerous articles continued to question the ethical implications of predicting future
dangerous behavior (e.g., Litwack, 1993). And although many of the second-generation
actuarial methods greatly improved upon previous methods and clinical judgment, they
were not without their flaws. Corrado (1996), commenting on the notion that for every true
positive, there is at least one false positive (based on the then-current research), says, “Th[e]
rate of error would seem to many to be unacceptably high; it is much higher, for example,
than the rate of error that we would find acceptable in convicting people of crimes” (p. 792).
Grisso and Appelbaum (1992), arguing against the notion that future violent behav-
ior predictions are by definition unethical, cited four distinct types of violence predictions:
dichotomous (future violent acts will or will not occur), dichotomous with qualified confi-
dence (future violent acts will or will not occur, along with the confidence of that happening
[e.g., “very likely”]), risk, individual-based (the degree of likelihood future violent acts will
occur with respect to an individual [e.g., “20% probability person will be violent”]), and risk,
class-based (degree of likelihood future violent acts will occur with respect to a group the
individual is assumed to be a member). As they note, most earlier research (i.e., from the
first generation) was in the form of dichotomous predictions, particularly predictions made
from clinicians. (Note that probabilistic risk predictions were not new, as they go back to
some of the original research in the form of Burgess expectancy tables and the Glueck pre-
dictive tables.) The authors cite numerous studies from the 1980s that detected subgroups
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within research populations having higher base rates of future violence. They state,
These newer studies, of course, do not provide scientific evidence with which to
claim validity for predictive testimony in dichotomous form . . . They merely pro-
vide research support, in some cases, for predictive testimony that offers courts a
sense of the relative risk of violence associated with individuals in question . . . Yet
this is enough to contradict the generalized assertion that all predictive testimony
regarding future violence is unethical for lack of a scientific basis.
In the authors’ discussion on statutes such the New York Family Court Law, they argue
that risk predictions, not dichotomous predictions, are required and that detention is based
on sufficient risk. Because, as they state, predictions regarding the degree of risk have
been shown to be accurate, the degree of risk deemed sufficient is up to society. However,
given that a threshold has been set to justify preventive detention, say at 40% probability
of committing an act of violence, the decision remains dichotomous; as Gottfredson (1987)
points out, “Most selection applications of prediction devices use some cutting score that
essentially reduces the predictor scale to a dichotomy” (p. 30).
2.8.1 The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Repealing the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984
(H.R. 5865, 1984). The new version, among other things, authorized judicial officers to deter-
mine pretrial detention (§ 3141(a)), required a detention hearing held in any case involving
a violent crime (§ 3142(f)(1)(A)), and required detention of any person awaiting sentencing
unless the judicial officer determined, with clear and convincing evidence, the person was
not likely to flee or did not pose a threat to the community or any persons (§ 3142(f)).
Shortly after, the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (specifically the clauses
mentioned) was challenged and reached the United Stated Supreme Court (United States
v. Salerno, 1987). The Supreme Court ruled that detention under the Act was regulatory
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and not penal. In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated, “The majority’s technique
for infringing [the right to be free from punishment before conviction] is simple: merely re-
define any measure which is claimed to be punishment as ‘regulation,’ and, magically, the
Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition” (p. 765).
In Louisiana, an individual is committed to a psychiatric hospital after being found
guilty by reason of insanity unless that individual can prove that he or she is not dangerous.
If committed, that individual can be released if no longer posing a threat to others or
himself/herself and upon hospital recommendation, but not before the court holds a hearing
to determine the individual’s dangerousness. If the court finds the individual is dangerous,
he/she is returned to the psychiatric hospital regardless of whether the individual is mentally
ill. This process was challenged in Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), and the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the defendant, Terry Foucha, be released. In some ways, the
ruling that Foucha could not be held strictly based on perceived dangerousness seemed to
contradict the ruling of United States v. Salerno (1987), but as Justice Byron White noted
in the majority opinion, “Salerno, unlike this case, involved pretrial detention” (p. 81).
Corrado (1996) opines that the ruling implied detention based on perceived dangerousness
was not permissible; however, he also notes,
[A]s Justice [Sandra Day] O’Connor made clear in her concurring opinion, the states
may eliminate the insanity defense altogether (Foucha v. Louisiana, pp. 88–89,
O’Conner, J., concurring), which means that people innocent of crimes because
of insanity would be convicted and imprisoned nevertheless—a good functional sub-
stitute for detention on grounds of dangerousness (see Robinson, 1993).
2.9 Combining Prediction Methods
Sawyer (1966) makes the distinction between clinical and statistical (mechanical) pre-
diction and clinical and statistical measurement; defining the former as how the data are
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combined and the latter as how the data are collected. In combination, he notes eight pre-
diction methods: pure clinical (collected and combined clinically), pure statistical (collected
and combined statistically), trait ratings (collected clinically, combined statistically), profile
interpretation (collected statistically, combined mechanically), clinical composite (collected
both clinically and statistically, combined clinically), mechanical composite (collected both
clinically and statistically, combined statistically), and two forms of syntheses. The first he
called clinical synthesis, defined as “[t]ak[ing] a prediction, produced by mechanical [original
emphasis] combination, and treat it as a datum to be combined clinically [original emphasis]
with the other data”; the second, mechanical synthesis, he defined as “[t]ak[ing] a prediction,
produced by clinical [original emphasis] combination, and treat it as a datum to be com-
bined mechanically [original emphasis] with the other data.” (p. 184). Sawyer examined 45
studies and concluded, among other things, that statistical combinations outperform clinical
combinations for every type of data collection, and within each type of data combination
the clinical mode of data collection is inferior to the other types of data collection.
The debate on clinical versus actuarial prediction performance is ongoing, but Mon-
ahan et al. (2001) feel it should have been declared over long ago: “More research demon-
strating that the outcome of unstructured clinical assessments . . . seem[] to be overkill: That
horse [i]s already dead” (p. 7; for arguments supporting clinical predictions of violence in the
second generation, see Lidz, Mulvey, & Gardner, 1993; Litwack, 2001). Although the general
conclusion among researchers is that clinical prediction is inferior to statistical predictions,
Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, and Shaw (1996b), in their “progress report” on actuarial prediction
of violence, note that actuarial methods are seldomly used in practice. Some suggested clin-
ical prediction should be combined with actuarial methods (e.g., in general, see Kleinmuntz,
1990; specifically for violence prediction, see Buchanan, 1999). G. T. Harris et al. (1993)
state,
If adjustments [to actuarial methods] are made conservatively and only [original
emphasis] when a clinician believes, on good evidence, that a factor is related to
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the likelihood of violent recidivism in an individual case, predictive accuracy may
be improved. (p. 333)
However, they have since recanted this belief (Quinsey et al., 2006; M. E. Rice, Harris, &
Hilton, 2010) and the authors of the VRAG take the extreme view: “What we are advising
is not the addition of actuarial methods to existing practice, but rather the replacement of
existing practice with actuarial methods” (Quinsey et al., 2006, p. 197; see also Quinsey,
Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1999, p. 171).
Helmus, Hanson, and Thornton (2009) report that the recidivism norms of the Static-
99 (i.e., the rates of recidivism for the risk categories) needed revision, citing declining crime
rates as a reason. Sreenivasan, Weinberger, Frances, and Cusworth-Walker (2010) discuss
the consequences of the changing norms and question the importance given the Static-99 by
the courts. Because of the flaws that may exist with Static-99 norms, the authors pushed for
clinical judgment to assist in decision making. But Abbott (2011) suggests their arguments
are incorrect and without empirical support and that supplementing clinical judgment will
only worsen the situation.
In his seminal work, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction, Meehl (1954) suggested
that a clinician, in certain circumstances, can provide valuable information that may not be
included in an actuarial device. He provided the following example:
[S]uppose that . . . we are trying to predict whether a given professor will attend
the movies on a given night. On the basis of the [data] and a failure to show any
time-series change in the relative frequency when the occasions are ordered as to
time, we arrive at a probability of .90 that he will attend the neighborhood theater,
the present night being Friday. The clinician, however, knows in addition to these
facts that Professor A has recently broken his leg. This single fact is sufficient to
change the probability of .90 to a probability of approximately zero. (pp. 24–25)
The example provided by Meehl (1954) is often used as justification for combining
statistical and clinical prediction. But Meehl later cautions clinicians to “beware of overdoing
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the broken leg analogy” (1957, p. 270). Although circumstances may not be as obvious as
in the example provided by Meehl, clinicians may nevertheless hold strong opinions on
adjustments. In other words, misplaced intuition may again be the clinician’s own undoing,
despite the use of actuarial methods. In testing this idea, Hilton and Simmons (2001)
found that in tribunal decisions about mentally-ill prisoners, actuarial risk assessment did
not influence clinical judgment and tribunal decision making. Krauss and Sales (2001)
found that clinical testimony is more influential than actuarial results on jurors’ decisions.
Ægisdo´ttir et al. (2006) found in their meta-analysis that access to statistical methods failed
to improve a clinician’s accuracy, and possibly worsened it. That’s not to say clinicians have
no value to prediction; as Hilton et al. (2006) put it, “Because some of the best indicators
[for predicting violence] require clinical skill to measure, accurately appraising violence risk
is likely to remain a task for the clinician, but the place for the clinical judgment is within
rather than outside actuarial tools” (p. 402). Dawes (2002) argues that when a validated,
superior statistical prediction measure exists, practitioners have an ethical obligation to use
them (see also Dawes, 2005); he also states,
[T]he practitioner claiming to use his or her own intuition to “improve” [a statistical
prediction method] has an ethical obligation to keep track of outcomes to see if
modification really does result in improvement (and must be wary of confounded
judgments, self-fulfilling prophesies and other challenges to the validity of evaluating
such feedback). (pp. S181–S182)
And what about the combination of multiple actuarial instruments? Seto (2005)
notes that combining instruments does not increase accuracy and in some instances reduces
it. Taking a different approach to violence prediction, Skeem, Manchak, Lidz, and Mulvey
(2013) suggest that an accurate measure of risk assessment is to simply ask the individuals
(i.e., measure risk via self-reported measures). Their results show that a self-perception
measure of violence is a significant predictor of serious and any violence, even outperforming
two risk assessment measures (one being the COVR). The authors’ results also suggest that
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self-perception adds incremental utility to the RAIs but not the other way around.
2.10 Aggregate Versus Individual Prediction
S. D. Hart, Michie, and Cooke (2007) discuss two types of errors when using risk
assessment instruments (RAIs): group (i.e., nomethetic or aggregate) and individual (i.e.,
idiographic) error. Group error typically is expressed in the form of confidence intervals (CIs).
Individual error is a bit more complicated, and, as the authors note, rarely provided. The
authors suggest using individual CIs that can be calculated using a method first introduced
by Wilson (1927) and given below:
𝑝+ 𝑧2𝛼/2/2𝑛
1 + 𝑧2𝛼/2/𝑛
± 𝑧𝛼/2
√︀
𝑝(1−𝑝)/𝑛+ 𝑧2𝛼/2/4𝑛2
1 + 𝑧2𝛼/2/𝑛
,
where 𝑝 is an estimate for the proportion of individuals with a given RAI score who recidi-
vate (or, are violent, violate parole, etc.), 𝑧𝛼/2 is the 1− 𝛼 quantile of the standard normal
distribution (i.e., 𝑃 (𝑍 ≤ 𝑧𝛼/2) = 𝛼/2), and 𝑛 is the number of individuals with a given RAI
score. Agresti and Coull (1998) note that the coverage of Wilson’s method for estimating a
confidence interval is closer to the 1 − 𝛼 value than other methods such as Wald’s method
(𝑝± 𝑧𝛼/2
√︀
𝑝(1−𝑝)/𝑛). As S. D. Hart et al. (2007) note, Wilson’s method requires few assump-
tions, such as the reasonable assumption that RAI scores follow the binomial distribution; is
easy to calculate; and does not require the raw data, only the individually-assigned proba-
bilistic value. S. D. Hart et al. (2007) examined individual CIs for the Static-99 and VRAG
and found that the individual intervals were very large, especially compared to the group
CIs, for these RAIs. For instance, the average width of a 95% confidence interval for the
different Static-99 categories was about 13 percentage points and for the VRAG, 20 per-
centage points. For the individual 95% CIs, the average widths were 86 and 85 percentage
points, respectively, for the Static-99 and VRAG. As an example, an individual who scores
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an 8 on the VRAG is categorized in a group where 76% of the individuals are recidivists.
The 95% CI for this group estimate is (.58, .88); for the individual estimate using Wilson’s
method, it is (.12, .99). In other words, for individuals who score an 8 on the VRAG one can
be confident that most (about 3 of every 4) will recidivate; however, for any given individual
who scores an 8, one cannot be as confident. It is worth noting that when 𝑛 = 1, the width
of a 95% CI using Wilson’s method depends strictly on the point estimate (i.e., estimated
probabilities); the width is minimal at 0 and 1 (.79) and maximal at .5 (.89). Even a 50%
confidence interval will have a width larger than .5 for more than half the possible point
estimates. This is not a criticism of Wilson’s method but rather a reminder of the inherent
difficulties of individualized prediction. S. D. Hart et al. (2007) caution against the use of
RAIs in situations where decision errors are high; in addition, they state that “[l]ow pre-
dictive accuracy not only makes reliance on [actuarial ]RAIs ethically problematic, it also
means that they may not meet legal standards for the admissibility of expert or scientific
evidence” (p. s64).
S. D. Hart et al. (2007) sparked controversy with their article; in their response
G. T. Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (2008), argue that actuarial methods, although infallible,
are the best available:
An actuarial tool . . . is simply an efficient distillation of relevant empirical evidence.
Actuarials do not afford certainty, but . . . are more valid than any other method.
The undeniable [emphasis added] superiority of actuarials means that their use can
optimise the balance between public safety and offenders’ civil liberties. Hart et al’s
advice to eschew risk-related decisions means less accurate decisions that cumulate
in avoidable harm to victims, unnecessary restriction of offenders, or both. (p. 154)
G. T. Harris and Rice (2007) also commented on the S. D. Hart et al. (2007) article, stating
that their article “does not sensibly indict actuarial tools or any other empirically based
decision policies using data from groups” and that
the psychometric data about the (VRAG) (e.g., Harris et al., 1993; Harris et
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al., 2003) have indicated that its standard error of measurement is such that,
with 95% confidence, an individual true score differs from an obtained score
by less than one category. (p. 1648)
Mossman and Sellke (2007) question, “[I]f all one knows about an individual is his member-
ship of a risk group, what can ‘individual risk’ mean?” The authors suggest that “95% CIs
for ‘individual risk’ pile nonsense on top of meaninglessness” (p. 561). Skeem and Monahan
(2011), expressing their opinion on the matter, state that “group data theoretically can be,
and in many areas empirically are, highly informative when making decisions about individ-
ual cases” (p. 40). They support their argument by analogizing human behavioral risk with
insurance sales and rainy days.
In their article discussing the use of the OGRS used for assessing risk of harm and
reoffense, Copas and Marshall (1998) note,
The statement accompanying the OGRS is careful to point out that the score is
not a prediction about an individual, but an estimate of what rate of conviction
might be expected of a group of offenders who match that individual on the set of
covariates used by the score. (p. 170)
Grove and Meehl (1996) also discuss the issue with aggregate prediction:
There is a real problem, not a fallacious objection, about uniqueness versus ag-
gregates in defining what the statisticians call the reference class for computing a
particular probability in coming to a decision about an individual case (p. 306)
They argue that the probability of an outcome attached to an individual depends on which
reference class is used. This is a notion echoed by Janus and Meehl (1997). They suggest,
as do others (e.g., Monahan, 1973; Meehl, 1954) that individual probabilities are, in reality,
statements about the group to which a person belongs. For example, stating that an indi-
vidual has a .75 probability of recidivism is equivalent to stating that the individual belongs
to a (reference) group where 75% of the individuals recidivate.
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Berlin, Galbreath, Geary, and McGlone (2003) express caution as well, stating, “It is
critical to note that individuals within any such ‘high risk’ group are not all at equal risk”
(p. 378). G. Harris (2003) criticizes the work of Berlin et al. (2003), calling it “essentially
a layperson’s commentary on the recent research in the field of risk assessment” (p. 389).
Specifically addressing the idea Berlin et al. presented in the above quote, G. Harris (2003)
states,
[V]irtually all decisions require clinicians to treat patients or clients as members of
groups. Diagnosis and prognosis inevitably demand probabalistic statements about
whether an individual falls within a particular reference class (even if clincians
address the probabilities only implicitly). Attempting to treat a patient or client as
if he were unique in any real sense (i.e., not a member of any group) would require
clinicians to ignore all prior scientific research. (p. 391)
2.10.1 Prediction Intervals
Cooke and Michie (2010) suggest using prediction intervals, rather than confidence
intervals, when providing an interval estimate for an individual’s risk. Prediction intervals
are used to convey uncertainty in prediction of a new observation; they depend on the
variability of both the estimated model and new observation. Prediction intervals are wider
than comparative confidence intervals and depend less on the size of the sample. Consider
the simple linear regression model, 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥. The confidence interval for true expected
value of 𝑦 given 𝑋 = 𝑥* is
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥* ± 𝑡𝛼/2,𝑛−2
(︃√︃
?^?2
(︂
1
𝑛
+
(𝑥* − ?¯?2)
SS𝑥
)︂)︃
,
where ?^?2 is the estimated error variance, SS𝑥 is the sum of squares of the mean deviations
for 𝑥, and 𝑡𝛼/2,𝑛−2 the critical value of a 𝑇 -distribution with 𝑛 − 2 degrees of freedom such
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that 𝑃 (𝑇 ≤ 𝑡𝛼/2,𝑛−2) = 𝛼/2. For a new observation, the prediction interval is
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥* ± 𝑡𝛼/2,𝑛−2
(︃√︃
?^?2
(︂
𝑛+ 1
𝑛
+
(𝑥* − ?¯?2)
SS𝑥
)︂)︃
.
Cooke and Michie (2010) estimated prediction intervals for the probability of recon-
viction estimated by a logistic function and based on PCL-R scores. The 95% prediction
intervals for different PCL-R scores did not deviate much from the uninformative (0, 1) in-
terval. Cooke and Michie (2010) conclude, “[O]n the basis of empirical findings, statistical
theory, and logic it is clear that predictions of future offending cannot be achieved, with any
degree of confidence, in the individual case” (p. 272).
Attempting to address many of the criticisms received for the S. D. Hart et al. (2007)
article, S. D. Hart and Cooke (2013) built a logistic regression model; the individual risk
estimates from the model ranged from .03 to .68 with confidence interval widths ranging
from .14 to .64 indicating, according to the authors, that “the individual risk estimates
made using the [actuarial ]RAI had margins of error that were very large, indicating that it
was virtually impossible to identify subjects with distinct or non-overlapping probabilities
of failure” (p. 94). S. D. Hart and Cooke (2013) also question how RAIs can be considered
legally admissible under the Daubert standard “when the margins of error for individual risk
estimates made using the tests are large, unknown, or incalculable” (p. 97).
Hanson and Howard (2010) disagree with S. D. Hart et al. (2007) and argue that
an individual “confidence interval of [0, 1] is a consequence of having only two possible
outcomes” (p. 279; i.e., due to a dichotomous outcome variable). Because of this, they
state that “individual confidence intervals are uninformative about the accuracy of the risk
assessment procedure when the outcome is dichotomous” (p. 280).
2.10.2 Credible Intervals
Scurich and John (2012) attack the controversy altogether for being centered around
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the “frequentist” approach using confidence intervals; they state, “[i]t is simply unintelli-
gible to employ frequentist confidence intervals to describe the precision of actuarial risk
estimates” (p. 243). Similar to Hanson and Howard (2010), they also dismiss the idea of us-
ing a prediction interval for a binary outcome, such as whether an individual will recidivate,
because “intervals around discrete quantities make no sense” (p. 239). Instead, the authors
advocate the use of Bayesian credible intervals. Using the same VRAG data provided in
S. D. Hart et al. (2007), Scurich and John (2012) provide a numerical example using four
different beta distributions for the Bayesian prior of the parameter, 𝑝, representing the prob-
ability of recidivism. The probability density function for the beta distribution is provided
in Equation (2.1):
𝑓(𝑝|𝛼, 𝛽) = Γ(𝛼 + 𝛽)
Γ(𝛼)Γ(𝛽)
𝑝𝛼−1(1− 𝑝)𝛽−1, (2.1)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function, Γ(𝑡) = ∫︀∞
0
𝑥𝑡−1𝑒−𝑥d𝑥. The choice for the parameters
𝛼 and 𝛽 for the four priors used by Scurich and John were representative of four different
hypothetical people: an na¨ıve person (𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1; i.e., the standard uniform distribution,
an uninformative prior) and three mental health professionals working in (a) an outpatient
setting (𝛼 = 1.5, 𝛽 = 3.5), (b) a facility with involuntarily- and voluntary-committed pa-
tients (𝛼 = 3, 𝛽 = 7), and (c) a maximum-security ward (𝛼 = 15, 𝛽 = 35). The expected
value of the beta distribution given in Equation (2.1) is 𝛼/(𝛼+𝛽); thus, all three informative
priors have the same mean, .30, representing the approximate base rate in the sample. The
four credible intervals for an individual scoring an 8 on the VRAG is, for the na¨ıve person,
(.58, .88) and for the three mental health professionals, (a) (.53, 83), (b) (.49, .78), and (c)
(.36, .58). It is clear from the four intervals that the prior distribution plays an important
role, which the authors note, “deserves some attention within the context of violence risk
assessment”; unfortunately, this was beyond the scope of their article. Given a proper way of
constructing a prior distribution, a credible interval offers the distinct advantage of attaching
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a probability to the parameter 𝑝, whereas a confidence interval only provides the confidence
one has that the interval will, in the long run, contain 𝑝.
2.11 Predictors of Recidivism
The type of predictor variables used in risk assessment measures can vary but com-
monly include the perpetrator’s age, criminal history (e.g., number of previous arrests),
victim (particularly used with sex offenders), substance abuse, and personality (e.g., the
Psychopathy Checklist). Predictor variables are often classified into two categories, dynamic
and static, described in the next section.
2.11.1 Dynamic Versus Static Predictors
Predictor variables that change over time are referred to as dynamic predictors . As
Dr. Howard Barbaree states in his comments in Grisso, Malamuth, Barbaree, Quinsey, and
Knight (2003), “Static factors are a between-subjects kind of variable and dynamic factors
are a within-subject variable” (p. 240). Examples of dynamic predictors include current or
recent substance abuse, recent death in family, and current treatment. In contrast, static
predictors are ones that do not change over time, or change in one direction. Examples of
static variables include age, many of the variables related to criminal history (e.g., number
of previous arrests) but not all (e.g., months since last arrest), many of the variables related
to the victim (e.g., victim’s age and gender at time of offense), and family history variables
(e.g., father’s drug use). Some variables do not fit neatly into the two categories; for example,
many personality traits are considered stable but not until after a certain age, and for some
traits this occurs quite late in one’s life (B. W. Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).
Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) opine that static variables are more common because
dynamic variables “may be more problematic from a methodological viewpoint because such
variables may be more difficult to measure” (p. 192). Quinsey et al. (2006) argue that
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dynamic predictors pose numerous problems. For instance, they suggest that “predictors
that change may lose their predictive ability with remeasurement” (p. 45) and state that it
is not possible to compare the accuracy of static predictors with dynamic predictors “unless
one uses dynamic predictors as measured at a particular point of time” (p. 45). G. T. Harris
and Rice (2003) state,
Predictive accuracy achieved by already-identified static, historical variables places
a limit on the amount of remaining variance available for assessments (one-time or
change scores) of such putatively dynamic variables as changes in mood, insight, or
procriminal attitudes. We conclude that in predicting long-term violent recidivism,
there is very little outcome variance left over for “dynamic” variables. . . . As yet,
there have been no demonstrations that change scores add anything to initial scores
in predicting recidivism among sex offenders. The predictive accuracy achieved
under optimal conditions by a comprehensive set of such static, historical predictors
. . . imply that such dynamic attitudinal and intrapsychic variables (assessed one or
more times before release) cannot make incremental [original emphasis] contribution
to the prediction of recidivism. (pp. 204–205)
Under the assumption that psychopathic personality is static, the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide is an example of a risk assessment tool that is based on only static variables.
But just because a measure uses static variables does not mean it will necessary
produce similar results from different evaluators. Consider the Static-99, a tool that has been
shown to possess interrater reliability (e.g., de Vogel, de Ruiter, van Beek, & Mead, 2004) and
contains only static predictors (see Appendix B). Boccaccini et al. (2012) looked at Static-
99 evaluations in Texas and New Jersey and found that rater agreement (as measured by
intraclass correlations) were strong (.79 in Texas and .88 in New Jersey), but that evaluation
pairs were identical only about half the time (55.0% in Texas and 54.1% in New Jersey).
When looking at the scoring at the item-level, evaluation pairs were in agreement across all
items less than half the time (49.7% in Texas and 43.0% in New Jersey). The disagreement
106
in total scores was generally within one point, but over ten percent of the evaluation pairs
were more than two points (12.5% in Texas and 12.6% in New Jersey). The authors suggest
the use of confidence intervals around raters’ total scores. C. S. Miller, Kimonis, Otto, Kline,
and Wasserman (2012) found similar results with the PCL-R, MnSOST-R, and Static-99.
In United States v. Abregana (2008), convicted sex offender Jay Abregana received
evaluations from three experts, Dr. Dennis M. Doren, Dr. Luis Rosell, and Dr. Howard E.
Barbaree. Abregana received different scores on both the RRASOR and Static-99 (they
could not agree on the shared item “prior sex offenses”). It should be noted that Drs. Rosell
and Barbaree—both witnesses for the defendant—did agree, whereas Dr. Doren, a witness
for the United States, had a higher overall score. In addition, the three agreed on only twelve
of the sixteen MnSOST items and all three overall scores differed.
An actuarial device that provides a probabilistic measure based on static variables
implies that the individual’s risk for violence remains static. As Slobogin (2006) points out,
the score on an actuarial instrument such as the VRAG, “does not take into account whether
[an individual] is undergoing treatment, is about to get married, has recently lost functioning
in one or more limbs, or has found religion” (pp. 23–24). Bechman (2001) says, “There is
little dispute that a consideration of dynamic factors can be important in accurately assessing
risk” (p. 28). Some research has supported this; Gendreau, Little, and Goggin (1996) found
in their meta-analytic study that many dynamic predictors are as good and often better
than static predictors.
Instruments that use dynamic predictors assume that risk is liable to change. This
point is made by Douglas and Skeem (2005) where they distinguish between what they call
risk status and risk state; as they explain, “Static risk factors describe an individual’s risk
status, whereas a combination of static and dynamic factors describes an individual’s risk
state” (p. 350; see also Skeem & Mulvey, 2002). Some research (Skeem et al., 2006, e.g.,)
has shown that changes in some psychiatric symptoms (e.g., anger) may lead to an increased
risk of violence. Gottfredson (1987) plainly states, “If a variable can be measured reliably
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and if it is predictive, then of course it should be used—absent legal or ethical challenge”
(p. 193).
2.11.2 Gender and Race
One of the factors used in Tibbitts (1931) was “Nationality” and it was noted that
“Irish,” “Austrians,” and “Negroes” are more likely to violate parole. The use of race or
ethnicity in the prediction of dangerousness, whether directly or indirectly, is a controversial
topic. Such a factor would likely never explicitly be included in today’s actuarial models
(e.g., Monahan et al., 2001, in the development of the COVR state that they removed race
from their model “on ethical and legal grounds” [p. 119]).
Using race as a predictor involves the controversial issue of racial profiling. In 1996,
Victor Saldano was sentenced to death for capital murder; an expert witness in the case was
a psychologist named Dr. Walter Quijano, who testified on behalf of the state. Dr. Quijano
assessed Saldano’s future dangerousness using numerous risk factors, including race, and
Saldano was ultimately sentenced to death (Saldano v. Roach, 2004; see also Monahan,
2006). After certiorari was granted, the Attorney General of Texas, before the United States
Supreme Court, confessed error in introducing race as a factor; however, the en banc session
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the confession of error was “contrary
to [Texas’s] procedural law for presenting a claim on appeal” (Saldano v. State, 2002, p.
891). The Court did not collectively opine on the use of ethnicity or race in determining
risk of dangerousness, but several dissenting members of the Court did. For example, Judge
Tom Price stated,
Dr. Quijano’s testimony during the punishment phase of the appellant’s trial drew a
correlation between the appellant’s race and incarceration rates. I would hold that
the admission of this evidence was fundamental error, which should be reviewed
even in the absence of a trial objection. (p. 892)
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Judge Cheryl Johnson stated, “I do not think that race or ethnicity should ever be a con-
sideration, in any degree, in the assessment of punishment” (p. 893). The legislators of the
state of Texas later addressed the issue of race: “evidence may not be offered by the state to
establish that the race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely that the defendant will
engage in future criminal conduct” (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 2014).
In another Texas capital murder case, Buck v. Thaler (2011), Dr. Quijano again
testified in court, this time on behalf of the defendant, Duane Buck, an African-American.
Dr. Quijano testified that the defendant did not pose a threat to society; however, when
the defense questioned Dr. Quijano about statistical factors used, he cited race as one and
suggested that Mr. Buck’s race is a factor related to increased risk of dangerous behavior.
Although race may not be explicitly provided in predictive measures, it is often
implicitly included; as Berk (2009) states, “In locales with substantial residential segregation,
knowing the zipcode is virtually the same as knowing an individual’s race” (p. 232). Professor
Bernard Harcourt says,
When you live in a world in which juveniles are much more likely to be stopped—
or, if stopped, be arrested, or, if arrested, be adjudicated—if they are black, then
all of the indicators associated with prior criminal history are going to be serving
effectively as a proxy for race. . . . [It] inscribes the racial discrimination you have
today into the future. (Labi, 2011, para. 9)
Berk (2009) examined the role of race in parole failures; using sophisticated decision
tree analyses (specifically random forests; see Chapter 5), he found that race plays an im-
portant role in the model’s predictive accuracy. Berk (2012) later argues, “By not including
age, gender, and race as forecasting predictors, one may be sparing some young African-
American men substantial time in prison, but at the cost of the deaths of other young
African-American men” (p. 8). Heilbrun, Douglas, and Yasuhara (2009) state that research
is lacking in terms of risk assessment measures performance across different ethnicities; lack-
ing a predictor variable for race may render risk assessment measures that are developed
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on racially-homogeneous populations useless. For instance, L˚angstro¨m (2004) found that
the Static-99 and RRASOR could not distinguish recidivists and non-recidivists among a
Swedish subpopulation of African-Asian descent.
Many risk assessment tools are constructed using predominantly male samples (e.g.,
the construction sample for the VRAG was all male) and some research has shown that they
may not be appropriate for use in female populations (e.g., de Vogel & de Ruiter, 2005;
G. T. Harris et al., 2002). Most crime statistics support the notion that males are far more
likely to commit violent acts than women (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).
It is clear that more research is needed before making conclusions, and until conclu-
sions suggest that risk assessment measures generalize across race and gender, evaluators
should take extreme caution when assessing select populations.
2.12 A Third Generation?
Several authors have suggested a third generation of violence risk is in effect (e.g.,
Bonta, 1996), consisting of risk assessment measures that are “theoretically based, inclusion
of dynamic items, and concerned with measuring changes in risk” (Campbell, French, &
Gendreau, 2007, p. ii).
2.12.1 Structured Professional Judgment
Skeem and Monahan (2011) suggest that risk assessment methods “now exist[] on
a continuum of rule-based structure [original emphasis’]” (p. 39) as opposed to the simple
clinical/actuarial dichotomy. As they suggest, the two extremes of this continuum are com-
pletely unstructured (i.e., clinical) and completely structured (i.e., actuarial) assessments.
Somewhere in the middle of the continuum exists what some call structured professional
judgment (SPJ; e.g., see Kropp & Hart, 2000) where “decision-making is assisted by guide-
lines that have been developed to reflect the ‘state of the discipline’ with respect to scientific
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knowledge and professional practice” (S. D. Hart, 2009, p. 150).
A completely structured actuarial assessment tool, such as the Violence Risk Ap-
praisal Guide (VRAG), advises against any sort of modification based on clinical judgment
because, as M. E. Rice et al. (2010) state, “[N]o evidence supports contentions that any alter-
ations (based on clinical judgment) of actuarial scores . . . results in more accurate decisions
compared to actuarially derived scores alone” (p. 99).
S. D. Hart (2009) notes the difference between the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol
(RSVP; an SPJ assessment tool) with the Static-99 (an actuarial assessment tool): “Rather
than offer a prediction of what will happen, the evaluator [using the RSVP] speculates
systematically about what the offender might or could do in the future and how to prevent
it. . . . [The Static-99] is focused on prediction, not prevention” (pp. 163–164). As Heilbrun
et al. (2009) describe it,
Rather than reaching a numeric conclusion, SPJ evaluators are asked to rate each
case as low, moderate, or high risk by assuming (1) the more risk factors present
that are individually relevant to a person’s violent behavior [original emphasis], the
higher the risk; and (2) the greater the degree of intervention required to stem
the risk of violence, the higher the risk. . . . The “judgment” part of SPJ requires
evaluators to decide for whom it is relevant (and to what extent) and for whom it
is not. (p. 337)
As Doyle and Logan (2012) say, actuarial measures “are derived from a prediction rather
than a prevention paradigm, so that conceptually they are designed to determine ‘if’ a person
is a risk rather than ‘why’ (p. 411).
Along with the RSVP, the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide (SARA), the His-
torical Clinical Risk–20 (HCR-20), the Sexual Violence Risk–20 (SVR-20), the Short-Term
Assessment of Risk and Treatability (START), the Early Assessment Risk List for boys
(EARL-20B), the Early Assessment Risk List for girls (EARL-21G), and the Structured As-
sessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY) are all considered SPJ assessment instruments
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(Guy, 2008). Many of these instruments have been shown to predict violent recidivism with
moderate accuracy (e.g., HCR–20, de Vogel & de Ruiter, 2006; de Vogel & de Ruiter, 2005;
and Douglas, Ogloff, & Hart, 2003; SAVRY, Catchpole & Gretton, 2003; EARL-20B, Ene-
brink, L˚angstro¨m, & Gumpert, 2006), sometimes outperforming actuarial instruments (e.g.,
de Vogel et al., 2004, found the SVR–20 was more accurate than the Static-99 in predicting
sexual recidivism; Douglas, Yeomans, & Boer, 2005, found the HCR–20 was as good and
often better than many actuarial methods, including the VRAG, in predicting violence).
2.13 Violence Risk Communication
Following the ruling in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976),
Monahan (1993) advised,
Four tasks form the basis of any professionally adequate risk assessment: The clini-
cian must be educated about what information to gather regarding risk, must gather
it, must use this information to estimate risk, and, if the clinician is not the ultimate
decision maker, must communicate the information and estimate to those who are
responsible for making clinical decisions. (p. 242)
With respect to communication, Monahan adds, “Only by making the information salient
can one be assured that the decision maker has had the option to make use of it” (p. 245).
Risk communication “involv[es] the provision of information from an assessor to a
decision-maker regarding the risk of a specified event’s occurrence” (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, Hart,
& McNiel, 1999, p. 91); it plays an important role in legal decision making. Monahan and
Steadman (1996) opine, “Understanding how best to communicate assessments of risk is as
important to mental health law as improving the validity of those assessments themselves” (p.
938) and suggest that risk communication closely follow the paradigm found in meteorology
(e.g., no threat, violence watch, violence warning).
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Heilbrun, Dvoskin, et al. (1999) argue for more research in violence risk commu-
nication and provide guidelines for communicating risk of violence in the mental health
community. In a survey involving fifty-five participants who had received “Basic Forensic
Evaluator Training through the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of Virginia” only one indicated that numerical figures, such as probabilities, were
used when communicating risk; about half of the participants stated they do not use nu-
merical figures is because “the state of the research literature doesn’t justify using specific
numbers” (Heilbrun, Philipson, Berman, & Warren, 1999, p. 399). In a separate survey, Heil-
brun, Philipson, et al. (1999) report that, among the fifty-seven participants (mental health
clinicians who were participants in a continuing education workshop on risk assessment),
only four indicated they used numerical probabilities to communicate risk. Hanson, Lloyd,
Helmus, and Thornton (2012) suggest the use of non-arbitrary metrics for communicating
risk: “[I]t is the responsibility of the professional community to establish plausible definitions
for risk communication. Given that nominal categories [i.e., high-, moderate-, and low-risk]
are unlikely to go away, we should work towards giving nominal risk categories explicit,
non-arbitrary meanings” (p. 19). If using percentile rankings, the authors recommend also
including recidivism base rates.
Heilbrun, O’Neill, Strohman, Bowman, and Philipson (2000) presented eight vignettes
describing hypothetical patients differing in three aspects: risk level (low risk vs. high risk),
risk factors (static risk factors [e.g., age] vs. dynamic risk factors [e.g., substance abuse]),
and risk model (prediction with legal decision being civil commitment vs. management with
legal decision be parole). The vignettes concluded with six different forms of risk commu-
nication and seventy-one psychologists/sociologists and psychiatrists were asked to rate (on
a five-point Likert scale) how valuable they found the risk communication to be. Risk level
was found to be significantly different among all respondents; in particular, risk communi-
cation identifying risk factors and specifying possible interventions was rated significantly
more valuable among high-risk patients. Among low-risk patients, ratings of value differed
113
significantly between psychiatrists and psychologists/sociologists when the risk communica-
tion described relevant clinical characteristics (psychiatrists’ ratings were higher; there were
no other significant differences between the two groups of respondents). The authors con-
clude from the results of their study that “violence risk communication is valued by experts
according to both the risk level of the individual being assessed and the nature of the risk
factors that are present . . . particularly true in the high-risk cases” (p. 145).
Interested in laypersons’ and clinicians’ perceptions of a person’s risk of violence,
Slovic and Monahan (1995) asked participants to judge the probability that a person would
be violent, whether that person should be labeled as “dangerous,” and the necessary course
of action. Their results showed that the higher the perceived risk, the more likely partici-
pants (both laypersons and clinicians) advocated hospitalization (coerced, if necessary). The
authors note that “the concept ‘probability of harm’ was not represented in [the participants’
(both laypersons and clinicians)] minds in a consistent, quantitative way” (pp. 61–62). But
Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000) caution that one should “temper deriving strong
conclusions about risk communication” (p. 273) from these results.
Pescosolido, Monahan, Link, Stueve, and Kikuzawa (1999) surveyed U.S. residents’
opinions regarding mental health in the country using vignettes describing an individual
who was either schizophrenic, severely depressed, alcohol-dependent, drug-dependent, or
troubled/distressed (used as the control). The authors discovered, among other things, that
respondents viewed most individuals as being somewhat or very likely to be violent toward
others (lowest: 17% among the troubled group; highest: 87% among the drug dependent
group). The authors also found that when the person was considered dangerous to others
that coerced treatment was deemed necessary (lowest: 83% among the troubled group; 96%
among the drug dependent group).
Slovic et al. (2000) conducted a three-part study: Study 1 asked experienced clinicians
to estimate violence risk after reviewing hospital discharge summaries; Study 2 instructed
clinicians in making probabilistic judgments and compared their violence risk estimates to the
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(uninstructed) estimates from Study 1; Study 3 measured the effects of risk communication
in clinicians’ decision making. In Studies 1 and 2, the authors also examined the effect of
communicating risk with probabilities versus per-one-hundred frequencies stated using large-
response scales or small-response scales, creating four distinct groups (in Study 1, there was
a fifth group that were presented small-response scale frequencies per one-thousand). In
Study 1 they found that when likelihood judgments were stated as frequencies they were
significantly lower than when stated as probabilities; however, within the different likelihood
categories (e.g., “.01”, “1 in 100”, “10 in 1000”), respondents who stated their likelihoods
in frequencies were more likely to label the patient as medium- or high-risk. When provided
with a tutorial (Study 2) the differences in mean likelihood estimates were greater when
presented in terms of probabilities, but only between the large-response scales groups. The
mean likelihood judgments in Study 2 were uniformly higher across the four groups, but the
tutorials “did not substantially reduce or eliminate scale [i.e., large vs. small response scales]
and format [i.e., probability vs. frequency] effects” (p. 283). Again, those in the frequency
groups labeled more patients as medium- or high-risk across nearly every likelihood level. In
Study 3, there were seven questionnaires differing only in the assessment of a hypothetical
patients (see Fig. 5, p. 297 in Slovic et al., 2000), and participants were asked to make several
judgments (e.g., the risk of harming one’s self or others). Once again, their findings showed
that when presented risk of violence in terms of frequencies, the patient was more likely to be
labeled as medium- or high-risk. Slovic et al. (2000) conclude, “Clearly, it makes no clinical
or policy sense to keep twice as many people in the hospital when their risk of violence is
characterized as ‘20 out of 100’ than when it is characterized as ‘20%’ ” (p. 292).
In a similar study, Monahan et al. (2002) compared risk communication using proba-
bility versus frequency formats and pallid versus vivid outcome depictions. Participants—all
whom were members of the American Psychological Association with an interest in clinical
or forensic psychology—were told that a hypothetical patient had just been evaluated for
discharge. Participants in the pallid outcome were told that “recently, a stranger in the
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community sustained fatal injuries from another patient who was discharged from the same
facility” (p. 122); those in the vivid outcome were told that “recently, another patient who
was discharged from the same facility killed a stranger in the community by smashing her
skull with a baseball bat, resulting in her instant death” (p. 122). Each participant was then
presented with a risk estimate in probability or frequency format and asked if the patient (a)
should be discharged, (b) not be discharged, or (c) if a second opinion was needed. Similar
to the results of Slovic et al. (2000), the authors found that those participants in the fre-
quency format were more conservative in their decision to discharge a patient. Additionally,
the authors found that those in the pallid outcome/probability format group were the least
conservative and those in the vivid outcome/frequency format were the most conservative.
However, their results were only significant for participants who worked in forensic facil-
ities. In noting relevant differences between the two groups, the authors stated that the
participants who work in forensic settings “provide consultation more often to courts, and
. . . provide formal assessments of dangerousness more often as part of their practice” (p.
126). In other words, these participants are the ones more likely to make such a meaningful
decision.
Monahan and Silver (2003) conducted a survey among judges using the five risk
categories from the COVR (see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1). The judges were presented with
five risk categories, either in frequency or probabilistic format, and asked to decide on the
lowest likelihood of violence (according the COVR estimate) that would meet their definition
of someone being dangerous to others or himself, requiring short-term civil commitment.
Results from twenty-six judges (thirteen in each format group) reveal that, as shown by
Slovic et al. (2000) and Monahan et al. (2002), frequency formatting led to more conservative
decision making (i.e., smaller likelihood of violence needed to civilly commit). Three judges
selected the very low-risk group (all in the frequency format) and no judge selected the very
high-risk group. The mean group levels selected were 2.4 (for the frequency format), 2.9
(for the probabilistic format), and 2.7 (across both formats). The authors summarize their
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findings as follows:
Risk Class 3—a 0.26 likelihood of committing a violent act—best reflects the judges’
decision threshold for short-term civil commitment as “dangerous to others.” Put
otherwise, while fully half the judges (13 of 26) were of the view that people with
a serious mental disorder whose risk was assessed by the MacArthur procedures as
being in Risk Classes 1 or 2 qualified for commitment, it was not until Risk Class 3
was reached that a majority of the judges (19 of 26) would commit.
In connection with the aggregate-versus-individual debate previously discussed, Scurich,
Monahan, and John (2012) examined when people apply aggregate-level data to individuals.
The authors collected data from jury-eligible mock jurors in the United States; each par-
ticipant read COVR case-summary vignettes that included an estimated risk in the form of
frequencies (three groups: low risk: eight out of 100; medium [average] risk: 26 out of 100; or
[very] high risk: 76 out of 100; see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1) and possibly provided additional
risk factors (three “packing” groups: six, three, or no risk factors given) that are among
the COVR variables (e.g., father’s drug use, recent violence). Participants were asked for
the likelihood that they would commit the hypothetical patient and how likely they felt the
patient was one of the 𝑋 number of people who were violent (where 𝑋 = 8, 26, or 76), as
measured using seven-point Likert scales. In addition, the authors measured participants’
numeracy using the Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS; Fagerlin et al., 2007). An individual
said to be an innumerate is defined as being “marked by an ignorance of mathematics and
the scientific approach” (Innumerate, n.d.). Their results suggest that no unpacking (i.e.,
no risk factors presented) does not lead to significant differences in commitment likelihood
across different levels of risk, but unpacking (i.e., three or six risk factors presented) does. In
addition, for high-risk patients, unpacking led to an increased likelihood to commit, whereas
in the low-risk patients the likelihood decreased. Among high-risk patients, unpacking did
not significantly affect participants’ perceived likelihood that the patient was one of the 𝑋
number of people who were violent; however, in the low-risk group, unpacking reduced this
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likelihood. Their results also suggest that numerates were not affected by the unpacking
scheme.
In one of their most important works, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) show that the
framing of a question, whether in terms of losses or gains, lead to predictable changes in
preferences. Their 1981 article appeared in Science and showed that participants’ choices
differed among two mathematically-equivalent, forced-choice questions posed in terms of
either lives saved or lives lost. Their “Asian disease problem” proposed two options, a sure
thing or a gamble; when the question is posed in terms of lives saved, most participants
choose the sure-thing; when posed in terms of lives lost, most choose the gamble. Scurich
and John (2011) looked to see if the framing effect exists in the context of civil commitment
decisions. The authors suggest that “[b]etter-informed decisions depend not only on the
substance of the [risk] assessment, but also on how that substance is communicated to
the decision maker” (p. 83). In their study, undergraduate mock-judge participants were
given six COVR case-summary vignettes and presented with a forced-choice question asking
if they would commit or release the hypothetical patient and indicate how likely—on a
six-point Likert scale—they were to do so. The case summaries provided estimated risk
probabilities (three groups: [very] low risk: .01; moderate [average] risk: .26; or [very] high
risk: .76; see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1) and their corresponding confidence intervals framed in
terms of either “probability of violence occurring” (e.g., .26) or “probability of violence not
occurring” (e.g., .74). When framed as a probability of violence occurring, significantly more
participants had patients committed and were significantly more likely to commit patients
(given high and moderate probabilities of violence; there were no significant differences for
the low-risk probability).
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2.14 Determining the Accuracy of Predictions
Measuring accuracy has long been a topic of debate in violence and sexual recidivism
prediction. In his article, Gottfredson (1987) discusses several measures of predictive accu-
racy. Some of the accuracy measures discussed are Pearson’s chi-square (Pearson, 1900b),
Pearson’s 𝜑 (Pearson, 1900a), the index of predictive efficiency (Horst, 1941; Ohlin & Dun-
can, 1949), mean cost rating (MCR; Berkson, 1947; Duncan et al., 1953), and relative
improvement over chance (RIOC; Loeber & Dishion, 1983). As Gottfredson (1987) states,
which measure to use “depends on the question to be answered”; he continues,
If the relative power of different devices that are developed on different populations
is an issue (for which the base rates may well be different), then indices that are less
sensitive to base rates would seem preferable [e.g., MCR]. However, if one wishes an
estimate of the power of a particular device administered with particular decision
rules on a particular population, then base rate-dependent indices will be more
informative [e.g., Pearson’s 𝜑].
For a review of the relationships between several measures of predictive accuracy, see Tarling
(1982).
Otto (1992) suggests comparing the true positive rates with the base rates: “When
the true positive rate exceeds the base rate, it can be concluded that the technique is, to
some extent, valid” (p. 109). S. D. Hart, Webster, and Menzies (1993) note that Otto (1992),
when discussing the number of false positives, used the ratio of false positives to the sum of
false positives and false negatives (what we refer to as the false positive rate; see Chapter 1);
whereas Monahan (1981) used the ratio of false positives to the sum of false positives and
true positives (what would be the complement of what we call the positive predictive value).
The differences are obviously problematic when attempting to compare studies; S. D. Hart et
al. (1993) opines that “Monahan’s method (1981) gives the information of greatest interest
to most reviewers, namely, the probability that a prediction of violence was incorrect” (p.
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698).
Because terminology can become confusing, S. D. Hart et al. (1993) suggest that every
report contain the raw data, either in the form of text or a 2 × 2 contingency table. The
authors state this as being the minimum necessary information required, and that positive
and negative predictive values should also be presented along with chance-corrected measures
of accuracy such as Cohen’s 𝜅 (J. Cohen, 1960) or Pearson’s 𝜑. Wollert (2006) also argues
for the use of 2× 2 tables, saying,
Because SVP predictions classify offenders into only two groups (will recidivate or
will not recidivate), scores in the alternate test range below this critical test range are
considered important for identifying likely nonrecidivists. . . . Once an evaluator has
selected the [cutscore] he or she will use with an actuarial to select likely recidivists,
he or she is able to compile a 2 × 2 table . . . Several measures may be calculated
from this simple table that are useful for evaluating the test’s performance in the
sample on which it was developed and for estimating its performance in another
group that has a different recidivism rate from the developmental sample. (p. 58).
Mossman (1994b) disagrees, saying, “2 × 2 tables conflate intrinsic ability to detect
future violence with the level of risk” (p. 588). Furthermore, Mossman argues that because 𝜅,
𝜑, and the positive and negative predictive values are all dependent upon the base rate, they
“will not be the best indices for describing and comparing intrinsic properties of diagnostic
tests” (p. 589). Mossman recommends using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
instead, stating that “ROC methods describe accuracy with indices of performance that are
unaffected by base rates or by clinicians’ biases for or against Type I or Type II prediction
errors” (p. 783). An ROC curve, as described in Chapter 1 (for thorough discussions,
see Green & Swets, 1966; Metz, 1978), plots the true positive rate (or sensitivity) against
the false positive rate (or 1 − specificity). The common measure in ROC analysis is the
area under the curve, or AUC; Fergusson, Fifield, and Slater (1977) show that the AUC is
related to the mean cost rating. Diagnostic accuracy of predicting violent behavior refers
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to an actuarial method’s (or clinician’s) ability to discriminate between future violent and
nonviolent individuals; as Zweig and Campbell (1993) state, “[It] is the most fundamental
characteristic of the test itself as a classification device” (p. 552). McFall and Treat (1999)
state that ROC analysis “provides an estimate of diagnostic accuracy that is not confounded
by changing cutoff values or prevalence rates” (p. 229). M. E. Rice and Harris (1995) make
this point as well and demonstrate the independence of the AUC with base rates (see also
Fergusson et al., 1977) in advocating the use of ROC curves (see also Swets, Dawes, &
Monahan, 2000a, 2000b); the authors include correlation coefficients and odds ratios, along
with the previously mentioned statistics, as measures that are dependent on base rates. For
comparisons across different studies, M. E. Rice and Harris (2005) provide conversions for
three different measures of effect size: AUC, Cohen’s 𝑑 (J. Cohen, 1969), and point-biserial
correlations (see also Mossman, 2013). By the late 1990s, AUCs were, and are still the
primary statistic used in establishing a diagnostic test’s accuracy in predicting violence.
According to their review of the literature from published articles during the years 1990–
2010, Singh, Desmarais, and Van Dorn (2013) note that only three of the fifty did not report
an AUC measure. Mossman (2013) suggests that AUC measures played a significant role in
changing the attitude regarding the ability to predict violence with reasonable accuracy.
The use of the AUC as a measure of predictive accuracy is not without its critics. For
example, Szmukler (2001) suggests that because ROCs are independent of base rates, they
can be misleading. In addition, Szmukler shows that given a fixed sensitivity and specificity,
the positive predictive value differs depending on the base rate. Szmukler, Everitt, and Leese
(2012) state, “[T]he statistical significance of the AUC of the ROC alone offers little help
when it comes to a particular patient, yet this is the statistic that is now most relied upon in
the risk assessment literature” (p. 897), and that the positive predictive value is “is crucial in
assessing the meaning of a positive test result for a particular patient in a particular setting”
(p. 896). (These ideas are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.) Neller and Frederick (2013)
also encourage the use of the positive predictive values and say that clinicians are misled
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in RAI manuals by proportions, stating that manuals report the proportion who recidivate
given a score but the real value of interest is the proportion who recidivate given the score
or higher (i.e., the positive predictive value).
Vrieze and Grove (2008) state,
[T]he AUC only informs one about best-case classification accuracy—accuracy that
is achievable in practice only if quite restrictive assumptions are all satisfied [and
i]f one or more of these assumptions is materially false, then to that extent the
classification accuracy achieved may fall short of what one might expect from a
published AUC figure. (p. 268)
According to the authors, these assumptions are:
1. the AUC is estimated without error; 2. the mathematical model relating the form
of the ROC, its area, and the distributions of recidivists’ and nonrecidivists’ test
scores is exactly valid, so that a certain equation relating the AUC to the difference
between group test score distributions’ means is exactly correct; 3. the recidivism
base rate is estimated without error; and 4. the equation relating the forms of re-
cidivists’ and nonrecidivsts’ test score distributions, their mean separation, and the
recidivism base rate, is solved for the exactly optimal cutting score that minimizes
classification errors. (p. 268)
They also state,
An AUC statistic tells a researcher or clinician how well a test performs across
the whole potential range of disorder (recidivism) base rates and optimum cutting
scores for those base rates. It can lull the clinician into thinking that, if the AUC
is suitably high, the test will perform satisfactorily in a given population, i.e., at a
given base rate. This is far from necessarily so; a sufficiently high AUC only ensures
that a test can [original emphasis] perform well in a population with a certain base
rate, if [original emphasis] the cutting score is appropriately set. (p. 274)
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In their article, Vrieze and Grove (2008) push the use and maximization of correct fractions
(sum of true positives and negatives divided by the total sample) because it is a measure
of a test’s incremental validity over base rates (i.e., the test’s predictive validity compared
to simply choosing the more likely outcome). Mossman (2008) disagrees saying, “Whatever
one thinks about such a policy, mental health professionals must recognize that legislatures
have set a different one: identifying individuals who are ‘likely to reoffend’ ” (p. 288).
Cook (2008) distinguishes diagnostic models from predictive (prognostic) models in
that both are typically concerned with classification but the latter also incorporates a time
dimension; she notes the distinction as “[p]rognostication and prediction involve estimating
risk, or the probability of a future event or state. The outcome not only is unknown, but does
not yet exist, distinguishing this task from diagnosis” (p. 17). Cook (2008) discusses two
aspects of a model’s accuracy: discrimination and calibration. In terms of violence prediction,
discrimination is an RAI’s ability to distinguish violent individuals from nonviolent ones,
or different levels of risk (e.g., low, moderate, and high); calibration refers to the RAI’s
ability to estimate the risk of violence correctly. Although discrimination is a goal of both
diagnostic and predictive models, calibration is a component unique to a predictive model.
The discriminative component can be measured with the use of an ROC curve, but the
calibration is measured by the positive and negative predictive values, values that are absent
from the ROC curve. Because of this, Cook (2008) says that ROC curves are not sufficient
to demonstrate the accuracy of a predictive model. Singh (2013) presents these ideas in the
realm of violence prediction along with the pros and cons of many of the common statistics
used (AUC and others) to assess an RAI’s predictive validity. The Test Validation Study
(TVS; Frederick & Bowden, 2009) provides one way of incorporating both components of
predictive accuracy (see Neller & Frederick, 2013, for an application using RAIs).
Bossuyt et al. (2003) declare, “The quality of reporting of studies of diagnostic accu-
racy is less than optimal” (p. 7); the authors created a twenty-five item checklist they call
the Standards for Reporting of Diagnostic Accuracy (STARD). Of the twenty-five items,
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three are most relevant to our discussion here:
12. “Describe methods for calculating or comparing measures of diagnostic accuracy, and
the statistical methods used to quantify uncertainty (e.g., 95% confidence intervals)”
(p. 12)
21. “Report estimates of diagnostic accuracy and measures of statistical uncertainty (e.g.,
95% confidence intervals)” (p. 15)
23. “Report estimates of variability of diagnostic accuracy between subgroups of partici-
pants, readers or centers, if done” (p. 15)
2.14.1 Generalizability of Predictive Measures
Accuracy of the test on samples similar to the construction sample is important, but
unless the measure is accurate on other populations, its use is severely limited; generalizabil-
ity of RAIs should not be assumed. As Bechman (2001) puts it, “[F]ailure to scientifically
cross-validate RAls can be fatal because characteristics of offender populations can vary dra-
matically, and an RAI constructed on one population may not generalize, or cross over, to a
different population” (p. 29). Additionally, Gottfredson (1987) warns, “There is a danger . . .
of overestimating the extent to which relations found in one sample can be used to explain
relations in a similar sample” (p. 185).
Obviously the generalizability of predictive instruments is important and many stud-
ies have shown the instruments do generalize to other populations. For example, G. T. Harris,
Rice, & Camilleri, 2004 found the VRAG to generalize to nonforensic populations (see also
G. T. Harris et al., 2003). Snowden, Gray, Taylor, and MacCulloch (2007) found the VRAG
and OGRS were good predictors of violent and general recidivism among UK patients, but
warn that both devices over-predict recidivism. Schlager and Simourd (2007) suggest that
the LSI-R could be used on Hispanic and African-American offenders. Ralston and Epperson
(2013) found that the Static-99 and MnSOST-R were significant predictors of recidivism in
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a juvenile sex offender sample (although they required slight revisions in scoring to account
for the young ages).
Although the previous studies and others have suggested that the overall predictive
accuracy of the VRAG is robust, or generalizable, across different populations, Mills, Jones,
and Kroner (2005) looked specifically at the generalizability of the VRAG (and LSI-R) bins
(i.e., the different probabilistic categories an individual may fall into). As the authors note,
“The conclusion that the [VRAG and LSI-R] instruments are predictive of the outcome is
based on aggregate analysis across the entire range of participants and scores. This approach
provides limited useful information for the communication of risk within the cross-validated
sample” (p. 567). In their study, the authors conclude that their results fail to “support
the generalizability of the original probabilities associated with the prediction bins” for both
the VRAG and LSI-R because the rates of recidivism (violent for the VRAG and violent
and nonviolent for the LSI-R) within the bins were not similar to the probabilities assigned
to them; the VRAG overestimated recidivism whereas the LSI-R underestimated it. They
did note that the both instruments were significantly related to recidivism but suggest that
“[t]he strength of the statistical relationship between an instrument’s scores and outcome
does not necessarily impute accuracy to the clinical application of those scores” (pp. 580).
Singh, Serper, Reinharth, and Fazel (2011) examined ten risk assessment instruments
(including the COVR, HCR-20, START, VRAG, and VRS), seven of which they classified as
being developed for use in mentally-ill offenders (HCR-20, START, VRAG, and VRS) and
found “little direct evidence to support the use of these risk assessment tools in schizophreni[c
offenders]” (p. 904).
Doren (2004a) found the rates of recidivism among most of the different Static-99
and RRASOR scores were consistent across numerous studies that were conducted in sev-
eral locations around the world. However, Mossman (2006a) critiqued Doren’s approach in
comparing risk percentages across studies: “By directly comparing percentages of reoffenders
falling in each risk category, Doren compares values that combine discriminative properties
125
of the risk assessment measure with the population’s base rate.” (p. 43). Mossman (2006a)
suggests using likelihood ratios within each score to compare across studies with differing
base rates; using likelihood ratios, he shows that the Static-99 and RRASOR scores were
not consistent.
2.14.2 Authorship Bias
Hare (1998), the creator of the PCL and PCL-R, once commented,
Researchers who obtain extremely low reliabilities for the PCL-R or its factors
clearly have not used the instrument properly, do not have enough information
to score the PCL-R, or have allowed the ratings to be completed by untrained or
unskilled personnel (p. 107)
Murrie, Boccaccini, Johnson, and Janke (2008) found evidence of an allegiance effect
regarding the interrater reliability of the PCL-R. The authors reviewed 43 civil commitment
hearings for sexual offenders, noting that in more than half of them (23), the two legal sides
significantly differed in their scores, usually in the direction of the side they represented;
they called this “partisan allegiance.” Boccaccini, Turner, and Murrie (2008) found similar
results with the PCL-R.
In their influential article, Luborsky et al. (1999) found evidence for an allegiance ef-
fect, or authorship bias, in the psychotherapy literature; that is, they found effect sizes were
significantly larger in studies using the author’s own method or diagnostic measure. In fact,
they failed to find any published result in the literature that was counter the first author’s
allegiance. Blair, Marcus, and Boccaccini (2008) examine whether this authorship bias ex-
ists for actuarial risk assessments. Specifically, they examine whether effect sizes (Pearson’s
𝑟) reported for the Static-99, VRAG, and SORAG were significantly larger for published
studies conducted by the instruments’ authors than independent researchers. Their results
suggest that “there is . . . a pattern of allegiance in the actuarial risk assessment literature,
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at least when allegiance is defined as being an author of an instrument” (p. 354). The
authors conjecture several possible reasons for this including that the “instrument authors’
studies incorporate certain important study design characteristics that are needed to max-
imize effects” (p. 354), the so-called “file drawer” effect (Rosenthal, 1979) suggesting that
instrument authors are less likely to publish inconclusive results, and their own allegiance to
the allegiance effect. Lilienfeld and Jones (2008) also provide three suggestions: file drawer
effect, or specifically “submission bias” (authors’ failure to report negative results); selective
reporting where not all of the relevant results are published; and “data massaging,” both
defensible and indefensible treatment of data ad hoc.
In their reply to Blair et al. (2008) and Lilienfeld and Jones (2008), (G. T. Harris,
Rice, & Quinsey, 2010, authors of the VRAG and SORAG instruments) performed their own
analysis but using AUC measures rather than Pearson’s 𝑟. They point out several flaws in
Blair et al.’s (2008) work; specifically, G. T. Harris et al. disagree with Blair et al.’s decision
to only include published studies. They included all unpublished studies using the VRAG
and SORAG (none by the authors themselves); they conclude “that examining all currently
available data yields no evidence of an allegiance effect, and therefore, no basis in our work
for a commentary (Lilienfeld & Jones, 2008) on the topic” (p. 86).
Singh, Grann, and Fazel (2013) examine authorship bias in nine different actuarial
tools from published journals, conference presentations, government reports, and theses and,
using odds ratios (the ratio between the odds of a true positive and the odds of a false
positive), found “[e]vidence of a significant authorship effect . . . specifically to risk assessment
studies published in peer-reviewed journals” (p. 6). Possibly more disconcerting was the
authors’ finding of consistent failure to report conflict of interest statements:
Six of the 16 journals in which the studies appeared requested in their Instructions
for Authors that any financial or non-financial conflicts of interest be disclosed.
None of the 25 studies where a tool designer or translator was the author of an
investigation of that instrument’s predictive validity contained such a disclosure.
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2.15 Admissibility of Actuarial Methods
Based on the numerous failed attempts to challenge the constitutionality of preventive
detention despite disagreements among many academics, it appears that the courts have
expressed their opinion. But what about the admissibility of the methods making those
predictions? Despite a plethora of studies indicating the inability of clinicians to make
predictions regarding future dangerous behavior, the ruling in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983)
made it clear that because it was not impossible to predict future behavior, it was admissible.
As Janus and Meehl (1997) state, “As a legal matter, prediction is not, in all of its forms
and for all purposes, so inaccurate as to violate the due process clause” (p. 36). Following
the ruling in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976), as Monahan (1996)
put it, “Liability, rather than constitutionality, [wa]s the concern that motivate[d] interest
in the prediction of violence in the mid-1990s” (p. 111).
L. Walker and Monahan (1988) provide a thoughtful review of the use of social science
research in the legal system. Berlin et al. (2003) suggest that assessment instruments, such
as the RRASOR, MnSOST-R, and Static-99 should be used to screen potentially violent
individuals but not used as evidence for an individual’s risk in civil commitment hearings.
Mossman et al. (2011) provides a detailed review of state laws addressing risk of danger-
ousness and the role of RAIs in determining this risk. Vitacco, Erickson, Kurus, and Apple
(2012) review 46 legal cases that involved the use VRAG or HCR-20, both instruments
designed to predict or assess risk of violence; the authors found that most cases where the
instruments are used are SVP cases involving commitment or release, which the authors note
is justifiable given the research. The authors do caution that risk assessment instruments
should be used “in a manner that is empirically justified and consistent with research,” citing
cases involving the death penalty and juveniles being tried as adults as situations where risk
assessment measures may not be appropriate.
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Doren (2000) discusses the admissibility of actuarial instruments used to make deci-
sions regarding civil commitment of sexual offenders. He addresses several issues he claims
were commonly made, the most relevant being that the instruments possess only moder-
ate accuracy. Doren states that civil commitment laws require a degree of likelihood that
an individual sexual offender will recidivate and not a determination of recidivism (i.e., a
prediction). He also suggests that statistics such as the AUC may not be appropriate in
determining whether a sexual offender’s recidivism risk is beyond the legal threshold; rather,
he suggests the use of confidence intervals to provide more meaningful distinctions among
the recidivism risk levels. In their reply to Doren (2000), Otto and Petrila (2002) state that
it is often assumed by the lawyers and judges of the court that predictions regarding recidi-
vism are in fact being made about a sexual offender, providing excerpts of court transcripts
offering such suggestive language. Doren (2000) also addresses the issue that actuarial in-
struments may not meet psychological test standards, by stating that the instruments are
“clearly not psychological tests” (p. 66). He also makes the peculiar comparison of insur-
ance actuarial methods with those used for sexual recidivism (similarly done in Skeem &
Monahan, 2011). He states, “successful use in other fields [e.g., insurance] demonstrates
that the failure to meet standards for psychological testing does not summarily negate the
value or usefulness of data derived from actuarial instruments in assessing risk factors” (p.
78). Otto and Petrila (2002) point out that actuarial instruments for sexual recidivism
have (a) unknown inter-rater reliabilities, (b) unknown rates of measurement error, (c) lack
cross-validation, and (d) lack minimally acceptable test manuals. Otto and Petrila note that
some courts have characterized the instruments as “tests” and state, “If these are not ‘tests,’
those providing testimony based on them should explain to the court how they differ from
instruments meeting test standards and how those differences diminish the credibility of the
testimony based on them” (p. 14).
Janus and Prentky (2003) state,
Although preventive detention would be legally and ethically problematic even with
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perfect knowledge about the future, the imperfection of risk assessment exacer-
bates constitutional and ethical concerns because it raises the likelihood that non-
recidivists and low-risk individuals will be among the group suffering long-term loss
of liberty. The same is true for the more utilitarian concerns about resource alloca-
tion and efficacy. The central justification for spending huge sums of money on SVP
programs is that the “most dangerous” offenders are incapacitated. Public policy is
not well served if, because of inaccurate assessment of risk, extraordinary resources
are devoted to the ordinarily dangerous (Janus, 2003). (p. 1448)
Janus and Meehl (1997) examine the evidence used in court to estimate the standard
of proof for predicting future dangerousness used in the legal setting. As the authors argue,
civilly committing sexual offenders based on dangerousness implies,
(a) the probability of dangerousness is susceptible of measure, (b) there is a way
to discriminate between predictions of higher and lower probability, (c) there are
standards that allow commitments based on the former while excluding confinement
based on the latter, and (d) these standards are, in fact, enforced. (p. 38)
Janus and Meehl’s paper focuses on these last two points; they point out that errors in
decisions (commitment or release) occur because the decision is dichotomous and based
on continuous data that is “imperfectly perceived” (p. 38). The causes of these erroneous
decisions, they argue, come from two sources: imperfect perception from the decision maker
and the probabilistic nature of risk (e.g., the event where a truly low-risk individual engages
in a violent act). Janus and Meehl (1997) note that the courts use vague terms such as highly
likely to describe an offender’s risk of recidivism without having a standard for quantifying
this risk. By using evidence from previous court cases, the authors attempt to determine a
quantification of said vagaries. As an example of how judicial systems may (mis-)quantify
such terms, they cite the case of In re Young (Wash. 1993) involving a Washington State
sex offender, Andre Young, serving an indefinite involuntary commitment term:
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[T]he Washington Supreme Court quoted a prominent sex offender scholar: “ ‘using
theoretically relevant and empirically tested predictors, predictive accuracy [of sex-
ual recidivism] can realistically be expected to be in the 80% range’.” The Court
used this quote to support its assertion that the “likelihood of reoffense is extremely
high” among those subject to commitment. (p. 40).
The authors note this incorrect equivalence of witness accuracy and probability of a correct
identification as a common heuristic bias. This bias is, in fact, an example of what is known
as the Prosecutor’s Fallacy.
The Prosecutor’s Fallacy (also called the Inversion Fallacy) was first coined by
W. C. Thompson and Schumann (1987). This fallacy involves misinterpreting conditional
probabilities; for example, misinterpreting the sensitivity as the positive predictive value.
The statement “predictive accuracy” quoted in In re Young (Wash. 1993) was given by Dr.
Vernon Quinsey, one of the authors who developed the VRAG, and can be found in Review
of Sexual Predator Program: Community Protection Research Project (Washington State
Institute for Public Policy, 1992). Dr. Quinsey was presumably referring to the sensitivity
of the test, meaning the number of recidivists correctly predicted to recidivate (this is the
probability that an individual attains a given score on the actuarial measure given that the
individual will truly recidivate). The mistakenly-assumed equivalent statement, made by the
Court, was that “likelihood of reoffense is extremely high.” This quantification is measured
by a different conditional probability, namely the positive predictive value (i.e., the proba-
bility an individual will recidivate given the individual attains a given score on the actuarial
method). This probability, as we will see in several subsequent chapters, can be vastly dif-
ferent than the sensitivity of the test, particularly when the base rate for violence is low. Dr.
Quinsey could have instead been referring to the overall accuracy of the actuarial method,
as implied by Janus and Meehl (1997, see p. 44, footnote 59). The accuracy, as we will see
in the next section, depends on conditional and prior probabilities. Similarly, this can vary
dramatically from the positive predictive value depending on the prior probabilities. In ad-
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dition to misinterpreting conditional probabilities, the incorrect assumption of independence
can play a scathing role in the legal system (e.g., see Tribe, 1971, for a thorough discussion
on the use of mathematics in the judicial system; also, see Hubert & Wainer, 2012, and
Schneps & Colmez, 2013, for numerous examples of the misuse of probability, statistics, and
mathematics in the legal system).
Janus and Meehl (1997) used probabilities of recidivism of 50% and 75% to quantify
the terms “likely” and “highly likely,” respectively. The authors defined their “commitment
standard” as the ratio of correct commitments to total commitments, claiming it to be “the
probability that a person actually committed by the courts would have been a recidivist
had it not been for the commitment” (p. 43). The authors used two models to emulate
the process of civil commitment in Minnesota sex offender commitment cases. The authors’
research, based on empirical base rates and overall accuracy for predicting recidivism, led
them to,
(a) conclude, using Model 1, that “a standard of commitment of 50% appears achievable
but only under favorable conditions” and “rule out the possibility that sex offender
commitment courts are using a standard of commitment that approximates 75%” (p.
55);
(b) and, using Model 2, that “Minnesota courts never attain a 50% probability of recidi-
vism standard of commitment” (p. 58).
Mossman (2006b) says,
[W]e may need to abandon the hope that more accurate methods of predicting
violence or assessing patients’ level of violence risk will prove useful to practicing
clinicians. Abandoning this hope may be cause for initial disappointment. But if
courts and my mental health colleagues agree with my conclusion, abandoning the
hope for useful risk assessments will ultimately liberate us from obligations that we
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cannot carry out rationally, and will allow us to refocus our attention on treating
patients (p. 530)
2.15.1 The Federal Rules of Evidence
In Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923), the use of a polygraph test as acceptable
scientific evidence was challenged. The Court stated,
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such stand-
ing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made. (p. 1014)
In addition, the Court noted the difficulty in determining what constituted scientifically-
sound evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
The Frye standard refers to the admissibility of scientific evidence; regardless of the source
of the evidence (e.g., from a so-called expert), the evidence is only admissible if the method
generating the evidence (e.g., an actuarial method) is considered reliable among the scientific
community.
In 1975, the United States federal courts established a code of evidence law, since
revised, entitled the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The purpose of the FRE is “to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
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growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined” (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2013, p. 1). Rule 702,
regarding testimony made by expert witnesses, states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case. (p. 30)
United States Federal Judge Jack Weinstein comments on Rule 702, and others, as
well as the use of probability and statistics in the legal setting in his article Litigation and
Statistics (1988). Regarding Rule 702(b) he states, “The breadth of the ‘assistance to the
trier of fact’ standard has encouraged courts to adopt a balancing test in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony” (p. 287). Regarding expert testimony in general, he notes,
Unfortunately, we have concluded that an expert can be found to testify to the
truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case
sufficiently to avoid summary judgment and forcing the matter to trial. At the trial
itself, an expert’s testimony can be used to obfuscate what would otherwise be a
simple case. The most tenuous factual bases are sufficient to produce firm opinions
in some experts to a high degree of “probability.” Juries and judges can be, and
sometimes are, misled by such experts for hire. (p. 289)
Slobogin (1984) argues that if clinicians testify they need to limit their statements to
within the realm of their capabilities, excluding predictions of individual dangerousness:
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Unfortunately, where clinical predictions are concerned, even those individuals who
have acquired some specialized knowledge about dangerousness often provide tes-
timony exceeding the boundaries of their knowledge. In particular, clinical predic-
tions that an individual is dangerous or “likely to be violent,” although presently
the mainstay of commitment and sentencing proceedings, go beyond the limited
scope of current expertise. There simply are no clinical theories that permit such
bald assertions. (p. 130)
He then states, “The Federal Rules of Evidence do permit an expert to address the ‘ultimate
issue’ to be decided by the trier of fact [e.g., the jury]” (p. 130). The author suggests that
clinical predictions of dangerousness should only be permitted if the defendant chooses to
use such testimony or if the predictions are actuarial, unless in a civil commitment setting
“because the nature of the dangerousness inquiry that it requires is fundamentally differ-
ent from the prediction process [encountered in the sentencing and criminal commitment
contexts]” (p. 171).
In People v. Murtishaw (1981), the defendant, David Murtishaw, having been con-
victed on three counts of first degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit
murder, went to the penalty phase of his trial in California. Dr. Ronald Siegel, a psychophar-
macologist, testified,
[The] defendant in a prison setting “will continue to be a violent assaultive and
combative individual . . . [a]nd that he may become not only assaultive and violent,
but he could show the same types of homicidal tendencies that he has shown in the
past, with no ability to morally or physically constrain himself to the demands of
the environment in which he finds himself.” (p. 767)
The California Supreme Court, in its opinion, states that Dr. Siegel’s testimony should not
have been permitted because:
(1) expert predictions that persons will commit future acts of violence are unreliable,
and frequently erroneous; (2) forecasts of future violence have little relevance to
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any of the factors which the jury must consider in determining whether to impose
the death penalty; [and ](3) such forecasts, despite their unreliability and doubtful
relevance, may be extremely prejudicial to the defendant. (p. 767)
The Court particularly disapproved of predictions of dangerousness in capital punishment
cases: “In short, evidence which is barely reliable enough to justify a civil judgment or a
limited commitment is not reliable enough to utilize in determining whether a man should
be executed” (p. 771).
The United States Supreme Court determined a standard for admissible scientific
data and expert testimony used in the United States federal court system in Daubert v.
Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). Two major consequences of the ruling were the
suspension of the Frye Standard by the FRE, and the establishment of the trial judge as
a “gatekeeper” for allowing evidence that is determined relevant and scientifically valid.
Several relevant points regarding the admissibility of a theory or technique were laid forth,
requiring that they be:
(a) falsifiable, refutable, or testable;
(b) subjected to peer review and publication;
(c) have a known or potential error rate; and
(d) reliable and relevant among the appropriate scientific community.
Two other landmark cases, General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael (1997), together with Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., are known
as the Daubert trilogy; they set forth what has been called the Daubert standard (i.e., the
four requirements stated above). Rule 702 from the FRE, as revised to its current 2013
state and provided earlier, follows the rulings in the Daubert trilogy. Most state judicial
systems have elected to follow the Daubert standard, although some states still follow the
Frye standard. Scherr (2003) notes that “since Daubert, every appellate court to have
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reviewed the question has admitted expert predictions” (p. 59) and that “[j]udicial opinion,
split on virtually every other form of behavioral or psychic expertise, has so far unanimously
accepted predictive expertise in civil commitments” (p. 61). (For a thorough review of the
FRE and Daubert trilogy and their relationship to predictions of dangerous behavior, see
Scherr, 2003; Slobogin, 2006.)
In State v. Randall (1995), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarized the findings
of the United States Supreme Court, many that have been discussed in this chapter:
[T]he Supreme Court [of the United States] has found the following to be consti-
tutionally permissible: civil and criminal insanity acquittees may be treated dif-
ferently with regard to the burden of proof required for the initial commitment—
commitment following an insanity acquittal may be based on a preponderance of
the evidence, whereas in a civil commitment the state must establish its burden
of proof by clear and convincing evidence; automatic commitment following an in-
sanity acquittal does not violate due process; the length of commitment for both
civil and criminal committees may be indefinite; the term of commitment for an
insanity acquittee may exceed the length of the maximum sentence the acquittee
could have been subjected to had a sentence been imposed; and, following the initial
commitment of an insanity acquittee, the burden of proof at a subsequent hearing
for reexamination and release may be borne by the acquittee. (p. 821)
Noticeably absent from the above summary is the use of testimony (actuarial or
clinical) regarding dangerousness in capital punishment phases; in Flores v. Johnson (2000),
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit Judge Emilio Garza offered his opinion on the
matter:
On the basis of any evidence thus far presented to a court, it appears that the
use of psychiatric evidence to predict a murderer’s “future dangerousness” fails all
five Daubert factors. First, “testing” of these theories has never truly been done
. . . Second, as is clear from a review of the literature in the field, peer review of
137
individual predictions is rare, and peer review of making such predictions in general
has been uniformly negative. . . . Third, the rate of error, at a minimum, is fifty
percent, meaning such predictions are wrong at least half of the time. . . . Fourth,
standards controlling the operation of the technique are nonexistent. . . . Overall,
the theory that scientific reliability underlies predictions of future dangerousness has
been uniformly rejected by the scientific community absent those individuals who
routinely testify to, and profit from, predictions of dangerousness. (pp. 464–465,
citations omitted)
2.15.2 State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof (2009)
In 1998, William Ploof was sentenced to four to ten years for felonious sexual assault
at the New Hampshire State Prison, but after his maximum release date in 2007, he con-
tinued to be held in prison (State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof , 2009). According to
the state’s SVP laws, a multidisciplinary team (MDT) established by the New Hampshire
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is required to determine whether per-
sons convicted of sexually violent offenses and eligible for prison release, such as Mr. Ploof,
meet the definition of a “sexually violent predator” (N.H. Stats., 2014b, Ch. 135-E:3.I). If so,
the county attorney or attorney general can file a petition with the state’s superior court to
argue the case against the plaintiff. In New Hampshire, a sexually violent predator is defined
as a person who “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense” and “suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment” (N.H.
Stats., 2014b, Ch. 135-E:2.XII (a)–(b)). In the case of Mr. Ploof, the MDT consisted of two
psychologists and a DHHS employee; the Static-99 was used by the MDT to determine Mr.
Ploof’s risk of recidivism. In State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof (2009), the admissi-
bility of the Static-99 was essentially put on trial, in particular the Static-99R; although it is
never referred to as the Static-99R in the court transcripts (only the Static-99), the revised
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norms of the Static-99 are continually referenced.
In July 2004, the New Hampshire state courts set forth reliability standards of experts,
derived from the Daubert standard. In Section 516:29-a of the New Hampshire Revised
Statutes Annotated (RSA; N.H. Stats., 2014a), requirements for the testimony of expert
witnesses are as follows:
I. A witness shall not be allowed to offer expert testimony unless the court finds:
(a) Such testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(b) Such testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(c) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.
II. (a) In evaluating the basis for proffered expert testimony, the court shall con-
sider, if appropriate to the circumstances, whether the expert’s opinions
were supported by theories or techniques that:
(1) Have been or can be tested;
(2) Have been subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) Have a known or potential rate of error; and
(4) Are generally accepted in the appropriate scientific literature.
(b) In making its findings, the court may consider other factors specific to the
proffered testimony.
According to the court transcripts for State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof
(2009), to comply with the RSA requirements stated above, the expert testimony “does
not have to reliably predict [original emphasis] whether a particular individual will or will
not recidivate . . . Rather . . . [it has to] reliably differentiate[] between those ‘likely’ to
recidivate and those with a lesser recidivism risk” (State of New Hampshire v. William
Ploof , 2009, pp. 6–7). In the court hearings, it was testified by Dr. Amy Phenix, a clinical
psychologist and “contributor to the Static-99 Coding Rules Revised” (Static-99, 2013),
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and concluded by the Court that the “Static-99 can be described as having ‘moderate’
predictive accuracy” (State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof , 2009, p. 17); this was
based on validation studies of the Static-99 finding AUC values as high as .71. The AUC of
the Static-99, according to testimony given by Dr. Phenix, is .68; for the new norms .665 (at
the time of the hearing, the new norms had not been cross-validated). She also testified and
led the Court to conclude that the “Static-99 has an accuracy rate that is significantly better
than chance” (p. 15), “the use of multiple actuarial tools d[oes] not increase the predictive
accuracy of the assessment” (pp. 13–14), and “the use of empirically guided clinical judgment
to adjust the results may decrease the overall predictive accuracy of a particular assessment”
(p. 30). However, Dr. Phenix also led the Court to conclude that “an evaluator should not
base his or her conclusions about an individual’s recidivism risk solely on the Static-99[R]”
(State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof , 2009, p. 35).
It is recommended by Helmus et al. (2009) that once a range is determined by the
Static-99R, a judgment be made where the individual falls within this range. The Court
ruled this clinical judgment fails to meet the requirement of the RSA 516:29-a I(b), but
did eventually conclude that the Static-99R is admissible in the court of law. This decision
appeared to be dictated by the accuracy of the Static-99R, quantified by the AUC values.
2.15.3 Probabilities and the Law
In the memorandum from United States v. Fatico (1978), Judge Jack Weinstein dis-
cussed the continuum of burden of proof; the terms associated with the continuum were
mentioned several times throughout the chapter, but will be discussed here in further detail.
The constitutionally-mandated standard for criminal conviction in the United States
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As Tribe (1971) puts it,
The jury is charged that any “reasonable doubt,” of whatever magnitude, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. . . . for the jury to announce that it is prepared to
convict the defendant in the face of an acknowledged and numerically measurable
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doubt as to his guilt is to tell the accused that those who judge him find it preferable
to accept the resulting risk of his unjust conviction than to reduce that risk by
demanding any further or more convincing proof of his guilt. (p. 1374).
Given the evidence (𝐸), an individual is guilty (𝐺) when 𝑃𝑗(𝐺|𝐸) ≥ 𝑏𝑗 where 𝑏𝑗 is the
probability threshold assigned by juror 𝑗. Fienberg (1989) notes that 𝑏𝑗 should be quite
close to 1 when the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. He also notes, as does
Tribe, that 𝑏𝑗 ̸= 1, for if 𝑏𝑗 = 1 this would correspond to “proof beyond any doubt” (p. 199).
Fienberg (1989, see also Fienberg & Kadane, 1983) also note that “innocent until proven
guilty” might imply that 𝑃𝑗(𝐺) = 0; but from a Bayesian perspective this would mean that
𝑃𝑗(𝐺|𝐸) = 0 for all 𝐸.
In civil cases, the standards are generally less strict than in criminal cases; that is,
the juror or judge follows the notion of preponderance of evidence—more probable than
not—where the law “seeks to minimize the probability of error” (United States v. Fatico,
1978, p. 403). Fienberg and Kadane (1983) state this corresponds to a Bayesian requirement
that 𝑃𝑗(𝑇 |𝐸) ≥ 𝑑𝑗 where 𝑇 (the authors use 𝑃 ) is the “event that the plaintiff’s version
of the issue in dispute is correct” (p. 200) and 𝑏𝑗 > 𝑑𝑗 ≥ 1/2. Fienberg and Kadane (1983)
note that legal theory requires 𝑃𝑗(𝑇 ) ≥ 1/2 but it is often assumed that the theory suggests
𝑃𝑗(𝑇 ) = 1/2; they state, “it would be impossible to find a jury for whom 𝑃𝑗([𝑇 ]) = 0.5,
exactly for each juror 𝑗” (p. 93).
According to Weinstein, civil proceedings use the standard of clear and convincing
evidence when “moral turpitude is implied” (p. 404). As noted earlier, this is often the
standard for civil commitment (Addington v. Texas , 1979, i.e.,); it requires a burden of
proof 𝑃𝑗(𝐶|𝐸) ≥ 𝑐𝑗 where 𝑏𝑗 > 𝑐𝑗 > 𝑑𝑗. Weinstein also included clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence as a more demanding burden of proof than clear and convincing, but
less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Simon and Mahan’s (1971) research found that both university students and poten-
tial jurors serving on jury duty service were less likely to find a defendant guilty if first asked
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to assign a probability of guilt. The authors also asked judges, jurors, and university stu-
dents to provide a probability quantifying proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Note that the
probabilities were based on a scale ranging from 0–10 by increments of 0.5, but are adjusted
here to a 0–1 range; see Figure 2 in Simon & Mahan, 1971 for more details.) The authors
found that the three groups had similar ideas of what beyond a reasonable doubt meant
probabilistically; the median for all four groups was in the range (.85, .90]; eight respondents
(three students and five jurors) gave a probability less than .50. In contrast, when asked
to provide a probability estimate for proof by preponderance of evidence, judges’ median
estimate was in the range (.50, .55], as Fienberg and Kadane (1983) suggests; however, for
jurors and students the median was (.75, .80] and (.70, .75], respectively. As the authors
state,
[F]or these lay groups, the difference between the criminal (beyond a reasonable
doubt) and civil (by a preponderance of the evidence) standards are much less than
they are for the judges. The judges make a much sharper distinction between the
criminal and civil standards. (p. 325)
In discussing Simon and Mahan’s research, Underwood (1977) believes the results suggest
that “for most people the distinction [i]s clear” (p. 1311). She continues,
There is some evidence, then, that factfinders can distinguish among degrees of
belief, and that rules about the burden of persuasion affect the outcome of cases. It
is at least plausible, therefore, that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt serves the purposes attributed to it. (p. 1311)
Underwood’s assertion implies that, although the probabilistic definitions may not be correct,
the fact that the two burdens are distinguished is important.
Weinstein surveyed ten judges in the Eastern District of New York asking for proba-
bilistic assessments of the four burdens of proof (United States v. Fatico, 1978); the results are
reproduced in Table 2.1. Given the varying probabilistic assignments, an interesting contra-
diction arises if one considers the results from Monahan and Silver (2003) discussed earlier.
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Recall that their results found that judges were willing to civilly commit an individual given
an estimated probability of violence of .26 or greater. In other words, given the evidence
provided by the COVR the average judge in their study would require 𝑃𝑗(𝐶|𝐸) ≥ .26, where
𝐶 is the decision to civilly commit an individual and 𝐸 is the score of the COVR. These
results seem to contradict the belief that 𝑏𝑗 > 𝑐𝑗 > 𝑑𝑗 > 1/2, where 𝑐𝑗 = .26 is the probability
measure assigned to clear and convincing evidence, the typical burden of proof in a civil
commitment case. Based on the results in Weinstein’s table, the threshold for the COVR
score should be either the high-risk or very high-risk category (corresponding to estimated
probabilities of .56 or .76, respectively). The only true difference is that the COVR score
(the evidence) is for an event that may occur, whereas the earlier discussion in this section
considers evidence for an event that did occur.
Judge Preponderance
Clear and Clear, Unequivocal Beyond a Reasonable
Convincing and Convincing Doubt
1 50+% 60–70% 65–75% 80%
2 50+% 67% 70% 76%
3 50+% 60% 70% 85%
4 51% 65% 67% 90%
5 50+% — — 90%
6 50+% 70+% 70+% 85%
7 50+% 70+% 80+% 95%
8 50.1 75% 75% 85%
9 50+% 60% 90% 85%
10 51% — — —
Table 2.1: A survey of ten judges from the Eastern District of New York assessing proba-
bilistic values to the four burdens of proof (see table on page 410 in United States v. Fatico,
1978).
2.16 Prediction Hits the Streets
The following plot summary describes the 2002 movie Minority Report :
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In the year 2054 A.D. crime is virtually eliminated from Washington D.C. thanks to
an elite law enforcing squad “Precrime.” They use three gifted humans (called “Pre-
Cogs”) with special powers to see into the future and predict crimes beforehand.
(Soumitra, 2014)
In the movie, John Anderton (played by Tom Cruise) arrests Howard Marks (played by Arye
Gross), saying,
Mr. Marks, by mandate of the District of Columbia Precrime Division, I’m placing
you under arrest for the future murder of Sarah Marks and Donald Dubin that was
to take place today, April 22 at 0800 hours and four minutes. (de Bont, Curtis,
Molen, Parkes, & Spielberg, 2002)
Predictive policing is the real world version of Minority Report’s Pre-Cogs. PredPol
is a predictive policing software program developed by scholars at several California univer-
sities; according to its website (http://www.predpol.com), PredPol is “[b]uilt upon the same
underlying technology used to predict aftershocks following earthquakes” and “[p]redicted
twice as much crime as experienced crime analysts in 6 month randomized control trials”
(PredPol, 2014). PredPol is just one of many new softwares being developed to predict
crime and, according to Sengupta (2013), this is “a large and fast-growing market” (para.
12). Much of the discussion in the media has touted predictive policing as being able to
prevent crime at lower costs (e.g., see Goode, 2011; J. Rubin, 2010), and lower crime rates
in cities using predictive policing are often cited as proof of its success. But Sengupta also
points to some of the issues behind predictive policing, particular a self-fulfilling bias: “[A]n
area with historically high rates of crime gets greater police attention, which results in more
arrests, which in turn the algorithm uses to deem that neighborhood an area where crime is
more likely to occur” (para. 9). And Vlahos (2011) says, “The dirty secret of the futuristic
approach [i.e., predictive policing] . . . is that nobody knows for certain that it works” (p.
64).
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In an article entitled Misfortune Teller appearing in The Atlantic, Nadya Labi dis-
cusses the realization of predicting crime before it occurs, focusing on Professor Richard
Berk: “[He] likes to think he knows what criminals will do—even before they know,” the
author says (Labi, 2011, para. 1). Labi describes how Berk’s methods using decision trees
have been implemented in the state of Pennsylvania, methods that he says, when compared
to older ones, are “like comparing a Ford Focus to a Ferrari” (para. 6).
And with the use of predictive policing, the clinical-versus-statistical-prediction de-
bate may again rear its ugly head:
Computers are better at flagging statistical trends, but cops still have to interpret
them, says Lt. Col. Howell Starnes of the [Memphis Police Department]. “Until you
get that street officer who knows his ward, you won’t know what’s causing [original
emphasis] the crime,” he says. “That’s what you’ve got to look at. Not that you’ve
got a problem—what’s causing the problem.” (Vlahos, 2011, p. 65)
2.16.1 Stop-and-Frisk
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court ruled that confrontation involving a police
officer investigating a citizen under suspicion, the police officer has the right to “stop-and-
frisk” (Terry v. Ohio, 1968). The defense in the case argued unsuccessfully that this was
unconstitutional, citing that it violated the Fourth Amendment, which states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(U.S. Const. amend. IV, n.d.)
In 1964, New York State amended its Code of Criminal Procedure law (New York
Criminal Procedure, 2014) to allow the police to stop and question any person suspicious of
criminal activity (Ronayne, 1964). Harcourt (2008) notes,
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[T]he implementation of a targeted policing strategy focused on increased stop-
and-frisk searches on the streets of New York City in the 1990s resulted in
disproportionate searches of African-American and Latino citizens, as well
as a sharp rise in the number of civilian complaints of police misconduct,
including brutality (pp. 30–31)
In 2010, New York’s law gained national attention after former New York City Police-
man Adrian Schoolcraft released audio recordings revealing, among other things, specified
stop-and-frisk quotas set forth by the NYPD (Rayman, 2010). Shortly after, several civil
rights groups filed a class-action lawsuit targeting the stop-and-frisk program. The New
York City Liberties Union reported that “[n]early nine out of 10 stopped-and-frisked New
Yorkers have been completely innocent”; that every year since 2003 over half of those stopped
were black, around one-third were Latino, and about ten percent were white; and that the
number of stop-and-frisks increased every year from 2002 (97,296 reported cases) to 2011,
except in 2007 (New York Civil Liberties Union, 2014). Facing criticism for his city’s police
department, then-mayor Michael Bloomberg stated, “We are not going to walk away from
a strategy that we know saves lives” (K. Taylor, 2012).
In Floyd v. The City of New York (2013a), the stop-and-frisk law, as carried out by
the NYPD, was ruled unconstitutional by Judge Shira Sheindlin; she stated, “Without a
system to ensure that stops are justified, such pressure [to make a certain number of stops]
is a predictable formula for producing unconstitutional stops” (p. 10). She also noted,
The City and its highest officials believe that blacks and Hispanics should be
stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect popula-
tion. But this reasoning is flawed because the stopped population is overwhelmingly
innocent—not criminal. There is no basis for assuming that an innocent population
shares the same characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same area.
(pp. 8–9)
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She did not rule the stop-and-frisk program to be terminated, but rather that it be “carried
out in a manner that protects the rights and liberties of all New Yorkers” (Floyd v. The City
of New York , 2013b).
2.17 Neuroprediction of Violence
Neurocriminology is a neurobiological field of criminology (i.e., the study of brain-
and cognitive-related risk factors in crime). In his book, Anatomy of Violence, Adrian Raine
tells the story of a middle-aged man who develops a tumor and begins displaying pedophilia-
like symptoms that include fondling his step-daughter and collecting pornography of minors.
After failing treatment, the man is to be sent to prison; just prior, the tumor is discovered
and removed. After the removal he appears to return to his normal self. Raine suggests
that the case is “as close as one can get to demonstrating a causal [original emphasis] link
between brain dysfunction and deviant behavior” (p. 305). The author examines biological,
physiological, and neurological factors that may be predictive of violence, including vitamin
deficiency at an early age, low-resting heart rate, and an abnormal brain structure (Raine,
2013). Interestingly, many of these predictive factors that Raine cites can be found in himself
(P. Bloom, 2013).
Neuroprediction uses neuroscientific results (e.g., different brain compositions) to
make predictions. This area of research has garnered recent attention in predicting fu-
ture violence (Nadelhoffer et al., 2012; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012); however,
it is not novel (e.g., Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso believed criminals could be dis-
tinguished from noncriminals based on biological features, Lombroso, 1911). Aharoni et al.
(2013) found that hemodynamic activity in the anterior cingulate cortex was a significant
predictor of recidivism in a modest-sized sample (𝑁 = 96) of adult male offenders.
Because this is a relatively new area for violence prediction and not a lot of research
exists, it is likely to be one that receives considerable attention in the years to come (Lam-
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parello, 2010; Looney, 2009; Monahan, 2013).
2.18 Where to Next?
Melamed, Bauer, Kalian, Rosca, and Mester (2011) suggests that violence risk as-
sessment can and should be used before issuing firearms licenses (see also Consortium for
risk-based firearm policy, 2013); one may imagine how this requirement would hold up
against the Second Amendment in the United States. Several laws across the United States
have banned—often over a specified period of time—gun possession to those who have been
involuntarily committed or have a mental disorder and a history of violence (Luo & McIn-
tire, 2013). When guns are confiscated from persons with mental disorders they are often
returned; some jurisdictions require that mentally-ill persons be cleared by a mental health
professional, and this may be in the form of a “doctor’s note certifying that the gun owner is
no longer a danger” (Luo & McIntire, 2013, para. 55). In Maine, possession of firearms are
prohibited if a person has been “[c]ommitted involuntarily to a hospital” (Maine Criminal
Procedure, 2014, 1.E(1)); however, under certain circumstances (e.g., emergency involuntary
commitment) the law has been deemed unconstitutional (United States v. Rehlander , 2012).
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals arrived at a similar ruling in Furda v. State (2010):
[When] a judge approves an ex parte petition for an emergency, involuntary mental
health evaluation is hardly the equivalent of a commitment. In our view, that would
be akin to suggesting that an arrest warrant approved by a judge is the equivalent
of a conviction. (p. 888)
Monahan (2012) discusses risk assessment of terrorism, presenting risk factors, ap-
proaches and considerations, and methodological challenges, particularly noting the diffi-
culty of validating such a predictive measure. The United States’ Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) developed the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) to “rapidly
identify suspicious behavior indicators to provide real-time decision support to security and
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law enforcement personnel” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 2). FAST was
designed to measure heart rate and respiration, track position and gaze of eyes and measure
pupil diameters, detect thermal changes in the facial skin, and provide detailed images of
the face and body and audio analysis determining pitch changes. Because a terrorist act
is an extremely rare event, the number of false positives is an immediate concern (Furnas,
2012; Weinberger, 2012). The DHS has attempted to measure the accuracy of FAST by
“instructing some people passing through the system to carry out a ‘disruptive act’ ” (para.
6), reporting an accuracy of around 70% (Weinberger, 2012). As Furnas (2012) notes, this
means that FAST “would produce false positives at an abysmal rate” (para. 6).
2.19 Conclusion
Nearly a year after the Newtown shooting, and several mass murders since, the state
of Connecticut released its report on the Newtown shootings (State of Connecticut Division
of Criminal Justice, 2013). The report states,
It is known that the shooter had significant mental health issues that affected his
ability to live a normal life and to interact with others, even those to whom he
should have been close. As an adult he did not recognize or help himself deal with
those issues. What contribution this made to the shootings, if any, is unknown as
those mental health professionals who saw him did not see anything that would have
predicted his future behavior. (p. 3)
This was reiterated later in the report: “It is important to note that it is unknown, what
contribution, if any, the shooter’s mental health issues made to his attack on [Sandy Hook
Elementary School]” (p. 35). The report concludes,
[Adam Lanza’s] mental status is no defense to his conduct as the evidence shows he
knew his conduct to be against the law. He had the ability to control his behavior
to obtain the results he wanted, including his own death. . . . The existence of an
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extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse
is also not present in this case. (p. 42)
The report makes it clear that although Lanza may have been mentally ill, there was no
reason to suspect it was a cause of his violent behavior.
The history of violence prediction is a long and controversial one and will continue
to be. As computational power increases and “big data” continues to be popular, it may
appear that prediction becomes easier. But, as we have seen, many of the issues that initially
existed continue to exist today. As Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier (2013) state,
The more we switch from holding people accountable for their acts to relying on
data-driven interventions to reduce risk in society, the more we devalue the ideal of
individual responsibility. The predictive state is the nanny state, and then some.
Denying people’s responsibility for their actions destroys their fundamental freedom
to choose their behavior. (p. 177)
What does the future of violence prediction entail? One can only try and predict it.
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Chapter 3
It’s All About the Base Rates
“The chief reason for our ignorance of the base rates is nothing more subtle than our
failure to compute them”
— Paul E. Meehl and Albert Rosen
When prediction using a diagnostic test outperforms simple prediction using base
rates, the test is said to be “clinically efficient.” This term was first defined by Meehl
and Rosen (1955); its importance is often dismissed by proponents of actuarial de-
vices for predicting violent and dangerous behavior. This chapter examines clinical
efficiency in such devices. The chapter also provides three equivalent conditions
for determining clinical efficiency of a prediction method: (1) Meehl-Rosen (Meehl
& Rosen, 1955); (2) Dawes (Dawes, 1962); and (3) the Bokhari-Hubert condition,
introduced here.
3.1 Clinical Efficiency
Base rates play an important role in prediction and decision making (Bar-Hillel,
1980; Faust & Nurcombe, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; N. Schwarz, Strack, Hilton,
& Naderer, 1991). The phrase “clinical efficiency” refers to prediction by a diagnostic test
being better than prediction using just base rates (Meehl & Rosen, 1955). If 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2,
then prediction by base rates would be to say consistently that a person does not have “it”
because the probability of a correct prediction is 𝑃 (𝐴) ≥ 1/2 (i.e., the prediction is correct
at least half the time). Similarly, if 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2, prediction by base rates would be to always
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say that the person has “it.” Prediction according to the diagnostic test is to say that the
person has “it” when the test is positive, and to say the person does not have “it” when the
test is negative. To measure how “good” a diagnostic test is, consider the accuracy (or hit
rate) of the test defined as
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) =
(︂
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐴
)︂(︁𝑛𝐴
𝑛
)︁
+
(︂
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐴
)︂(︁𝑛𝐴
𝑛
)︁
=
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛
.
This expression is just the sum of the main diagonal frequencies from a 2 × 2 contingency
table (e.g., see Table 1.1) divided by the total number of subjects, 𝑛.
Assuming 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2, a general condition can be given for when prediction by a test
will be better than prediction by base rates:
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴); (3.1)
in words, when the base rate is at most 1/2, the test should be used for prediction only if the
accuracy of the test is greater than the proportion of the population not having “it.”
Using the general condition presented in Equation (3.1), there are three important
(and equivalent) conditions that can be derived for clinical efficiency. All three conditions
involve an attempt to predict an event having a low base rate by using a test possessing less
than ideal sensitivity and specificity values; they characterize the circumstances when more
accurate prediction would just be to use the larger base rate (i.e., to say the person does
not have “it”) rather than to rely on the diagnostic test. These three equivalent conditions
for base-rate prediction being superior to prediction from the test are attributed to Meehl
and Rosen, Dawes, and Bokhari and Hubert; the introduction of this latter condition is the
major motivation for the current chapter.
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3.1.1 Meehl-Rosen Condition
Assume 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2. The Meehl-Rosen condition (Meehl & Rosen, 1955) states that
it is best to use the test over base rates if and only if
𝑃 (𝐴) >
1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + (1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)) , (3.2)
or in terms of specificity and sensitivity,
1− specificity
sensitivity + (1− specificity) .
Because 1 − 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) this condition implies that the test should be used for
prediction over base rates if and only if the base-rate probability is larger than the ratio of
the false positive rate to the sum of the true positive and false positive rates. The proof of
the Meehl-Rosen condition and all other proofs can be found in Chapter A.
If 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2, the Meehl-Rosen condition becomes
𝑃 (𝐴) >
1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) + (1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)) =
1− sensitivity
specificity + (1− sensitivity) ,
and the proof is similar.
3.1.2 Dawes Condition
Assume 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2. The Dawes condition (Dawes, 1962) states that it is best to use
the test over base rates if and only if
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 1
2
. (3.3)
Equivalently, the Dawes condition can be written as 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) > 1/2, implying that prediction
by the test is better than prediction by base rates if and only if the positive predictive value
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is greater than 1/2. If the positive predictive value is less than 1/2 (i.e., the Dawes condition
fails to hold and it is better to just use base rates for prediction rather than the test), it is
more likely that a person does not have “it” than they do even if the test says the person
has “it.” In other words, given a positive test result there is a higher probability that the
person does not have “it” than they do. This has been called the “false positive paradox.”
If 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2, then the Dawes condition becomes
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) > 1
2
;
in words, when 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2, the negative predictive value must be greater than 1/2 for
prediction by the test to outperform prediction by base rates. The proof is similar.
3.1.3 Bokhari-Hubert Condition
Assume 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2. We will show that it is better to use the test over base rates
if and only if differential prediction holds between the row entries in the contingency table:
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴. In words, when the number of true positives (𝑛𝐵𝐴) is greater
than the number of false positives (𝑛𝐵𝐴) and the number of true negatives (𝑛?¯?𝐴) is greater
than the number of false negatives (𝑛?¯?𝐴), prediction using the test is better than prediction
by base rates.
This condition requires no probability calculations and can be seen directly in the
contingency table—for base rates to be worse than the test, differential prediction must
exist. All three conditions are equivalent; if the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds then the
positive predictive value is greater than 1/2 (due to the Dawes condition). In addition, the
Bokhari-Hubert condition implies the negative predictive value is greater than 1/2; thus, the
Bokhari-Hubert condition is equivalent to both the positive and negative predictive values
being greater than 1/2. Unlike the Meehl-Rosen and Dawes conditions, when 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2 the
Bokhari-Hubert condition is exactly the same. Thus, if prediction by the test is better than
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prediction by base rates, the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds for any 𝑃 (𝐴).
Relationship to measures of association.
The Goodman-Kruskal lambda coefficient (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) is a proportional-
reduction-in-error measure for predicting a column event (𝐴 or 𝐴) from knowledge of a row
event (𝐵 or ?¯?) over a na¨ıve prediction based solely on marginal column frequencies (𝑛𝐴 and
𝑛𝐴). Thus, the Goodman-Kruskal lambda coefficient can be considered a measure of associ-
ation between the diagnostic test result and the state of nature. For the 2× 2 contingency
table (e.g., Table 1.1), lambda is defined as:
𝜆column|row =
max {𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴}+max {𝑛?¯?𝐴, 𝑛?¯?𝐴} −max {𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐴}
𝑛−max {𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐴}
.
If 𝜆column|row is zero, the maximum of the column marginal frequencies is the same as the
sum of the maximum frequencies within rows; therefore, no differential prediction of a col-
umn event is made based on knowledge of what particular row an object belongs to. A
non-zero 𝜆column|row is an alternative way of specifying the Bokhari-Hubert differential pre-
diction condition. If 𝜆column|row = 0, max {𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴} +max {𝑛?¯?𝐴, 𝑛?¯?𝐴} = max {𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐴}. If
max {𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐴} = 𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 ≥ 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ≥ 𝑛?¯?𝐴, and the condition fails to
hold. Similarly, if max {𝑛𝐴, 𝑛𝐴} = 𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 ≥ 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ≥ 𝑛𝐵𝐴, and again
the condition fails to hold.
An alternative and more popular test of association is based on Pearson’s chi-squared
statistic (Pearson, 1900b). Although this test can be used for significance testing in a 2× 2
contingency table, it says nothing about differential prediction. For instance, this test may
show a significant relation between the state of nature (𝐴 and 𝐴) and the diagnostic test
results (𝐵 and ?¯?), but when 𝜆column|row is zero, there is no differential prediction and the
use of base rates will outperform the diagnostic test.
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Relationship to odds ratio and relative risk.
Odds ratios, or relative odds, are another way of measuring association. The odds of
an event is defined as the ratio of the probability that a person has “it” to the probability
that a person does not have “it,” given a specific diagnostic test result:
𝑂𝐵 =
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵
=
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴
and
𝑂?¯? =
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) =
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯?
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯?
=
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴
.
The first term, 𝑂𝐵, gives the odds of a person having “it” when they tested positive for
having “it”; the second term, 𝑂?¯?, gives the odds that a person has “it” when they did not
test positive for “it.” In Bayesian terms, the odds can be thought of as posterior odds,
given the test result; the prior odds is 𝑃 (𝐴)/𝑃 (𝐴). The odds ratio is simply the ratio of the
two odds, 𝑂𝑅 = 𝑂𝐵/𝑂?¯?. Thus, the odds ratio compares which group (𝐵 versus ?¯?) is more
likely to have “it.” If the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds, then 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 ⇔ 𝑂𝐵 > 1 and
𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ⇔ 𝑂?¯? < 1. This means that if the person tests positive for “it,” the odds are
greater than not that they do have “it”; if the person tests negative for “it,” the odds are
greater that they do not have “it” than they do. If 𝑂𝐵 > 1 and 𝑂?¯? < 1, then 𝑂𝑅 > 1.
Therefore, the Bokhari-Hubert condition implies that the odds ratio is greater than one;
thus, the odds someone has “it” is greater in the group that tests positive for “it.” Of
course, none of the entries in the denominators can be zero, but when the Bokhari-Hubert
condition holds, only 𝑛𝐵𝐴 has any possibility of being equal to 0.
Relative risk is the ratio of the probability that a person has “it” given they tested
positive for having “it” to the probability that a person has “it” given that they did not test
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positive for “it.” The relative risk is defined as
𝑅𝑅 =
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) =
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯?
=
𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?
𝑛?¯?𝐴𝑛𝐵
.
This ratio is greater than 1 if and only if 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯? > 𝑛?¯?𝐴𝑛𝐵. If the Bokhari-Hubert condition
holds, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴.
For this implication to work, 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 0. In summary, if 𝑛?¯?𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 0, the Bokhari-
Hubert condition holds if and only if 𝑂𝐵 > 1 and 𝑂?¯? < 1; the Bokhari-Hubert condition
also implies 𝑂𝑅 > 1 and 𝑅𝑅 > 1.
Relationship to diagnostic likelihood ratios.
The positive diagnostic likelihood ratios can be used to assess the performance of a
diagnostic test. A positive diagnostic likelihood ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵, provides the likelihood that
a positive test (indicating that a person has “it”) occurs in an individual who truly does
have “it” than one who does not. Similarly, a negative diagnostic likelihood ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯?,
indicates the likelihood that a negative test (indicating a person does not have “it”) occurs
in an individual who truly does have “it” than one who does not. The diagnostic likelihood
ratios are defined as follows:
𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 =
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) =
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴
=
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴
(︂
𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐴
)︂
,
𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯? =
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) =
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴
=
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴
(︂
𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐴
)︂
.
Ideally, a diagnostic test has 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 > 1 and 𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯? < 1. If the Bokhari-Hubert condition
holds, then we know 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴; 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 > 1 if 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐴/𝑛𝐴, which is always true if
𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2. Similarly, if the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds, 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯? < 1 if
𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯?𝐴 < 𝑛𝐴/𝑛𝐴, which is always true if 𝑃 (𝐴) ≥ 1/2. Thus, if the Bokhari-Hubert condition
holds, at least one of the two ideal diagnostic likelihood ratio conditions also holds.
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And what about when the Bokhari-Hubert condition is not met? If the condition
fails, it is either because (a) 𝑛𝐵𝐴 ≤ 𝑛𝐵𝐴, or (b) 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ≤ 𝑛?¯?𝐴, or both (a) and (b) are true. If
(a) is true and 𝑃 (𝐴) ≥ 1/2, then 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 ≤ 1. Similarly, if (b) is true and 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2, then
𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯? ≥ 1. The other two situations (where (a) is true but 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2 or (b) is true but
𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2) will depend on the data.
3.2 Predicting Violence and Dangerousness
Predicting violence and dangerousness continues to be a heavily debated topic; the
importance of base rates in predicting violent behavior has been discussed elsewhere (Doren,
1998; Vrieze & Grove, 2008; Wollert, 2006), although not all agree (e.g., see G. T. Harris &
Rice, 2007). We begin with a numerical example of predicting violence from Monahan et
al. (2005) using an actuarial model developed in the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study (Monahan et al., 2001) to attempt validation of the model. This article reports a cross-
validated instrument for the diagnostic assessment of violence risk (event 𝐵, risk present;
event ?¯?, risk absent) in relation to the occurrence of followup violence (event 𝐴, violence
present; event 𝐴, violence absent) among persons with mental disorders. Table 3.1 displays
their results in the form of a 2× 2 contingency table.
State of Nature
𝐴 (Violence Present) 𝐴 (Violence Absent) Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Risk Present) 19 36 55
?¯? (Risk Absent) 9 93 102
Totals 28 129 157
Table 3.1: 2× 2 contingency table for predicting risk of violence among persons with mental
disorders (Monahan et al., 2005).
The base rate for violence in this sample is 28/157 = .18 < 1/2. The authors correctly
predicted violence in approximately one-third of their patients (19/55 = .35); the authors also
correctly predicted nonviolence in about ten of every eleven patients (93/102 = .91). Overall,
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the authors correctly diagnosed three of every four patients; thus, the accuracy of their test
was (19+93)/157 = .71. Because 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2, prediction by base rates would be to say that all
patients will not commit violence. In doing so, one would be correct 82% of the time for this
sample (𝑃 (𝐴) = 129/157 = .82). Because prediction using base rates is better than prediction
using their test, all three of the conditions fail, as demonstrated below.
The specificity is 93/129 = .72, the sensitivity of the test is 19/28 = .68, and the base
rate (for violence) is 𝑃 (𝐴) = .18. Attempting to verify the Meehl-Rosen condition, we see
.18 = 𝑃 (𝐴) ≯
1− specificity
sensitivity + (1− specificity) =
1− .72
.68 + (1− .72) = .29,
so the condition fails to hold. The positive predictive value (PPV) of the test is PPV =
19/55 = .35 < 1/2, so the Dawes condition fails to hold. Finally, because 𝑛𝐵𝐴 = 19 < 36 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴,
the Bokhari-Hubert condition also fails. Another easy way to detect the failure of this
latter condition is to note there is no differential prediction because the row entries in the
contingency table (Table 3.1) are ordered in the same direction.
The authors also provide “revised estimates” of their sample, reclassifying partici-
pants from both groups by “using a slightly more inclusive operational definition of vio-
lence” (Monahan et al., 2005, p. 814). (Interestingly, this revised definition differs from the
original MacArthur definition of violence used to develop the instrument being validated.)
In their revised estimate their accuracy is better (it is exactly equal to 𝑃 (𝐴)), but all three
conditions again fail to hold.
Using the original MacArthur dataset (Monahan et al., 2001), several diagnostic
tests were examined for predicting dangerousness. The first is based on arrest history (𝐵:
dangerous—one or more prior arrests; ?¯?: not dangerous—no prior arrests). These data
are presented in Table 3.2. Three of every four predictions of dangerousness are wrong
(294/397 = .74), and one of every ten predictions of not being dangerous are wrong (39/393 =
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.10); the accuracy of the test is (103+354)/790 = .58. Using base-rate prediction (i.e., predicting
that no one is dangerous) yields an accurate decision for four out of every five predictions
(648/790 = .82). Thus, prediction by base rates is superior to prediction using prior arrest
history. This same conclusion is evidenced by noting that differential prediction fails because
𝑛𝐵𝐴 = 294 > 103 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴 implying that the Bokhari-Hubert condition fails to hold.
State of Nature
𝐴 (Dangerous) 𝐴 (Not Dangerous) Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Dangerous) 103 294 397
?¯? (Not Dangerous) 39 354 393
Totals 142 648 790
Table 3.2: 2 × 2 contingency table for predicting dangerousness based on history of prior
violence (Monahan et al., 2001).
A second diagnostic test from the MacArthur data used prior violence. If an in-
dividual exhibited prior violence, they were at risk to commit a violent act in the future
(𝐵); if the individual did not have any prior history of violence, they were not at risk (?¯?).
The data are shown in Table 3.3. Here, seven out of ten predictions of dangerousness are
wrong (106/154 = .69), and one out of six predictions of being not dangerous are incorrect
(128/785 = .16). The accuracy of this test is (48+657)/939 = .75; the accuracy of prediction by
base rates is 763/939 = .81. Again, this test fails to outperform base-rate prediction, and there
is a failure of the Bokhari-Hubert condition: 𝑛𝐵𝐴 < 𝑛𝐵𝐴.
State of Nature
𝐴 (Dangerous) 𝐴 (Not Dangerous) Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Dangerous) 48 106 154
?¯? (Not Dangerous) 128 657 785
Totals 176 763 939
Table 3.3: 2×2 contingency table for predicting dangerousness based on prior arrest history
(Monahan et al., 2001).
Kozol et al. published a paper in 1972 entitled The Diagnosis and Treatment of
Dangerousness. It presented a ten-year study involving nearly 600 male convicted offenders,
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most of whom were sex offenders. The authors advised the courts on 592 patients and 435
were released. Based on their clinical assessment and prior history, the authors recommended
the release of 386 and opposed the release of 49. In other words, the authors labeled 386 of
the patients as not dangerous (?¯?) and 49 of the patients as dangerous (𝐵). After release, the
patients were followed for an average of 43 months. Of the 386 patients recommended for
release, 31 committed serious assaultive crimes (𝐴), and 355 did not (𝐴). For the patients
not recommended to be released, but who were nevertheless released, 17 of the 49 committed
serious assaultive crimes and 32 did not. The base rate of dangerous was 𝑃 (𝐴) = 48/435 = .11.
A 2× 2 contingency table summarizing these frequencies is given in Table 3.4.
State of Nature
𝐴 (Dangerous) 𝐴 (Not Dangerous) Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Dangerous) 17 32 49
?¯? (Not Dangerous) 31 355 386
Totals 48 387 435
Table 3.4: 2 × 2 contingency table for predicting dangerousness among criminal patients
(Kozol et al., 1972).
As is clear from Table 3.4, the Bokhari-Hubert condition fails to hold; thus, prediction
by base rates (i.e., nobody is dangerous) is better than prediction from the test. It is noted
that we are not the first to point out flaws of these data; in 1973, Monahan stated that Kozol
et al.’s conclusion of reliably diagnosing dangerousness “is, at best, misleading and is largely
refuted by their own data” (p. 418). One might make this same unfortunate conclusion
for the instruments and variables studied under the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study.
3.3 Conclusion
For more than fifty years conditions have been available to assess when a diagnostic
test will outperform base-rate prediction. Meehl and Rosen’s (1955) article has been cited
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numerous times but the main point appears to be lost on most authors conducting research
on violence prediction. The typical way to describe the accuracy of a diagnostic test is by
the area under the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve; unfortunately, this can be
extremely misleading. The implications of an inability to predict violence have meaningful
consequences for the individuals involved. Incarcerating an individual based on the results
of a diagnostic test that fails to outperform base rates is unethical; as is profiteering from
these diagnostic tests.
The Bokhari-Hubert condition presented in this chapter provides a simple condition
for determining whether prediction from a diagnostic test outperforms prediction by base
rates; this condition is equivalent to those presented by Meehl and Rosen (1955) and Dawes
(1962). Unlike these latter two conditions, the Bokhari-Hubert pattern is unchanged with
respect to base-rate probability. The Bokhari-Hubert condition also has several relationships
with measures of association, such as Goodman-Kruskal’s lambda and odds ratios.
The simplicity of the Bokhari-Hubert condition relies on the use of 2× 2 contingency
tables; this is turn leads to questioning why researchers typically fail to present data in this
simple form. Besides its use in assessing the Bokhari-Hubert condition, 2 × 2 contingency
tables provide all the information needed to determine the quality of a diagnostic test,
including the area under the ROC curve for a single cutscore.
This chapter also demonstrated that several measures for predicting violence fail to
satisfy the BH condition. Unfortunately this appears to be the norm. In a meta-analysis
of seventy-three samples, Fazel et al. (2012) determined that the median positive predictive
value among the measures examined was .41 suggesting that the instruments failed to satisfy
the BH condition in over half of the studies. This is a disconcerting figure that deserves more
attention than given, possibly due to the sole reliance on the area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) for measuring test accuracy. The AUC is the topic of the
next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Hiding Behind the AUC
“Some individuals use statistics as a drunk man uses a lamppost—for support rather
than for illumination”
—Andrew Lang
The most common measure for accuracy in methods for predicting violent and
dangerous behavior is the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) and
it is often touted for being independent of base rates. This chapter argues that this
notion is why they should not be used and are in fact misleading, particularly when
the base rate is low. We suggest the use of positive and negative predictive values
as a supplement, or even substitute, for the AUC measures.
4.1 Introduction
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve used to evaluate binary classifiers
is a plot of the true positive rate (sensitivity) against the false positive rate (1− specificity).
A common measure of how a test performs in practice is the area under the ROC curve
(AUC); the AUC represents the probability that a randomly chosen person who has “it” has
a higher score than a person who does not (Hanley & McNeil, 1982). We argue that whenever
the base rates for a condition being assessed are relatively low, the AUC is inappropriate as
a measure for evaluating the adequacy of the actual predictions made from a diagnostic test.
This inappropriateness results from the AUC’s failure to incorporate information about base
rates. The AUC only evaluates the test itself and not how the test actually performs when
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used on a specific population having unequal base rates for the presence or absence of the
particular condition being assessed. Despite this current widespread adoption, the AUC as a
measure of diagnostic adequacy can be misleading when evaluating conditions with differing
base rates. These interpretative problems are further compounded when AUC measures are
the basic data subjected to a meta-analysis.
In contrast to some incorrect understandings in the literature about the invariance
of specificity and sensitivity across samples, it has been known for some time that these
two basic measures are subject to a variety of biases (Begg, 1987). For example, sizable
subgroup variation can be present in the sensitivity and specificity values for a diagnostic test
(this has been called “spectrum bias”; Ransohoff & Feinstein, 1978). In addition, because
sensitivity and specificity are calculated from frequencies present in a 2 × 2 contingency
table, it is always best to remember the operation of Berkson’s fallacy (Berkson, 1946): the
relationship that may be present between two dichotomous variables in one population may
change dramatically for a selected sample based on some other variable or condition (e.g.,
hospitalization, being a volunteer, age, and so on). In short, because ROC measures are
generally not invariant across groups, however formed, we do not agree with the sentiment
expressed in the otherwise excellent review article by Swets et al. (2000b). We quote:
These two probabilities [sensitivity and specificity] are independent of the prior
probabilities (by virtue of using the priors in the denominators of their defining
ratios). The significance of this fact is that ROC measures do not depend on the
proportions of positive and negative instances in any test sample, and hence, gener-
alize across samples made up of different proportions. All other existing measures of
accuracy vary with the test sample’s proportions and are specific to the proportions
of the sample from which they are taken. (p. 26)
Our general suggestion is to use the positive predictive value (PPV) and the nega-
tive predictive value (NPV) to evaluate diagnostic test performance. These two measures
incorporate both specificity and sensitivity along with the base rates in the sample for the
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presence or absence of the condition under study. In considering the use of positive and
negative predictive values, it is important to note that one cannot directly estimate these
probabilities is case-control studies as they are predetermined.
4.2 The Area Under the ROC Curve
Although the most commonly used measure of diagnostic adequacy is the area under
the ROC curve, our contention, as noted in the Introduction, is that the AUC is not a good
measure of clinical efficiency precisely because it does not incorporate base rates. (Clinical
efficiency — according to Meehl and Rosen (1955) — refers to prediction by a diagnostic
test being better than prediction just using base rates). The AUC is a function of the test
itself and not of its use on groups of individuals. To show the “independence” of base rates
for the AUC, consider an ROC curve (as in Figure 4.1) defined by a single coordinate pair
of sensitivity and (1 − specificity) values. This simple situation might conform to making
decisions with a diagnostic test having only a single cutscore (threshold), and where the
test is considered “positive” when some score exceeds a particular cutscore, and “negative”
otherwise. As shown below, the AUC in this case of one cutscore is just the average of the
sensitivity and specificity values, and neither is a function of base rates.
We can see explicitly how different normalizations (using base rates) are used to
calculate the AUC and accuracy (or hit rate) measures. Letting sensitivity = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) =
𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴 and specificity = 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴, the AUC is (𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)+𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴))/2 = (𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐴+𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛𝐴)/2;
accuracy is 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)+𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) = (𝑛𝐵𝐴+𝑛?¯?𝐴)/𝑛. Note that when 𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛𝐴 (i.e., when
the base rates are equal), the accuracy and AUC measures are identical.
4.2.1 The Wilcoxon Statistic
Another way to interpret what the AUC measures is to note its equivalency to the
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank-test statistic (Hanley & McNeil, 1982) that compares
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Figure 4.1: An illustrative example of computing the AUC given one cutscore.
randomly selected pairs of observations between two (independent) groups. As an example,
suppose we wish to know the probability in a randomly selected pair of people, where one
person committed violence and the other did not, that the psychopathy score for the person
committing violence is greater than or equal to that for the person not committing violence.
For a variable with two ordinal levels, a typical 2 × 2 contingency table is presented in
Table 4.1. The Wilcoxon statistic is
𝑛12𝑛21 +
1
2
(𝑛22𝑛21) +
1
2
(𝑛11𝑛12)
𝑁1𝑁2
. (4.1)
The average of the sensitivity and specificity (i.e., the AUC) is
1
2
(︂
𝑛11
𝑁1
+
𝑛22
𝑁2
)︂
,
which, after some algebra, is equal to the Wilcoxon statistic in Equation (4.1).
Similarly, the equivalence between the AUC and the Wilcoxon’s statistic can be ex-
tended. For example, suppose we have a variable with four ordinal levels, such as for dif-
ferent cutscores on the Screening Version of the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL:SV;
S. D. Hart et al., 1995). A generic table for such a variable is presented in Table 4.2. The
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Level Group 1 Group 2
I 𝑛11 𝑛12
II 𝑛21 𝑛22
Column Totals 𝑁1 𝑁2
Table 4.1: A variable with two ordinal levels for two groups.
Wilcoxon statistic for this four-level ordinal variable is
𝑛12 (𝑛21 + 𝑛31 + 𝑛41) +
1
2
(𝑛11𝑛12) + 𝑛22 (𝑛31 + 𝑛41) +
1
2
(𝑛21𝑛22) + 𝑛32 (𝑛41) +
1
2
(𝑛31𝑛32) +
1
2
(𝑛41𝑛42)
𝑁1𝑁2
.
(4.2)
The AUC can be calculated using the so-called trapezoidal rule, designed to approx-
imate a definite integral. Given a finite number of points (i.e., cutscores) the approximation
is exact when all points of the ROC curve are used. Working with the PCL:SV example
above, a given cutscore, say 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, is represented by the point (Sens𝑐𝑖 , 1− Spec𝑐𝑖)
on the ROC plot, where Sens𝑐𝑖 and Spec𝑐𝑖 are the sensitivity and specificity of the test using
the cutscore 𝑐𝑖. Beginning from (0, 0) (i.e., predicting that nobody will be violent), the area
under the curve from (0, 0) to (Sens𝑐4 , 1 − Spec𝑐4) can be determined using the trapezoidal
rule:
1
2
((1− Spec𝑐4)− 0) (Sens𝑐4 + 0) =
1
2
(︂
1− 𝑛32 + 𝑛22 + 𝑛12
𝑁2
)︂(︂
𝑛41
𝑁1
)︂
=
1
2
(𝑛42𝑛41)
𝑁1𝑁2
.
Continuing with the remaining cutscores, it can be shown that this equals the Wilcoxon
statistic of Equation (4.2).
Level Group 1 Group 2
I 𝑛11 𝑛12
II 𝑛21 𝑛22
III 𝑛31 𝑛32
IV 𝑛41 𝑛42
Column Totals 𝑁1 𝑁2
Table 4.2: A variable with four ordinal levels for two groups.
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4.2.2 Berkson’s Bias: An Illustrative Example
In 1978, R. S. Roberts et al. presented one of the first real data examples evidencing
Berkson’s bias. In reviewing different biases in analytic research, Sackett (1979) presented
a table adapted from R. S. Roberts et al. (1978) that showed the relationship between
allergic and metabolic disease with fatigue both in the general population and for a selected
population hospitalized within the previous six months. These data are given in Table 4.3.
The author points out the differences in relative risk (1.89 in the general population versus
0.37 in the hospitalized population), but one might also note that both “tests” fail to meet
the Bokhari-Hubert condition (see Chapter 3) that characterizes those situations where it
would be more accurate to predict from simple base rates and say that nobody suffered from
fatigue than to use allergic and metabolic disease as an indicator of fatigue. That aside, we
are presented with a test used in two populations so AUCs can be compared.
The base rates in each population are unequal: 𝑃 (𝐴) = .05 in the general population
and 𝑃 (𝐴) = .11 in the hospitalized population. The sensitivities for the two tests are .09
(for the general population) and .04 (for the hospitalized population). The specificities are
.95 (for the general population) and .91 (for the hospitalized population). The AUC for
the test used in the general population is (.09+.95)/2 = .52; the AUC for the test used in
the hospitalized population is (.03+.91)/2 = .47. Although neither test is much different from
one with no discriminating power (i.e., an AUC = .50), the AUC (.47) for the hospitalized
population is actually below the so-called line of discrimination (i.e., the 45∘ line) in an ROC
plot, rendering the test useless (one would be better off reversing the diagnostic test results).
Looking at the negative and positive predictive values it can be seen that the tests
fail to outperform base-rate prediction because, for both populations, the PPV is less than
1/2 (.09 for the general population and .05 for the hospitalized population). The justification
for this statement is summarized in the next section.
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General Population
Fatigue
Yes No Row Totals
Allergic and Metabolic Yes 13 136 149
Disease No 127 2508 2635
Column Totals 140 2644 2784
Hospital Population
Fatigue
Yes No Row Totals
Allergic and Metabolic Yes 1 21 22
Disease No 27 208 235
Column Totals 28 229 257
Table 4.3: An example of Berkson’s bias (R. S. Roberts et al., 1978).
4.3 Positive and Negative Predictive Values
The Bokhari-Hubert (BH) condition developed in Chapter 3 states that a diagnostic
test will outperform base rates (i.e., 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴)) if and only
if differential prediction holds between the row entries in a 2 × 2 contingency table (i.e.,
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴). This condition is equivalent to both the positive and negative
predictive values being greater than 1/2; therefore, the negative and positive predictive values
presented together determine if the test is outperforming simple base-rate prediction.
The condition where the positive predictive value is greater than one-half, attributed
to Robyn Dawes (Dawes, 1962), provides a minimal condition that a diagnostic test must
satisfy for it to be better than prediction according to base rates (when 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2). Stated
in words, assuming the base rate for a person having “it” is less than 1/2, the positive
predictive value must be greater than 1/2 for prediction by the test to outperform prediction
by base rates. If this condition fails to hold, it will be more likely that the person does not
have “it” than they do, even when a test result says the person has “it.” This has been
referred to as the “false positive paradox.”
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One way to relate the positive predictive value with the sensitivity and the negative
predictive value with specificity is by applying Bayes’ Theorem. The positive predictive
value is
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
(︂
𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
)︂
,
and the negative predictive value is
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) = 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
(︂
𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
)︂
.
If 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) and, consequently, 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (?¯?), the positive predictive value is equal
to the sensitivity and the negative predictive value is equal to the specificity. Assuming
𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2, the general condition for when a diagnostic test outperforms prediction by base
rates can be rewritten as
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) > 𝑃 (?¯?).
The use of these measures will possibly eliminate the terminological confusion about
what the term “false positive” might mean. One usual interpretation (that does not take into
account the base rates) is (1−specificity): the probability that the test is positive given that
the person does not have “it.” Another interpretation (which does account for base rates) is
(1−NPV): the probability that a person has “it” given that the test is negative. Similarly,
for a “false negative,” the usual interpretation (failing to take base rates into account) is
(1 − sensitivity): the probability that the test is negative given that a person has “it”; the
other (taking base rates into account) is (1 − PPV): the probability that the person does
not have “it” given that the test is positive. By equating 𝑃 (𝐴) and 𝑃 (𝐵), the confusions
about the meaning of false positive and false negative can be finessed because different
interpretations can be given as to what is “false” and what is “positive” and “negative.”
When evaluating a diagnostic test where different cutscores can be set, it makes
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intuitive sense to set a cutscore so that the proportion of positive decisions is close to the
prior probability of a positive decision, 𝑃 (𝐴), and to then consider the consistency of positive
and of negative decisions. The consistency of a positive decision is defined as the proportion
of positive decisions that are correct: 𝑃 (𝐴∩𝐵|𝐴∪𝐵); the consistency of a negative decision
is the proportion of negative decisions that are correct: 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?|𝐴 ∪ ?¯?).
Another possible measure of diagnostic accuracy that does take base rates into ac-
count would be an average of the positive and negative predictive values, either weighted
or not. Taking the simple average, (PPV+NPV)/2, would correspond to an AUC measure
for the single cutscore equalizing the base rates 𝑃 (𝐴) and 𝑃 (𝐵). When the BH condition
holds, the average of PPV and NPV will be greater than .50, with an upper limit of 1.0.
When the BH condition fails, the upper limit of this average is .75 because at least one of
PPV or NPV will be at most 1/2. Therefore, any test with an average at or below .50 should
not be used because it fails the BH condition. Any test with an average greater than .75
guarantees that the BH condition holds. When the average falls within the range of .50 and
.75, the PPV and NPV should be considered separately to determine if the BH condition
holds. Reasonable weights for a weighted average of the PPV and NPV would be the base
rates of the test so that the weighted average is
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴);
this is simply the accuracy of the test. These measures allow comparison between two similar
tests using different cutscores.
4.4 AUC Inflation
Consider data from Helmus, Thornton, et al. (2012) using the Static-2002R for esti-
mating five-year risk of recidivism (these data are described in detail in Chapter 7). Table 4.4
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presents a 2× 2 contingency table when using a moderate-level risk (a score of 5 or higher)
as a prediction for recidivism.
Sexual Recidivism
𝐴 𝐴 Totals
Predicted 𝐵 256 949 1205
Recidivism ?¯? 85 1319 1404
Totals 341 2268 2609
Table 4.4: A 2× 2 contingency table for predicting sexual recidivism with the Static-2002R.
Here, a score of 5 or higher leads to a prediction of recidivism. The results are used to
demonstrate Dawes’s (1993) properties.
The average of the sensitivity and specificity (i.e., the AUC at this cutscore) is AUC =
(.75+.58)/2 = .67; modest, but significant (𝑝 < .001). The accuracy of predicting recidivism
using this cutscore is Acc = (256+1319)/2609 = .60 < AUC. The positive and negative predictive
values of this test are, respectively, PPV = 256/1205 = .21 and NPV = 1319/1404 = .94; the
average of the positive and negative predictive values is .21+.94/2 = .58 < Acc. Thus, we have
the following relationship:
AUC > Acc >
PPV + NPV
2
. (4.3)
4.4.1 Dawes (1993)
Dawes (1993) demonstrates that under certain properties to be discussed shortly, the
following inequalities hold:
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
2
> 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?) > 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)
2
. (4.4)
Earlier we showed that the left-hand side of Equation (4.4) is the AUC at a given cutscore;
the middle term is the accuracy, Acc, and the right-hand side is the average of the positive
and negative predictive values. Thus, the equation can be rewritten as Equation (4.3).
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As Dawes notes, this suggests that the accuracy observed between a diagnostic test
conditioned on the state of nature is reduced when predicting new outcomes from the diag-
nostic test (i.e., the state of nature conditioned on the diagnostic test). In other words, the
average of the sensitivity and specificity will always be larger than the accuracy and this in
turn is always greater than the average of the positive and negative predictive values.
Dawes (1993) provides three properties needed to satisfy Equation (4.4); he notes
that the second and third property imply the first, but “given the importance of the first . . .
it is presented separately” (p. 5). The properties are presented in the same order as Dawes
(1993).
Property (1)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
The first property states that the sensitivity of the test must be greater than the false positive
rate. This is a property that any researcher desires and very few diagnostic tests (in the
literature) fail to meet.
Property (2)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
The second property states that the sensitivity must be greater than the specificity. This
property can be difficult to meet, particularly when the base rate is low. However, it is a
reasonable goal for the researcher; paraphrasing Dawes (1993), the researcher is generally
interested in predicting the presence of the outcome rather than the absence of it (p. 5).
Property (3)
𝑃 (𝐴) <
1
2
𝑃 (𝐵) <
1
2
Property (3) states that both the base rate and selection ratio must be less than one-half.
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Again, these are reasonable assumptions. Often we are trying to predict the rare event (i.e.,
𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2) so the first part of the property is generally met. The second part of the property
certainly should be met especially if 𝑃 (𝐴) ≪ 1/2. (See the last section for a discussion on
calibration; however, note that if 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) Property (2) cannot be satisfied. In fact, if
Properties (2) and (3) are true, 𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐴); this is shown by Dawes and in the proof in
Chapter A.)
Given that the three properties are met, then we have the reduction in accuracy
given in Equation (4.4); a proof is provided in Chapter A and can also be found in Dawes
(1993, Appendix 1). As mentioned, Properties (2) and (3) imply Property (1); this can be
noted by the fact that only Properties (2) and (3) are needed to complete the proof. Despite
Property (1)’s irrelevance to the proof, out of respect to the wishes of Dawes we keep it.
The implications of these properties are important; as Dawes (1993) states
The properties leading to these results are quite common in psychological investiga-
tions and in other social sciences. We are interested in predicting the unusual (base
rates < .50) from the unusual. When we do so, however, a fundamental asymme-
try results. The degree of predictability appears to be systematically greater when
the analysis is retrospective than when it is prospective. . . . We systematically
overestimate. It is that simple. (p. 7)
Consider the hypothetical ROC plot in Figure 4.2. The dotted, gray line is the 45∘ line
called the line of no discrimination. Any point along the ROC curve above (to the left of) this
line, satisfies Property (1). The solid black line orthogonal to the line of no discrimination
represents the boundary for when Property (2) is met: Any point on the ROC curve above
(to the right of) this line satisfies Property (2). The red section of the ROC curve represents
the points on the curve satisfying both Properties (1) and (2). If Property (3) is met the
cutscores in red represent when the reduction in accuracy is guaranteed to occur.
An interesting phenomenon arises as a consequence of Properties (2) and (3): The
negative predictive value will always be larger than the positive predictive value. This is an
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Figure 4.2: A hypothetical ROC plot: the shaded red area represents when Properties (1)
and (2) are met; the red line represents the points on the ROC curve satisfying the two
properties.
interesting situation because, given Property (2), this seems counterintuitive. To see that
this is true refer to the proof provided in Chapter A. The last line in the penultimate set of
equations states,
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
>
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
.
Applying Bayes’ Theorem we have
𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) > 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵).
In other words, if a researcher develops a diagnostic test that has a sensitivity larger than
the specificity and the base rate and selection ratio are both less than one-half, then the
negative predictive value will be larger than the positive predictive value. In addition there
is no restrictive lower bound on the positive predictive value (i.e., we still have PPV > 0).
Returning to the data presented at the beginning of this section (Table 4.4) we first
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note that Property (2) is satisfied: 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 256/341 = .75 > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 1319/2268 = .58;
similarly, Property (3) is satisfied: 𝑃 (𝐴) = 341/2609 = .13 and 𝑃 (𝐵) = 1205/2609 = .46. Also
note that as expected, 𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐴) and 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = 949/2268 = .42. Thus, as
expected, the inequalities hold as well.
4.5 AUC: Misleading the Way
The following sections provide several examples of the ineffectiveness of the AUC
measure in evaluating a test, with particular focus on tests attempting to predict violent or
dangerous behavior.
4.5.1 Predicting Violence
Just saying that a measure is “good” because it is independent of base rates does not
make it good for the use to which it is being put (or, in computer science jargon, a “bug”
does not suddenly become a “feature” by bald-faced assertion). In Chapter 3, an actuarial
model of violence risk assessment (Monahan et al., 2005) was used as an example. The 2×2
contingency table is provided in Table 4.5. The average of sensitivity (𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) = .68) and
specificity (𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = .72) gives the area under the curve: AUC = (.68+.72)/2 = .70. This
number tells us precious little of importance in how the diagnostic test is doing with the
cross-validated sample. The positive predictive value is 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = .35 and the negative
predictive value is 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) = .91. Because the positive predictive value is less than 1/2, the
test fails the BH condition implying that prediction by base rates (𝑃 (𝐴) = .82) is better
than prediction using the test (𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) +𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) = .71). Based on this test, two
out of three predictions of dangerousness are wrong; and one out of eleven predictions of
nondangerousness are wrong. It is morally questionable to have one’s liberty (or, in some
Texas cases, one’s life) jeopardized by an assessment of dangerousness that is incorrect two
out of three times.
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State of Nature
𝐴 (Violence Present) 𝐴 (Violence Absent) Row Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Risk Present) 19 36 55
?¯? (Risk Absent) 9 93 102
Column Totals 28 129 157
Table 4.5: A 2× 2 contingency table for predicting violence risk among persons with mental
disorders (Monahan et al., 2005).
4.5.2 Violence Risk Assessment Study
The data presented in the previous section were used to validate a model developed
in the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (Monahan et al., 2001). This study
looked at predicting violence among persons with mental illnesses and had two goals: “to
do the best ‘science’ on violence risk assessment possible and to produce a violence risk
assessment ‘tool’ that clinicians in today’s world of managed mental health services could
actually use” (Monahan et al., 2001, p. 9). There were several diagnostic measures used in
data collection, but the measure that appeared to be the best in terms of predicting violence
was the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV). The PCL:SV consists of twelve
items; each item is scored 0 (factor not present), 1 (factor may be present or is partially
present), or 2 (factor present) during a structured interview. The total score on the PCL:SV
ranges from 0 to 24, with higher scores supposedly more predictive of dangerousness and
violence. The twelve items on the PCL:SV are identified below using short labels:
1) Superficial
2) Grandiose
3) Deceitful
4) Lacks Remorse
5) Lacks Empathy
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6) Doesn’t Accept Responsibility
7) Impulsive
8) Poor Behavioral Controls
9) Lacks Goals
10) Irresponsible
11) Adolescent Antisocial Behavior
12) Adult Antisocial Behavior
Table 4.6 displays the results from the MacArthur dataset for each available PCL:SV
total score. The base rate for violence in this population is 159/860 = .18; thus, prediction
by base rates is to say that no person will commit violence (𝑃 (𝐴) = .82). The table is split
into four blocks, representing the three possible cutscores of 6, 12, and 18. Tables 4.7, 4.8,
and 4.9 display 2× 2 contingency tables using the three different cutscores. Figure 4.3 plots
an ROC curve for the three cutscore points.
When using a cutscore of 18, the test does outperform base rates, although minimally.
The base rate to three decimals is .815; the accuracy of the test to three decimals is 704/860 =
.819. The efficacy of this test is seen in the positive and negative predictive values (.53
and .84, respectively, so the BH condition holds). Note that 𝑃 (𝐵) = 55/860 = .06, which is
quite smaller than 𝑃 (𝐴). The AUC measure tells a different story: the sensitivity is .18, the
specificity is .96, and the AUC is .57, the lowest for any of the three tests. One would be
hard-pressed trying to equate accuracy with AUC for this test.
4.5.3 Comparing All Cutscores
In the previous subsection, three cutscores were examined in depth but many other
cutscores could be considered. When looking at all the cutscores, the positive and negative
178
PCL-SV Block Violence at Followup Block Row
Score Yes Yes No No Totals
0 0 34 34
1
18
1 45
328
46
2 1 54 55
3 6 48 54
4 1 57 58
5 4 41 45
6 5 49 54
7
69
8 51
254
59
8 10 57 67
9 13 38 51
10 9 40 49
11 16 31 47
12 13 37 50
13
43
12 19
93
31
14 9 14 23
15 7 26 33
16 3 13 16
17 7 10 17
18 5 11 16
19
29
10 10
26
20
20 5 6 11
21 4 1 5
22 5 5 10
23 0 2 2
24 5 2 7
Column Totals 159 701 860
Table 4.6: PCL:SV data from the MacArthur Risk Assessment Study (Monahan et al., 2001).
predictive values can be useful in determining an “ideal” cutscore for a diagnostic test.
Table 4.11 displays the positive and negative predictive values using cutscores ranging from
0 (the minimum PCL:SV total score) to 23 (a cutscore of 24 is equivalent to prediction by
base rates; i.e., predicting that no person will commit a violent act); the accuracy and the
AUC are also provided.
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Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 141 373 514
No (?¯?) 18 328 346
Column Totals 159 701 860
Table 4.7: Predicting violence using a PCL:SV cutscore of 6.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 72 119 191
No (?¯?) 87 582 669
Column Totals 159 701 860
Table 4.8: Predicting violence using a PCL:SV cutscore of 12.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 29 26 55
No (?¯?) 130 675 805
Column Totals 159 701 860
Table 4.9: Predicting violence using a PCL:SV cutscore of 18.
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Figure 4.3: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve using three cutscores for PCL:SV
in predicting violence.
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Violence
PCL:SV Score Yes No
0–6 18 328
7–12 69 254
13–18 43 93
19–24 29 26
Column Totals 159 701
Table 4.10: Using PCL:SV to predict violence for four cutscores.
All NPV values are greater than .50 for the tests, so cutscores with PPV values
greater than .50 meet the BH condition. From Table 4.11, there are six cutscores leading to
diagnostic tests that meet the BH condition. Looking at the individual AUC measures, the
largest value occurs at a cutscore of 18. Often when determining cutscores, individual AUCs
are not used; instead, two common metrics are relied on: the distance from (Sens𝑐, 1−Spec𝑐)
to (0, 1): 𝐷 =
√︀
(1− Sens𝑐)2 + (1− Spec𝑐)2; or Youden’s 𝐽 (Youden, 1950): 𝐽 = Spec𝑐 +
Sens𝑐 − 1, where Sens𝑐 and Spec𝑐 are the sensitivity and specificity, respectively, of the test
using a cutscore 𝑐. Both statistics fall between 0 and 1; minimizing 𝐷 or maximizing 𝐽
implies the best cutscore. For the PCL:SV data, the smallest 𝐷 and the largest 𝐽 both
occur when the cutscore is 8. The accuracy of the test using a cutscore of 8 is .65, and fails
to meet the BH condition.
4.5.4 Comparing Tests
We now demonstrate several examples showing the differences in the PPV and NPV
despite similar or exactly the same AUC values. First, in their paper discussing the advan-
tages of using ROCs, M. E. Rice and Harris (1995) provided AUC values, as well as several
other statistics, for their VRAG instrument after manipulating the base rate. The base rate
ranged from .15 to .58. The AUC ranged from .73 to .76, whereas the PPV increased linearly
as the base rate increased. The positive predictive value was as low as .36 (𝑃 (𝐴) = .15),
with a maximum of .73 (𝑃 (𝐴) = .58).
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Cutscore PPV NPV Accuracy AUC
0 0.19 1.00 0.22 0.52
1 0.20 0.99 0.28 0.55
2 0.22 0.99 0.34 0.59
3 0.23 0.96 0.39 0.60
4 0.24 0.96 0.45 0.64
5 0.26 0.96 0.49 0.66
6 0.27 0.95 0.55 0.68
7 0.29 0.94 0.60 0.69
8 0.32 0.92 0.65 0.70
9 0.33 0.91 0.68 0.68
10 0.35 0.90 0.72 0.68
11 0.35 0.88 0.73 0.66
12 0.38 0.87 0.76 0.64
13 0.38 0.86 0.77 0.62
14 0.37 0.85 0.77 0.60
15 0.42 0.85 0.80 0.60
16 0.47 0.85 0.81 0.60
17 0.48 0.84 0.81 0.58
18 0.53 0.84 0.82 0.57
19 0.54 0.83 0.82 0.55
20 0.58 0.83 0.82 0.54
21 0.53 0.82 0.82 0.53
22 0.56 0.82 0.82 0.51
23 0.71 0.82 0.82 0.51
Table 4.11: positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), their average,
accuracy, and AUC for twenty-four cutscores for the PCL:SV.
As a simple demonstration, we show how base rates can dramatically affect the pos-
itive predictive value despite the AUC (and sensitivity and specificity at each cutscore)
remaining unchanged. We start with a base rate of .50. The results of a hypothetical diag-
nostic instrument are displayed in Table 4.12. The AUC for this test is .75; the sensitivities
at the three cutscores (excluding those predicting nobody and everybody to have “it”; i.e.,
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prediction using base rates) are .4, .7, and .9. Similarly, the specificities at the three cutscores
are .9, .7, and .4. A plot of the ROC curve can be found in Figure 4.4. All the positive
predictive values are greater than or equal to .50 (see Table 4.15).
Has “It”
Cutscore Yes No
4 200 50
3 150 100
2 100 150
1 50 200
Column Totals 500 500
Table 4.12: Hypothetical diagnostic test results with an AUC of .75; population has a base
rate of .50.
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Figure 4.4: ROC curve for ypothetical diagnostic test found in Table 4.12.
We now adjust the base rate of those who have “it” to .40; the results can be found
in Table 4.13. The sensitivities and specificities at each cutscore are exactly the same as
before; and therefore so is the AUC (.75). The positive predictive values are not the same,
however. At each cutscore, the PPV is reduced (see Table 4.15).
Continuing, we adjust the base rates to be .30, .20, .10, .05, and .01. Table 4.14 gives
the diagnostic test when the base rate is equal to .01. For each base rate, the hypothetical
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Has “It”
Cutscore Yes No
4 160 60
3 120 120
2 80 180
1 40 240
Column Totals 400 600
Table 4.13: Hypothetical diagnostic test results with an AUC of .75; population has a base
rate of .40.
diagnostic test has the same sensitivities and specificities at each cutscore (and same AUC),
but, as Table 4.15 summarizes, the positive predictive value is dramatically affected. As
the results of this simple exercise demonstrate, simply reporting the AUC can be extremely
misleading. In addition, promoting the AUC as a base-rate independent measure without
discussing the importance of the positive and negative predictive values leads the reader to
ignore the consequences of differing PPVs. If one knows that the test has an AUC of a
certain value and the base rate is very low, then the clinician should be aware that the PPV
is going to be poor.
Has “It”
Cutscore Yes No
4 4 99
3 3 198
2 2 297
1 1 396
Column Totals 10 990
Table 4.14: Hypothetical diagnostic test results with an AUC of .75; population has a base
rate of .01.
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Base Rate
Cutscore .50 .40 .30 .20 .10 .05 .01
4 .80 .73 .63 .50 .31 .17 .04
3 .70 .61 .50 .37 .21 .11 .02
2 .60 .50 .39 .27 .14 .07 .01
1 .50 .40 .30 .20 .10 .05 .01
Table 4.15: Positive predictive values for hypothetical diagnostic tests with differing base
rates but fixed sensitivity and specificity (and AUC).
In the last example the sensitivity and specificity were exactly the same at each
cutscore and consequently, the AUC was the same. This need not be the case and the
final illustrative example demonstrates this (see also Mossman, 2006a). Here, the PCL:SV
measure divided into four subgroups from Table 4.10 is used to predict violence; for simplicity
we will consider each of the four ranges of PCL:SV scores as individual cutscores so that the
test possesses only four cutscore values. Recall the base rate for violence in this sample is
𝑃 (𝐴) = 159/860 = .18. As demonstrated, using a cutscore of 19–24 to predict violence has an
accuracy of .82, slightly better than prediction using base rates; thus, the test meets the BH
condition when using a cutscore of 19–24. The AUC measure for this test is .7296.
Now suppose the data were slightly different, as presented in Table 4.16. The only
differences between the two datasets are the frequencies at each PCL:SV score; the base rate
is unchanged (i.e., 𝑃 (𝐴) = .18). In this hypothetical situation, no cutscore meets the BH
condition. The best cutscore (in terms of accuracy of the test) is the 13–18 PCL:SV scoring
range. Using this cutscore, the accuracy is (85+595)/860 = .79 < .82. The AUC for this test
is .7295, nearly the same as for the original test. Both tests differ significantly (𝑝 < .0001)
from one with no discriminating power (AUC = .50), and are not significantly different from
each other (𝑝 = .996); however, only one of the tests has any merit for predicting violence
(i.e., the original test).
Now suppose that the definition of violence was redefined to be less stringent and
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Violence
PCL:SV Score Yes No
0–6 19 329
7–12 55 266
13–18 66 28
19–24 19 78
Column Totals 159 701
Table 4.16: Hypothetical PCL:SV distribution. The base rate for violence is the same as in
Table 4.10, but the number at each cutscore differs.
we ended up with the hypothetical results in Table 4.17. In this situation we have twice as
many “violent” individuals (the base rate for violence is now 𝑃 (𝐴) = 318/860 = .37), but the
number at each cutscore is the same as before. In this scenario, the prediction using the
test outperforms the base-rate prediction at each cutscore, but the AUC measure is slightly
worse than the two other examples (AUC = .7282). The AUC measure significantly differs
from a test with no discrimination power (𝑝 < .0001), but does not differ significantly from
the original test (𝑝 = .926).
Violence
PCL:SV Score Yes No
0–6 60 286
7–12 124 199
13–18 92 44
19–24 42 13
Column Totals 318 542
Table 4.17: Hypothetical PCL:SV distribution. The number at each cutscore is the same as
in Table 4.10, but the base rate is different.
Given these three tests, how is one to choose the “best”? If only the AUC measures
are provided, there is no way to distinguish between the three; the reader would be left
to conclude that all three tests are good (because they differ significantly from a test with
no discrimination power), but that is not the case. Table 4.18 displays the the accuracy
and the AUC measure of each test at each cutscore. Scenario 1 consists of the original
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data (Table 4.10), scenario 2 refers to the hypothetical example with the same base rate for
violence as the original data (Table 4.16), and scenario 3 refers to the hypothetical example
with a less stringent definition of violence (Table 4.17). From Table 4.18, the three tests
can be compared at each cutscore, or each test across the three cutscores. Again, for each
test at each cutscore the AUC does not provide much information regarding test accuracy.
For instance, in scenario 1 as the cutscore increases, the accuracy increases but the AUC
decreases. For scenario 2, the AUC based on a cutscore of 0–6 is larger than the AUC using
a cutscore of 19–24 (.68 vs. .50), but the accuracy provides an opposite conclusion (.55 vs.
.75). We again conclude that the AUC is not a good indication of test accuracy.
Scenario Accuracy AUC
Cutscore: 0–6
Scenario 1 .55 .68
Scenario 2 .55 .68
Scenario 3 .63 .67
Cutscore: 13–18
Scenario 1 .76 .64
Scenario 2 .79 .69
Scenario 3 .72 .66
Cutscore: 19–24
Scenario 1 .82 .57
Scenario 2 .75 .50
Scenario 3 .66 .55
Table 4.18: Accuracy and AUC for three scenarios of violence prediction at three different
cutscores.
4.6 Calibration
Calibration means that the selection ratio is equal to the base rate; that is, 𝑃 (𝐴) =
𝑃 (𝐵) (⇔ 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (?¯?)). Assuming 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1/2, because 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) =
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵)+𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?), the general condition for when prediction by a diagnostic test
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is better than prediction by base rates can be rewritten as
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) > 𝑃 (?¯?).
Given this scenario, the general condition above is equivalent to differential prediction be-
tween the column entries: 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 (see Appendix A). Thus, when
prediction by a diagnostic test is superior to prediction by base rates and 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵),
differential prediction holds between both the row entries and the column entries.
One way to determine an ideal cutscore is to consider when 𝑃 (𝐵) ≈ 𝑃 (𝐴) (Cook,
2007). When a diagnostic measure is calibrated, two measures one might consider are the
consistency of positive decisions (i.e., the proportion of correct positive decisions among
all positive decisions: 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵|𝐴 ∪ 𝐵)) and the consistency of negative decisions (i.e., the
proportion of correct negative decisions among all negative decisions: 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?|𝐴 ∪ ?¯?)). If
the BH condition holds, then 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 = 𝑛?¯?𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴 (i.e., differential
prediction holds between both the rows and columns). In this situation, it is easy to show
that both consistency measures must be at least 1/3 (see Appendix A).
In Chapter 3, the implications of the BH on diagnostic likelihood ratios was discussed.
If, in addition to the BH condition being met, 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵), then it can be shown that both
the positive and negative diagnostic likelihood ratios are ideally met (i.e., 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 > 1 and
𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯?), regardless of 𝑃 (𝐴) (see Appendix A). In Chapter 3 it was also shown that when a
diagnostic test meets the BH condition at a given cutscore, both the positive and negative
predictive values are greater than 1/2. When 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) as well, both the sensitivity and
specificity are also greater than 1/2, implying that the AUC is greater than 1/2.
4.6.1 Example
As a numerical example of when 𝑃 (𝐴) ≈ 𝑃 (𝐵), consider the PCL:SV with a cutscore
of 13. The 2× 2 contingency table is shown in Table 4.19. The base rate for nonviolence is
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𝑃 (𝐴) = 701/860 = .815 and the probability of a nonviolent prediction is 𝑃 (?¯?) = 700/860 = .814.
The consistency of positive decisions for the test is 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵|𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = 60/(60+100+99) = .23;
the consistency of negative decisions is 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?|𝐴 ∪ ?¯?) = 601/(601+100+99) = .75. Three out
of four negative decisions are consistent, but only about one of four positive decisions is
consistent.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 60 100 160
No (?¯?) 99 601 700
Column Totals 159 701 860
Table 4.19: Predicting violence using a PCL:SV cutscore of 13.
Some might argue (e.g., G. T. Harris & Rice, 2013) that the base rates do not matter
and that the test is independent of them, so then why calibrate? But the test should be
used on a similar population which displays similar charateristics and similar base rates; if
not, then the generalizability of the test is worth questioning.
4.7 Conclusion
The AUC measure is a poor indicator of a diagnostic test’s accuracy. When used
in populations with differing base rates, and in particular in populations with low base
rates, the AUC measure can be very misleading. When only the AUC is presented, the
reader is forced to base an assessment of the test with a statistic that does a poor job of
judging. If AUCs are to be presented, they should be accompanied by the positive and
negative predictive values. The PPV and NPV allows a determination of whether the test
outperforms base-rate prediction, something that is not possible with the AUC. The AUC
also does a poor job of determining an optimal cutscore for a given diagnostic test. Other
statistics, such as the distance measure or Youden’s 𝐽 also fail to determine an optimal
cutscore in terms of test accuracy. In contrast, the average of PPV and NPV is a better
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indicator of how well a test does at a given cutscore. Others have also advocated the use
of the PPV and NPV(e.g., see McCusker, 2007); an alternative presentation of the positive
and negative predictive values are documented in Frederick and Bowden (2009).
The AUC is often touted as being independent of base rates, but there is evidence that
the sensitivity and specificity do vary, and often quite dramatically, across different base rates
and that the positive and negative predictive value do not vary as much as might be expected
(Brenner & Gefeller, 1997; Leeflang, Bossuyt, & Irwig, 2009). The “independence of base
rates” argument is one the most heavily cited reasons to use the AUC, but this argument
may be as misleading as the AUC itself. Other issues associated with the AUC have also
been noted (Guggenmoos-Holzmann & van Houwelingen, 2000; Hand & Anagnostopoulos,
2013; Marzban, 2004; Vecchio, 1966; Vrieze & Grove, 2008).
In short, it is misleading to use the AUC as an indicator of a good test; the AUC
can disguise a poor test as a good one, with obvious consequences for individuals diagnosed
by the test. Employing a test with a “significant” AUC measure that fails to outperform
base-rate prediction to assess whether an individual will be violent or dangerous is ethically
questionable. Predicting violence is a difficult and important task and methods for prediction
should be continually improved, but settling for diagnostic tests whose predictions fail to
outperform base-rate predictions is unacceptable.
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Chapter 5
Lack of Cross-Validation
“What we’ve got here is ... failure to cross-validate”
Cross-validation is an important evaluation strategy for predictive modeling; with-
out it, a predictive model is likely to be overly optimistic. As Meehl and Rosen
(1955) state, “If a psychometric instrument is applied solely to the criterion groups
from which it was developed, its reported validity and efficiency are likely to be
spuriously high” (p. 194). This chapter discusses different cross-validation meth-
ods. To demonstrate the importance of cross-validation, several predictive models
are constructed with data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study
(Monahan et al., 2001) and compared with the original (non-cross-validated) Clas-
sification of Violence Risk assessment tool. The results show that the predictive
models’ measures of accuracy (AUC, misclassification error, sensitivity, specificity,
positive and negative predictive values) worsen when applied to a testing sample
than compared with the training sample used to fit the model. In addition, unless
false negatives (i.e., incorrectly predicting an individual to be nonviolent) are con-
sidered more costly than false positives (i.e., incorrectly predicting an individual to
be violent), the models generally make few predictions of violence. The implica-
tions of these results are discussed; skepticism regarding non-cross-validated results
is encouraged.
We begin by introducing several widely-used methods for cross-validation. Data are
presented from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS) that were used to
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develop the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) assessment tool. Based on this dataset
we construct a main effects logistic regression, a linear and a quadratic discriminant analysis,
and several classification tree models and demonstrate the process of cross-validation for
each.
5.1 An Introduction to Cross-Validation
Cross-validation is an important tool for prediction. It allows the researcher to esti-
mate a prediction tool’s accuracy in practice. Assessing the accuracy of a model with the
same data used to create the model will give biased—and overly optimistic—estimates of
accuracy; cross-validation is a strategy to mitigate such bias.
Assume we have a dataset (X,y), whereX is an 𝑛×𝑝matrix containing 𝑛 observations
measured across 𝑝 predictor variables, and y is an 𝑛 × 1 vector containing 𝑛 observations
measured on a single outcome variable (e.g., the outcome of violence). In this scenario the
outcome variable is known; this is typically referred to as supervised learning (in contrast,
when y is unknown we have unsupervised learning). In violence prediction the methods
commonly fall into the supervised learning category—the outcome for the subject (whether
he or she committed an act of violence) is known when the model is being constructed.
In prediction, interests are in modeling y as a function of X; it is assumed that for
some function 𝑓 ,
y = 𝑓(X) + 𝜀,
where 𝜀 represents the vector of random error terms; it has mean 0 and is uncorrelated with
the set of predictor variables. The primary goal is to estimate 𝑓(X) so
y^ = 𝑓(X).
The total error in prediction, y− y^, can be divided into two types of components: reducible
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error (𝑓(X)− 𝑓(X)) and irreducible error (𝜀). Based on mean-squared error,
E
[︀
(y − y^)2]︀ = E [︁(𝑓(X) + 𝜀− 𝑓(X))2]︁
= E
[︁
(𝑓(X)− 𝑓(X))2
]︁
+ 2E
[︁
(𝑓(X)− 𝑓(X))𝜀
]︁
+ E(𝜀2)
= E
[︁
(𝑓(X)− 𝑓(X))2
]︁
⏟  ⏞  
reducible error
+ V(𝜀),⏟  ⏞  
irreducible error
where E(·) and V(·) represent the expected value and variance, respectively. These two
types of error determine the accuracy of predictions. Although the term V(𝜀) is unknown
and cannot be reduced (hence the term “irreducible error”), the reducible error can be
minimized; this is the goal of prediction. If the predicted function perfectly matches the
true function, the total mean squared error is equal to V(𝜀); thus, V(𝜀) represents a lower
bound for the total error. In practice 𝑓(X) is not known, so one can only hope to get close
to this lower bound.
In constructing a predictive model, there are several available measures (e.g., the
mean squared error, the coefficient of determination [𝑅2], the proportion of predictions
correct) for assessing how well the model fits the data. It is important to note that this
error is often associated with the sample that is relied on to construct the model and not on
predictions in an independent sample. If the model is constructed for purposes of prediction,
what is most relevant is the model’s predictive accuracy on new data. Suppose there is a
given measure of accuracy, say 𝛾, for assessing the model and this measure was obtained
with the same data used to construct the model. One way of evaluating a model’s predictive
ability is to gather new data and measure how accurate the predictions are; that is, a new
accuracy measure 𝛾′ is obtained. The difference between 𝛾 and 𝛾′ represents the drop in how
well the model predicts (assuming a larger 𝛾 is associated with better accuracy; typically,
𝛾−𝛾′ > 0); this drop is known as shrinkage. Rather than assessing predictive accuracy with
the same data relied on to build the model, the original data can be randomly split into
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two parts: the training data and the testing data. The training data is for constructing the
model; the testing data is for estimating the predictive accuracy of the model. This process
is typically more efficient in terms of time and cost than collecting new data after the model
is developed.
5.1.1 Cross-Validation Methods
Several methods are available for cross-validation. The data can be split so that a
specified proportion, say 𝑞, of the data is present in the training set. Thus, 𝑞𝑛 observations
are in the training data and (1−𝑞)𝑛 are in the testing data. This can be carried out multiple
times choosing a different training and testing set each time. Because each replication of
this process will produce results that vary, it is common to compute an average across all
replications.
𝐾-fold Cross Validation.
𝐾-fold cross validation involves splitting the data into 𝐾 subsets; the training set
consists of the union of 𝐾 − 1 subsets, and the testing set is defined by the remaining
observations. This process is repeated so that each subset acts once as the testing sample.
The simplest form of 𝐾-fold cross validation is to let 𝐾 = 2: the training set contains half
of the observations, and the testing set the other. The most computationally costly form is
to let 𝐾 = 𝑛, so that each observation acts as the testing sample; this is commonly known
as leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV). A disadvantage of 𝐾-fold validation is that the
variance of the estimate can be relatively large compared to other estimates; it is, however,
approximately unbiased (see Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009, p. 242).
Mote Carlo Validation.
Monte Carlo validation (or repeated random sub-sampling validation) randomly splits
the data into a training set and a testing set. The model is fit with the training data and
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accuracy assessed with the testing data. This is repeated for a different random split over
a specified number of replications. The predictive accuracy of the model is determined
by averaging across all replications. One advantage of Monte Carlo validation is that the
number of training and testing sets is not dependent on the number of replications. In𝐾-fold
cross-validation, the size of each dataset is predetermined by 𝐾. The obvious disadvantage
to Monte Carlo validation is that there is no guarantee each observation will be a part of
the training and testing sets.
5.1.2 Resampling Methods
Bootstrapping.
The bootstrap (Efron, 1979) is a resampling technique for estimating the sampling
distribution for some statistic or for an estimator of some parameter of interest. The process
involves randomly sampling a specified number of times from the original data with replace-
ment. For instance, when the dataset contains 𝑛 observations, one can randomly resample 𝑛′
observations (typically 𝑛′ = 𝑛) from the dataset with replacement. This implies that a given
observation could be sampled more than once, and likely will be. An estimate of the param-
eter is made from the sample; this process is repeated, say 𝐵 times. For example, when the
parameter of interest is 𝛾, each of the 𝑏 = 1, . . . , 𝐵 replications of bootstrap sampling process
will produce an estimate of 𝛾, namely 𝛾(𝑏). The bootstrap method allows construction of
the standard error (and thus a confidence interval) for the population parameter of interest.
Thus, one obtains a better sense of the variability present in an accuracy estimate, 𝛾.
Jackknife.
The jackknife procedure (Tukey, 1958) like the bootstrap, is a resampling method
applied to reduce bias and estimate the variance of parameter estimates. The jackknife
procedure splits the observations into 𝐾 groups—much like in 𝐾-fold cross-validation—and
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the parameter is estimated removing one of the 𝐾 groups; this is carried out for each group
and a new estimate is made defined as the difference between the parameter estimate with
all observations and the one leaving out the 𝑘th group. For example, if 𝛾 is the parameter
estimate for the entire sample and 𝛾−𝑘 is the estimate with the 𝑘th group removed, the new
estimate is 𝛾*𝑘 = 𝐾𝛾 − (𝐾 − 1)𝛾−𝑘. These estimates can be used to construct a standard
error (and again a confidence interval) for the population parameter, 𝛾. This procedure also
reduces bias in an initially biased estimator.
5.2 The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) assessment
tool is based on an iterative classification tree (ICT) model. Relying on the proportion of
violent individuals at each leaf to estimate the probability of committing an act of violence,
the authors classified subjects as low-risk when their estimated probability of violence was
less than half the base rate (.09) and high-risk if the estimated probability was more than
twice the base rate (.37). After the authors developed their first classification tree, 477
patients were classified as either high- or low-risk; the patients not fitting into either of
these two groups were selected to construct a second classification tree model. This second
tree classified 119 of the previously unclassified subjects into high- or low-risk groups. The
third iteration classified 63 more individuals and the fourth, 60 more. The fifth and final
tree failed to classify any additional subjects into the two categories leaving 719 individuals
classified and 220 unclassified. This ICT process constructed nine more times and the five
best models—as chosen from a logistic regression model—-classified individuals into five
groups: very high risk, high risk, average risk, low risk, and very low risk with expected
violence probabilities of .76, .56, .26, .08, and .01, respectively.
The authors did not cross-validate their model. As Monahan et al. (2001) state on
page 106, “Dividing the sample leaves fewer cases for the purpose of model construction”
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and, quoting Gardner et al. (1996b), “wastes information that ought to be used estimating
the model.” When their ICT models were constructed in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
computing power was not what it is now, but LOOCV on a dataset of 939 was certainly
possible (although possibly not in the version of SPSS they relied on). With today’s com-
puting power there is no reason not to cross-validate one’s model or to argue that LOOCV
“wastes” data. As will be shown, cross-validated error can be drastically different than the
misclassification error for the initially constructed model (i.e., the resubstitution error).
As noted, Monahan et al. (2001) cite a source when they make their disingenuous
remark, so their reasoning did not necessarily originate with them. Looking at the Gardner
et al. (1996b) article referenced in the quote above, a footnote on page 43 states that a
bootstrap cross-validation was performed on the authors’ logistic regression model, a per-
fectly reasonable alternative. Monahan et al. also performed a bootstrap analysis to estimate
the variability of the predictions; 1,000 bootstrap samples helped estimate 95% confidence
intervals for the probability-of-violence point estimates given above.
5.2.1 VRAS Data
Based on data discussed in Monahan et al. (2001), several predictive models are con-
structed and used to demonstrate the process of cross-validation. Data from the MacArthur
Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS) were initially discussed in Chapter 1; here, we
represent it with more detail. The data are observations on 939 patients discharged from
inpatient psychiatric facilities based in Pittsburgh, Kansas City, and Worcester, MA. The
ages of the patients range from 18–40 (Mean = 29.9; Median = 30.0). Of the 939 patients,
538 (57%) were male; 645 (69%) were White, 273 (29%) were African-American, and 21
(2%) were Hispanic.
The response variable (Violence) is a binary outcome variable representing whether
an act of violence took place within the follow up period (Violence = 1 if an act of vi-
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olence occurred; Violence = 0 if not)1. Thirty-one predictor variables were included
based on the results from the main effects logistic regression and iterative classification tree
models in Monahan et al. (2001). The variables used in Monahan et al.’s (2001) main
effects logistic regression model are the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) non-planning
subscale (BISnp); the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; activation subscale: BPRSa;
hostile-suspiciousness subscale: BPRSh; and total score: BPRSt); child abuse seriousness
(ChildAbuse); employed prior to hospitalization (Emp); father’s drug use (DadDrug);
prior arrest history (frequency, PriorArr); presence of grandiose delusions (GranDel);
involuntary hospitalization admission status (LegalStatus); proportion of social network
members who are also mental health professionals (snmhp); Novaco Anger Scale (NAS) Be-
havioral Subscale (NASb); loss of consciousness due to head injury (Consc); Psychopathy
Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) total score (PCL); DSM-III-R checklist: drug abuse
(DrugAbuse); threat/control override symptoms (tco); violent fantasies with escalating
seriousness (FantEsc); and violent fantasies with single target focus (FantSing). The
variables used in their initial CART model are self-reported violence two months prior to
hospitalization (RecViol2); alcohol or drug abuse (SubAbuse); admission reason (suicide,
Suicide); father ever arrested (DadArr); any previous head injury (HeadInj); violent
fantasies with target present (FantTarg); diagnosis of schizophrenia (Schiz); age of pa-
tient (age); level of functioning (Function); arrested since age 18 for property crime
(PropCrime); MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale (PCS, PCS); threats at admission
(Threats); and number of negative relationships (NegRel). The authors also constructed
a “clinically feasible” model, excluding risk factors that were not readily available or involved
lengthy instruments (e.g., PCL).
All statistical analyses were carried out in MatLab (MATLAB, 2013) with pre-
processing done in R (R Core Team, 2012). The data are available for download through
the MacArthur Research Network website (http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/
1All variable coding that follows is based on our coding (see Appendix C.1).
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risk.html); the dataset for the present analysis was directly obtained from the MacArthur
researchers—it is a “cleaned-up” version from the statistician on the project. Monahan et
al. (2001) relied on mean (for continuous variables) and mode (for categorical variables)
substitution for handling missing data (see p. 93 for details) in their main effects logistic
regression model; thus, the same was done for all variables in this analysis. The best attempt
was made for preprocessing the data to match that in Monahan et al.’s analysis. All R and
MatLab code, including the preprocessing of the data, can be found in Appendix C.2.
As a way of comparing how close our variables match those of the MacArthur authors,
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were compared to those found in Chapter
5 of Monahan et al. (2001; see Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.5). Table 5.1 displays
the estimated correlations for each predictor variable with the response variable as well as
the reported correlations from Monahan et al.. Note that all correlations are computed
before missing value imputation. Although not a foolproof method for confirming that the
variables were preprocessed in the same manner, it certainly does indicate discrepancies that
may exist. There is a lot of agreement (at least to two decimal places), but it is not complete.
Eight of the 31 correlations disagree, seven to only one-hundredths of a correlation. The
largest discrepancy is between prior head injury (𝑟 = .04 vs. 𝑟′ = .06).
5.3 Main Effects Logistic Regression Model
Monahan et al. (2001) constructed a main effects logistic regression (MELR) model to
predict violence that was fit with forward-stepwise variable selection with a 𝑝 < .05-threshold
for retaining predictor variables. The present analysis constructs an MELR model as well
but one fitted with only the variables from the final model given by Monahan et al. (see the
discussion in the previous section). Table 5.2 displays the estimated coefficients (to three
decimals for comparative purposes) and the estimated odds ratio for the MELR models for
both the present analysis and that in Monahan et al. (2001). In addition, the corresponding
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Variable 𝑟 𝑟′
BISnp .05 .05
BPRSa −.08 −.08
BPRSh .08 .08
BPRSt −.04 −.04
ChildAbuse .14 .14
Emp −.05 −.05
DadDrug .15 .16
PriorArr .24 .24
GranDel −.01 −.01
LegalStatus .11 .11
SNMHP −.10 −.10
NASb .17 .16
Consc .09 .10
PCL .26 .26
DrugAbuse .16 .17
tco −.09 −.10
FantEsc .13 .13
FantSing .10 .10
RecViol2 .14 .14
SubAbuse .18 .18
Suicide −.01 −.01
DadArr .14 .15
HeadInj .04 .06
FantTarg .12 .12
Schiz −.12 −.12
Age −.07 −.07
Function −.01 −.01
PropCrime .11 .11
PCS .03 .03
Threats .06 .06
NegRel .05 .06
Table 5.1: Pearson product-moment correlations of predictor variable with response variable,
Violence, in reanalyzed dataset (𝑟) and reported correlations in Monahan et al. (2001)
(𝑟′).
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95% confidence intervals are provided for the current analysis.
Present Study VRAS
Variable 𝛽 CI ̂︂𝑂𝑅 CI 𝛽 ̂︂𝑂𝑅
Intercept −2.900 (−4.218,−1.583) — — −2.814 —
BISnp −0.028 (−0.053,−0.003) 0.97 (0.95, 0.997) −0.031 0.97
BPRSa −0.151 (−0.275,−0.027) 0.86 (0.76, 0.97) −0.164 0.85
BPRSh 0.117 (0.039, 0.196) 1.12 (1.04, 1.22) 0.127 1.14
BPRSt −0.033 (−0.065,−0.002) 0.97 (0.94, 0.998) −0.033 0.98
ChildAbuse 0.373 (0.169, 0.578) 1.45 (1.18, 1.78) 0.427 1.53
Emp −0.477 (−0.870,−0.085) 0.62 (0.42, 0.92) −0.530 0.59
DadDrug 0.737 (0.195, 1.279) 2.09 (1.22, 3.59) 0.779 2.18
PriorArr 0.298 (0.137, 0.459) 1.35 (1.15, 1.58) 0.286 1.33
GranDel 0.711 (0.037, 1.385) 2.04 (1.04, 4.00) 0.826 2.28
LegalStatus 0.511 (0.122, 0.901) 1.67 (1.13, 2.46) 0.500 1.65
SNMHP −1.856 (−3.322,−0.390) 0.16 (0.04, 0.68) −1.704 0.18
NASb 0.038 (0.008, 0.068) 1.04 (1.01, 1.07) 0.038 1.04
Consc 0.520 (0.007, 1.032) 1.68 (1.01, 2.81) 0.551 1.73
PCL 0.898 (0.484, 1.313) 2.46 (1.62, 3.72) 0.876 2.40
DrugAbuse 0.381 (−0.070, 0.831) 1.46 (0.93, 2.30) 0.449 1.58
tco −0.900 (−1.571,−0.229) 0.41 (0.21, 0.80) −0.412 0.66
FantEsc 0.676 (0.035, 1.316) 1.97 (1.04, 3.73) 0.648 1.90
FantSing 0.565 (0.057, 1.073) 1.76 (1.06, 2.92) 0.628 1.87
Table 5.2: Estimated coefficients for the main effects logistic regression model (𝛽) and odds
ratios (̂︂𝑂𝑅) for present analysis (with confidence intervals [CI]) and those presented in
Monahan et al. (2001, Table 5.1).
The estimated model for the present analysis differs slightly from that presented by
Monahan et al. (2001). All variables in the present analysis were found to be significant
(𝑝 < .05) except DrugAbuse (𝑝 = .11); this is unlike the results in Monahan et al. (2001)
in that all estimated beta coefficients were significant (𝑝 < .05). Predicted probabilities
ranged from .003 to .91; the VRAS predicted probabilities ranged from .002 to .93. The
authors used a predicted probability cutscore of half the sample base rate (.09) and twice
the sample base rate (.37) to classify low- and high-risk patients, respectively. In doing so,
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57.1% (536 individuals) of their sample was classified under the two risk categories. Similarly,
the present model classified 55.2% (518) of the patients as high risk or low risk. From these
results, the 2× 2 contingency Table 5.3 can be constructed; those who fall into the high risk
group are predicted to be violent, those who fall in the low risk group are not. The base rate
for the subsample is 98/518 = .189; the resubstitution error is less, (67+23)/518 = .174. This
result implies that the model outperforms base rate prediction; that is, the accuracy of the
model is better than na¨ıve prediction using only base rate information (i.e., predicting all
individuals to be nonviolent; see Chapter 3). Given that the base rate for violence in the
sample is less than one-half, a model that outperforms base rate prediction is equivalent to
one with a positive predictive value greater than one-half (Dawes, 1962, see also Chapter 3);
thus, it is guaranteed that at least half of the predictions of violence are correct. Thus,
outperforming base rate prediction should be a minimal requirement. The sensitivity and
specificity are, respectively, .765 and .840. The positive and negative predictive values are
75/142 = .528 and 353/376 = .939, respectively. The model, when used on the training data,
satisfies the Bokhari-Hubert (BH) condition (see Chapter 3); that is, the model outperforms
prediction using base rates. The results of the LOOCV are given in Table 5.4; there were
five fewer individuals classified as low risk. The base rate is 94/513 = .183; the LOOCV
error is (72+24)/514 = .187, slightly larger meaning that the cross-validated model no longer
meets the BH condition. In addition to the increase in overall error, the validated model
also shows decreased sensitivity (70/94 = .745), specificity (347/419 = .828), positive predictive
value (70/142 = .493), and negative predictive value (347/371 = .935). Note that because the
test fails to outperform base rate prediction, the positive predictive value is less than one-half
implying that an individual predicted to be violent is more likely than not to be nonviolent.
Instead of splitting the data by so-called low- and high-risk individuals, a cutscore
of .50 might be used to classify violence, representing a “more likely than not” probability.
The resubstitution error is (29+130)/939 = .169 (Table 5.5); the model outperforms base-rate
prediction. The sensitivity is 46/176 = .261; the specificity is 734/763 = .962. The positive and
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Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 75 67 142
No (?¯?) 23 353 376
Column Totals 98 420 518
Table 5.3: Predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression model. If a patient had
a predicted probability greater than two times the base rate (.37), a prediction of violence
was made; if the predicted probability was less than half the base rate (.09), a prediction of
no violence was made.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 70 72 142
No (?¯?) 24 347 371
Column Totals 94 419 513
Table 5.4: LOOCV results for predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression
model. If a patient had a predicted probability greater than two times the base rate (.37),
a prediction of violence was made; if the predicted probability was less than half the base
rate (.09), a prediction of no violence was made.
negative predictive values are, respectively, 46/75 = .613 and 734/864 = .850. The LOOCV
error is .182 (Table 5.6), slightly less than the base rate; thus, the cross-validated model also
satisfies the BH condition and outperforms base rate prediction. However, the sensitivity
is low indicating that the model fails to correctly identify most (over three quarters) of
violent individuals. The cross-validated sensitivity (39/176 = .222), specificity (734/763 = .955),
positive predictive value (39/73 = .534), and negative predictive value (729/866 = .842) are all
less. The ROC curve for the main effects model is shown in Figure 5.1. The AUC for the
non-cross-validated logistic regression model is .79 (.75, .83); the cross-validated AUC is .77
(.72, .81). Both AUC values are significantly different than .50 and significantly different
from each other (𝑝 < .001). The authors reported an AUC of .81 for their logistic regression
model.
Next, the data are randomly split into two parts, the training set (70% of the original
sample, or 658 observations) and the testing set (30% of the original sample, or 281 obser-
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Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 46 29 75
No (?¯?) 130 734 864
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 5.5: Predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression model. If a patient
had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made; otherwise a
prediction of no violence was made.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 39 34 73
No (?¯?) 137 729 866
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 5.6: LOOCV results for predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression
model. If a patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was
made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Se
ns
itiv
ity
1 − Specificity
ROC Curve for MELR Model
Figure 5.1: ROC plot for the main effects logistic regression model. The AUC is .79.
vations). The base rate for violence in the training set is .188; in the testing set, .185. The
model fit to the training data is then used to predict violence in the testing data. These
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results (based on a .50 cutscore) are given in Table 5.7, where Table 5.8 displays the results
for the high-risk and low-risk cutscores.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 12 17 29
No (?¯?) 40 212 252
Column Totals 52 239 281
Table 5.7: Predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression model on the testing
sample. If a patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence
was made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 22 31 53
No (?¯?) 9 101 110
Column Totals 31 132 163
Table 5.8: Predicting violence with a main effects logistic regression model on the testing
sample. If a patient had a predicted probability greater than two times the base rate (.37),
a prediction of violence was made; if the predicted probability was less than half the base
rate (.09), a prediction of no violence was made.
Setting the cutscore to .50 and fitting the model to the training data, the model’s
sensitivity and specificity are 40/124 = .323 and 518/534 = .970, respectively; the positive
and negative predictive values are 40/56 = .714 and 𝑛𝑓518602 = .860, respectively; and the
resubstitution error is 100/658 = .152, much lower than the base rate. When the model is used
to classify training observations as high-risk and low-risk, the sensitivity and specificity are
now 58/75 = .773 and 260/303 = .858, respectively; the positive and negative predictive values
are 58/101 = .574 and 260/277 = .939, respectively; and the resubstitution error is 60/378 = .159,
again less than the base rate for violence. The AUC for the model fit to the training data is
.80 (.75, .84). (Note that the training data results are not provided as tables.)
These results suggest the model is doing well at predicting violence; however, it is
important to note that they are based on the same data used to fit the model. Fitting
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the model to the testing data (with a cutscore of .50), the sensitivity and specificity are
12/52 = .231 and 212/239 = .889, respectively; the positive and negative predictive values are
12/29 = .414 and 212/252 = .84, respectively; and the misclassification error is (17+40)/281 =
.203, slightly larger than the base rate meaning the model fails to meet the BH condition.
Classifying testing observations as high-risk and low-risk, the sensitivity and specificity are
22/31 = .710 and 101/132 = .765, respectively; the positive and negative predictive values are
22/53 = .415 and 218/255 = .918, respectively; and the misclassification error is (31+9)/163 = .245,
again implying the model fails to satisfy the BH condition. The AUC is .74 (.66, .82).
From these results we find that the model performs far worse on the testing sample,
demonstrating the importance of cross-validation and the inflated accuracy when measured
with the same data that created the model; the sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative
predictive values, and AUC all decrease. Furthermore, the model no longer meets the BH
condition. The logistic regression model does not seem nearly as promising when cross-
validated on new data.
5.4 Discriminant Analysis
This section applies discriminant analysis to classify individuals from the VRAS data,
for both a linear fit (i.e., assuming the covariances among the two populations—nonviolent
and violent—are equal) and a quadratic fit (i.e., the covariances are allowed to be unequal).
For a linear discriminant function on the entire dataset, the AUC is .80 and the
resubstitution error is .176, less than the base rate; the LOOCV error is .190, slightly
larger than the base rate so the model satisfies the BH condition and outperforms base rate
prediction. The data were then split into a training and testing sample. The training sample
again contains 70% of the original sample (658 observations); the base rate for violence is
124/658 = .188. The testing sample contains the remaining 30% (281 observations); the base
rate for violence is 52/281 = .185. After fitting a linear discriminant model to the training data,
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it was used to predict the observations in the testing data; the 2× 2 contingency Table 5.9
displays the results with a cutscore of .50. The sensitivity and specificity of the tests are,
respectively, 14/52 = .269 and 210/229 = .917; the positive and negative predictive values are,
respectively, 14/33 = .424 and 210/248 = .847; the misclassification error is (19+38)/281 = .203;
and the AUC is .74 (.67, .83). The model fails to outperform base prediction and fails to
correctly identify a large number of violent individuals.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 14 19 33
No (?¯?) 38 210 248
Column Totals 52 229 281
Table 5.9: Predicting violence with a linear discriminant analysis model on the testing data.
If a patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made;
otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
Applying a quadratic discriminant function, the model is again fit to the entire
dataset. The AUC is .91 and the resubstitution error is .145, quite an improvement over the
linear model. However, the LOOCV error is .227, much higher than the linear model. Based
on the same training and testing samples as the linear model, the results of Table 5.10 are
obtained. The model performs much worse on the testing data than the linear model. The
sensitivity and specificity are, respectively, 17/52 = .327 and 202/229 = .882; the positive and
negative predictive powers are, respectively, 17/44 = .386 and 202/237 = .852; the misclassifi-
cation error is (27+35)/281 = .221; and the AUC is .69 (.60, .77). Again, the model does not
outperform base rate prediction and identifies a only small proportion of violent individuals.
These results again show the differences in resubstitution error when cross-validating.
Additionally we see that a more flexible model (i.e., using a quadratic classifier) does better
on the training data than the less flexible model (i.e., using a linear classifier), but worse on
the testing sample. This is an indication that the more flexible model overfits the data.
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Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 17 27 44
No (?¯?) 35 202 237
Column Totals 52 229 281
Table 5.10: Predicting violence with a quadratic discriminant analysis model on the testing
data. If a patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was
made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
5.5 Classification and Regression Trees
The last type of modeling discussed involves classification and regression tree (CART)
analyses as described in Chapter 1. A classification tree is first developed as done in Mon-
ahan et al. (2001) before proceeding to more sophisticated methods. For the initial CART
analysis, SPSS (IBM Corportation, 2012) was used to implement the Chi-Squared Automatic
Interaction Detection (CHAID; Kass, 1980) decision tree; a decision tree is also constructed
in MatLab. Subsequent analyses will be with an ensemble learning method known as
bagged decision trees. For these latter CART analyses, MatLab (MATLAB, 2013) is used
exclusively.
Before beginning, it is necessary to discuss how a classification tree classifies obser-
vations and how this process is related to the costs of false positives and negatives.
5.5.1 Misclassification Costs
Suppose in a given terminal node there are 𝑛 observations, of which 𝑛𝑘 are from class
𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾). An observation is classified into class 𝑘 based on the modal class at that
given terminal node; thus, if 𝑛𝑘 > 𝑛𝑘′ for all 𝑘 ̸= 𝑘′, all observations within the terminal
node are classified as belonging to class 𝑘. The empirical posterior probability for each class
can be defined as the number of observations in the terminal node coming from a particular
class divided by the total number of observations; thus, the estimated posterior probability
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is
𝑃 (𝑘|x) = 𝑛𝑘
𝑛
,
where x is a vector of predictor variables associated with the observation. Given this defi-
nition, an observation, 𝑦, is classified as coming from class 𝑘 when 𝑃 (𝑘|x) > 𝑃 (𝑘′|x) for all
𝑘 ̸= 𝑘′.
As an addition to the classification process, costs can be assigned to misclassifications;
the cost function is labeled 𝐶𝑗(𝑘) and represents the cost of classifying an observation into
class 𝑗 when it belongs in class 𝑘 (note that 𝐶𝑘(𝑘) = 0). By including a cost function, an
observation is classified into class 𝑘 by minimizing
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑃 (𝑘|x)𝐶𝑗(𝑘)
across all 𝑗. Note that when 𝐶𝑗(𝑘) is the same for all 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 (i.e., the costs are equal
across all classes), the previous situation obtains and an observation is classified based on
the modal class.
Given two classes (i.e., 𝑘 = 1, 2; for example, 1 could represent nonviolent individuals
and 2 violent individuals) an observation is classified into class 𝑘 = 2 when
𝑃 (2|x)𝐶1(2) > 𝑃 (1|x)𝐶2(1).
With respect to classification of nonviolent and violent individuals, 𝐶1(2) and 𝐶2(1) are,
respectively, the costs associated with a false negative and a false positive. Alternatively,
the above inequality can be written as
𝐶1(2)
𝐶2(1)
>
𝑃 (1|x)
𝑃 (2|x) .
The lower bound, 𝑃 (1|x)/𝑃 (2|x), is the conditional odds in favor of the event 1; for example,
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the odds in favor that an individual is not violent, given the data.
If 𝐶1(2) = 𝐶2(1), an observation is classified as coming from class 2 when 𝑃 (2|x) >
𝑃 (1|x), or equivalently,
𝑃 (2|x)
𝑃 (1|x) > 1.
Bayes Theorem allows this to be rewritten as
𝑃 (x|2)𝑃 (2)
𝑃 (x)
𝑃 (x|1)𝑃 (1)
𝑃 (x)
=
𝑃 (x|2)𝑃 (2)
𝑃 (x|1)𝑃 (1) > 1.
Considering 𝑃 (x|2) and 𝑃 (x|1) fixed, the classification cutscore can be changed by adjusting
𝑃 (1) and 𝑃 (2); these probabilities are the sample base rates (note that for 𝑘 = 1, 2, 𝑃 (2) =
1− 𝑃 (1)). Thus, adjusting the prior probabilities is an equivalent way for adjusting costs.
As noted earlier, Monahan et al. (2001) suggested the cutscore for classification of
high-risk individuals be twice the sample base rate of violence (approximately .37). This
implies that an individual is classified as violent when the individual belongs to a termi-
nal node where 𝑃 (2|x) > .37. This implicitly assigns unequal costs to false positives and
negatives; let 𝑃 (2|x) = 2𝑃 (𝐴) = .37 (and consequently, 𝑃 (1|x) = 1− 2𝑃 (𝐴) = .63) so
𝐶1(2)
𝐶2(1)
=
1− 2𝑃 (𝐴)
2𝑃 (𝐴)
=
.63
.37
= 1.67.
By lowering the cutscore to .37 for classification of violence, the authors have implied that
false negatives are 1.67 times worse than false positives. By letting the cutscore equal .50
the misclassification error in each terminal node is ensured to be less than .50, implying that
the BH condition is satisfied in the decision tree for the training data.
Most authors of actuarial measures are reluctant to discuss the costs of false positives
versus false negatives (Mossman, 2006b, 2013; Vrieze & Grove, 2008); an exception is Richard
Berk. In his book, Criminal Justice Forecasts of Risk: A Machine Learning Approach (Berk,
2012), he suggests that
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the costs of forecasting errors need to be introduced at the very beginning when the
forecasting procedures are being developed [original emphasis]. Then, those costs can
be built into the forecasts themselves. The actual forecasts [original emphasis] need
to change in response to relative costs. (p. 20)
In the examples Berk provides (regarding parole release), he suggests that the ratio of false
negatives to false positives be as high as twenty to one (see also Berk, 2011).
5.5.2 VRAS CART Model in SPSS
Although Monahan et al. (2001) included all 134 potential risk factors in their analy-
sis, for simplicity only the 31 predictor variables previously discussed and provided in detail
in Appendix C.1 are included here. As in Monahan et al. (2001), the minimum leaf size
was set to 50 with no limit on the tree depth and a significance level of 𝑝 < .05 for vari-
able selection. A Bonferroni adjustment was applied for significance values; it is unknown
whether the authors implemented a Type-I-error correction in their analyses. Finally, a
𝐾-fold cross-validation is implemented, not done by the authors. The syntax can be found
in Appendix C.2.
The classification tree is displayed in Figure 5.2; the results are poor and not similar
to what was identified by the authors. With a .50 cutscore (as determined by the proportion
of violent individuals in a given terminal node), both the resubstitution and cross-validation
errors were .187, or equal to the base rate, because all cases were classified as nonviolent
in the decision tree (i.e., no terminal node contained a sample with more than 50% having
committed an act of violence). The proportion of violent individuals in each terminal node
varied from 0 to .392. Using the previously noted values of .37 and .09 for high-low classi-
fications to predict violence, the contingency Table 5.11 is constructed (see also Figure 5.2
where the low-risk groups are within dashed boxes and the high-risk groups are within bold
boxes). Of the 939 patients, 444 were classified as high- or low-risk (compare this to the 518
classified in the MELR model). The CART model performs poorly; only 62.1% of patients
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were correctly classified. The base rate for violence in the subset is .236, but the model
classifies nearly 60% of the sample as high risk.
Total Sample
n = 939, 18.7% Violent
PCL = 0
748, 13.9%
PCL = 1
191, 37.7%
PriorArr ≤ 1
443, 8.4%
LegalStatus = 0
324, 6.2%
PriorArr > 1
305, 22.0%
NegRel ≥ 7.5
53, 22.6%
NegRel ≤ 2.5
178, 14.6%
NegRel Є (2.5,.75)
74, 39.2%
DrugAbuse = 0
180, 3.3%
DrugAbuse = 1
144, 9.7%
LegalStatus = 1
119, 14.3%
Emp = 0
63, 20.6%
PCS = {0,3,4,5}
123, 0.0%
PCS = {1,2}
57, 10.5%
LegalStatus = 0
118, 10.2%
LegalStatus = 1
60, 23.3%
Emp = 1
56, 7.1%
Figure 5.2: CHAID decision tree for MacArthur data (Monahan et al., 2001) using SPSS
and following similar guidelines set forth by the authors. The bold boxes represent terminal
nodes with a proportion of violent individuals greater than twice the base rate (.37); the
dotted boxes represent terminal nodes with a proportion less than half the base rate (.09).
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 101 164 265
No (?¯?) 4 175 179
Column Totals 105 339 444
Table 5.11: Predicting violence with a CHAID decision tree model. If a patient had a pre-
dicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made; otherwise a prediction
of no violence was made.
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5.5.3 VRAS CART Model in MatLab
We begin by constructing a simple classification tree to determine the minimum leaf
size for each node by defining the leaf size over the log10-space, ranging from 10 to 100 at
ten intervals; thus each point, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 10, is equal to 10(8+𝑖)/9. The general intent here
is to obtain an idea of minimum leaf size based on the data. To quantify this decision,
LOOCV error is estimated; the minimum leaf size plotted against the cross-validation error
is provided in Figure 5.3 (left plot). Note that after the point 1016/9 ≈ 59.9, the cross-
validated error is the same as the base rate for violence (labeled with a dashed horizontal
line and labeled “BR” on the vertical axis). This implies that the classification tree is not
providing any information (i.e., everyone is classified as non-violent), so a minimum leaf size
is restricted to be less than 60. Next, each integer between 1 and 60 was assessed for the
minimum leaf size. Because 𝐾-fold cross-validation randomly selects 𝐾 subsamples, and the
minimum leaf size will be influenced by this randomness, LOOCV is adopted at the cost of
increased computing time. The plot displaying the minimum leaf size versus the LOOCV
error is given in the right-hand side of Figure 5.3. Several minimum leaf sizes give a CV
error less than the base rate; the minimum CV error of .178 is obtained at the two minimum
leaf sizes of 41 and 42. A minimum leaf size of 41 produces a decision tree with a minimum
leaf of 42 (i.e., there is no tree produced that has a leaf with the specified minimum of 41).
Based on a minimum leaf size of 42, the first classification tree constructed in Mat-
Lab is shown in Figure 5.4. The resubstitution error (with a cutscore of .50) is .175, implying
the misclassification of 164 patients; the LOOCV-error is a slightly higher .178. Both mea-
sures indicate the model is outperforming base rate prediction (the base rate for violence in
the sample is .187). The high-risk, low-risk classification for violence prediction discussed
earlier is essentially useless with this tree because no terminal node contains a subsample
with a rate of violence less than half the base rate. Based on a .50 cutscore, 46 individuals
are classified as violent (29 of whom are) and the rest nonviolent.
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Figure 5.3: Determining the minimum leaf size for a classification tree with 𝐾-fold cross-
validation error. The figure on the left is over log10-space (𝐾 = 10). The results helped
determine a more restricted range for the results in the right-hand plot; the minimum leaf
size is determined to be 42 (𝐾 = 𝑛).
Total Sample
n = 939, 18.7% Violent
PCL = 0
748, 13.9%
PCL = 1
191, 37.7%
ChildAbuse < 1.4
44, 18.2%
ChildAbuse ≥ 1.4
147, 43.5%
SNMHP < .1
88, 52.3%
SNMHP ≥ .1
59, 30.5%
BISnp < 28.5
46, 63.0%
BISnp ≥ 28.5
42, 40.5%
Figure 5.4: Classification tree with an optimal minimum leaf size of 42 and setting equal
costs.
The same analyses were repeated but the cost matrix was set so the cutscore for
classifying individuals was twice the base rate (i.e., .37); thus, false negatives are considered
to be about 1.67 times more costly than false positives (see the earlier section). Through
similar analyses presented earlier, the minimum leaf size was determined to be 26; Figure 5.5
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displays the tree. The resubstitution error for this model is .177—less than the base rate; the
cross-validated error is .257—much larger than the base rate. Unlike before when costs of
false positives and negatives were considered equal, a minimum leaf size of 50 does produce
a tree (not shown).
Total Sample
n = 939, 18.7% Violent
PCL = 0
748, 13.9%
PCL = 1
191, 37.7%
ChildAbuse ≤ 1.4
44, 18.2%
ChildAbuse ≥ 1.4
147, 43.5%
SNMHP < .2
116, 49.1%
SNMHP ≥ .2
31, 22.6%
BISnp < 30.5
47, 34.0%
BISnp ≥ 30.5
69, 59.4%
PriorArr ≤ 1.0
443, 8.4%
PriorArr > 1.0
305, 22.0%
ChildAbuse ≥ 2.5
46, 45.7%
NASb < 25.5
75, 5.3%
NASb ≥ 25.5
184, 22.8%
ChildAbuse < 2.5
259, 17.8%
SCHIZ = 0
147, 27.2%
SCHIZ = 1
37, 5.4%
DadArr = 0
55, 25.5%
DadArr = 1
35, 51.4%
BPRSh < 5.5
57, 14.0%
BPRSh ≥ 5.5
90, 35.6%
Figure 5.5: Classification tree with an optimal minimum leaf size of 26 and setting cost of
false negatives to 1.67 times the cost of false positives.
If we adhered to Berk’s (2012) 20:1 false negative to false positive ratio, the resub-
stitution error (with a minimum leaf size of 30) is .612 but the cross-validated error is .995.
Because of these results and the fact that it is impossible to justify a 20:1 ratio for the VRAS
definition of violence, this cost ratio is not considered in the remaining analyses.
Suppose we decided not to empirically determine a minimum leaf size but let a min-
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imum leaf size of 1, the default setting in MatLab. Doing so, a resubstitution error of
.071 is obtained; far better than any other model developed thus far because only 67 of the
939 patients are misclassified. This model is better than the “best” logistic regression or
discriminant model examined thus far. The sensitivity of the test is .78, the specificity is .97,
the PPV is .86, the NPV is .95, and the AUC is .97. We have yet to come across an actuar-
ial measure this promising. Without cross-validating this model, however, one can blindly
believe that an extremely capable model for predicting violence is found; the LOOCV error
of .244 provides evidence of this as it is one of the highest of any model examined thus far.
Based on a cutscore of .37 rather than .50 the model misclassifies only 63 individuals (resub-
stitution error of .067) but the cross-validation error is .352. This exemplifies the over-fitting
of a model and the importance of cross-validation, and provides yet another example of a
more flexible model performing well on the data for which the model was fit but far worse
on new data.
5.5.4 Ensemble Learning Methods for Decision Trees
A prediction method called ensemble learning is now implemented on the VRAS
dataset. Bagging is an ensemble learning method designed to avoid the overfitting of a
model; it is commonly used with classification trees (i.e., tree bagging) (bag is a short-hand
phrase for bootstrap aggregation; see Breiman, 1996). Suppose a dataset, X, contains 𝑛
observations. Similar to the bootstrap method, 𝐵 training sets of size 𝐾 are generated,
where 1 ≤ 𝐾 ≤ 𝑛, by randomly sampling (with replacement) from X; each training set is fit
by the model and, after aggregating, an average over the 𝐵 replications provides a predicted
response for each observation.
Note that some of the observations in the 𝑖th training set, B(𝑖), may be duplicate
observations. The larger𝐾 is, the more likely there will be at least one duplicate observation;
the probability of such an event is 1− 𝑛!
𝑛𝐾(𝑛−𝐾)! . The probability that any given observation
is not selected is (1− 1
𝑛
)𝐾 . If 𝐾 = 𝑛 and as 𝑛→∞, the probability approaches 𝑒−1 ≈ .37.
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For a large enough 𝑛 and when the training sample is equal to 𝑛, it would be expected
that on average, about 63% of the bootstrap sample consists of unique observations. The
63% represents a probabilistic lower bound; for 𝐾 < 𝑛, one would expect more than 63%
of the sample to be unique (e.g., in the trivial case where 𝐾 = 1, there are no duplicate
observations). The approximately 37% of the observations not used in fitting the model on
the 𝑖th replication are called out-of-bag (OOB); thus, the OOB observations are the testing
set and can be used to assess predictive accuracy. For any given observation, by aggregating
over the subset of 𝐵 replications—where the observation was not used to fit the model—
the average OOB prediction accuracy can be calculated and this can be compared to the
misclassification error; this comparison gives us the average OOB error difference. The OOB
errors can also be used to assess the importance of predictors by randomly permuting the
OOB data across variables one at a time, and estimating the OOB error after permutation—a
large increase in the OOB error indicates the variable’s importance in the model.
Random forests (Breiman, 2001) are a tree bagging method that randomly selects
a subset of variables at each split. The advantage of randomly selecting variables at each
node in the decision tree is that it can decorrelates the trees. This is advantageous because
it prevents a single variable from dominating the analysis; for instance, if one predictor is
very strong it likely will be the root node for a majority of the trees constructed and the
subsequent nodes will be similar as well (i.e., the trees will be highly correlated). Typically,
√
𝑝 predictors are randomly selected for classification trees. Random forests were constructed
in MatLab (MATLAB, 2013) and the results are presented in the following sections.
VRAS Random Forest Model in MatLab.
Randomly selecting a subset of the VRAS dataset as the training sample in the
random forest algorithm, the remaining observations represent the testing sample. The
testing sample contains 30% of the original data (281 observations); the training data contain
the remaining 658 observations (the base rate for violence in the training sample is .188, and
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.185 in the testing sample). The random forest model was fit to the training sample for
𝐵 = 1000 and a minimum leaf size of 10. After fitting 1000 trees, the random forest model
was used to predict violence in the training set (i.e., the observations for initially fitting the
model). No nonviolent individual is misclassified as violent but 81.5% of violent individuals
are misclassified; thus the model outperforms base rate prediction. The 1000 trees generated
can be aggregated to estimate the probability an individual will be violent by computing
the proportion of times the individual is classified as violent (an individual is classified
as violent if the predicted probability exceeds .50; i.e., costs are considered equal here).
This is quite different than probabilities assigned to violence prediction with a single tree;
in such instances, the probability an individual will be violent is equal to the proportion of
individuals in the terminal node who are violent. These results are summarized in Table 5.12.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 23 0 23
No (?¯?) 101 534 635
Column Totals 124 534 658
Table 5.12: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the training sample. If a
patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made;
otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
The parallel coordinates plot (Figure 5.6) displays the predicted probabilities for each
of the 658 individuals. The green-colored lines are the individuals who were violent; the blue
lines are those who were not. The horizontal axis is the estimated probability an individual
will be violent (i.e., the proportion of trees for which an individual was classified as violent).
There is not a lot of mixture of green and blue lines, which is ideal. The separation between
the two types of individuals implies that the method is performing well.
The results seen thus far are, as noted, based on the training data. The greater
concern is with how well violence can be predicted in new observations with the random
forest model, as demonstrated with the testing data. Of the 281 observations, only one
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Figure 5.6: Parallel coordinate plot for random forest predictions of violence on the training
sample (𝑛 = 658).
is predicted—incorrectly—to be violent (see Table 5.13). The misclassification error is
(1+52)/281 = .189, slightly more than the base rate. The sensitivity and specificity are,
respectively, 0/52 = 0 and 228/229 = .996; the positive and negative predictive values are,
respectively, 0/1 = 0 and 228/280 = .814. The parallel coordinate plot in Figure 5.7 indicates
that the method is doing only moderately well with a poorer separation of the green and
blue lines.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 0 1 1
No (?¯?) 52 228 280
Column Totals 52 229 281
Table 5.13: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the testing sample. If a
patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made;
otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
The next analysis is the same as before except that the cost ratio of false negatives
to false positives is set to 1.67. At the individual tree level an observation is classified as
violent when it belongs to a terminal node where the proportion of violent individuals is
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Figure 5.7: Parallel coordinate plot for random forest predictions of violence on the testing
sample (𝑛 = 281).
greater than .37. At the aggregate level (i.e., across all 1000 trees) an individual is predicted
to be violent when classified as violent in more than 37% of the trees. The results for the
training data (base rate of .187) are displayed in Table 5.14 and Figure 5.8; for the testing
data (base rate .189), the results can be found in Table 5.15 and Figure 5.9.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 120 74 194
No (?¯?) 3 461 466
Column Totals 123 535 658
Table 5.14: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the training sample. If a
patient had a predicted probability greater than twice the base rate (.37), a prediction of
violence was made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
As expected, more predictions of violence are being made. The selection ratio (𝑃 (𝐵))
for the training data is .295 compared to .035 when the costs were considered equal; for the
testing data, the model classifies 24.2% of the sample as violent (compared to 0.4% when
costs are equal) and less than half of these are correct. Once again, the model performs well
on the training data (resubstitution error .117) but not on the testing data (misclassification
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Figure 5.8: Parallel coordinate plot for random forest predictions of violence on the training
sample (𝑛 = 658) with classification cutscore of .37.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 31 37 68
No (?¯?) 22 191 213
Column Totals 53 228 281
Table 5.15: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the testing sample. If a
patient had a predicted probability greater than twice the base rate (.37), a prediction of
violence was made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
error .210).
Out-of-bag Prediction.
Rather than splitting the data prior to fitting the ensemble method, the entire dataset
can be used with cross-validation error estimated from the OOB observations. Relying
on OOB observations, the sample size is maximized (i.e., nothing is “wasted”) but cross-
validated error estimates are still obtained. Carrying this out for the VRAS dataset, the
2× 2 contingency Table 5.16 is constructed; the parallel coordinate plot for these results are
in Figure 5.10. The parallel coordinate plot shows little separation between the violent and
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Figure 5.9: Parallel coordinate plot for random forest predictions of violence on the testing
sample (𝑛 = 658) with classification cutscore of .37.
nonviolent individuals. The mean out-of-bag error is .188, slightly above the base rate; the
minimum OOB error is .185, slightly less than the base rate.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 4 5 9
No (?¯?) 172 758 930
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 5.16: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the entire sample. If a patient
had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made; otherwise a
prediction of no violence was made.
Running the same analysis but setting the classification cutscore to .37 produces
similar results. As seen in Table 5.17, the model classifies 32.1% of individuals as violent,
only 37.9% of whom are. The parallel plot (Figure 5.11) illustrates the model’s lack of
differentiation among violent individuals.
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Figure 5.10: Parallel coordinate plot for out-of-bag random forest predictions on the entire
sample (𝑛 = 939).
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 114 187 301
No (?¯?) 62 576 638
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 5.17: Predicting violence with a random forest model on the entire sample. If a patient
had a predicted probability greater than twice the base rate (.37), a prediction of violence
was made; otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
Variable Selection.
Out-of-bag observations allow the quantification of variable importance to the clas-
sification trees. Thus far, the decision trees studied have included all thirty-one variables.
For each variable, the values are randomly permuted and the increase (or decrease) in the
OOB error calculated (i.e., the difference in OOB error before and after permutation). This
is carried out for every tree and normalized with the standard deviations of the differences.
Variables with larger average differences can be quantified as more important than variables
with smaller averages. A bar plot of the variable importance is in Figure 5.12.
From Figure 5.12 several variables appear to be more important than others and
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Figure 5.11: Parallel coordinate plot for out-of-bag random forest predictions on the entire
sample (𝑛 = 939) with a cutscore of .37.
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Figure 5.12: Measure of importance for each of the thirty-one variables. The importance
measure is the average of the differences in out-of-bag error before and after permuation
across all trees.
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several actually decrease the OOB error after permutation. The variables that appear the
most important are PCL and PriorArr. It is interesting to note that Schiz is among
the more important variables and Age is not. The decision for removing variables will be
conservative; only variables with average OOB error differences near and less than zero are
removed (Threats, Function, Consc, GrandDel, HeadInj, NegRel); thus, the final
model consists of 25 variables. When applying the cost function, all variables have negative
mean OOB error differences implying that the OOB error decreases on average after random
permutation for all the variables in this model.
Final Model.
For the final model, the data are split into a training set and a testing set. Again, the
training set contains 658 of the original 939 observations and the testing set the remaining
281. The base rate for violence in the training set is .1884; in the testing set, .1851. The
final model was estimated with 10000 trees omitting the variables discussed in the previous
section. The mean, median, minimum, and maximum OOB errors are, respectively, .1873,
.1869, .1763, and .2097, slightly better than with all the variables. Based on the model
with the testing data and a cutscore of .50, only two individuals are predicted to be violent,
only one of which is (see Table 5.18). The parallel coordinate plot (Figure 5.13) appears to
indicate that the final model does a slightly better job than before.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 1 1 2
No (?¯?) 51 228 279
Column Totals 52 229 281
Table 5.18: Predicting violence with the final random forest model on the testing sample.
If a patient had a predicted probability greater than .50, a prediction of violence was made;
otherwise a prediction of no violence was made.
The ROC plot is given in Figure 5.14; the AUC for the final model is .748. The cost
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Figure 5.13: Parallel coordinate plot for final random forest model predictions with the
testing data.
function was not applied in fitting the final model, but a .37 cutscore can be applied at the
aggregate-tree level to classify individuals as violent or not. So doing, nineteen individuals
are classified as violent, ten of whom are.
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Figure 5.14: ROC plot for the final random forest model. The AUC is .75.
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The .37 cutscore was arbitrarily chosen; however, an optimal cutscore can be deter-
mined through a performance curve similar to the ROC curve that plots the expected cost
against possible cutscores. Figure 5.15 displays the estimated cost function; it suggests that
the cost is minimized when the cutscore is approximately .37 (slightly below the base rate
when carried to more decimal places). Based on this cutscore, the model predicts twenty-
three individuals to be violent (about 8% of the sample), ten of them incorrectly. Although
the minimum cost is at the .37 cutscore, cutscores slightly below and much higher than .37 do
not produce much greater overall costs; in other words, the cost function appears to approach
an asymptote suggesting that around a .32 cutscore a trade-off between false negatives and
false positives commences. This is indeed the case as Table 5.19 demonstrates. The first
and third columns give the actual outcome of the individual (1 = Violent, 0 = Nonviolent);
the second column is the predicted probability for violence (i.e., the proportion of trees for
which the individual was classified as violent). Only individuals with estimated probabilities
greater than .32 are provided. The pattern roughly switches between violent and nonviolent.
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Figure 5.15: Estimated cost function for the final random forest model. The estimated model
cost (assuming equal costs of false positives and negatives) is plotted across all cutscores.
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Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Outcome Probability Outcome Probability
0 .324 1 .379
1 .328 0 .380
1 .328 1 .386
0 .330 1 .392
1 .335 0 .396
0 .338 0 .403
1 .346 1 .403
0 .346 1 .404
0 .347 0 .409
1 .348 0 .411
0 .358 0 .461
1 .365 0 .463
0 .366 1 .468
0 .367 0 .482
1 .370 1 .485
1 .370 1 .488
0 .372 0 .530
1 .373 1 .574
1 .375
Table 5.19: Predicted probabilities and actual outcomes for individuals with a predicted
probability greater than .32 based on the final random forest model.
5.6 Conclusion
The results given in this chapter reiterate the argument that predicting violent be-
havior is extremely difficult. Unless unequal costs regarding false positives and negatives
are assumed—particularly when false negatives are considered to be more costly than false
positives—our methods typically make a small number of predictions of violence. Thus, un-
less the model explicitly states false negatives as more costly than false positives, predictions
of violence will be infrequent. G. T. Harris and Rice (2013) claim “it can be reasonable for
public policy to operate on the basis that a miss (e.g., failing to detain a violent recidivist
beforehand) is twice as costly as a false alarm (e.g., detaining a violent offender who would
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not commit yet another violent offense)” (p. 106). Although this may be true, it is ethically
questionable to assume that costs are anything but equal unless a public policy explicitly
states otherwise.
The analyses presented also demonstrate the importance of cross-validation. Without
cross-validating a model, results and conclusions regarding accuracy can be misleading and
an extreme overestimate. For each type of model constructed (logistic regression, discrimi-
nant analysis, classification trees), when assessed on the data used to fit it, performed quite
well, almost always outperforming base rate prediction (although as noted, this should be
a minimal requirement). But when cross-validation methods were implemented, the results
were dramatically different. Rarely did the model outperform base rate prediction on the
testing sample, and the resubstitution error was higher. Table 5.20 is from the VRAS study
(derived from Table 6.7 in Monahan et al., 2001). When individuals who fall into the very
high- and high-risk groups are classified as violent and all others as nonviolent, the model
correctly classifies 86.0% of individuals which is better than nearly every model found in
these analyses. Given this cutscore, the model has a sensitivity and specificity of, respec-
tively, (48+57)/176 = .597 and (135+229+339)/763 = .921; the positive and negative predictive
values are, respectively, (48+57)/(63+102) = .636 and (135+229+339)/(183+248+343) = .908. Recall
from Chapter 1 that the COVR was a combination of ten ICT models, five of which were
kept. The authors claim that this “multiple model approach minimizes the problem of data
overfitting that can result when a single ‘best’ model is used” (p. 127). Because the authors
did not do a cross-validation, it is not possible to determine how much the model overfits
the data, but it certainly seems that it does. As McCusker (2007) says,
One could wonder whether the iterative classification tree methodology (a technique
that involves repetitive sifting of risk factors) that was used to create the COVR
ended up, in a sense, fitting the data in the development sample too specifically.
Perhaps as a very carefully tailored garment will be expected to fit one individual
perfectly but most other people not as well, so the algorithms of the COVR ought
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to be anticipated to classify other samples less exactly than they categorized the
members of the development sample. (p. 682)
Violence
Yes No Row Totals
Risk Group
Very High 48 15 63
High 57 45 102
Average 48 135 183
Low 19 229 248
Very Low 4 339 343
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 5.20: COVR risk groups from Monahan et al. (2001, cf. Table 6.7, p. 125).
As important as cross-validation is when developing a model, the true test lies in how
well the model does with an independent sample. Therefore, the next step in validating the
model is to assess the model’s accuracy with a completely new sample. Chapter 7 looks at
the performance of the COVR across six different studies (we also examine the predictive
ability of the Static-99 and Static-2002).
A final point is to note that in general, as the model became more flexible (e.g.,
moving from a linear to a quadratic classifier, or decreasing the minimum leaf size) the
resubstitution error decreased but the cross-validated error increased. This is an example of
the bias-variance trade-off discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
The Variance-Bias Trade-off
“Strategy is about making choices, trade-offs”
— Michael Porter
The mean squared error of a predictive model can be decomposed into three parts:
the variance of the model, the squared bias, and irreducible error. The trade-off be-
tween variance and bias in predictive modeling is an important concept commonly
overlooked; often, test error is not minimized when using unbiased predictors. Trad-
ing off bias for variance (i.e., increasing squared bias while decreasing variance) will
lead to decreased test error, a desired result in prediction. This chapter looks at the
variance-bias trade-off and examines several shrinkage estimators designed to reduce
overall error at the cost of increased bias; the biased estimators that are discussed
consistently outperform their unbiased counterparts in terms of mean squared error.
6.1 Introduction
Let 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑝) be a collection of 𝑝 predictor variables and let 𝑌 be a response
variable. Suppose
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜀,
where 𝜀 is an error random variable with E(𝜀|𝑋) = 0 and V(𝜀|𝑋) = 𝜎2𝜀 ; that is, there exists
a function 𝑓(·) for modeling the response variable, plus unknown error 𝜀.
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A loss function measures the error between the estimated function, 𝑓(𝑥), and the
true one, 𝑓(𝑥); a common type of loss function is the squared error loss,
ℒ2(𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑥)) =
(︁
𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑓(𝑥)
)︁2
.
The quality of an estimator can be quantified by taking the expectation of the loss function;
this is called the risk function and defined as
ℛ(𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑥)|𝑋) = E(ℒ(𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑥))|𝑋).
The interest in prediction reduces to estimating the function, 𝑓(𝑥), given the observed
data, (X,y), where X is an 𝑛× 𝑝 matrix of 𝑛 observations on 𝑝 predictors and y is an 𝑛× 1
vector containing the outcome; the estimated function will be denoted as y^ ≡ 𝑓(𝑥) ≡ 𝑓(𝑥|X).
Given the observed data, (X,y), the estimated risk function for the estimator y^ using the
squared loss function, as
1
𝑛
‖y − y^‖22 =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)2,
where ‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidean, or ℓ2, norm (for simplicity, the subscript 2 will be dropped);
this is commonly known as the mean squared error and denoted MSE.
6.1.1 Variance-Bias Decomposition
The risk function for the squared error,
ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦|𝑋) = E (ℒ2(𝑦, 𝑦) |𝑋) = E
[︀
(𝑦 − 𝑦)2|𝑋]︀ ,
is decomposable into two parts (see Chapter 5; for proof, see Appendix A):
ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦|𝑋) = E [︀(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2⃒⃒𝑋] + V(𝜀|𝑋). (6.1)
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The first term, E [(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2|𝑋], is the reducible error. The better the estimator 𝑦, the closer
the reducible error is to zero; the reducible error is equal to zero when 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥). The second
term in Equation (6.1), V(𝜀|𝑋), is the irreducible error and represents a lower bound for the
risk function. Even when 𝑓(𝑥) is perfectly estimated (i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥)), ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦) = V(𝜀|𝑋) > 0.
The reducible error can be further decomposed (see Appendix A) so that the risk
function reduces to
ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦|𝑋) = (bias(𝑦|𝑋))2 + V(𝑦|𝑋) + V(𝜀|𝑋). (6.2)
The first term is the squared bias associated with the estimator for the function. The bias
measures how much, on average, the estimated function over- or underestimates the true
function, 𝑓(𝑥); an unbiased estimator has a squared bias equal to zero. The second term is
the variance of the estimator and represents how much, on average, the estimated function
deviates from the true function. Thus, reducible error depends on both the variance and the
bias of the estimator.
6.1.2 Brier Score
Let y𝑖 be an outcome vector of size 𝐾 for an 𝑖th observation corresponding to one
of 𝐾 classes that the outcome may belong to. Explicitly, this outcome of being in the 𝑘th
class can be defined as y𝑖 = e𝑘, where e𝑘 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector with the 𝑘th entry equal to one
and all others equal to zero:
𝑦𝑖𝑘 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if the 𝑖th observation belongs to class 𝑘,
0 otherwise.
Let y^𝑖 be an estimator for y𝑖 where y^𝑖 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector containing estimated proba-
bilities that the 𝑖th observation belongs to each of the 𝐾 classes: y^𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖1, . . . , 𝑦𝑖𝐾)
𝑇 , where
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∑︀𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 1. For instance, consider the outcome of violent behavior so that y𝑖 = (1, 0)
𝑇
when violent behavior is observed for the 𝑖th individual and (0, 1)𝑇 otherwise; y^𝑖 contains the
estimated probabilities assigned to the 𝑖th individual (i.e., 𝑦𝑖1 is the estimated probability
of violent behavior and 𝑦𝑖2, for non-violent behavior).
Given 𝑛 observations, Brier (1950) devised a verification score defined as
VS =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
‖y𝑖 − y^𝑖‖2 = 1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(y𝑖 − y^𝑖)𝑇 (y𝑖 − y^𝑖) = 1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(𝑦𝑖𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖𝑘)2. (6.3)
This measure is commonly referred to as the Brier score in the literature and is a variant of
the mean squared error.
Clearly the minimum of VS is 0, occurring when the estimated probability corre-
sponding to the true class is equal to 1 for all observations. The maximum of VS is 2,
occurring when the estimated probability for one of the incorrect classes is equal to one for
all observations.
Brier (1950) notes that when given prior probabilities for each class, say 𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝐾
where 𝑝1+ · · ·+ 𝑝𝐾 = 1, na¨ıve prediction is to let 𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 𝑝𝑘 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 and 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾
(i.e., prediction using the base rates). The prior probability can be estimated as
𝑝𝑘 =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖𝑘.
In such a scenario, the Brier score is
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(𝑦𝑖𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖𝑘)2 = 1
𝑛
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑦2𝑖𝑘 − 2𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝2𝑘)
=
1
𝑛
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(︃
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑦2𝑖𝑘 − 2𝑝𝑘
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖𝑘 +
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑝2𝑘
)︃
=
1
𝑛
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(︀
𝑛𝑝𝑘 − 2𝑛𝑝2𝑘 + 𝑛𝑝2𝑘
)︀
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=
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(︀
𝑝𝑘 − 𝑝2𝑘
)︀
= 1−
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝2𝑘.
Comparing a Brier score obtained using a predictive tool to the na¨ıve method above
is one way to quantify the predictive tool’s incremental value. The maximum of the above is
when 𝑝1 = · · · = 𝑝𝐾 = 𝐾−1 in which case the minimal Brier score is 1− 1/𝐾; the minimum is
0 when 𝑝𝑘 = 1 for some 𝑘 and 𝑝𝑘′ = 0 for all 𝑘
′ ̸= 𝑘. Note the similarities between the Brier
score using na¨ıve prediction and the Gini index discussed in Chapter 1 for determining the
purity of a terminal node in a decision tree.
For 𝐾 = 2 classes, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1− 𝑦𝑖1; thus, the Brier score is equal to
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
2(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖1)2.
Because 𝑝2 = 1− 𝑝1 the minimal Brier score obtained with na¨ıve prediction using the base
rates is 2𝑝1(1− 𝑝1); thus, a base rate closer to one half implies a larger minimal Brier score.
Alternatively, for 𝐾 = 2 classes the Brier score can be written as
VS′ =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)2, (6.4)
where 𝑦𝑖 is the outcome of interest for the 𝑖th observation (e.g., 𝑦𝑖 = 1 if the 𝑖th individual
is violent and 0 otherwise) and 𝑦𝑖 is the estimated probability of the outcome for the 𝑖th
observation (e.g., the probability the 𝑖th individual is violent). The Brier score still has a
minimum of 0 corresponding to perfect prediction, but the maximum is now one.
Brier Score Decomposition.
Because violent and dangerous behavior is primarily considered a binary outcome,
the focus will be restricted to such cases. Consider the Brier score given by Equation (6.3)
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and suppose there exist 𝑅 distinct probability estimates. Let y^(𝑟), 𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, repre-
sent a collection of 𝑅 mutually exclusive subsets for the estimated probabilities; thus, for
𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, y^(𝑟) represents a unique estimated probability vector of size 2×1. Within each
subset, 𝑛𝑟 probabilities are estimated. For example, consider the risk categories given by the
Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) shown in Table 6.1. There are 𝑅 = 5 estimated prob-
abilities associated with the five risk categories; thus, y^(5) = (.76, .24)𝑇 , y^(4) = (.56, .44)𝑇 ,
y^(3) = (.26, .74)𝑇 , y^(2) = (.08, .92)𝑇 , y^(1) = (.01, .99)𝑇 .
Category Risk Probability
5 Very High .76
4 High .56
3 Average .26
2 Low .08
1 Very Low .01
Table 6.1: The five risk categories for the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) with
estimated probabilities of violence (Monahan et al., 2001).
For a given subset, the Brier score is
VS(𝑟) =
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
‖y(𝑟)𝑗 − y^(𝑟)‖2,
where y
(𝑟)
𝑗 is the 2 × 1 outcome for the 𝑗th individual in the 𝑟th subset. Murphy (1972a)
shows (see also Murphy, 1972b; Sanders, 1958, 1963) that the Brier score for a given subset
can be decomposed as
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)‖2 + 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟⟨y¯(𝑟), e− y¯(𝑟)⟩, (6.5)
where e is an 2 × 1 vector of 1’s, y¯(𝑟) = 1
𝑛𝑟
∑︀𝑛𝑟
𝑗=1 y
(𝑟)
𝑗 , and ⟨·, ·⟩ is the inner product, or dot
product, in the Euclidean space (see Appendix A for a proof of this decomposition).
The first term in Equation (6.5) is commonly referred to as the reliability or calibration
236
of a predictive measure (note the counterintuitive result that a lower reliability is better);
the second term has been called the resolution or refinement and provides an idea of the
uncertainty in prediction. Ferri, Herna´ndez-Orallo, and Flach (2011) demonstrate the use
of the Brier score decomposition in creating Brier curves ; such a curve is meant to be an
alternative to the typical ROC curve, with the area under the Brier curve equal to the Brier
score.
The Brier score decomposition is analogous to the sum of squares error decomposition
where the sum of squares error is decomposed into the lack of fit and pure error. Both
decompose a measure of error into reducible error (reliability, lack of fit) and irreducible
error (resolution, pure error).
Murphy (1973) further decomposed the Brier score into three partitions; the first
partition (the reliability) remains the same; the second partition, however, is further decom-
posed into two parts so that the Brier score now reduces to
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)‖2 − 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y¯(𝑟) − y¯‖2 + ⟨y¯, e− y¯⟩, (6.6)
where y¯ = 1
𝑛
∑︀𝑅
𝑟=1
∑︀𝑛𝑟
𝑗=1 y
(𝑟)
𝑗 (see Appendix A for a proof). Murphy (1973) refers to the
three terms respectively as reliability, resolution, and uncertainty. Reliability, as mentioned,
is the same as in Equation (6.5) and represents the reducible error. The uncertainty term is
⟨y¯, e− y¯⟩ = y¯𝑇e− y¯𝑇 y¯ = 1− (𝑝1)2 + (1− 𝑝1)2 = 2𝑝1 (1− 𝑝1) ,
the minimal Brier score obtained using na¨ıve base rate prediction; geometrically it is pro-
portional to the cosine of the angle, 𝜃, of the mean vector, y¯, and the vector e − y¯. When
𝑝1 = 𝑝2, 𝜃 = 0 and cos(𝜃) = 1; when 𝑝1 = 1 or 𝑝2 = 1, 𝜃𝜋/2 and cos(𝜃) = 0. Thus, the uncer-
tainty depends solely on the base rate and is equal to the minimal Brier score using na¨ıve
prediction. The resolution measures the difference in the conditional prior probabilities from
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the overall prior. The larger the resolution the better; the minimum is 0 when the base rate
probability is used for the estimated probabilities. The maximum of the resolution is equal
to the uncertainty (consequently, the Brier score will equal the reliability); this occurs when
the conditional probabilities are all one or zero. Stated alternatively, the resolution can be
thought of as how much the prediction tool improves accuracy over na¨ıve prediction.
Example Using the VRAG.
Table 6.2 displays the nine risk categories for the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
(VRAG) and their estimated probabilities for recidivism; there are 𝑅 = 9 unique probability
estimates. Kro¨ner, Stadtland, Eidt, and Nedopil (2007) examined the predictive validity of
the VRAG in a German sample; the sample consisted of 113 men and women previously
charged with a criminal offense and who were evaluated at a forensic psychiatric unit during
the years 1994–1995. The outcome variable is recidivism, determined using official records.
The authors asserted that the VRAG was successfully replicated in the German sample
based on the area under the ROC curve (AUC = .70). Table 6.2 displays the estimated
frequencies based on the authors results (derived from the proportions given in Table 4, p.
94).
Category VRAG Score Probability Violent Nonviolent Total
9 ≥ 28 1.00 2 0 2
8 [21, 27] .76 0 1 1
7 [14, 20] .55 8 2 10
6 [7, 13] .44 8 5 13
5 [0, 6] .35 8 16 24
4 [−7,−1] .17 8 19 27
3 [−14,−8] .12 7 19 26
2 [−21,−15] .08 1 8 9
1 ≤ −22 .00 0 1 1
Table 6.2: Observed violent and nonviolent individuals for each of the nine VRAG categories
derived from Kro¨ner et al. (2007, Table 4, p. 94); probabilities are in reference to recidivism
(G. T. Harris et al., 1993).
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The observed Brier score for these data is VS′ = .21 (the Brier score provided here
uses Equation (6.4), so the maximum is one). An R function for producing the Brier score
and its parts for a two-category outcome variable is provided in Appendix C. Decomposing
the score into its three parts gives the following:
VS′ = Reliability− Resolution + Uncertainty
= .02− .04 + .23.
It was noted earlier that the maximum of the resolution is equal to the uncertainty (the
minimum is zero). The ratio of the resolution to uncertainty provides a way to measure
how much the predictive tool improves na¨ıve prediction. The uncertainty and resolution
will not change when the estimated probabilities change because the two parts make up the
irreducible error for the data; thus, the ratio is inherent to the data, given the probabilities
assigned by the predictive tool. The VRAG accounts for about Resolution/Uncertainty = .18 of
the uncertainty. Using na¨ıve prediction (i.e., assigning an estimated probability of violence
to each individual equal to the base rate, .37), the Brier score is equal to Uncertainty =
.23 = 𝑝1(1− 𝑝1); thus, the VRAG improves prediction over na¨ıve use of base rates but only
slightly (VS′ = .21 compared to Uncertainty = .23).
6.2 The Variance-Bias Trade-off
As noted in Chapter 5, as some models became more flexible (e.g., reducing the
minimum leaf size in a decision tree), the training error decreased but the testing error
increased. As Equation (6.2) suggests, this increase in testing error can be attributed to
either an increase in the variance of the predictor or an increase in the squared bias, or both.
Higher variance implies that a change in a set of observations (e.g., applying a model to a
new data set) can lead to dramatic changes in the model error; a higher bias implies that the
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model assumes a less complex relationship than is true (e.g., assuming a linear relationship
when the true relationship is nonlinear). An increase in model flexibility generally leads to
an increase in the variance and a decrease in the squared bias (Hastie et al., 2009, p. 38).
The test error may initially decrease as the model becomes more flexible but it eventually
increases; in contrast, the training error always decreases because the more flexible model
fits the data more closely. Fitting too complex of a model leads to increased test error and
can be thought of as overfitting; similarly, fitting models leading to decreased test error can
be considered underfitting. Ideally, the researcher wants to find the minimal point where
the model neither under- nor ovefits the data; this minimum can be estimated using cross-
validation.
As an illustration, consider the function
𝑓(𝑥) = 5− 3𝑥+ 2𝑥2 − 7𝑥3 + 𝜀;
one-hundred observations were simulated from the above function, where V(𝜀|𝑋) = 1, and
plotted in Figure 6.1; the black curve represents the true cubic function. Figure 6.2 plots
the linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic least-squares line fit to the data.
Test error is estimated using leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) (see Chapter 5)
and plotted against different polynomial regression models (ranging from first-order up to
twelfth-order; see Figure 6.3). The horizontal dashed line represents V(𝜀|𝑋) = 1, the ir-
reducible error. The training error (blue line) approaches this line quickly and eventually
decreases to 0. The testing error is at a minimum for the cubic model, as expected. The test
error for the fourth-order model is only slightly larger; but moving to a tenth- or higher-order
model leads to large increases in the testing error.
The test error can be split into the squared bias and the variance of the model and
this is shown in Figure 6.4. The squared bias is at a maximum for the linear model and
is still large for the quadratic model but quickly decreases for the cubic model. Further
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Figure 6.1: Scatter plot of data simulated from 𝑓(𝑥) = 5 − 3𝑥 + 2𝑥2 − 7𝑥3 + 𝜀 where
V(𝜀|𝑋) = 1. The black line represents the true relationship.
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Figure 6.2: Scatter plot of data simulated from 𝑓(𝑥) = 5 − 3𝑥 + 2𝑥2 − 7𝑥3 + 𝜀 where
V(𝜀|𝑋) = 1. The lines represent the different least squares fits.
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increasing the flexibility of the model leads to near-zero bias. In contrast, the variance is
near zero for the linear model and remains near zero until the tenth-order model when the
variance rapidly increases with greater flexibility.
Testing and training error for model flexibility
Model Flexibility
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re
d 
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ro
r
Error
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0
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5
6
Figure 6.3: Training and testing error plotted against different levels of model flexibility
(i.e., different order polynomial regression models).
It is clear that the linear and quadratic models underfit the data and the quartic-
and higher-order models overfit the data (although this overfitting is hardly noticeable until
the degree is greater than or equal to 10). This simple example illustrates the importance
of variance-bias trade-off; in building the best predictive model, often one must sacrifice an
increase in bias for less variance to minimize the overall test error.
6.3 Shrinkage Estimators
Shrinkage estimators are designed to improve an estimator by “shrinking” the es-
timator toward zero or some other value (e.g., the mean of the variable being estimated).
Often this shrinkage introduces or increases bias but reduces the variance, and consequently,
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Bias−variance trade−off for model flexibility
Model Flexibility
Test Error
bias2
Variance
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Figure 6.4: Testing error broken down into its two main components,
(︁
bias(𝑓(𝑥))
)︁2
and
V(𝑓(𝑥)|𝑋), across different levels of model flexibility.
may provide an estimator with smaller overall test error.
Several type of shrinkage estimators are presented in the following sections. The
chapter concludes with a demonstration using the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study (Monahan et al., 2001) fit with a main effects logistic regression model.
6.3.1 𝑛+ 1 Estimator
Suppose one is interested in estimating the population variance, 𝜎2𝑋 . The common
choice for an estimator is
?^?2 =
1
𝑛− 1
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑖 − ?¯?)2,
where ?¯? = 1
𝑛
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1𝑋𝑖 is the sample mean and 𝑛 is the number of observations. The estimator
is unbiased (i.e., E(?^?2) = 𝜎2𝑋) but it is not a unique unbiased estimator; in fact, there
exist an infinite number of unbiased estimators of the form ?^?2 =
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑐𝑖(𝑋𝑖 − ?¯?)2 where∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑛/(𝑛−1). The unbiased estimator in the above equation does, however, have minimal
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variance among all unbiased estimators of the population variance; thus, it is the uniformly
minimum-variance unbiased estimator (UMVUE). It can be shown that the variance and,
because the estimator is unbiased, the mean squared error of the UMVUE estimator is
MSEumvue = V
(︀
?^?2umvue
)︀
=
2𝜎4𝑋
(𝑛− 1) ,
Another commonly used estimator of 𝜎2𝑋 is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator,
?^?2
ML
=
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑖 − ?¯?)2.
This is a biased estimator and it underestimates the population variance:
bias
(︀
?^?2
ML
)︀
= E
(︀
?^?2
ML
)︀− 𝜎2𝑋 = − 1𝑛𝜎2𝑋 .
However, the variance of the ML estimator,
V
(︀
?^?2
ML
)︀
=
2(𝑛− 1)𝜎4𝑋
𝑛2
<
2𝜎4𝑋
(𝑛− 1) ,
and the mean square error,
MSE
ML
=
(2𝑛− 1)𝜎4𝑋
𝑛2
<
2𝜎4𝑋
(𝑛− 1) ,
when 𝑛 > 1.
Hubert (1972) points out that an even better estimator in terms of variance is the
estimator,
?^?2𝑛+1 =
1
𝑛+ 1
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑖 − ?¯?)2,
which we refer to as the 𝑛 + 1 estimator. Again the estimator underestimates the true
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variance,
bias
(︀
?^?2
ML
)︀
= − 2
𝑛+ 1
𝜎2𝑋 ,
which is slightly more of an underestimate than the ML estimator (when 𝑛 = 1 the biases
are equal) but the variance is less than both the UMVUE and ML estimators:
V
(︀
?^?2𝑛+1
)︀
=
2(𝑛− 1)𝜎4𝑋
(𝑛+ 1)2
.
Furthermore, when 𝑛 > 1, Hubert (1972) points out that mean squared error for the 𝑛 + 1
estimator,
MSE
ML
=
2𝜎4𝑋
𝑛+ 1
,
is the minimum mean squared error for all estimators of the population variance.
The ratio of the variances (i.e., the relative efficiency) of the UMVUE estimator and
𝑛+ 1 estimator is
V (?^?2umvue)
V
(︀
?^?2𝑛+1
)︀ = (𝑛+ 1)2
(𝑛− 1)2 ;
as 𝑛 → ∞, the estimators are nearly equal in their bias and variance. In fact, it is worth
noting that all three estimators are consistent; that is, for some 𝜖 > 0,
lim
𝑛→∞
𝑃 (|?^?2umvue − 𝜎2𝑋 | < 𝜖) = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑃 (|?^?2
ML
− 𝜎2𝑋 | < 𝜖) = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑃 (|?^?2𝑛+1 − 𝜎2𝑋 | < 𝜖) = 1.
By increasing the constant in the denominator of the estimator, the variance will
continue to decrease while the bias continues to increase (in absolute terms)—an example
of the variance-bias trade-off—but the minimum mean squared error is obtained using the
𝑛+ 1 estimator.
To illustrate, suppose 𝑋𝑖
iid∼ 𝒩 (𝜇, 25). Simulating 10,000 independent samples of
size 𝑛 = 10 from this distribution gives the following estimates: ̂︀E(?^?2umvue) = 24.99 and̂︀V(?^?2umvue) = 134.97; ̂︀E(?^?2𝑛+1) = 20.45 and ̂︀V(?^?2𝑛+1) = 90.353. The estimated mean squared
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Figure 6.5: Variance of UMVUE and 𝑛+1 estimators of the population variance (𝜎2𝑋 = 25)
for sample size of 𝑛 = 10 (top plot) and 𝑛 = 100 (bottom plot).
errors are M̂SEumvue = 136.32 and M̂SE𝑛+1 = 112.00. Because 𝜎
2
𝑋 = 25, it is expected that
E(?^?2umvue) = 25, V(?^?2umvue) = MSEumvue = 138.89, E(?^?2𝑛+1) = 20.45, V(?^?2𝑛+1) = 92.98, and
MSE𝑛+1 = 113.64.
For a sample size of 100, the estimates are ̂︀E(?^?2umvue) = 24.95, ̂︀V(?^?2umvue) = 12.28,̂︀E(?^?2𝑛+1) = 24.46, ̂︀V(?^?2𝑛+1) = 11.80, M̂SEumvue = 12.78, and M̂SE𝑛+1 = 12.53; the expected
values are E(?^?2umvue) = 25, V(?^?2umvue) = MSEumvue = 12.63, E(?^?2𝑛+1) = 24.50, V(?^?2𝑛+1) = 12.13,
and M̂SE𝑛+1 = 12.38. The top plot in Figure 6.5 gives the first 100 estimates of sample size
𝑛 = 10 (the black lines represent the UMVUE estimates; the red lines, the 𝑛+1 estimates);
similarly, the bottom plot displays the first 100 estimates of sample size 𝑛 = 100. It is clear
that for large enough 𝑛, the trade-off between bias and variance becomes negligible, but for
small 𝑛, it is not.
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6.3.2 Kelley True Score Estimator
In 1923, Truman Lee Kelley published Statistical Method where he discusses true
score estimation (i.e., the estimation of the true ability of an individual) denoted here as
𝑋𝑇 . Equation 168 on page 214 provides an estimator for the true score:
?^?𝑇 = 𝜌𝑋𝑋 + (1− 𝜌𝑋)𝜇𝑋 , (6.7)
where 𝑋 is the observed score, 𝜇𝑋 is the overall mean of a subset of observations, and 𝜌𝑋 is
a reliability measure. Kelley’s true score estimator regresses, or shrinks, the observed score
toward the group mean; the less reliable the measure, the greater the shrinkage.
The classical true score model is
𝑋 = 𝑋𝑇 + 𝜀,
where E(𝜀|𝑋𝑇 ) = 0, V(𝜀|𝑋𝑇 ) = 𝜎2𝜀 , and Cov(𝑋𝑇 , 𝜀) = 0 so that 𝜎2𝑋 = 𝜎2𝑋𝑇 + 𝜎2𝜀 . One choice
for 𝜌𝑋 is Corr(𝑋,𝑋𝑇 )
2, where
Corr(𝑋,𝑋𝑇 ) =
Cov(𝑋,𝑋𝑇 )
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑋𝑇
=
E(𝑋𝑋𝑇 )− E(𝑋)E(𝑋𝑇 )
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑋𝑇
=
E((𝑋𝑇 + 𝜀)𝑋𝑇 )− E(𝑋𝑇 )2
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑋𝑇
=
E(𝑋2𝑇 )− E(𝑋𝑇 )2
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑋𝑇
=
𝜎𝑋𝑇
𝜎𝑋
;
thus, 𝜌𝑋 = 𝜎
2
𝑋𝑇/𝜎2𝑋, which is the typical definition of the reliability coefficient.
Kelley’s true score estimator can be directly related to the simple linear regression
model where one would like to model 𝑋𝑇 from 𝑋. The estimated simple linear regression of
𝑋𝑇 regressed onto 𝑋 is ?^?𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 where 𝛽1 = 𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑇 (?^?𝑋𝑇/?^?𝑋), 𝛽0 = ?^?𝑋𝑇 − 𝛽1?^?𝑋 , and
𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑇 is the estimated correlation coefficient between 𝑋 and 𝑋𝑇 . Letting 𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑇 = ?^?𝑋𝑇/?^?𝑋,
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the estimated regression equation can be rewritten as
?^?𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋
= ?^?𝑋 − 𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑇
(︂
?^?𝑋𝑇
?^?𝑋
)︂
?^?𝑋 + 𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑇
(︂
?^?𝑋𝑇
?^?𝑋
)︂
𝑋
=
(︀
1− 𝑟2𝑋𝑋𝑇
)︀
?^?𝑋 + 𝑟
2
𝑋𝑋𝑇
𝑋
= 𝜌𝑋𝑋 + (1− 𝜌𝑋)?^?𝑋 .
The observed score, 𝑋, is an unbiased estimator of 𝑋𝑇 ; thus, Kelley’s true score
estimator, ?^?𝑇 , is a biased estimator when 𝜌𝑋 ̸= 1 or 𝑋 ̸= 𝜇𝑋 . The standard error of the
observed score is 𝜎𝑋
√
1− 𝜌𝑋 ≥ 𝜎𝑋𝜌𝑋
√
1− 𝜌𝑋 , the standard error of Kelley’s True Score
estimator; thus, Kelley’s True Score estimator is more efficient compared to the observed
score (when 𝜌𝑋 ̸= 0). Said differently, Kelley’s True Score estimator trades off increased
squared bias for decreased variance.
6.3.3 James-Stein Estimator
Given a collection of 𝑛 observations on 𝑝 variables, X = (X1,X2, . . . ,X𝑝), simultane-
ous estimation of their means is common (e.g., in an analysis of variance [ANOVA] setting).
Suppose that 𝑋𝑖𝑗
iid∼ 𝒩 (𝜇𝑗, 𝜎2𝑋) for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑝; here, one may want to estimate
𝜇 = (𝜇1, . . . , 𝜇𝑝)
𝑇 .
An unbiased, sufficient, and consistent estimator of 𝜇𝑗 is the sample mean, ?¯?𝑗 =
1
𝑛
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1𝑋𝑖𝑗. However, given 𝑝 ≥ 3 variables, C. Stein (1956) showed that X¯ = (?¯?1, . . . , ?¯?𝑝)
is inadmissible; that is, ℛ(𝜇, X¯) > ℛ(𝜇, 𝛿(X)) for some estimator 𝛿(X) (for an empirical
Bayes approach, see Efron & Morris, 1973). Such an estimator is provided by W. James and
Stein (1961) and commonly referred to as the James-Stein estimator,
X¯𝐽𝑆 =
(︂
1− (𝑝− 2)𝜎
2
?¯?
‖X¯‖2
)︂
X¯, (6.8)
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where 𝜎2
?¯?
= 𝜎2𝑋/𝑛. Note that although ℛ(𝜇, X¯) > ℛ(𝜇, X¯𝐽𝑆), the James-Stein estimator
itself is not inadmissible.
The James-Stein estimator shrinks the estimator X¯ toward 0 when (𝑝−2)𝜎2
?¯?
< ‖X¯‖2.
Alternatively, one can shrink X¯ toward an arbitrarily-chosen vector, say 𝜇X¯, where each
entry is equal to the overall mean 1
𝑝
∑︀𝑝
𝑗=1 ?¯?𝑗. The James-Stein estimator is then
X¯𝐽𝑆 =
(︂
1− (𝑝− 2)𝜎
2
?¯?
‖X¯− 𝜇X¯‖2
)︂
(X¯− 𝜇X¯) + 𝜇X¯.
This can be rewritten as
X¯𝐽𝑆 =
(︂
1− (𝑝− 2)𝜎
2
?¯?
‖X¯− 𝜇X¯‖2
)︂
X¯+
(︂
1− 1− (𝑝− 2)𝜎
2
?¯?
‖X¯− 𝜇X¯‖2
)︂
𝜇X¯
= 𝜌X¯X¯+ (1− 𝜌X¯) ?^?X¯,
where
𝜌X¯ =
(︂
1− (𝑝− 2)𝜎
2
?¯?
‖X¯− 𝜇X¯‖2
)︂
.
When (𝑝− 2)𝜎2
?¯?
< ‖X¯− 𝜇X¯‖2, the estimator shrinks X¯ toward 𝜇X¯.
6.3.4 Example
As a demonstration, suppose 𝑁 patients are evaluated using eleven distinct violence
prediction methods and all 𝑁 of these patients will commit an act of violence in the future.
Let 𝑋𝑖
iid∼ ℬernoulli(𝑝𝑖) where 𝑝𝑖 = .60, .62, . . . , .80 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 11; that is, 𝑝𝑖 represents
the true sensitivity for each of the eleven distinct prediction devices. Kelley’s True Score
(TS) estimator is used to estimate the “true” sensitivity of the eleven violence prediction
methods and this is compared to the mean squared error of the observed sensitivity, 𝑝
(𝑖)
𝐵|𝐴 =
1
𝑁
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1𝑋𝑖𝑗. The reliability coefficient is estimated using Hoyt’s method (Hoyt, 1941), where
in Hoyt’s terminology, the prediction method represents the “student” and the patients are
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the “items.” The simulation code can be found in Appendix C.
For 𝑁 = 20, the estimated reliability coefficient is .610. The observed proportions are
p^𝐵|𝐴 = (.50,.65,.40,.75,.90,.85,.80,.60,.75,.75,.85)𝑇 ; the estimates using Kelley’s TS estimator
are p^TS = (.582,.673,.521,.734,.825,.795,.765,.643,.734,.734,.795)
𝑇 . Eight of the eleven Kelley
TS estimates are closer to the true sensitivity than the observed sensitivity. In addition, the
mean squared error for Kelley’s TS estimator (M̂SE = 0.006) is about a third of the size
when using the observed sensitivities (M̂SE = 0.016).
Increasing the number of observations reduces, but does not diminish, the benefit of
using Kelley’s TS estimator. For 𝑁 = 100, six of Kelley’s TS estimates are closer to the true
value; the mean squared error for Kelley’s TS estimator is 0.0011 compared to 0.0012 using
the observed sensitivities. The advantage of Kelley’s True Score estimator is still present,
but it has decreased with a larger number of observations.
6.3.5 Ridge Regression
Regularization imposes a penalty term in the fitting of a regression model as a way
of preventing overfitting of the model. There are several methods of regularization, but only
ridge regression is discussed here (Hoerl & Kennard, 1970) based on Tikhonov regularization
(Tikhonov, 1943, 1963). Two other popular regularization tools are the Lasso (least absolute
shrinkage and selection operator; Tibshirani, 1996) and elastic net (a weighted combination
of ridge regression and the Lasso; Zou & Hastie, 2005). Both methods are similar to ridge
regression and are shrinkage estimators; unlike ridge regression they also perform variable
selection and should be preferred to techniques such as stepwise regression which is prone
to overfitting (e.g., see Babyak, 2004).
Consider the 𝑛 × 𝑝 dataset, X, containing 𝑝 mean-centered predictor variables for
𝑛 observations, and a mean-centered response variable, y, of size 𝑛 × 1 (the variables are
assumed to be mean-centered for simplicity of notation, but they need not be). In addition,
X should be standardized so that V(X𝑗) = 𝜎2𝑋 for 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑝 (typically 𝜎2𝑋 = 1) because,
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unlike the least squares estimator for regression, the ridge regression estimator is not scale
equivariant (i.e., the ridge estimator is affected by the scale of the variables). In least
squares regression, one minimizes the squared loss function to obtain the unique (when X is
of full column rank, which is assumed throughout) least squares solution for the regression
coefficients; that is,
?^?LS = min
𝛽
‖y −X𝛽‖2, (6.9)
where 𝛽 = (𝛽1, . . . , 𝛽𝑝)
𝑇 is the 𝑝× 1 vector containing the estimates for the linear regression
function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝛽1𝑥1 + · · ·+ 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝.
Ridge regression minimizes the slightly different objective function,
?^?
𝑅
= min
𝛽
‖y −X𝛽‖2 + 𝜆‖𝛽‖2, (6.10)
where 𝜆 ≥ 0 is called a tuning parameter (cross-validation can be used to determine an
appropriate value of 𝜆). Note in the trivial case where 𝜆 = 0, Equation (6.10) is equivalent
to Equation (6.9), the least squares solution. Increasing 𝜆 tends to decrease the estimates of
𝛽; as 𝜆→∞, ?^?𝑅 → 0𝑝, where 0𝑝 is a 𝑝× 1 vector of 0’s. Thus, ridge regression is another
type of shrinkage estimator and the term 𝜆‖𝛽‖2 can be thought of as a shrinkage penalty.
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that the least squares (LS) estimator of 𝛽 (i.e.,
?^?LS) is the best linear unbiased estimator of 𝛽; that is, of all unbiased estimators, ?^?LS has
minimum variance. Therefore, if one were to choose an unbiased estimator for 𝛽, the least
squares estimator is the obvious choice; however, one may desire an estimator that is more
efficient than the LS estimator (i.e, one that has smaller variance). Clearly, this estimator is
biased because there does not exist an unbiased estimator that is more efficient than the least
squares one; thus, there again is a trade-off between variance and bias. In fact, increasing
𝜆 decreases the flexibility of the ridge regression model and this typically leads to decreased
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variance and increased bias.
Equation (6.10) can be considered a constrained optimization problem; that is, min-
imizing Equation (6.10) for a given 𝜆 is equivalent to minimizing
‖y −X𝛽‖2 subject to ‖𝛽‖2 ≤ 𝑠,
where 𝑠 is inversely proportional to 𝜆 (i.e., a larger 𝑠 corresponds to a smaller 𝜆). Geomet-
rically, ‖𝛽‖2 ≤ 𝑠 represents a hypersphere in R𝑝 .
To solve for ?^?
𝑅
, Equation (6.10) can be rewritten as
?^?
𝑅
= min
𝛽
‖y −X𝛽‖2 + ‖0𝑝 −
√
𝜆I𝑝𝛽‖2,
where I𝑝 is the 𝑝× 𝑝 identity matrix. Letting
y𝜆 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝y
0𝑝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
and
X𝜆 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝ X√
𝜆I𝑝
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
Equation (6.10) can be re-expressed as
‖y𝜆 −X𝜆𝛽‖2,
where
?^?
𝑅
= (X𝑇𝜆X𝜆)
−1X𝑇𝜆y𝜆 = (X
𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)
−1X𝑇y (6.11)
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is the solution. As one might expect, the ridge regression estimator is a biased estimator of
𝛽 when 𝜆 > 0:
E
(︁
?^?
𝑅
)︁
=
(︀
I𝑝 + 𝜆(X
𝑇X)−1
)︀−1
𝛽.
When the data are orthonormal so that X𝑇X = I𝑝,
?^?
𝑅
=
(︂
1
1 + 𝜆
)︂
?^?LS.
As a simple example, suppose that 𝑛 = 𝑝 and X = I𝑝; Equation (6.11) reduces to (I𝑝 +
𝜆I𝑝)
−1y, so that for 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑝,
𝛽𝑅𝑗 =
𝑦𝑗
1 + 𝜆
.
Because 𝑦 = 0,
𝛽𝑅𝑗 =
𝑦𝑗
1 + 𝜆
=
𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦
1 + 𝜆
+ 𝑦 =
1
1 + 𝜆
𝑦𝑗 +
(︂
1− 1
1 + 𝜆
)︂
𝑦.
For this simple situation, the ridge regression estimator is a special case of Kelley’s True
Score estimator where 𝜌 = 1/(1+𝜆).
Ridge Regression Estimator and the Singular Value Decomposition.
Let X = UDV𝑇 be the singular value decomposition (SVD) of X, where U is an
𝑛 × 𝑝 matrix containing the left singular vectors (U𝑇U = I), D is a 𝑝 × 𝑝 diagonal matrix
containing the singular values 𝜃1 ≥ 𝜃2 · · · · ≥ 𝜃𝑝 ≥ 0 (because the variables have common
variance, if the variables are also uncorrelated 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = · · · = 𝜃𝑝 ≥ 0), and V is a 𝑝 × 𝑝
orthogonal matrix containing the right singular vectors. Using the SVD of X, the estimator
?^?
𝑅
can be rewritten as
?^?
𝑅
= (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)
−1X𝑇y
= (VDU𝑇UDV𝑇 + 𝜆I𝑝)
−1VDU𝑇y
253
= (VD2V𝑇 + 𝜆I𝑝)
−1VDU𝑇y
=
(︁
V(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)V
𝑇
)︁−1
VDU𝑇y
= V(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)
−1DU𝑇y
= VD𝑅U
𝑇y,
where D𝑅 is a diagonal matrix such that {D𝑅}𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗/(𝜃2𝑗+𝜆). Thus, UD𝑅V𝑇 is the singular
value decomposition of
(︁
?^?
𝑅
)︁𝑇
= X(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)
−1.
The least squares solution can be similarly decomposed as
?^?LS = VDLSU
𝑇y,
where {DLS}𝑗𝑗 = 1/𝜃𝑗.
The estimated values of y are y^𝜆 = X?^?
𝑅
= H𝜆y whereH𝜆 = X(X
𝑇X+𝜆I𝑝)
−1X𝑇 is a
symmetric matrix that is analogous to the so-called “hat matrix” in least squares regression
(but note this matrix is not idempotent so it is not a projection matrix). The estimated
response can be expressed in terms of the SVD of X,
y^𝜆 = UDV
𝑇VD𝑅U
𝑇y = UD𝜆U
𝑇y,
where {D𝜆}𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃2𝑗/(𝜃2𝑗+𝜆); thus, UD𝜆U𝑇 is the singular value decomposition of H𝜆.
The square of the singular values of X are the eigenvalues of X𝑇X so 1/𝜃2𝑗 is the
(𝑝 − 𝑗 + 1)th eigenvalue of (X𝑇X)−1. The eigenvalues and eigenvectors, v𝑗, are directly
related to principal components analysis where v𝑗 is the 𝑗th principal component of (X
𝑇X)
and 𝜎2𝑗 is the variance associated with it. Furthermore,
y^𝜆 = X𝛽
𝑅
= UD𝜆U
𝑇y
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=𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑑𝜆𝑗u𝑗u
𝑇
𝑗 y.
Thus, y is projected to the singular vector space for H𝜆 (UU
𝑇 is a projection matrix), and
then shrunken by the singular values of H𝜆 .
Comparison of Ridge Regression with Least Squares.
Suppose that
y = 𝑓(X) + 𝜀,
where E(𝜀|X) = 0𝑛 and V(𝜀|X) = 𝜎2𝜀I𝑛. Given (y,X), 𝑓(X) is estimated as y^ ≡ 𝑓(X).
Let (y*,X*) be a set of 𝑛′ new observations (e.g., the testing sample) and y* = 𝑓(X*) + 𝜀*
where E(𝜀*|X*) = 0𝑛′ and V(𝜀*|X*) = 𝜎2𝜀I𝑛′ (note that 𝑓(·) is the same). Here, y* and y
are assumed independent. Let y^LS = X*?^?LS = X*(X
𝑇X)−1X𝑇y represent the least squares
estimates for the new observations. The measure of interest is the expected error for the
new observations:
E
(︀‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*)︀ = ‖E (y* − y^LS|X,X*) ‖2 + tr (V(y* − y^LS)|X,X*) .
Because ?^?LS is an unbiased estimator of 𝛽, E (y* − y^LS) = 0𝑛′ .
Note that y^LS depends only on y, and y and y* are independent, so y* and y^LS are
also independent. Thus,
V(y* − y^LS|X,X*) = V(y*|X*) + V(y^LS|X)
= 𝜎2𝜀I𝑛′ +X*(X
𝑇X)−1X𝑇V(y|X)X(X𝑇X)−1X𝑇*
= 𝜎2𝜀I𝑛′ + 𝜎
2
𝜀X*(X
𝑇X)−1X𝑇* .
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The expected error reduces to
E
(︀‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*)︀ = 𝜎2𝜀 (︀tr(I𝑛′) + tr (︀X*(X𝑇X)−1X𝑇* )︀)︀
= 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝜎
2
𝜀tr
(︀
X𝑇*X*(X
𝑇X)−1
)︀
.
Because X = UDV𝑇 , (X𝑇X)−1 = VD−2V𝑇 and letting the singular value decompo-
sition ofX* beU*D*V𝑇* , whereU* is 𝑛
′×𝑝 andD* andV* are 𝑝×𝑝, givesX𝑇*X* = V*D2*V𝑇* ;
thus,
tr
(︀
X𝑇*X*(X
𝑇X)−1
)︀
= tr
(︀
V*D2*V
𝑇
*VD
−2V𝑇
)︀
.
The above equation can be simplified further:
tr
(︀
V*D2*V
𝑇
*VD
−2V𝑇
)︀
=
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
𝜃2*𝑗
𝜃2𝑗
)︂
=
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑠2𝑗𝑘
where 𝑠𝑗𝑘 = 𝑣*𝑘𝑗𝑣𝑘𝑗 (𝜃*𝑗/𝜃𝑗), 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑝.
Dividing the expected error by 𝑛′ gives the average expected error,
1
𝑛′
E
(︀‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*)︀ = (︂𝜎2𝜀
𝑛′
)︂ 𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑠2𝑗𝑘 + 𝜎
2
𝜀 ,
where 𝜎2𝜀 is the irreducible error and (𝜎
2
𝜀/𝑛′)
∑︀𝑝
𝑘=1
∑︀𝑝
𝑗=1 𝑠
2
𝑗𝑘 is the variance associated with
the model (this is equal to the reducible error because the estimator is unbiased).
Suppose X* = X so that V(y^LS|X) = 𝜎2𝜀H and E (‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*) = 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝑝𝜎2𝜀
so the reducible error is (𝑝/𝑛′)𝜎2𝜀 . Note that y* ̸= y; rather new values on the response are
considered corresponding to the observations on the predictor variables used to construct
the model. Because the true function, 𝑓(X), depends on the 𝑝 predictor variables, the
reducible error is reduced when new observations are closer to 0 (the means of the predictor
variables); that is, by reducing ‖x*𝑖‖2. When X* = X, reduction in the variance is achieved
by increasing the sample size.
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For the ridge regression estimator, the estimates for the new observations are y^𝜆 =
X*?^?
𝑅
= X*(X𝑇X + 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇y. Similar to the least squares solution, the expected error
for the ridge regression estimator can be split into two parts:
E
(︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀ = ‖E(y*|X*)− E(y^𝜆|X)‖2 + tr (V(y* − y^𝜆|X,X*))
The first part reduces to
‖E(y*|X*)− E(y^𝜆|X)‖2 = ‖X*𝛽 −X*(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇E(y)‖2
= ‖X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X
)︀
𝛽‖2.
When 𝜆 = 0 the above equation is zero; this corresponds to the least squares solution and is
consistent with the result found earlier. Because y* and y are independent, the covariance
term in the second part of the expected error becomes
V(y* − y^𝜆|X,X*) = V(y*|X*) + V(y^𝜆|X)
= 𝜎2𝜀I𝑛′ +X*(X
𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)
−1X𝑇V(y|X)X(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇*
= 𝜎2𝜀
(︀
I𝑛′ +X*(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇*
)︀
.
The trace of the above expression is
tr (V(y* − y^𝜆|X,X*)) = tr
(︀
𝜎2𝜀
(︀
I𝑛′ +X*(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇*
)︀)︀
= 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝜎
2
𝜀tr
(︀
X𝑇*X*(I𝑝 + 𝜆(X
𝑇X)−1)−1(X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1
)︀
= 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝜎
2
𝜀tr
(︀
V*D2*V
𝑇
*V(I𝑝 + 𝜆D
−2)−1V𝑇V(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)−1V𝑇
)︀
= 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝜎
2
𝜀tr
(︀
X𝑇*X*VD
2(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)
−2V𝑇
)︀
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The second part can be rewritten as
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
𝜃2𝑗𝜃
2
*𝑗
(𝜃2𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
=
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑠2𝜆𝑗𝑘,
where 𝑠𝜆𝑗𝑘 = 𝑣*𝑘𝑗𝑣𝑘𝑗
(︀
𝜃𝑗𝜃*𝑗/(𝜃2𝑗+𝜆)
)︀
, 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑝.
Putting this together and averaging over the 𝑛′ observations gives the average esti-
mated error:
1
𝑛′
E
(︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀ = 1
𝑛′
‖X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X
)︀
𝛽‖2+
(︂
𝜎2𝜀
𝑛′
)︂ 𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑠2𝜆𝑗𝑘+𝜎
2
𝜀 .
The difference in the squared bias between the least squares and ridge estimators is the bias
of the ridge estimator,
‖X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X
)︀
𝛽‖2.
Using the SVD of X leads to the following:
X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X
)︀
𝛽 = X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (VD2V𝑇 + 𝜆I𝑝)−1VD2V𝑇
)︀
𝛽
= X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (V(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)V𝑇 )−1VD2V𝑇
)︀
𝛽
= X*
(︀
I𝑝 −V(D2 + 𝜆I𝑝)−1D2V𝑇
)︀
𝛽
= X*
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
𝛽.
When 𝜆 = 0, I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇 = 0𝑝×𝑝 and as 𝜆 → ∞, I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇 → I𝑝 so the bias depends
on the size of 𝜆 and X*. The squared bias for the for the ridge estimator is
‖X*
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
𝛽‖2 = (X*
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
𝛽)𝑇 (X*
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
𝛽)
= 𝛽𝑇
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
X𝑇*X*
(︀
I𝑝 −VD𝜆V𝑇
)︀
𝛽
Clearly the bias will always be larger for the ridge estimator (𝜆 > 0) than for least
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squares (𝜆 = 0), but what about the variance? The difference in variance between the
estimates
𝜎2𝜀)
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
(︀
𝑠2𝑗𝑘 − 𝑠2𝜆𝑗𝑘
)︀
;
this leads to the following:
(︀
𝑠2𝑗𝑘 − 𝑠2𝜆𝑗𝑘
)︀
= 𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
𝜃2*𝑗
𝜃2𝑗
− 𝜃
2
𝑗𝜃
2
*𝑗
(𝜃2𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
)︂
= 𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
𝜃2*𝑗(𝜃
2
𝑗 + 𝜆)
2 − 𝜃2𝑗 (𝜃2𝑗𝜃2*𝑗)
𝜃2𝑗 (𝜃
2
𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
)︂
= 𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
𝜃2*𝑗(𝜃
4
𝑗 + 2𝜃
2
𝑗𝜆+ 𝜆
2)− 𝜃4𝑗𝜃2*𝑗
𝜃2𝑗 (𝜃
2
𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
)︂
= 𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
2𝜃2*𝑗𝜃
2
𝑗𝜆+ 𝜃
2
*𝑗𝜆
2
𝜃2𝑗 (𝜃
2
𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
)︂
.
Because 𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝜃2𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝜃2*𝑗 ≥ 0, and 𝜆 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑝, the above expression
is always nonnegative; in other words, the variance for the least squares estimator is always
greater than (or in the trivial cases, equal to) the ridge estimator. Davis-Stober, Dana, and
Budescu (2010) provide similar results for a set of constrained estimators for the regression
coefficient that include the ridge estimator. Similar to the estimator for the population
variance, the variance of the ridge estimator for 𝛽 can be made infinitesimally small by
increasing 𝜆, but also similarly, this is at the cost of increasing the squared bias.
Taking the difference of the expected errors between the least squares estimator and
the ridge regression estimator gives
E
(︀‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*)︀− E (︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀
= 𝜎2𝜀
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
(︀
𝑠2𝑗𝑘 − 𝑠2𝜆𝑗𝑘
)︀− ‖X* (︀I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X)︀𝛽‖2
Thus, the mean squared error for the ridge estimator will be less than that for the least
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squares estimator when
𝑝∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑣2*𝑘𝑗𝑣
2
𝑘𝑗
(︂
2𝜃2*𝑗𝜃
2
𝑗𝜆+ 𝜃
2
*𝑗𝜆
2
𝜃2𝑗 (𝜃
2
𝑗 + 𝜆)
2
)︂
𝜎2𝜀 > ‖X*
(︀
I𝑝 − (X𝑇X+ 𝜆I𝑝)−1X𝑇X
)︀
𝛽‖2
In the case when the data are orthonormal so that X and X* are orthogonal the
variance of the ridge estimator simplifies to
𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 + 𝑝𝜎
2
𝜀
(︂
1
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
and the variance of the least squares estimator is
(𝑛′ + 𝑝)𝜎2𝜀 ;
clearly the variance is less for the ridge estimator than the least squares one. The bias of
the ridge estimator simplifies to (︂
𝜆
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2.
Thus, the mean squared error is for the ridge estimator is
E
(︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀ = (︂ 𝜆
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2 + 𝑝𝜎2𝜀
(︂
1
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
+ 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 ,
Taking the derivative with respect to 𝜆,
𝜕
𝜕𝜆
(︀
E
(︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀)︀ = (︂ 2𝜆
(1 + 𝜆)3
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2 −
(︂
2
(1 + 𝜆)3
)︂
𝑝𝜎2𝜀 ;
setting this to zero and solving for 𝜆 gives
𝜆 =
𝑝𝜎2𝜀
‖𝛽‖2 ,
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The second derivative evaluated at the above critical value is
2𝑝𝜎2𝜀 + 2‖𝛽‖2(︁
1− 𝑝𝜎2𝜀‖𝛽‖2
)︁4 ,
which is always positive; thus, the critical value is a global minimum meaning that the mean
squared error is minimized when 𝜆 = 𝑝𝜎
2
𝜀
‖𝛽‖2 . Assuming 𝑝 ≥ 1, 𝜎2𝜀 , and 𝛽 ̸= 0, the critical
value is always greater than zero meaning the mean squared error is never minimized for
the least squares solution. In practice 𝜎2𝜀 and 𝛽 are unknown but, as mentioned earlier,
cross-validation can assist in determining 𝜆.
The difference between the mean squared error for the least squares and ridge esti-
mators when X is orthogonal is
E
(︀‖y* − y^LS‖2|X,X*)︀− E (︀‖y* − y^𝜆‖2|X,X*)︀ = (𝑛′ + 𝑝)𝜎2𝜀 − 𝑛′𝜎2𝜀 − 𝑝𝜎2𝜀 (︂ 11 + 𝜆
)︂2
−
(︂
𝜆
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2
= 𝑝𝜎2𝜀
(︃
1−
(︂
1
1 + 𝜆
)︂2)︃
−
(︂
𝜆
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2.
The ridge estimator has a smaller mean squared error than the least squares one when
𝑝𝜎2𝜀
(︃
1−
(︂
1
1 + 𝜆
)︂2)︃
>
(︂
𝜆
1 + 𝜆
)︂2
‖𝛽‖2.
This can be reduced to
2 + 𝜆
𝜆
>
‖𝛽‖2
𝑝𝜎2𝜀
.
Letting 𝜆 = 𝑝𝜎2𝜀/‖𝛽‖2, the value that minimizes the mean squared error function, the above
equation states that the least squares estimator has a larger mean squared error than the
ridge one when 2 + 𝜆 > 1. The next section demonstrates logistic ridge regression for
predicting violence.
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6.3.6 Main Effects Ridge Logistic Regression Model
In Chapter 5, a main effects logistic regression model was found for the MacArthur
Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS). Here, a logistic regression model is fit using the
ridge estimator. The choice of 𝜆 is determined using cross-validation; based on the identi-
fied 𝜆, this model is compared to the maximum likelihood model similar to that found in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 1 introduced the VRAS and Chapter 5 discussed the data in detail; here
PCLtot represents the overall PCL:SV scores, as opposed to the dichotomized PCL used in
Chapter 5. A main effects logistic regression (MELR) and a ridge logistic regression (RLR)
model are fit; for simplicity, these models are fit using only a subset of the continuous
variables from VRAS dataset discussed in Chapter 5. Here, the variables are standardized
to have variance 1 and mean-centered. All analyses are done in R and the code can be found
in Appendix C. Table 6.3 displays the results of the MELR model.
Variable 𝛽 CI
Intercept -1.82 -2.04 -1.61
PCLtot 0.75 0.56 0.95
BISnp -0.21 -0.41 -0.01
BPRSa -0.27 -0.51 -0.05
BPRSh 0.36 0.11 0.61
BPRSt -0.38 -0.66 -0.11
PriorArr 0.30 0.11 0.48
SNMHP -0.21 -0.43 -0.01
NASb 0.33 0.13 0.52
Function 0.08 -0.12 0.28
NegRel 0.09 -0.10 0.26
Table 6.3: Estimated coefficients (𝛽) with confidence intervals (CI) for a main effects logistic
regression model using standardized variables from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study (Monahan et al., 2001).
The logistic regression model is fit using maximum likelihood estimation; the negative
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log-likelihood is the objective function to be minimized with respect to 𝛽 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1, . . . , 𝛽𝑝)
𝑇 :
min
𝛽
−
(︃
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗 −
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛𝑖 ln
(︃
1 + exp
{︃
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗
}︃)︃)︃
,
where 𝑥𝑖0 = 1 for all 𝑖. Similar to the linear regression objective function, a shrinkage penalty
can be added to the logistic regression objective function:
min
𝛽
−
(︃
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗 −
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛𝑖 ln
(︃
1 + exp
{︃
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗
}︃)︃)︃
+ 𝜆
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛽2𝑗 .
Note that the shrinkage penalty does not include the intercept term, 𝛽0.
A logistic regression model using ridge coefficients is examined; to determine the
choice for the tuning parameter, 𝜆, ten-fold cross-validation is conducted for values ranging
from 0.0085 to 85. Recall that as 𝜆 → 0 (or equivalently, as ln(𝜆) → −∞), the coefficients
approach the maximum likelihood estimates from Table 6.3; as 𝜆→∞ (ln(𝜆)→ +∞), they
approach 0. The value of the estimated coefficients across different values of 𝜆 are plotted in
Figure 6.6; this is given on a logarithmic scale to better illustrate the trend. Starting from
the ML estimates, the coefficients decrease toward zero as ln(𝜆) increases. The variable
BISnp, the only MELR variable with a confidence interval containing zero, shrinks toward
zero the fastest. All the other variables shrink at close to the same rate.
The optimal 𝜆, in terms of minimized misclassification error using ten-fold cross-
validation, was found to be 𝜆 = 0.01; this is displayed in Figure 6.7. Using this optimal
𝜆, a ridge logistic regression model is constructed. The parameter estimates are given in
Table 6.4 along with the ML estimates for comparison. Figure 6.8 plots both sets of esti-
mates; Figure 6.9 plots the shrinkage of the estimates (the arrows represent the amount of
shrinkage for the ML estimates to the ridge estimates).
The ten-fold cross-validated error for the ridge model is .179; for the main effects
model, .185. This improvement results in six more correct predictions for the ridge logistic
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Variable 𝛽
ML
𝛽𝑅
Intercept -1.82 -1.71
PCLtot 0.75 0.61
BISnp -0.21 -0.12
BPRSa -0.27 -0.22
BPRSh 0.36 0.23
BPRSt -0.38 -0.23
PriorArr 0.30 0.27
SNMHP -0.21 -0.17
NASb 0.33 0.27
Function 0.08 0.03
NegRel 0.09 0.07
Table 6.4: Comparison of ridge estimators (𝜆 = .01) and maximum likelihood estimators for
logistic regression model using VRAS data (Monahan et al., 2001)
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of ML and ridge logistic regression estimates for the VRAS data
(Monahan et al., 2001).
regression model.
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(Monahan et al., 2001).
6.4 Conclusion
The variance-bias trade-off is an important concept in prediction. The mean-squared
error and its variants, such as the Brier Score, are ways to measure the overall error of
a prediction method; these can be decomposed into the squared bias and variance of the
estimator. Varying the complexity (or flexibility) of a prediction model generally leads to
increased variance but decreased squared bias; the goal of increased accuracy in prediction
is based on determining where the combination of the two are minimized (i.e., where the
mean squared error is minimized).
Several types of shrinkage estimators designed to reduce the overall prediction error
at the cost of increased bias were presented and demonstrated in this chapter. In every
scenario presented, the biased estimator was shown to outperform the unbiased estimator
in terms of mean squared error, especially when the number of observations is small. Even
with a large number of observations, the superiority of the biased estimator is still present.
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It should be clear that there is a great advantage to using biased estimators in prediction.
The property of bias in an estimator is one of the more well-known concepts in
statistics; even in the most elementary courses it is usually discussed. Consequently, bias
may be viewed as the most central criterion that an estimator should satisfy; but this is not
necessarily the case. In prediction, an unbiased estimator should be discarded for one that
leads to a more accurate prediction—without argument. Referring to Kelley’s True Score
estimator, Harold Gulliken, one of the influential figures in classical test theory, stated in his
book Theory of Mental Tests, that “no practical advantage is gained from using [Kelley’s]
regression equation to estimate true scores” (p. 45). Hubert and Wainer (2012) bluntly reply
to this remark, “[W]ho really cares about bias when a generally more accurate prediction
strategy can be defined?” (p. 153).
267
Chapter 7
An Overview of Violence Prediction
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
— George E. P. Box
This chapter looks at multiple studies using the Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR) and Static-99R and Static-2002R actuarial tools. We conclude that within
and across studies, the methods for predicting violent and dangerous behavior fail
to satisfy the definition of clinical efficiency, cautioning their use in practice.
7.1 The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR)
The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) introduced in Chapter 1 has been our
main focus throughout. Recall that Monahan et al. (2001) used an iterative classification
tree (ICT) scheme discussed in Chapters 1 and 5 to assign patients into five risk groups (see
Table 7.1).
The ROC for the final ICT classification model provided an AUC of .88, which was
noted to be significantly different from a chance accuracy of .50 (for a thorough discussion on
the (mis)use of AUCs, see Chapter 4). Their model was not cross-validated (see Chapter 5
for a discussion of cross-validation). Table 7.2 displays a 2 × 2 contingency table for the
results of the ICT model prediction of violence. Those predicted to be violent fell into the
high and very-high risk categories.
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Category Risk Point Estimate 95% CI
5 Very High .762 [.654, .862]
4 High .559 [.462, .653]
3 Average .262 [.195, .324]
2 Low .077 [.047, .111]
1 Very Low .012 [.003, .024]
Table 7.1: The five risk categories for the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) diagnostic
test along with point estimate risks (in probabilities) and respective confidence intervals (CI)
(Monahan et al., 2006).
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Row Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 105 60 165
No (?¯?) 71 703 774
Column Totals 176 763 939
Table 7.2: A 2× 2 contingency table displaying the prediction of violence results using the
ICT model presented in Monahan et al. (2001).
The base rate for predicted violence (i.e., the percentage predicted to be violent) is
.175. In absolute terms, 165 patients were predicted by the ICT model to commit violence,
11 less than actually did (for a discussion of calibration, see Chapter 6). The sensitivity
and specificity of this test is, respectively, .60 and .92; the positive and negative predictive
values are, respectively, .64 and .91; the accuracy (i.e., the proportion correct) of the test is
.86. The test meets the Bokhari-Hubert (BH) condition (see Chapter 3).
7.2 Validation Studies
Several studies have attempted to validate the COVR; this chapter takes a “meta-
analytic” approach to assess just how well the COVR predicts violence. Although not as in
depth, we also look at several studies examining the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)
and the Static-99 (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of these measures). Our primary focus is on
the COVR because it “exemplifie[s]” (Nadelhoffer et al., 2012, p. 68) actuarial methods for
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predicting violence and is “user-friendly [and] produces excellent results” (Scurich & John,
2011, p. 83). The data used herein were (a) available directly from the article, (b) inferred
from the article (i.e., raw numbers converted from percentages), or (c) requested from the
authors.
7.2.1 Monahan et al. (2005)
In 2005, Monahan et al. conducted a study to validate the COVR actuarial tool they
had developed earlier. Their data consisted of 157 patients from three hospitals in the United
States who met the same inclusion criteria set forth in their original study (i.e., aged 18–40;
English speaking; white, African-American, or Hispanic; diagnosed as having one or more
disorders from a given list). Patients were classified as high risk (COVR score of 4 or 5),
average risk (COVR score of 2 or 3), and low risk (COVR score of 1), and interviewed up
to two times in a 20-week period after hospital discharge.
The 2× 2 contingency Table 7.3 gives the validation study’s results. A similar table
was presented and discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4; here, however, the data presented
correspond to the authors’ revised estimate of violence justified as follows:
During qualitative review of the follow-up violence data, we realized that a number
of the patients who had been classified as high risk by the software but who were
not reported as violent during the follow-up (according to the strict operational
definition given above) in fact presented strong evidence of violence. Indications
that violence had actually taken place during the follow-up included violent acts that
took place in an institution (for example, a jail or a hospital), evidence of violence
several days after the 20-week follow-up window (as indicated by arrest records),
and battery in which injury was highly likely but had been rated as “unknown.” (p.
814)
The final follow-up sample consisted of 157 randomly selected patients from either the
high-risk or low-risk groups, excluding the average-risk groups. The base rate for violence is
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.23; the base rate for predicted violence is .35. The sensitivity of the test is .75; specificity is
.77. The positive predictive value is .49 and the negative predictive value is .91. Although
their revised estimate of violence improves their results (eight patients in the high-risk group
previously classified as not violent were reclassified), the test still fails to meet the BH
condition. In describing the results several years later, Monahan (2012) stated,
The results of the COVR validation study were that during the follow-up approx-
imately (a) one-in-ten of the patients classified by the instrument as “low” risk of
violence committed a violent act; and (b) one-in-two of the patients classified by
the instrument as “high” risk of violence committed a violent act. This difference
was highly statistically significant. (pp. 192–193)
State of Nature
𝐴 (Violence Present) 𝐴 (Violence Absent) Row Totals
Prediction
𝐵 (Risk Present) 27 28 55
?¯? (Risk Absent) 9 93 102
Column Totals 36 121 157
Table 7.3: A 2× 2 contingency table for predicting violence risk among persons with mental
disorders (Monahan et al., 2005).
7.2.2 Snowden et al. (2009)
Snowden, Gray, Taylor, and Fitzgerald (2009) “undertook the first independent study
of the COVR” defined as a validation of the COVR not conducted by its original authors.
The sample consisted of 52 forensic patients in two United Kingdom medium-security psychi-
atric units. The authors used three types of inpatient behavioral aggression as an outcome
variable: verbal, property, and physical. Unfortunately, the authors do not provide defini-
tions for these three types of aggression (and did not respond to an email inquiry about the
definition of aggression used); the base rates of occurrence were, respectively, 1.00, .50, and
.52. The COVR was significantly correlated (𝑝 < .05) with all three types of aggression.
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The AUC measure for predicting property aggression was .57 and, for predicting physical
violence, .73 (the latter value being significant, 𝑝 < .001). These results led the authors to
conclude that “the COVR proved to be a good predictor in this setting, and thus this study
provides the first evidence of its usefulness in forensic services.”
The base rate of violence, property and physical, is unusually high given other typical
values in the literature. Focusing solely on property violence, it can be shown that, given
COVR cutscores of 4, 3, 2, and 1, the COVR test fails the BH condition when using the
two extreme cutscores (1 and 4) but not when using the middle cutscores (2 and 3). The
accuracy for both these tests was .56. For physical violence, the COVR only fails to meet
the BH condition when using a cutscore of 4. The highest accuracy was obtained with a
cutscore of 2 (.69). When combining both property and physical violence, the base rate for
violence increases to .65. None of the cutscores met the BH criterion; a cutscore of 1 or 2
produced the highest accuracy, .60.
Table 7.4 displays the results for the test predicting physical violence using 3 as a
cutscore (i.e., patients with a COVR score of 4 or 5 are predicted to commit violence; patients
with a COVR score of 1, 2, or 3 are not). The sensitivity of the test is .37; the specificity
is .96. The positive predictive value is .91 and the negative predictive value is .59; both are
larger than 1/2 implying satisfaction of the BH condition. The accuracy of the test is .65
and, as expected, is greater than the base rate for violence of .52.
Physical Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 10 1 11
No (?¯?) 17 24 41
Totals 27 25 52
Table 7.4: Predicting physical violence using the COVR presented in Snowden et al. (2009).
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7.2.3 Doyle et al. (2010)
Doyle, Shaw, Carter, and Dolan (2010) demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the COVR
in predicting violence. Their data came from non-forensic acute mental health patients in the
United Kingdom; it was the “ first independent study of community violence to evaluate the
validity of the COVR in a UK sample” (Doyle et al., 2010, p. 317). The authors followed a
similar protocol for selecting their sample as in Monahan et al. (2001) and used the “slightly
more inclusive measure of violence ... to control for any doubt regarding likely injury”
(Doyle et al., 2010, p. 318), as was done in Monahan et al. (2005). The authors noted
the nonsignificant AUC value of .58 and the nonsignificant 𝑋2 of 7.89 with four degrees of
freedom.
Their final sample included 93 patients, 22 of which committed at least one act
of violence; thus, the base rate for violence in the sample was .24. Table 7.5 displays a
2 × 2 contingency table, with persons in the very-high-risk and high-risk groups predicted
to commit an act of violence and persons in the other three are not. Only 5 patients were
classified as high or very high risk of being violent and none committed any acts of violence;
thus, the positive predictive value and the sensitivity of the test are 0. The specificity is .93;
the negative predictive value is .75. The accuracy of the test is .71; the test fails to meet
the BH condition.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 0 5 5
No (?¯?) 22 66 88
Totals 22 71 93
Table 7.5: Predicting violence using the COVR presented in Doyle et al. (2010).
7.2.4 McDermott et al. (2011)
McDermott, Dualan, and Scott (2011) looked at the predictive ability for the COVR
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diagnostic test among civilly committed psychiatric patients at a United States forensic fa-
cility. The study used 146 patients committed to the facility as not guilty by reason of
insanity or mentally disordered offender. The authors’ outcome variable is physical aggres-
sion defined as “any physical contact initiated by a patient wherein the intent was to do
physical harm, such as pushing, kicking, or biting or using a weapon to threaten others.”
(McDermott et al., 2011, p. 431). McDermott et al. (2011) further noted that “Unlike the
MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, in our study acts of physical aggression did
not necessarily result in physical injury” (p. 431). Each patient was part of the study for
twenty weeks following the completion of the COVR. The authors concluded the COVR
was an efficient diagnostic tool for aggression prediction based on a significant area under
the curve (AUC) measure and a chi-squared analysis indicating that “COVR scores were
strongly associated with overall aggression” (McDermott et al., 2011, p. 431).
Assuming high and very high COVR scores are indicators for aggression, Table 7.6
gives the 2 × 2 contingency table for the results of COVR and aggression prediction. The
base rate for aggression in the sample is .15; the accuracy of the COVR test for the sample
is .84, failing to outperform base-rate prediction (of .85). For this test, the sensitivity and
specificity are, respectively, .41 and .91; the AUC is .66. The PPV and NPV are, respectively,
.45 and .90.
Aggression
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 9 11 20
No (?¯?) 13 113 126
Totals 22 124 146
Table 7.6: Predicting aggression using the COVR presented in McDermott et al. (2011).
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7.2.5 Sturup et al. (2011)
In a another study, 331 patients from psychiatric hospitals in Sweden were interviewed
before they were discharged and violent behavior was measured up to twenty weeks after
their release (Sturup et al., 2011). Nineteen patients displayed violent behavior (four were
recorded in the criminal register as violent crimes); the base rate for violence in this sample
is .06. Violence was defined as given in Monahan et al. (2001) and reported violence from
criminal activity from the criminal register were defined as “aggravated assault, assault,
violence or threat to a public servant and violently resisting arrest (there were no homicide,
rape or other felonies recorded during the follow-up period for anyone in the sample)” (Sturup
et al., 2011, p. 162).
The COVR software classified 191 patients as very low risk, 92 as low risk, 37 as
average risk, 7 as high risk, and 4 as very high risk. Table 7.7 summarizes the classifications
with the number of patients displaying violent behavior. The authors reported a significant
AUC of .77; the ROC curve is shown in Figure 7.1. Regardless of which risk level is used as
a cutscore for predicting violence, the test fails to meet the BH condition.
Violent Behavior
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Risk
Very High 2 2 4
High 2 5 7
Average 7 30 37
Low 4 88 92
Very Low 4 187 191
Totals 19 312 331
Table 7.7: Predicting violent behavior using the COVR presented in Sturup et al. (2011).
Table 7.8 displays the positive and negative predictive values, their average, the accu-
racy, and the AUC for a diagnostic test using each cutscore. The largest AUC is for a cutscore
of 2 (this is also the “best” cutscore according to the distance measure 𝐷 and Youden’s 𝐽
[see Chapter 4]), suggesting a COVR score in the average-to-very-high risk categories is a
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Figure 7.1: ROC curve for COVR validation study (Sturup et al., 2011).
good indicator for someone who will commit violence. Using this cutscore, the accuracy of
the test is .86 and the PPV is .23 (37 out of 48 patients would be incorrectly predicted to
be at risk for committing violence). The PPV and NPV, taken together, suggest a cutscore
of 4 is the best, implying that anyone in the very-high-risk category is at considerable risk.
This test provides an accuracy exactly equal to the base-rate probability 𝑃 (𝐴). The AUC
for this test, however, is the lowest of all four cutscores; the cutscore is also the worst in
terms of the distance measure 𝐷 and Youden’s 𝐽 .
Cutscore PPV NPV Accuracy AUC
4 (High) 0.50 0.95 0.94 0.55
3 (Average) 0.36 0.95 0.93 0.60
2 (Low) 0.23 0.97 0.86 0.73
1 (Very Low) 0.11 0.98 0.61 0.69
Table 7.8: Positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), accuracy, and
AUC for four cutscores for the COVR.
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7.3 Aggregation of Studies
There are three obvious problems with combining the five validation studies. The
first is that the definition of violence was unclear in one study (Snowden et al., 2009) and
slightly different in another (Sturup et al., 2011). The second is that one study (Monahan et
al., 2005) only included high risk and low risk patients, excluding all patients scoring a 2 or
3 on the COVR. The third is that the aggregated population is heterogeneous: three studies
included recently discharged patients (Monahan et al., 2005; McDermott et al., 2011; and
Doyle et al., 2010) whereas two studies included hospitalized patients (Snowden et al., 2009;
and Sturup et al., 2011); two studies included patients from the United States (Monahan et
al., 2005; and McDermott et al., 2011), two from the United Kingdom (Snowden et al., 2009;
and Doyle et al., 2010), and one from Sweden (Sturup et al., 2011). Despite these caveats,
the five studies were combined.
Table 7.9 displays a 2×2 contingency table for predicting violence in the five studies.
In this table, patients scoring a 4 or 5 on the COVR were predicted to commit an act of
violence (or aggression) and those scoring a 1, 2, or 3 were not. The base rate for violence is
.16; the base rate for violence prediction is .13. The accuracy of the aggregate sample is .83,
below the mark (i.e., less than 𝑃 (𝐴) = .84). The sensitivity and specificity are, respectively,
.39 and .92; the AUC is .66. The PPV and NPV are, respectively, .48 and .89. Aggregated
over the five validation studies, the COVR fails to meet the BH condition.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 50 54 104
No (?¯?) 76 599 675
Totals 126 653 779
Table 7.9: Predicting violence using the COVR across all five validation studies.
Table 7.10 displays a 2 × 2 contingency table, but this time excluding those who
scored a 2 or a 3, as done in Monahan et al. (2005). The data were not directly available for
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McDermott et al. (2011). From their paper it could only be determined that “six of the 84
(7%) patients who scored in the low or very low categories committed an act of aggression”
(McDermott et al., 2011, p. 432). Because this description includes patients scoring a 2 on
the COVR, it was indeterminate just how many scored a 1 (an email to the corresponding
author did not receive a response); thus, none of the nineteen patients scoring a 1 on the
COVR were predicted to be violent. The base rate for violence is about the same as the all-
inclusive aggregation (.16); however, the base rate for violence prediction is greatly increased
(.22). The sensitivity is improved, but the specificity worsens (.65 and .86, respectively); the
AUC shows a large increase (.75). The PPV is the same; the NPV is improved (.92). The
accuracy is slightly worse (.83) and the COVR still fails to meet the BH condition.
Violence
Yes (𝐴) No (𝐴) Totals
Prediction
Yes (𝐵) 50 54 104
No (?¯?) 27 339 366
Totals 77 393 470
Table 7.10: Predicting violence using the COVR across all five validation studies (excluding
patient scoring a 2 or 3).
Table 7.11 displays a summary of the five studies. Because the sensitivity and speci-
ficity are independent of base rates, we can calculate the expected positive and negative
predictive values; these are included in the table (denoted E(PPV) and E(NPV), respec-
tively).
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Monahan et al. Snowden et al. Doyle et al. McDermott et al. Sturup et al.
(2005) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2011)
𝑁 157 52 93 146 331
Violence Base Rate .23 .52 .24 .15 .06
Violence Selection Ratio .35 .21 .05 .14 .03
Reported AUC .70 .73 .58 .73 .77
2× 2 AUC .76 .67 .46 .66 .59
Sensitivity .75 .37 .00 .41 .21
Specificity .77 .96 .93 .91 .98
PPV .49 .91 .00 .45 .36
E(PPV) .67 .88 .68 .55 .30
NPV .91 .59 .75 .90 .95
E(NPV) .89 .70 .89 .93 98
Accuracy .76 .65 .71 .84 .93
𝑂𝐵 0.96 10.00 0.00 0.82 0.57
𝑂𝐵 0.10 0.71 0.33 0.12 0.05
𝑂𝑅 9.96 14.12 0.00 7.11 11.62
𝑅𝑅 5.56 2.19 0.00 4.36 7.76
𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 3.24 9.26 0.00 4.61 9.38
𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 0.33 0.66 1.08 0.65 0.81
Bokhari-Hubert
No Yes No No No
Condition Met?
Table 7.11: Summary of the five COVR-validation studies.
𝑁 is the sample size; AUC is area under the ROC curve; PPV is positive predictive value; NPV is negative predictive value;
𝑂 is odds; 𝑂𝑅 is odds ratio; 𝑅𝑅 is relative risk; 𝐷𝐿𝑅 is diagnostic likelihood ratio.
Note: aside from Reported AUC, all statistics are calculated using data in the form of 2× 2 contingency tables where a COVR
score of 4 or 5 leads to a prediction of violence and a score of 1, 2, or 3 does not.
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7.4 Sexual Recidivism
7.4.1 Static-99R & Static-2002R
Chapter 1 introduced the Static-99 and Static-2002 in detail. Both these measures
were revised due to the possibility of overestimating recidivism for older males (Helmus,
Thornton, et al., 2012); the revised estimates are the Static-99R and Static-2002R, respec-
tively. For both scales, the age range was categorized by four groups: Aged 18–34.9; aged
35–39.9; aged 40–59.9; aged 60 or older. For the Static-99R, the scoring for the four groups
is, respectively 1, 0, −1, and −3; for the Static-2002R the scoring is, respectively, 2, 1, 0, −2.
The low group for the Static-99R are scores ranging −3 through 1; nothing else is changed.
For the Static-2002R the scoring is as follows: High (9 or higher); moderate-high (7 or 8);
moderate (5 or 6); low-moderate (3 or 4); and low (−2 through 2). Table 7.12 displays
the Static-99R and Static-2002R scores and relative risk/hazard ratios associated with each
score. On the Static-99’s website, an interpretation guide is provided for these scores. As
an example, for a score of 6 the following interpretation is provided: “The recidivism rate
of sex offenders with the same score as Mr. XXX would be expected to be approximately
2.6 times higher than the recidivism rate of the typical sexual offender (defined as a median
score of 3)” (see Static-2002R relative risk ratio table, Static-99, 2013).
The new norms established for the revised Static-99 and Static-2002 provides a range
of recidivism risk, rather than a single percentile. According to Helmus et al. (2009)
Currently, our recommendation is to report recidivism estimates with the new norms
in two stages. The first stage involves reporting an empirically-derived range of re-
cidivism risk. The recidivism estimates from the [Correctional Service of Canada]
samples represent the lower bound of the range and the preselected high-risk sam-
ples are the upper bound of the range. . . . The second stage involves making a
professional judgment as to where a particular offender is likely to fall within that
range. This judgment represents a separate task from reporting the empirical re-
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Static-99R Static-2002R
Relative Risk Hazard
Score Ratio Score Ratio
10+ 8.47
9 6.48 9+ 6.90
8 4.96 8 5.00
7 3.80 7 3.62
6 2.91 6 2.63
5 2.23 5 1.90
4 1.71 4 1.38
3 1.31 3 1.00
2 1.00 2 0.72
1 0.77 1 0.52
0 0.59 0 0.38
−1 0.45 −1 0.28
−2 0.34 −2 0.20
−3 0.26
Table 7.12: Scoring distribution and their associated hazard ratios for the Static-99R and
Static-2002R.
cidivism rates; currently, there is no research to assess how well evaluators are able
to make this judgment. Until further research is conducted, however, this profes-
sional judgment is unavoidable. It is also important to note that regardless of the
evaluator’s opinion of which sample the offender most closely resembles, recidivism
rates of both samples should be reported in all cases. Although reporting absolute
recidivism rates as a range may appear less precise, it is likely more realistic given
that predicting behavior was likely never as simple as associating a single number
with a single Static-99 score.
Although we agree with the final sentence (i.e., a range of absolute recidivism rate
is more realistic than a single number) we do not agree that the second stage is necessary
or even appropriate. It is certainly avoidable, and until further research is conducted, no
judgment should be made as to where an individual falls within the estimated range.
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7.4.2 Validation Studies
In developing the revised edition of the Static-99R and Static-2002R, Helmus, Thorn-
ton, et al. (2012) combined 24 studies (see referenced article for citations of these studies);
all 24 studies included Static-99 data (𝑁 = 8, 390; 23 recorded sexual recidivism and 19
recorded violent recidivism) and seven also included Static-2002 data (𝑁 = 2, 609). Eleven
samples were from the Canada, six from the United States, two from the United Kingdom,
one from Denmark, one from Austria, one from Germany, and one from New Zealand. The
sexual offenders across these studies ranged between the ages 18 and 84 and were released
between the years 1957 and 2007. We note a report using 20 of the 24 studies was published
(Babchishin, Hanson, & Helmus, 2011).
Table 7.13 displays results of combined 24 studies. This table is reconstructed from
the table provided in the appendix (Helmus, Thornton, et al., 2012, p. 95). Note the values
provided in the original article are given in terms of percentages; the values provided in
Table 7.13 are raw numbers. Although these raw numbers were estimated as best as possible,
there appear to be some discrepancies. For example, the authors state the 5-year sexual
recidivism rate for patients scoring low on the Static-2002 is 3.7%; the total number of
patients scoring low on the Static-2002 is given as 686. Simply multiplying 686 by .037
gives 25.382, or simply 25 after rounding. However, 25 is only 3.6% of 686 (when rounded
accordingly to one decimal) and 26 is 3.8%; neither matching the authors’ number. This
was the case for several entries so some estimates may be off slightly, but not by more than
one or two per cell, a meaningless difference in terms of the overall conclusion. In addition,
because of the large sample sizes within each Static-99 level, the raw numbers to match the
correct percentages were not unique. For instance, 4.1% of the 2,380 patients scoring low on
the Static-99 could translate to 97 or 98 patients. Again, the estimates may only be off by
one or two per cell.
The area under the curve for the Static-99R is .71 and is statistically significant from
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Static-99 Static-99R
Sexual Recidivism Sexual Recidivism
Yes No Yes No
High 308 903 High 326 898
Moderate-high 265 1565 Moderate-high 248 1589
S
co
re
Moderate-low 184 2501
S
co
re
Moderate-low 166 2043
Low 97 2283 Low 114 2722
Column Totals 854 7252 Column Totals 854 7252
Static-2002 Static-2002R
Sexual Recidivism Sexual Recidivism
Yes No Yes No
High 72 155 High 64 122
Moderate-high 112 332 Moderate-high 98 271
S
co
re
Moderate 94 620
S
co
re
Moderate 94 556
Moderate-low 44 649 Moderate-low 60 658
Low 19 512 Low 25 661
Column Totals 341 2268 Column Totals 341 2268
Table 7.13: Results from 24 combined studies using the Static-99 and Static-2002 (with
revised versions included) for predicted sexual recidivism after five years.
chance prediction. The ROC plot for these data are shown in Figure 7.2. Suppose we
recommend that all patients scoring high on the Static-99R remain locked up. Our results
can then be put in a 2 × 2 contingency table, as shown in Table 7.14. The AUC for this
test is .63; the odds ratio is 4.39; the relative risk is 3.48; the diagnostic likelihood ratio
for positive predictions is 3.09; the diagnostic likelihood ratio for negative predictions is .70;
the accuracy is .82; a Pearson’s chi-square test results in 𝑋2 = 396.4, 𝑝 < .0001. All these
point to a very good test. The base rate for sexual recidivism (after 5 years) is .11; if we
recommend no patients to be locked up, our accuracy increases to .89. Instead, using our
“very good test” we mistakenly lock up 898 of the 1224 patients we recommended remain
incarcerated. The positive predictive value for this test is .27; the test fails to meet the BH
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condition, in fact, it is not even close. Using the Static-2002R data, the results are not much
better (PPV = .34).
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Figure 7.2: ROC curve for Static-99R (see Table 7.13)
Sexual Recidivism
Yes No
Predicted Yes 326 898
Recidivism No 526 6356
Table 7.14: A 2× 2 contingency table for predicting sexual recidivism using the Static-99R.
A score of 6 or higher leads to a prediction of recidivism.
As previously mentioned, Helmus et al. (2009) recommends that a judgment be made
once a range is determined by the Static-99R, as to where the individual falls within this
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range. In State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof (2009), the court ruled this clinical
judgment does not meet the requirement of the RSA 516:29-a I(b) (N.H. Stats., 2014b, see
Chapter 1); however, the court eventually concluded that the Static-99R is admissible in
the court of law. These conclusions appeared to be largely influenced by the accuracy of
the Static-99R as deemed by the AUC values. There was no mention of positive predictive
values from either side. Had the Court been told that only about one in four individuals
scoring high on the Static-99R actually recidivate after five years, perhaps their conclusion
would be different. The Court also noted that “evidence like [the Static-99R] is particularly
helpful to a jury in this sort of case because it helps the jury differentiate between sexual
offenders and determine whether a particular respondent is ‘likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility’ ” (State of New Hampshire v. William Ploof ,
2009, p. 26). With all due respect to the Court and its decision, we disagree; although an
individual who scores in the high range on the Static-99R may be more likely to recidivate
than one who does not, a PPV of .27 is not an indication that the individual is “likely” to
recidivate.
7.5 Conclusion
The results in Table 7.11 show a number of things. First, the measures of predictive
accuracy (sensitivity, specificity, AUC, positive and negative predictive values, and accuracy)
are all generally lower in the validation studies (there are some exceptions; e.g., the reported
PPV is higher in Snowden et al., 2009). The positive predictive value is generally much lower
than expected, given the base rate of the sample and the original study’s reported sensitivity
and specificity; the negative predictive value is more close to its expected value. Depending
on the statistics used, any one of the five tests can be made to look impressive (except
for Doyle et al., 2010) but the fact that only one validation study outperforms base-rate
prediction is telling: The COVR simply fails to predict violence with acceptable accuracy.
285
Others flaws in several of these studies have also been pointed out (e.g., see Large, Ryan, &
Nielssen, 2010; McCusker, 2007)
The original data used to construct the COVR provided very good results and out-
performed base rate prediction but as the results of the five validation studies suggest, this
may have been due to overfitting (evidence for overfitting is also provided in Chapter 5).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
“Statisticians, like artists, have the bad habit of falling in love with their models.”
— George E. P. Box
This thesis is concerned with prediction in the social sciences. Specifically, it focuses
on four quantitative aspects of prediction, primarily in the realm of predicting dangerous
and violent behavior.
The first topic area involved the notion of clinical efficiency as it relates to a prediction
tool or diagnostic measure; this was presented in Chapter 3. Clinical efficiency as defined
by Meehl and Rosen (1955), is when a diagnostic instrument outperforms simple base rate
prediction. A general condition for determining when clinical efficiency is met was presented,
called the Bokhari-Hubert (BH) condition; it has several possible reinterpretations in terms
of odds ratios, relative risks, diagnostic likelihood ratios, and the Goodman-Kruskal lambda
coefficient. As shown, many diagnostic tools in the area of violence prediction fail to meet
this criterion; a major implication of this failure is that when the base rate is less than
one-half, a positive prediction is more likely to be incorrect.
A second topic of interest developed in Chapter 4, concerned the use of the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the related measure of accuracy, the area under
the ROC curve (AUC). The AUC is a commonly used measure of accuracy for evaluating
prediction tools, such as those designed to predict violent behavior, and is often touted for
being independent of base rates. To the contrary, however, it is our contention that base rates
should be taken into consideration in evaluating the actual usage of a test, particularly when
the base rate is close to zero; not doing so (i.e., relying solely on the AUC) is misleading.
287
When presenting the results of a prediction tool, alternative measures such as the positive
predictive value that take into account the base rate should be included.
The third area discussed was cross-validation. Chapter 5 uses several state-of-the-art
statistical learning methods for predicting violence. Although the methods are powerful, like
any predictive model they are susceptible to overfitting. Cross-validation is a crucial aspect
in the construction of any prediction model; this chapter demonstrates that inflated and
spurious results often arise when a model is not cross-validated. One specific result empha-
sized is that when base rates are low, positive predictions are infrequent unless overfitting
occurs or the cost ratio of false negatives to false positives is increased; the latter is ethically
questionable when predictions of dangerous behavior assist in decisions such as preventive
detention or the imposition of the death penalty.
A fourth topic deals with what is commonly referred to as the bias-variance trade-
off. Generally, as models become more complex, the squared bias decreases as the error
variance increases. Chapter 6 examines this phenomenon and advocates for the use of biased
estimators over those that are unbiased when the mean squared error is smaller. For example,
a ridge regression estimator will always have less error variance compared to least squares
when used on new data, despite the least squares estimator being unbiased; a consequence
of this result is that the mean squared error for the ridge estimator may be less than for
least squares. In addition, the relationship between the James-Stein estimator and Kelley’s
True Score estimation is shown. Several illustrative examples demonstrate the improvement
in mean squared error using biased estimators over their unbiased counterparts.
8.1 Prediction in Other Areas
This thesis has focused primarily on predicting violent and dangerous behavior, but
the topics developed extend to all areas concerned with prediction. One very important
field of application is medicine, and specifically with screening for disease and cancer. Over-
288
diagnosis in medicine is a heavily debated topic (e.g., see Welch, Schwartz, & Woloshin,
2011); one reason that the medical community may be overdiagnosing patients is because
of wide-spread programs for screening healthy individuals (i.e., screening a population with
a probable low base rate for the disease of interest). There are many areas where unnec-
essary screening may be present (Cassels, 2012; Welch et al., 2011), but probably the two
most notorious involve prostate cancer and the prostate specific antigen (PSA) exam and
breast cancer screening with mammographies. The latter recent received attention when
A. B. Miller et al. (2014) made national headlines with their publication of a twenty-five
year follow-up study comparing breast cancer incidence and mortality among nearly 90,000
Canadian women aged 40–59 who did or did not have mammography screenings. No re-
duction in mortality was found for those screened; rather, screening led to 142 more false
positives of breast cancer in the women screened.
Overdiagnosis leads to unnecessary and costly treatment and stress; the epitome of
this is the full-body scan (Cassels, Van Wiltenburg, & Armstrong, 2009). Furtado et al.
(2005) report that in a sample of 1192 patients (903, or 76%, of whom were self-referred),
1,030 (86%) had at least one abnormal finding discovered by computed tomographic (CT)
screening, with an average of 2.8 abnormalities per patient. In addition, 445 patients (37%)
were recommended for further evaluation; a tumor found when one is not looking has been
called an incidentaloma. According to some, most incidentalomas are not cancerous (Welch
et al., 2011).
Another area of screening gaining popularity is positron emission tomography (PET)
scans for diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease. One might question what happens when an incor-
rect diagnosis of Alzheimer’s is made. Analogous to full-body scans are whole genome scans
(National Public Radio, 2013b); some researchers suggest adopting genetic information with
other factors to predict future drug use in adolescents (Conner, Hellemann, Ritchie, & Noble,
2010).
Prenatal screening is another controversial idea in screening. NPR reported on a new
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blood test for detecting Down syndrome in a fetus (R. Stein, 2014). Two statements made
in the article should concern any reader versed in the topics presented in this thesis. The
first is, “Doctors recommend that all pregnant women get screened for Down syndrome and
other trisomies” (R. Stein, 2014, para. 5). The second appears several paragraphs later:
“The test’s ‘positive predictive value,’ which is its ability to accurately predict whether
the fetus has Down syndrome, was 10 times greater than standard testing, the researchers
reported (45.5 percent compared with 4.2 percent)” (R. Stein, 2014, para. 10). Although it
is commendable that the positive predictive value was reported by a popular media outlet,
the article fails to emphasize what this implies. If all pregnant women are screened for
Down syndrome in their unborn child and over half of the predictions of Down syndrome
are incorrect, what might this suggest about the aborting of healthy babies?
The issue of overdiagnosis seems related to innumeracy, discussed in Chapter 2 along
with the two informative papers by Gigerenzer et al. (2007) and Monahan (2007). Over-
diagnosis is not limited to physical diseases; Zimmerman et al. (2009) report that in a study
of 480 psychiatric outpatients completing the Mood Disorders Questionnaire (designed to
diagnose bipolar disorder), the positive predictive value was .34, suggesting that almost
two-thirds of those diagnosed as being bipolar were not. Other examples gaining a lot of
attention in the media are the excessive diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) and a new “condition” called sluggish cognitive tempo that includes children failing
to the meet the ADHD criterion (A. Schwarz, 2014).
Researchers at the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital are attempting to identify suicide
risk based on language used in notes of those who have committed suicide (National Public
Radio, 2013a). According to the head of research team, Dr. John Pestian, when suicidal
children come to their emergency room, it would be of value to know which kids should
receive help externally and which should receive help from within the hospital; the claim
is that their method is about 90% accurate in predicting who is suicidal (National Public
Radio, 2013a). The important number to note here is the probability of a false negative.
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Substantial discussion is available about brain trauma caused by head injuries among
football athletes in the National Football League (NFL). The problem is apparently so bad
that a lawsuit has been filed on behalf of numerous former players. The diagnosis in question
is chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), although currently there is no way to accurately
diagnose it. The urgency of the matter has prompted a large investment of resources into
CTE diagnosis, and in turn, to various diagnostic tests not as valid as claimed (Belson,
2013).
Also in sports, Major League Baseball (MLB) has undergone a serious blow to its
image caused by public awareness of players using performance enhancing drugs (PEDs).
This has led to increased punishments for perpetrators; of concern for MLB is the diagnostic
test’s sensitivity—MLB wishes to find as many (preferably all) PED users as possible. For
players (and its powerful union), the positive predictive value is of major concern—when
a player tests positive, how likely is it that he actually used PEDs? Because MLB and
the players’ union must reach agreements about testing procedures, these clearly are issues
relevant to the discussion. The problems associated with drug testing also exists in other
sports, most notably in cycling and track and field. The International Olympic Committee
(IOC), for example, allows an “expert panel” to declare female athletes ineligible for compe-
tition when their levels of testosterone are “within the male range” (International Olympic
Committe, 2014); however, Healy, Gibney, Pentecost, Wheeler, and Sonksen (in press) found
that although mean testosterone levels may differ, there is much overlap between male and
female levels in elite athletes and suggest that the IOC’s decision to “limit participation in
elite events to women with a ‘normal’ serum testosterone is unsustainable.”
Similar to testing athletes for PEDs, alcohol and drug screening are subject to the
same issues described in this thesis. Urine drug screening is the common way to detect
drug use; although these types of tests perform well for some drugs, such as marijuana
and cocaine, they are fallible and perform markedly worse for other drugs (Moeller, Lee, &
Kissack, 2008). Koerth-Baker (2014) states that field sobriety tests for determining when
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the driver of a vehicle is under the influence of alcohol “has been shown to catch 88 percent
of drivers under the influence of alcohol” (para. 2), but what does this mean? Clearly it
does not mean that field sobriety tests catch 88 percent of all drivers who are drunk. With
the legalization of marijuana in two states (Washington and Colorado), Koerth-Baker (2014)
discusses law enforcement’s (in-)ability to detect drivers under the influence of marijuana.
Given the recent research misconduct in psychology, groups of researchers are begin-
ning to specialize in detecting fraudulent studies. Social scientists generally agree that this
is important, but incorrectly accusing someone of fraud could have devastating effects for
one’s career and thus, the properties of such detection need close consideration. Audits by
the IRS and other businesses is an area where prediction should be carefully evaluated, as
is prediction of political elections or the potential impacts of climate change. Or, consider
credit risk calculators used by banks and other loan agencies. Areas of prediction where the
ideas presented in this thesis are relevant are wide-spread, indeed.
Consider the long-sought method for accurately detecting lies. Lie detectors are
vulnerable to many errors, making accurate lie detection an extremely difficult task Vrij,
Granhag, and Porter (2010). In a meta-analysis examining people’s ability to discriminate
lies from truth, Bond and DePaulo (2006) estimated that the average accuracy, across more
than two-hundred studies, was about 54%, slightly better than chance. They also noted that
lies were correctly classified only 47% of the time (61% of truths were correctly identified).
The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reportedly spent around
one billion dollars training TSA officers to identify terrorists based on nonverbal cues, such
as facial expressions (Tierney, 2014). According to the New York Times report, only one
percent of the more than 30,000 passengers suspected each year are arrested, and the arrests
were not linked to terrorist plots. Based on these results and those from the Bond and
DePaulo study, the TSA recommended cutting funds from the program (Tierney, 2014).
Eyewitness recall, like lie detection, is notoriously inaccurate. To evaluate the accu-
racy of eyewitness recall, Wixted and Mickes (2012) suggest the use of receiver operating
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characteristic curves. These authors state that the probative value—defined as the sensitiv-
ity divided by the false positive rate that was given as the diagnostic likelihood in Chapter 3
(𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵)—is “an irrelevant [original emphasis] consideration when trying to decide which
of two lineup procedures is better” (p. 276). The authors’ arguments are not necessarily
invalid but their support for the ROC curve suffers from the same criticisms presented in
Chapter 4.
Researchers at Google introduced a “big-data” method for predicting influenza out-
breaks based solely on search queries entered into Google’s search website (Ginsberg et al.,
2009)—they called this Google Flu Trends (GFT). When tested on new data, the model
showed a mean correlation of .97 with the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) results, based on “influenza-like illness” visits to the physician (Gins-
berg et al., 2009). Only a couple years later it was reported that GFT was consistently
overestimating the number of flu cases. As big data becomes ingrained into everyday vo-
cabulary, it is important to remember that big-data methods are susceptible to many of the
issues discussed in this thesis. The GFT anecdote is also a reminder that researchers should
continually be updating, validating, and improving a prediction model.
Another example of model overestimation comes from medicine and the diagnosis of
high cholesterol (Kolata, 2013). An online calculator intended to provide interested patients
with their risk of heart attack or stroke, was found to consistently overestimate the risk;
the diagnosis of high risk often leads to prescribing cholesterol-lowering statins. The data
are based on the Framingham Heart Study; the extrapolation of the 1980’s Framingham
population to today appears faulty.
When predictions go wrong, should someone be held accountable? The Italian judicial
system certainly thought so when seven Italian seismologists were convicted of manslaughter
and sentenced to prison for not predicting a deadly earthquake (Povoledo & Fountain, 2012).
This is a rather dramatic case, but certainly some accountability should be taken when
predictions (or lack thereof) have significant impact on numerous lives. When responsibility
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is assumed, it is hoped that careless and unethical prediction may be less common.
8.2 Concluding Remarks
To say that violence is a serious problem in the United States is quite an understate-
ment; as a society we incur far too many mass shootings. One of the first questions people
ask without fail, is how could this have been prevented (i.e., why was this not predicted), and
what was the shooter’s mental health status. After the April 2014 Fort Hood mass shooting,
the second such incident at Fort Hood in five years, the topic of Ivan Lopez’s mental health
was immediately brought to attention (Shapiro, 2014); this is the norm (e.g., see Memmott,
2014).
Media outlets report that mass shootings are increasing (e.g., see Follman, 2012b;
George, 2013; Plumer, 2012b; Strasser, 2014); even Attorney General Eric Holder suggests
this (The Associated Press, 2013). This conclusion, however, may need to be more nuanced
depending on how one defines a mass shooting or examines the data (Fox, 2012; Plumer,
2012a; J. Walker, 2014). Mass shootings are a terrible thing, but the media’s pandering
to people’s fear is reminiscent of the “superpredator” debacle in the 1990s. Dilulio (1995)
used the term superpredator to describe young adolescents raised under certain conditions
who are “perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for
the most trivial reasons” (p. 23). The superpredator scare garnered much media attention,
driven by Dilulio’s and others’ predictions that there would be dramatic increases in crimes
committed by these superpredators (Howell, 2009). Their predictions never amounted to
anything except generating a lot of unnecessary fear and panic (The New York Times ,
2014).
In the presence of degrading accuracy, Berk (2012) suggests that revising one’s pre-
diction tool is necessary. One issue with this idea and specifically with respect to predictions
of violent or dangerous behavior that leads to confinement, is that false negatives can be
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calculated and used to adjust the prediction method accordingly but false positives are in-
determinable. As Foote (1970b) states, “if you lock a man up because you have diagnosed
him to be dangerous, he has no chance to demonstrate that the diagnosis may have been
mistaken” (p. 10). In short, accuracy can only be adjusted based on false negatives and
adjusting to account for them will most likely be at the cost of many more false positives.
This thesis has tried to provide some cautions regarding predictions of dangerous
and violent behavior; as Slobogin (2006) states, “It may be that abolishing dangerousness
as a legal criterion would be the least costly approach to the problem” (p. 173). We are
not advocating abolishing prediction methods for predicting future behavior, and certainly
actuarial predictions should be used over clinical ones. What is being advocated is for a
more objective evaluation of such predictions. The point is not that the methods should be
abolished, but that uncertainty associated with them should be stated more clearly and that
they may not be as good as advertised. There is a Latin phrase, primum non nocere, meaning
“first, do no harm” and related to the Hippocratic Oath taken by healthcare professionals.
The popular statistician Nate Silver states, “If you can’t make a good prediction, it is very
often harmful to pretend that you can” (N. Silver, 2012, p. 230). This philosophy should
be considered whenever making decisions based on predictions of dangerous and violent
behavior. The ultimate goal of risk assessment predictions has been to curtail crime, but
when discussing preventive methods MacKenzie (2013) points out,
[W]e have a social obligation not to harm either the individuals who come under
the responsibility of the justice system or the society from which they come. Our
recent policies have come at a great financial cost and caused damage to individuals
and communities. And what we have been doing is not effective in reducing crime!”
(p. 3).
By saying that a test fails to outperform base rate prediction, we are not suggesting
that only base rate prediction should be done. But, by failing to outperform base rate pre-
diction, we know that more than half of the positive predictions will be incorrect. This is
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the point that should be understood and conveyed in the judicial system, or in any other
area where predictions are made. The implications, of course, differ under different con-
texts. In considering parole decisions where predictions involve the incarcerated population,
predictions concern individuals serving time for a crime they were convicted of committing.
In contrast, those on trial for a crime and subject to involuntary commitment, present a
much different situation. As this thesis has shown, predicting future human behavior is
difficult. Misleading researchers, academics, the legal system, and the general public with
statistics that only tell a part of the story is ethically irresponsible. More work is necessary;
we should definitely not simply settle with what is available because the AUC happens to
be “significant.”
It needs to be emphasized that more information is necessary to properly assess
predictive measures, and simply providing an AUC is insufficient. At the least, the positive
and negative predictive values should be included, possibly in the form of an AUC-like
measure or figure (for example, see Frederick & Bowden, 2009). The positive predictive
value should be considered the central measure when the base rate is less than one half. The
Brier score (Brier, 1950) is yet another way to better portray the accuracy of a measure,
particularly in its decomposed form. The use of contingency tables to display the results
should be provided routinely, either in text or through supplemental material; it allows
researchers to assess other accuracy measures apart from the AUC.
Failures to cross-validate are simply unacceptable. No prediction model deserves
consideration when it has not been cross-validated—it is far too likely that the model overfits
the data. With today’s inexpensive computing power, there is no excuse for not cross-
validating a prediction tool. When adjusting the cutscore of a prediction model, one needs
to consider the implications; for example, when using classification trees, cutscore adjustment
is equivalent to assigning differing costs to false negatives and false positives—when these
costs are not justified, cutscore adjustment should not be done.
Although widely popular, the use of unbiased predictors is inappropriate when other
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predictors with smaller mean squared error exist, even when they are biased. Biased predic-
tors should always be given consideration whenever an improvement in prediction accuracy
is possible.
The prediction of violence is controversial; although it may be possible to predict
those more likely to commit acts of violence (i.e., the violence prone), those more likely
to commit violence may not in fact, actually do so. Speculatively, it may be that these
individuals need to be “set off” by an event beyond anyone’s control, triggering a set of
reactions that leads to violence. Predicting this trigger may be impossible, and the events
leading to this point are part a dynamic system consisting of a series of unpredictable events.
The movie Falling Down starring Michael Douglas comes to mind. In Falling Down,
Michael Douglass plays a “disturbed man” where “nothing seems to be going right”; he
“finally snaps” and “reache[s] his boiling point” (Hartill, O’Cain, & Sutton, 2013). Of
course this is an over-dramatized version of a “set off” effect, but if the Korean store owner
had given him change for a dollar, would there have been a movie? The case in point is
that although William Foster (Douglas’s character) may have been someone who was violent
prone, it took a series of events to elicit this otherwise latent violent behavior.
So the question becomes, do you lock someone up because they could potentially
commit act(s) of violence? (Certainly there are alternatives with therapy being the first
that comes to mind.) This question was dissected in an entertaining confabulation between
the White Queen and Alice in Lewis Carrol’s book, Through the Looking-Glass, and What
Alice Found There (1875):
“It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,” the Queen remarked.
“What sort of things do you remember best?” Alice ventured to ask.
“Oh, things that happened the week after next,” the Queen replied in a careless
tone. “For instance, now,” she went on, sticking a large piece of plaster on her finger
as she spoke, “there’s the King’s Messenger. He’s in prison now, being punished:
and the trial doesn’t even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes
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last of all.”
“Suppose he never commits the crime?” said Alice.
“That would be all the better, wouldn’t it?” the Queen said, as she bound the
plaster round her finger with a bit of ribbon.
Alice felt there was no denying that. “Of course it would be all the better,” she
said: “but it wouldn’t be all the better his being punished.”
“You’re wrong there, at any rate,” said the Queen: “were you ever punished?”
“Only for faults,” said Alice.
“And you were all the better for it, I know!” the Queen said triumphantly.
“Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for,” said Alice: “that makes
all the difference.”
The well-respected statistician George Box provides the epigraph at the beginning of
this chapter. A similar saying might apply to psychologists: psychologists, like models, have
the bad habit of falling in love with their measurements.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 The Meehl-Rosen Condition
From Chapter 3.
Proof.
𝑃 (𝐴) >
1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + (1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴))
𝑃 (𝐴)[𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + (1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴))] > 1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐴)− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) > 1− 𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)(1− 𝑃 (𝐴)) > 𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴).
A.2 The Dawes Condition
From Chapter 3.
Before proving the Dawes condition, note that 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
and 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) = 𝑃 (𝐴). These two equalities are used in the proof.
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Proof.
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 1
2
2𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 1
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 1
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 1− 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) < 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) < 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) < 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?)
𝑃 (𝐴) < 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
A.3 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition
From Chapter 3.
Proof. We begin with the general condition:
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛
>
𝑛𝐴
𝑛
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴.
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Thus, 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴)⇔ 𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴. Now,
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 − (𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴)
𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐴 − 𝑛𝐴.
Because (by assumption) 𝑛𝐴 > 𝑛𝐴, we have 𝑛𝐴 − 𝑛𝐴 > 0, and therefore, 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴, as
desired.
A.4 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Relative
Risk
From Chapter 3.
We assume the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds.
Proof.
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ⇒ 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 (𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴) > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 (𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴)
𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯? > 𝑛?¯?𝐴𝑛𝐵
𝑛𝐵𝐴𝑛?¯?
𝑛?¯?𝐴𝑛𝐵
> 1
𝑅𝑅 > 1
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A.5 The Area Under the Curve
From Chapter 4.
Proof. From Figure 4.1, the labels of 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐶 conform to areas:
𝐴 = (1− sensitivity)(1− specificity);
𝐵 =
1
2
(1− specificity)(sensitivity);
and
𝐶 =
1
2
(1− sensitivity)(specificity).
Thus, the area under the ROC curve is
AUC = 1− (𝐴+𝐵 + 𝐶) = specificity + sensitivity
2
.
A.6 Relationship Between Dawes’ Properties
From Chapter 4.
We show that Properties (2) and (3) imply Property (1).
Proof. By Property (3), 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2 and 𝑃 (𝐵) < 1/2. For some constant 0 < 𝑘 < 1/2, we have
𝑃 (𝐴) = 1/2− 𝑘. Redefining 𝑃 (𝐵) = 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)(1− 𝑃 (𝐴)) and substituting for
𝑃 (𝐴), we have
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)(1− 𝑃 (𝐴)) < 1
2
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𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
(︂
1
2
− 𝑘
)︂
+ 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
(︂
1−
(︂
1
2
− 𝑘
)︂)︂
<
1
2(︂
1
2
)︂(︀
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴))︀+ 𝑘(︀𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴))︀ < 1
2
.
By Property (2)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) = 1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)⇔ 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) > 1,
and because 𝑘 > 0, it must be true that 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴), otherwise we contradict Property
(3) (namely, 𝑃 (𝐵) < 1/2).
A.7 Reduction in Accuracy Measures
From Chapter 4.
Given that the three Dawes’ properties hold, we show that Equation (4.3) is necessarily true.
Proof. We first show that AUC > Acc. Consider Property (2):
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴).
Because Property (3) states that 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2, we have that 1− 2𝑃 (𝐴) > 0; thus,
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)(︀1− 2𝑃 (𝐴))︀ > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)(︀1− 2𝑃 (𝐴))︀
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)(︀1− 2𝑃 (𝐴))︀ > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)(︀2𝑃 (𝐴)− 1)︀
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)− 2𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 2𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) > 2(︀𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴))︀
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
2
> 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?)
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AUC > Acc.
Thus, Properties (2) and (3) imply the first inequality.
To establish the last inequality, we first demonstrate that 𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐴); consider Property
(2):
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) > 1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴).
Now because 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2 (by Property (3)), we have
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > (︀1− 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴))︀𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐴).
Thus, Properties (2) and (3) imply that 𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?) > 𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐴). To show that the
two properties imply the last inequality begin with
𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐴)
(︀
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴))︀ > 𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > (︀1− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴))︀𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
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𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)(︀𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴))︀ > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐵) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐵)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴).
Because 𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?) we have
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐵)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)𝑃 (?¯?)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
>
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
.
Because 𝑃 (𝐵) < 1/2 we have that 1− 2𝑃 (𝐵) > 0 so
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
1− 2𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (?¯?)
)︂
> 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
1− 2𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐵)
)︂
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
2𝑃 (?¯?)− 1
𝑃 (?¯?)
)︂
> 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
1− 2𝑃 (𝐵)
𝑃 (𝐵)
)︂
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
2− 1
𝑃 (?¯?)
)︂
> 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
(︂
1
𝑃 (𝐵)
− 2
)︂
2𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)− 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
>
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
− 2𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
2
(︀
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴))︀ > 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (𝐵)
+
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
𝑃 (𝐵 ∩ 𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯? ∩ 𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)
2
Acc >
PPV + NPV
2
.
A.8 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition: 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵)
From Chapter 6.
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Proof. Suppose 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵). Without loss of generality let 𝑃 (𝐴) < 𝑃 (𝐴). Because
𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (𝐴)⇔ 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) > 𝑃 (?¯?), we have
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?) > 𝑃 (?¯?)
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵
(︁𝑛𝐵
𝑛
)︁
+
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?
(︁𝑛?¯?
𝑛
)︁
>
𝑛?¯?
𝑛
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴.
Because 𝑛?¯? > 𝑛𝐵,
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 − (𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴)
𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯? − 𝑛𝐵,
and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴, as desired.
A.9 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Consistency
From Chapter 6.
We assume that 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵). If the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds, then the consistencies
of both a positive and negative decision is at least 1/3.
Proof. For the consistency of positive decisions,
𝑃 (𝐴 ∩𝐵|𝐴 ∪𝐵) = 𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
>
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
=
1
3
;
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similarly for the consistency of negative decisions,
𝑃 (𝐴 ∩ ?¯?|𝐴 ∪ ?¯?) = 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
>
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
=
1
3
.
A.10 The Bokhari-Hubert Condition and Diagnostic
Likelihood Ratios: 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵)
From Chapter 6. Suppose 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵). For this proof, we first note that
𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵)⇔ 𝑛𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵 ⇔ 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴 ⇔ 𝑛?¯?𝐴 = 𝑛𝐵𝐴.
We saw in Chapter 6 that, given 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵), if the Bokhari-Hubert condition holds,
𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛?¯?𝐴 and 𝑛?¯?𝐴 > 𝑛𝐵𝐴 (i.e., differential prediction also exists between the columns).
We are ready to prove that, if 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) and the Bokhari-Hubert condition is met,
then the positive diagnostic likelihood ratio is greater than one and the negative diagnostic
likelihood ratio is less than one.
Proof. We saw in Chapter 3 that if 𝑛𝐵𝐴/𝑛𝐵𝐴 > 𝑛𝐴/𝑛𝐴, the positive diagnostic likelihood ratio
is greater than one. Similarly, if 𝑛?¯?𝐴/𝑛?¯?𝐴 < 𝑛𝐴/𝑛𝐴, the negative diagnostic likelihood ratio is
less than one. For the positive diagnostic likelihood ratio, we have
𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛𝐵𝐴
=
2𝑛𝐵𝐴
2𝑛𝐵𝐴
>
𝑛𝐵𝐴 + 𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
=
𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐴
.
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Similarly, for the negative diagnostic likelihood ratio,
𝑛?¯?𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴
=
2𝑛?¯?𝐴
2𝑛?¯?𝐴
<
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
𝑛?¯?𝐴 + 𝑛𝐵𝐴
=
𝑛𝐴
𝑛𝐴
.
Thus, 𝐷𝐿𝑅𝐵 > 1 and 𝐷𝐿𝑅?¯? < 1, necessarily, if 𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵) and the Bokhari-Hubert
condition holds.
A.11 𝑃 (𝐴) given fixed PPV and NPV
From Chapter 6. Suppose that both the PPV and NPV are fixed. We exclude the
trivial cases when 1 − NPV,PPV = 0, 1; that is, assume 𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛?¯?𝐴, 𝑛𝐵𝐴, 𝑛?¯?𝐴 ̸= 0. We show
that for 0 < 1− NPV < PPV < 1,
1− NPV < 𝑃 (𝐴) < PPV;
similarly, for 0 < PPV < 1− NPV < 1
PPV < 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1− NPV.
Proof. We have, by definition,
𝑃 (𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵)𝑃 (𝐵) + 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?)𝑃 (?¯?)
𝑃 (𝐴) = PPV · 𝑃 (𝐵) + (1− NPV)(1− 𝑃 (𝐵))
𝑃 (𝐴) = 𝑃 (𝐵)(PPV + NPV− 1) + (1− NPV).
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Solving for 𝑃 (𝐵), we have
𝑃 (𝐵) =
𝑃 (𝐴) + NPV− 1
PPV + NPV− 1 .
By definition, 0 < 𝑃 (𝐵) < 1. Let 1− NPV < PPV so that PPV + NPV− 1 > 0. Thus,
0 <
𝑃 (𝐴) + NPV− 1
PPV + NPV− 1 < 1
0 < 𝑃 (𝐴) + NPV− 1 < PPV + NPV− 1
1− NPV < 𝑃 (𝐴) < PPV.
Similarly, if we let PPV < 1− NPV we have PPV + NPV− 1 < 0; thus,
0 <
𝑃 (𝐴) + NPV− 1
PPV + NPV− 1 < 1
PPV + NPV− 1 < 𝑃 (𝐴) + NPV− 1 < 0
PPV < 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1− NPV.
A.12 Lower Limit for NPV
From Chapter 6. Suppose at a given cutscore that both the sensitivity and specificity
of a test are greater than .5; in other words, the point on the ROC curve for the given
cutscore is above the line of discrimination. Now suppose that 𝑃 (𝐴) < 1/2. We show that
the negative predictive value is greater than 1/2.
Proof. First, define the negative predictive value using Bayes’ Theorem:
NPV = 𝑃 (𝐴|?¯?) = 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?)
.
Note that 𝑃 (?¯?) = 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴), where .5 < 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴), 𝑃 (𝐴) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
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𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴), 𝑃 (𝐴) < .5 so 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) > 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴). This gives the desired inequality:
NPV =
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴) + 𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
>
𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
2𝑃 (?¯?|𝐴)𝑃 (𝐴)
=
1
2
.
Similarly, if both the sensitivity and specificity of a test are greater than .5 and 𝑃 (𝐴) > 1/2,
the PPV > 1/2
A.13 Bias-Variance Decomposition
From Chapter 6.
Proof. Note that all expectations and variances are conditioned on the data, 𝑋. Consider
the risk function for the squared error loss:
ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦) = E (ℒ2(𝑦, 𝑦)) = E
[︀
(𝑦 − 𝑦)2]︀ .
The risk function can be decomposed as follows:
E
[︀
(𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2]︀ = E [︀(𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥))2]︀+ E [︀(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2]︀+ 2E [(𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥))(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)] .
The first term reduces to
E
[︀
(𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥))2]︀ = E [︀(𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜀− 𝑓(𝑥))2]︀ = E (︀𝜀2)︀ = V(𝜀).
The last term (disregarding the 2) reduces to
E [(𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑥))(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)] = 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)− 𝑓(𝑥)2 + E(𝑦𝑦)− 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)
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= 𝑓(𝑥)2 − 𝑓(𝑥)2 + E ((𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜀)𝑦)− 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)
= E (𝑓(𝑥)𝑦 + 𝜀𝑦))− 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)
= 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)− 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦) = 0.
Thus,
ℛ(𝑦, 𝑦) = E [︀(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2]︀+ V(𝜀).
The first term can be further decomposed as follows:
E
[︀
(𝑓(𝑥)− 𝑦)2]︀ = E [︀(𝑓(𝑥)− E(𝑦) + E(𝑦)− 𝑦)2]︀
= E
[︀
(𝑓(𝑥)− E(𝑦))2]︀+ E [︀(E(𝑦)− 𝑦)2]︀+ 2E [(𝑓(𝑥)− E(𝑦))(E(𝑦)− 𝑦)]
= E
[︀
bias(𝑦)2
]︀
+ V(𝑦) + 2 [E (𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦))− E(𝑓(𝑥)𝑦)− E(E(𝑦)E(𝑦)) + E (E(𝑦)𝑦)]
= E
[︀
bias(𝑦)2
]︀
+ V(𝑦) + 2
[︀
𝑓(𝑥)E (𝑦)− 𝑓(𝑥)E(𝑦)− E(𝑦)2 + E(𝑦)2]︀
= bias(𝑦)2 + V(𝑦).
A.14 Brier Score Decomposition
From Chapter 6.
Proof. The Brier score for a given subset of estimated probabilities is given as
VS(𝑟) =
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
‖y(𝑟)𝑗 − y^(𝑟)‖2.
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This is decomposed as follows:
VS(𝑟) =
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
[︂(︁
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 − y^(𝑟)
)︁𝑇 (︁
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 − y^(𝑟)
)︁]︂
=
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
(︁
y
(𝑟)𝑇
𝑗 y
(𝑟)
𝑗 − 2y^(𝑟)𝑇y(𝑟)𝑗 + y^(𝑟)𝑇 y^(𝑟)
)︁
=
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)𝑇
𝑗 y
(𝑟)
𝑗 − 2y^(𝑟)𝑇
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 + y^
(𝑟)𝑇 y^(𝑟)
=
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)𝑇
𝑗 e− 2y^(𝑟)𝑇
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 + y^
(𝑟)𝑇 y^(𝑟),
where e is an 𝑛𝑟 × 1 vector of 1’s. Let
y¯(𝑟) =
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 ;
that is, y¯(𝑟) = (𝑝
(𝑟)
1 , 𝑝
(𝑟)
2 )
𝑇 where 𝑝
(𝑟)
2 = 1− 𝑝(𝑟)1 is the base rate probability within the subset
(i.e., the probability of the event occurring given the estimated probability).
Substituting y¯(𝑟) into the previous equation gives
y¯(𝑟)𝑇e− 2y^(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟) + y^(𝑟)𝑇 y^(𝑟) = y¯(𝑟)𝑇e− 2y^(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟) + y^(𝑟)𝑇 y^(𝑟) + y¯(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟)
= (y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟))𝑇 (y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)) + y¯(𝑟)𝑇 (e− y¯(𝑟))
= ‖y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)‖2 + ⟨y¯(𝑟), e− y¯(𝑟)⟩.
The overall Brier score is a weighted sum of the subsets:
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)‖2 + 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟⟨y¯(𝑟), e− y¯(𝑟)⟩. (A.1)
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This second term can be further decomposed. To show this, first note that
∑︀𝑅
𝑟=1 𝑛𝑟 = 𝑛 and
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟) =
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟
(︃
1
𝑛𝑟
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)
𝑗
)︃
=
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
y
(𝑟)
𝑗 ≡ y¯,
the vector containing the overall base rate probabilities, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Now, working with the
second partition from Equation (A.1),
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇 (e− y¯(𝑟)) = 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇e− 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟)
= y¯𝑇e− 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟)
= y¯𝑇e− 2y¯𝑇 y¯ + 2y¯𝑇 y¯ − 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟)
= y¯𝑇 (e− y¯)−
(︃
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟y¯
(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟) − 2y¯𝑇 y¯ + y¯𝑇 y¯
)︃
= y¯𝑇 (e− y¯)− 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟
(︀
y¯(𝑟)𝑇 y¯(𝑟) − 2y¯(𝑟)𝑇 y¯ + y¯𝑇 y¯)︀
= y¯𝑇 (e− y¯)− 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟
(︀
y¯(𝑟) − y¯)︀𝑇 (︀y¯(𝑟) − y¯)︀
= ⟨y¯, e− y¯⟩ − 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y¯(𝑟) − y¯‖2.
Substituting this into Equation (A.1) gives the new decomposition:
1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y^(𝑟) − y¯(𝑟)‖2 − 1
𝑛
𝑅∑︁
𝑟=1
𝑛𝑟‖y¯(𝑟) − y¯‖2 + ⟨y¯, e− y¯⟩.
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Appendix B
Assessment Tools
Risk Factor Codes Scores
Age 18–24 1
25 or older 0
Single Lived with lover
for at least two years?
No 1
Yes 0
Index non-sexual Yes 1
violence No 0
Prior non-sexual Yes 1
violence No 0
Prior sex Charges Convictions
offenses 6+ 4+ 3
3–5 2–3 2
1–1 1 1
0 0 0
Prior sentencing dates 4 or more 1
(excluding index) 3 or less 0
Any convictions for Yes 1
non-contact sex offenses No 0
Any unrelated victims Yes 1
No 0
Any stranger victims Yes 1
No 0
Any male victims Yes 1
No 0
Table B.1: Ten risk factors for the Static-99 and their scoring.
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Risk Factor Codes Scores
Age at 18–24.9 3
release 25–34.9 2
35–49.9 1
50+ 0
Persistence of sexual offending
Sentencing occasions 4 or more 3
for sexual offenses 2–3 2
1 1
0 0
Juvenile arrest for sexual Yes 1
offense (and convicted as No 0
an adult for a separate offense)
High rate of rate greater than once every 15 years 1
sexual offending rate less than once 15 years 0
Persistence 4–5 3
subscore 2–3 2
1 1
0 0
Deviant sexual interests
Any convictions for Yes 1
non-contact sex offenses No 0
Male victims Yes 1
No 0
Two or more victims Yes 1
< 12 years, one unrelated No 0
Deviant 3 3
subscore 2 2
1 1
Table B.2 continued on next page.
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Table B.2 (Cont.)
Risk Factor Codes Scores
0 0
Relationship to victims
Any unrelated victims Yes 1
No 0
Any stranger victims Yes 1
No 0
Relationship 2 2
subscore 1 1
0 0
General Criminality
Arrest/sentencing occasions 14 or more sentencing occasions 3
3–13 prior sentencing occasions 2
any prior charges/convictions
1
but less than 3 prior sentencing occasions
no prior charges for anything 0
Any breach of conditional Yes 1
release No 0
Years free prior to less than 4 years 1
index offense 4 or more years 0
Any convictions for Yes 1
non-sexual violence No 0
General criminality 5–6 3
subscore 3–4 2
1–2 1
0 0
Table B.2: Risk factors for the Static-2002 and their scoring.
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Appendix C
Analysis Details
C.1 Variables
From Chapter 5.
Table C.1 displays the variables included in the initial analyses. The first column is a
brief description; the second column is the coding used in the text; the third column
consists of the variable codes used in the original dataset. All variables come from the
SPSS file baseline.sav except F12VIOL and PCLTOT; they were from the SPSS file
follow up subjects.sav.
Variable Variable Original
Description Coding Variables Used
Response Variable
Violence Violence f12viol
Predictor Variables
Age Age AGE
BIS Non-Planning Subscale BISnp BISPLN
BPRS Activation Subscale BPRSa OACTV
BPRS Hostile-Suspiciousness Subscale BPRSh OHOST
BPRS Total Score BPRSt OBPRS
Child Abuse Seriousness ChildAbuse Q5.5.1, Q5.5.2, Q5.5.3,
Q5.5.4, Q5.5.5, Q5.5.6
Loss of Consciousness (Head Injury) Consc NEU2A
Table C.1 continued on next page
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Table C.1 (Cont.)
Variable Variable Original
Description Coding Variables Used
Father Arrest History DadArr Q5.20A, Q5.20B
Father’s Drug Use DadDrug Q5.19A, Q5.19B
Drug Abuse (DSM-III-R) DrugAbuse DSM16A, DSM16B,
DSM17A, DSM17B
Employed Prior to Hospitalization Emp Q4.4
Violent Fantasies: Escalating Seriousness FantEsc Q7.1, Q7.7
Violent Fantasies: Single Target Focus FantSing Q7.1, Q7.6
Violent Fantasies: Target Present FantTarg Q7.1, Q7.8
Level of Functioning Function Q9.1, Q9.2, Q9.3,
Q9.4, Q9.5, Q9.6
Grandiose Delusions GranDel DEL03.1
Previous Head Injuries HeadInj NEU4B.1, NEU4B.2, NEU4B.3,
NEU4B.4, NEU4B.5, NEU4B.6,
NEU4B.7, NEU4B.8, NEU4B.9
Legal Status for Hospitalization LegalStatus LEGALR
Novaco Anger Scale Behavioral Subscale NASb NASBEH
Number of Negative Relationships NegRel Q10.10N, Q10.11N,
Q10.12N, Q10.13N
Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version PCL PCLTOT
MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale PCS Q1.8, Q1.11, Q1.14,
Q1.21, Q1.22
Prior Arrest Frequency PriorArr FREQARR
Property Crime Arrest PropCrime PROPARR
Violent Before Hospitalized RecViol2 VIOL
Schizophrenic Schiz DSM2A, DSM5A
Proportion of Social Network
SNMHP SNMHP
are Mental Health Professionals
Substance Abuse SubAbuse DSM14A, DSM14B, DSM15A DSM15B
Table C.1 continued on next page
318
Table C.1 (Cont.)
Variable Variable Original
Description Coding Variables Used
DSM16A, DSM16B, DSM17A, DSM17B
Admission Reason: Suicide Suicide QREAS.02
Threat/Control Override Symptoms tco K1.1, K1.3, K2.1, K2.3,
K3.1, K3.3, K4.1, K4.3,
K8.1, K8.3, K9.1, K9.3,
K10.1, K10.3, K12.1, K12.3
Threats at Admission Threats QREAS.20, QREAS.21
Table C.1: Variables used in analyses, from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study Mon-
ahan et al. (2001).
What follows is a description based on those in Monahan et al. (2001), of the variables used
in our analyses.
Violence
Binary variable indicating violence at first or second follow-up time
0 = No Violence, 1 = Violence
Age
Patient’s age in years
BISnp
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), non-planning subscale
Possible Range: 0–44
BPRSa
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Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), activation rating
Possible Range: 3–21
BPRSh
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), hostility rating
Possible Range: 3–21
BPRSt
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), total score
Possible Range: 18–126
ChildAbuse
Patient’s self-reported seriousness of child abuse
0 = none, 1 = bare hand only, with no physical injury
2 = with an object, with no physical injury, 3 = resulting in physical injury
Consc
Patient’s self-reported prior loss of consciousness due to head injury
0 = No, 1 = Yes
DadArr
Patient’s self-reported arrest history of father
0 = Never, 1 = At least once
DadDrug
Patient’s self-reported excessive drug use of father
0 = less often, 1 = Weekly/daily
DrugAbuse
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Drug abuse diagnosis by trained clinician using DSM-III-R Checklist
0 = No diagnosis, 1 = Diagnosis
Emp
Patient’s self-reported employment status (within the last two months prior to
hospitalization)
0 = Not employed, 1 = Employed
FantEsc
Patient self-reported having daydreams or thoughts about physically hurting or
injuring some other persons that have become more serious since they first began
0 = Less serious or the same, 1 = More serious
FantSing
Patient self-reported having daydreams or thoughts about physically hurting or
injuring some other persons that have been about the same person
0 = Different persons, 1 = Same person
FantTarg
Patient self-reported having daydreams or thoughts about physically hurting or
injuring some other persons while being with or watching that person
0 = No, 1 = Yes
Function
Patient’s self-reported level of functioning based on difficulty of specific activities
GranDel
Trained clinician’s rating of the presence of grandiose delusions
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HeadInj
Patient’s self-report of any head injury (with or without loss of consciousness)
LegalStatus
Hospital admission record of patient’s admission status
0 = Voluntary, 1 = Involuntary
NASb
Novaco Anger Scale (NAS), behavioral rating
Possible Range: 16–48
NegRel
Average number of unique individuals patient named as involved in a negative
relationship
PCL
Total score on Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version
Possible Range: 0–24
PCS
MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale (PCS)
PriorArr
Patient’s self-reported number of arrests since age 15
0 = None, 1 = One, 2 = Two, 3 = Three or more
PropCrime
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Police record indicating patient was arrested (since age 18) for a property crime
0 = No arrests, 1=At least one arrest
RecViol2
Patient’s self-report of violence in the two months prior to hospitalization
0 = No violence, 1 = Violence
Schiz
Schizophrenia diagnosis by trained clinician using DSM-III-R Checklist
0 = No diagnosis, 1 = Diagnosis
SNMHP
Proportion of patient’s social network that are mental health professionals
SubAbuse
Drug or alcohol abuse diagnosis by trained clinician using DSM-III-R Checklist
0 = No diagnosis, 1 = Diagnosis
Suicide
Hospital admission record of patient’s admission status indicated suicide
0 = No, Yes
tco
Clinically validated affirmative answers to thought/control override symptoms
0 = Not present, 1 = Present
Threats
323
Presence of argumentativeness and threatening verbal statements by patient when
admitted to hospital
0 = No, Yes
Below are the original MacArthur VRAS items used to create the preceding variables
and their details based in the coding manuals (final bl clinical.pdf, final bl
research.pdf, and final follow subj.pdf).
F12VIOL
Violence during follow-up one or follow-up two
0 = No Violence, 1 = Violence
AGE
Age in years
BISPLN
Non-Planning subscale (11 items) for 30-item Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS)
Possible Range: 0–44
DEL03.1
Delusions characterized as grandiose 0 = Not checked, 1 = Checked
DSM2A
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Schizophrenia
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM5A
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DSM-III-R diagnosis: Schizoaffective Disorder
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM14A
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Alcohol dependence (Current)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM14B
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Alcohol dependence (Lifetime)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM15A
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Alcohol abuse (Current)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM15B
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Alcohol abuse (Lifetime)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM16A
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Drug dependence (Current)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM16B
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Drug dependence (Lifetime)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM17A
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DSM-III-R diagnosis: Drug abuse (Current)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
DSM17A
DSM-III-R diagnosis: Drug abuse (Lifetime)
1 = Absent, 3 = Present
FREQARR
Prior arrests (Frequency)
K1.1
In the past two months, have you believed people were spying on you?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K1.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K2.1
In the past two months, has there been a time when you believed people were
following you?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K2.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K3.1
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In the past two months, have you believed that you were being secretly tested or
experimented on?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K3.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K4.1
In the past two months, have you believed that someone was plotting against you
or trying to hurt you or poison you?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K4.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K8.1
In the past two months, did you feel that you were under the control of some
person, power or force, so that your actions and thoughts were not your own?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K8.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K9.1
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In the past two months, have you felt that strange thoughts or thoughts that were
not your own were being put directly into your mind?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K9.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K10.1
In the past two months, have you felt that someone or something could take or
steal your thoughts out of your mind?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K10.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
K12.1
In the past two months, have you felt strange forces working on you, as if you
were being hypnotized or magic was being performed on you, or you were being
hit by x-rays or laser beams?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
K12.3
[If yes to K1.1, then clinician] Rates whether belief is delusional
0 = No, 1 = Possibly, 2 = Yes
LEGALR
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Subject’s legal status upon admission
0 = Voluntary, 1 = Involuntary
NASBEH
Behavioral subscale (16 items) for 48-item Novaco Anger Scale (NAS), Part A
Possible Range: 16–48
NEU2A
Have you ever been knocked out, knocked dizzy, passed out, fainted, or blacked
out?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
NEU4B.1
Accident type: Bicycle. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.2
Accident type: Auto. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.3
Accident type: Motorcycle. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.4
Accident type: Fall. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.5
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Accident type: Fall/Stairs. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.6
Accident type: Drowning. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.7
Accident type: Punched/Hit. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
NEU4B.8
Accident type: Sports. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
tttNEU4B.9
Accident type: Other. [If yes] Were you injured?
0 = No, 1 = Yes, no head injury, 2 = Yes, head injury
OACTV
Activation subscale (Tension, Mannerisms and posturing, Excitement) for 18-item
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)
Possible Range: 3–21
OHOST
Hostile-Suspiciousness subscale (Hostility, Suspiciousness, Uncooperativeness) for
BPRS
Possible Range: 3–21
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OBPRS
Total score on BPRS
Possible Range: 18–126
PCLTOT
Total score on 12-item Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version
Possible Range: 0–24
PROPARR
Prior arrest for crimes against property
The following five questions are part of the Interpersonal Relations Scale – Abbreviated
(IRS-A). They form the MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale.
Q1.8
I felt free to do what I wanted about coming to the hospital
0 = False, 1 = True
Q1.11
I chose to come to the hospital 0 = False, 1 = True
Q1.14
It was my idea to come to the hospital 0 = False, 1 = True
Q1.21
I had a lot of control over whether I went to the hospital 0 = False, 1 = True
Q1.22
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I had more influence than anyone else on whether I came into the hospital 0 =
False, 1 = True
Q4.4
During the past two months [before you came to the hospital], did you work for
pay either full-time or part-time?
1 = No, 2 = Yes, full-time, 3 = Yes, part-time
Q5.5.1
Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever beat
or really hurt you with bare hand/fist?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.5.2
Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever beat
or hit you with something hard?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.5.3
Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever beat
or hit you with a whip, strap, or belt?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.5.4
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Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever
injure you with a knife, gun, or other weapon?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.5.5
Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever hurt
you badly enough that you needed a doctor?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.5.6
Thinking about when you were a child, (up to age 12), did your parents ever
physically injure you so that you were admitted to a hospital?
0 = Never, 1 = Once, 2 = Twice,
3 = Sometimes, 4 = Frequently, 5 = Most of the time
Q5.19A
Did your (biological) father ever use street drugs? If yes, How often?
0 = Never, 1 = Daily, 2 = Twice a week,
3 = Once a week, 4 = Once a month, 5 = Less often,
6 = Yes, but unknown frequency
Q5.19B
Did the man who raised you (not biological father) ever use street drugs? If yes,
How often?
0 = Never, 1 = Daily, 2 = Twice a week,
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3 = Once a week, 4 = Once a month, 5 = Less often,
6 = Yes, but unknown frequency
Q5.20A
Did your (biological) father ever get arrested? If yes, How many times?
0 = Never, 1 = 1 time, 2 = 2 times,
3 = 3 times, 4 = 4 times, 5 = 5–10 times,
6 = More than 10 times, 7 = More than once (unspecified)
Q5.20B
Did the man who raised you (not biological father) ever get arrested? If yes, How
many times?
0 = Never, 1 = 1 time, 2 = 2 times,
3 = 3 times, 4 = 4 times, 5 = 5–10 times,
6 = More than 10 times, 7 = More than once (unspecified)
Q7.1
Do you ever have daydreams or thoughts about physically hurting or injuring
some other persons?
1 = No, 2 = Yes
Q7.6
[If answered yes to Q7.1] Are they usually about the same person, or might they
be about many different people?
1 = Same Person, 2 = Different people
Q7.7
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[If answered yes to Q7.1] Since the time you first started having these thoughts,
have the injuries that you think about gotten worse and worse, or have they
always been about the same?
1 = Less Serious, 2 = Same, 3 = More Serious
Q7.8
[If answered yes to Q7.1] In the past two months, have you ever had these thoughts
while actually being with or watching the person that you imagine hurting?
0 = No, 1 = Yes
Q9.1
How much difficulty do you usually have (or would you have) doing housework
by yourself?
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q9.2
How much difficulty do you usually have (or would you have) shopping for food
or buying the things you usually need for yourself?
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q9.3
How much difficulty do you usually have (or would you have) managing your
money by yourself (such as keeping track of expenses, paying bills or making
money last until the end of the month?)
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q9.4
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How much difficulty do you usually have using transportation?
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q9.5
In the last two months, how much difficulty did you have (would you have) making
your own meals or cooking for yourself on a regular basis?
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q9.6
How much difficulty do you have (or would you have) doing laundry by yourself?
0 = None, 1 = Some, 2 = A lot, 3 = Unable to do it
Q10.10N
The number of persons mentioned to the question, Of the people you’ve mentioned
[in your social network], is there anyone who asks so much of you that it bothers
you?
Q10.11N
The number of persons mentioned to the question, Of the people you’ve mentioned
[in your social network], when you go for help, does anyone turn you away?
Q10.12N
The number of persons mentioned to the question, Is there anyone you’ve men-
tioned [in your social network] with whom you really don’t get along, or don’t
like, or who really upsets you?
Q10.13N
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The number of persons mentioned to the question, Is there anyone you’ve men-
tioned [in your social network] who really doesn’t seem to like you or who you
seem to upset?
QREAS.02
Reason for current hospital admission: Suicide threat/Suicide ideation
0 = No, not checked, 1 = Checked
QREAS.20
Reason for current hospital admission: Argument/Threat
0 = No, not checked, 1 = Checked
QREAS.21
Reason for current hospital admission: Homicidal threat/Ideation
0 = No, not checked, 1 = Checked
SNMHP
Proportion of social network that are mental health professionals
VIOL
Violence (Previous two months)
0 = None, 2 = Violence
C.2 Software Code
From Chapter 5.
The SPSS file baseline.sav was imported into R and was combined with the vari-
ables F12VIOL and PCLTOT from the SPSS file follow up subjects.sav to create
the dataset COVR.
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C.2.1 Preprocessing the Data
The preprocessing code uses a user-defined function for determining the mode of a
dataset:
varMode <- function(x) {
varMode = as.numeric(names(table(x))[table(x) == max(table(x))])
}
The code that follows was used to preprocess the data so the variables match, as measured
by matching correlations (see Table 5.1), the variables used in Monahan et al. (2001).
##### Response Variable
#violence committed? (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Violence = as.factor(COVR$F12VIOL)
##### Predictor Variables
#Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) non-planning subscale [1,44]
BISnp = as.numeric(COVR$BISNPLN)
BISnp[is.na(BISnp)] = mean(na.omit(BISnp))
#brief psychiatric rating scale (BPRS) activation subscale [3,14]
BPRSa = as.numeric(COVR$OACTV)
BPRSa[is.na(BPRSa)] = mean(na.omit(BPRSa))
#BPRS hostile-suspiciousness subscale [3,18]
BPRSh = as.numeric(COVR$OHOST)
BPRSh[is.na(BPRSh)] = mean(na.omit(BPRSh))
#BPRS total score [18,74]
BPRSt = as.numeric(COVR$OBPRS)
BPRSt[is.na(BPRSt)] = mean(na.omit(BPRSt))
#Child Abuse Seriousness {0,1,2,3}
ChildAbuseVars = cbind(COVR$Q5.5.1,COVR$Q5.5.2,COVR$Q5.5.3,COVR$Q5.5.4,COVR$Q5.5.5,COVR$Q5.5.6)
- 1
ChildAbuse = matrix(NA, 939, 1)
#0 = none
ChildAbuse0 = ChildAbuseVars
ChildAbuse0 = rowSums(ChildAbuse0)
ChildAbuse0[rowSums(is.na(ChildAbuseVars)) == 6] = NA
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ChildAbuse[ChildAbuse0 == 0] = 0
rm(ChildAbuse0)
#1 = bare hand only, with no physical injury
#if Q5.5.1 > 0
ChildAbuse1 = ChildAbuseVars[,1]
ChildAbuse1[ChildAbuse1 > 1] = 1
#2 = with an object, with no physical injury
#if at least one of Q5.5.2, Q5.5.3 are > 0
ChildAbuse2 = ChildAbuseVars[,c(2:3)]
ChildAbuse2 = rowSums(ChildAbuse2)
ChildAbuse2[ChildAbuse2 > 1] = 1
#3 = resulting 1n phys1cal injury
#if at least one of Q5.5.4, Q5.5.5, Q5.5.6 are > 0
ChildAbuse3 = ChildAbuseVars[,c(4:6)]
ChildAbuse3 = rowSums(ChildAbuse3)
ChildAbuse3[ChildAbuse3 > 1] = 1
ChildAbuse[ChildAbuse1 > 0 & rowSums(cbind(ChildAbuse2, ChildAbuse3)) == 0,] = 1
ChildAbuse[ChildAbuse2 > 0 & ChildAbuse3 == 0,] = 2
ChildAbuse[ChildAbuse3 > 0,] = 3
rm(ChildAbuse1)
rm(ChildAbuse2)
rm(ChildAbuse3)
ChildAbuse[is.na(ChildAbuse)] = mean(ChildAbuse)
rm(ChildAbuseVars)
#employed prior to hospitalization (0 = no, 1 = FT, 2 = PT)
Emp = as.numeric(COVR$Q4.4) - 1 #"YES - FULL-TIME" = 1, "YES - PART-TIME" = 2, "NO" = 0
Emp[Emp == 2] = 1 #employed 1, unemployed 0
Emp[is.na(Emp)] = varMode(Emp)
#father's drug use (0 = less often, 1 = weekly/daily)
DadDrug = cbind(COVR$Q5.19A,COVR$Q5.19B) - 1
DadDrug[DadDrug > 6] = NA
DD = matrix(NA, 939, 2)
DD[DadDrug %in% 1:3] = 1
DD[DadDrug %in% c(0,4:6)] = 0
DD[is.na(DD)] = 0
DD = rowSums(DD)
DD[DD == 2] = 1
DD[rowSums(is.na(DadDrug)) == 2] = NA
DD[rowSums(DadDrug) == 0] = NA #if father never used drugs
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DD[is.na(DD)] = varMode(DD)
DadDrug = DD
rm(DD)
#prior arrest history (frequency, 0 = none, 1 = one, 2 = two, 3 = 3+)
PriorArr = as.numeric(COVR$FREQARR) - 1
PriorArr[is.na(PriorArr)] = mean(na.omit(PriorArr))
#presence of grandiose delusions (0 = not present, 1 = present)
GranDel = as.numeric(COVR$DEL03.1) - 1
GranDel[is.na(GranDel)] = varMode(na.omit(GranDel))
#involuntary hospitalization admission status (0 = voluntary, 1 = involuntary)
LegalStatus = as.numeric(COVR$LEGALR) - 1
LegalStatus[is.na(LegalStatus)] = varMode(LegalStatus)
#proportion of social network members who are also mental health professionals [0,1]
SNMHP = as.numeric(COVR$SNMHP)
SNMHP[is.na(SNMHP)] = mean(na.omit(SNMHP))
#Novaco Anger Scale (NAS) behavioral subscale [16,48]
NASb = as.numeric(COVR$NOVBEH)
NASb[is.na(NASb)] = mean(na.omit(NASb))
#loss of consciousness due to head injury (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Consc = as.numeric(COVR$NEU2A) - 1
Consc[Consc > 1] = NA
Consc[Consc == 9] = as.factor(varMode(Consc))
#Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) total score (0 = 0-12, 1 = 13-24)
PCL = as.numeric(COVR$PCLTOT)
PCL = round(PCL)
PCL[PCL < 13] = 0 #low
PCL[PCL > 12] = 1 #high
PCL[is.na(PCL)] = varMode(PCL)
#DSM-III-R Checklist: Drug abuse (0 = no, 1 = yes)
DrugAbuse = cbind(COVR$DSM16A,COVR$DSM16B,COVR$DSM17A,COVR$DSM17B) - 1
DrugAbuse[DrugAbuse == 5] = NA
da = DrugAbuse
da[is.na(da)] = 0
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da = rowSums(da)
da[da > 1] = 1
da[rowSums(is.na(DrugAbuse)) == 4] = NA
DrugAbuse = da
DrugAbuse[is.na(DrugAbuse)] = varMode(DrugAbuse)
rm(da)
#threat/control override symptoms (0 = not present/verified, 1 = clinician verified)
tco.total = cbind(COVR$K1.1,COVR$K1.3,COVR$K2.1,COVR$K2.3,COVR$K3.1,COVR$K3.3,
COVR$K4.1,COVR$K4.3,COVR$K8.1,COVR$K8.3,COVR$K9.1,COVR$K9.3,
COVR$K10.1,COVR$K10.3,COVR$K12.1,COVR$K12.3) - 1
#patient's answers
tco.total[is.na(tco.total)] = 0
tco.patient = tco.total[,((1:8)*2-1)]
#clinician verification
tco.clinical = tco.total[,(1:8)*2]
tco.clinical[tco.clinical == 1] = 0
tco.clinical[tco.clinical == 2] = 1
#no individual refused to answer all 8 questions
tco = matrix(0, 939, 1)
#patient answered yes (1) and clinician verified (yes = 2)
tco[rowSums((tco.patient + tco.clinical) == 2) > 0] = 1
#no missing data
rm(tco.total,tco.patient,tco.clinical)
#violent fantasies with escalating seriousness (0 = no, 1 = yes)
viofan = cbind(COVR$Q7.1,COVR$Q7.7) - 1
viofan[viofan >= 3] = NA
viofan[viofan[,2] < 2,2] = 0 #less serious or the same
viofan[viofan[,2] == 2,2] = 1 #more serious
FantEsc = matrix(0, 939, 1)
FantEsc[is.na(viofan[,1])] = NA
FantEsc[viofan[,2] == 1] = 1
FantEsc[is.na(FantEsc)] = varMode(FantEsc)
rm(viofan)
#violent fantasies with single target focus (0 = no, 1 = yes)
viofan = cbind(COVR$Q7.1,COVR$Q7.6)
viofan[viofan >= 3] = NA
viofan[viofan[,2] == 2,2] = 0 #different person
FantSing = matrix(0, 939, 1)
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FantSing[is.na(viofan[,1])] = NA
FantSing[viofan[,2] == 1] = 1
FantSing[is.na(FantSing)] = varMode(FantSing)
rm(viofan)
#self-reported violence two months prior to hospitalization (0 = no, 1 = yes)
RecViol2 = as.numeric(COVR$VIOL) - 1
#no missing data
#alcohol or drug abuse (0 = no, 1 = yes)
SubAbuse = cbind(COVR$DSM14A,COVR$DSM14B,COVR$DSM15A,COVR$DSM15B,
COVR$DSM16A,COVR$DSM16B,COVR$DSM17A,COVR$DSM17B) - 1
SA = SubAbuse
SA[SA == 5] = NA
SubAbuse[SubAbuse == 5] = 0
SubAbuse = rowSums(SubAbuse)
SubAbuse[SubAbuse > 0] = 1
SubAbuse[rowSums(is.na(SA)) == 8] = NA
SubAbuse[is.na(SubAbuse)] = varMode(SubAbuse)
rm(SA)
#admission reason: suicide (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Suicide = cbind(COVR$QREAS.02) - 1
Suicide[is.na(Suicide)] = varMode(Suicide)
#father ever arrested (0 = no, 1 = yes)
DadArr = cbind(COVR$Q5.20A,COVR$Q5.20B) - 1
DadArr[DadArr == 8] = NA
DadArr[DadArr > 1] = 1
DadArr = cbind(DadArr,cbind(COVR$Q5.22A,COVR$Q5.22B) - 1)
DadArr[DadArr > 1] = NA
DA = DadArr
DadArr[is.na(DadArr)] = 0
DadArr = rowSums(DadArr)
DadArr[DadArr > 1] = 1
DadArr[rowSums(is.na(DA)) == 4] = NA
DadArr[is.na(DadArr)] = varMode(DadArr)
rm(DA)
#any previous head injury (0 = no, 1 = yes)
HeadInj = cbind(COVR$NEU4B.1,COVR$NEU4B.2,COVR$NEU4B.3,COVR$NEU4B.4,
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COVR$NEU4B.5,COVR$NEU4B.6,COVR$NEU4B.7,COVR$NEU4B.8,COVR$NEU4B.9) - 1
HeadInj[HeadInj == 3] = NA
HeadInj[HeadInj == 1] = 0
HeadInj[HeadInj == 2] = 1
HI = HeadInj
HeadInj[is.na(HeadInj)] = 0
HeadInj = rowSums(HeadInj)
HeadInj[HeadInj > 1] = 1
HeadInj[rowSums(is.na(HI)) == ncol(HI)] = NA
HeadInj[is.na(HeadInj)] = varMode(HeadInj)
rm(HI)
#violent fantasies with target was present (0 = not present, 1 = present)
viofan = cbind(COVR$Q7.1,COVR$Q7.8) - 1
viofan[viofan > 1] = NA
FantTarg = viofan
FantTarg[is.na(FantTarg)] = 0
FantTarg = rowSums(FantTarg)
FantTarg[FantTarg == 1] = 0
FantTarg[FantTarg == 2] = 1
FantTarg[rowSums(is.na(viofan)) == 2] = NA
FantTarg[is.na(FantTarg)] = varMode(FantTarg)
rm(viofan)
#diagnosis of schizophrenia (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Schiz = cbind(COVR$DSM2A,COVR$DSM5A) - 1
Schiz[Schiz == 5] = NA
Schiz[Schiz > 1] = 1
S = Schiz
Schiz[is.na(Schiz)] = 0
Schiz = rowSums(Schiz)
Schiz[Schiz > 1] = 1
Schiz[rowSums(is.na(S)) == 2] = NA
Schiz[is.na(Schiz)] = varMode(Schiz)
rm(S)
#age of patient [18,40]
Age = COVR$AGE
#no missing data
#level of functioning
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#(6 items: 0 = None; 1 = Some; 2 = A lot; 3 = Unable to do it; Sum: [0,18])
Function = cbind(COVR$Q9.1,COVR$Q9.2,COVR$Q9.3,COVR$Q9.4,COVR$Q9.5,COVR$Q9.6) - 1
F = Function
Function[is.na(Function)] = 0
Function = rowSums(Function)
Function[rowSums(is.na(F)) == 5] = NA
Function[is.na(Function)] = mean(Function)
rm(F)
#arrested since age 18 for property crime (0 = no, 1 = yes)
PropCrime = as.numeric(COVR$PROPARR) - 1
#no missing data
#MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale (PCS) (0 = True, 1 = False; Summed Score, 0-5)
PCS = -1*(cbind(COVR$Q1.8,COVR$Q1.11,COVR$Q1.14,COVR$Q1.21,COVR$Q1.22)) + 2
PCS2 = PCS
PCS[is.na(PCS)] = 0
PCS = rowSums(PCS)
PCS[rowSums(is.na(PCS2)) == 5] = NA
PCS[is.na(PCS)] = mean(PCS)
rm(PCS2)
#threats at admission (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Threats = cbind(COVR$QREAS.20,COVR$QREAS.21) - 1
T = Threats
Threats[is.na(Threats)] = 0
Threats = rowSums(Threats)
Threats[Threats > 1] = 1
Threats[rowSums(is.na(T)) == 2] = NA
Threats[is.na(Threats)] = varMode(Threats)
rm(T)
#number of negative relationships [0,8]
NegRel = cbind(COVR$Q10.10N,COVR$Q10.11N,COVR$Q10.12N,COVR$Q10.13N)
NegRel = rowMeans(NegRel)
#no missing data
344
C.2.2 Statistical Analyses
Below is the code for constructing the main effects logistic regression model, the dis-
criminant function models, and the classification trees in MatLab. The dataset containing
the predictor variables is called COVRData; the response variable, Violence.
Cross Validation
The code used to create the training and testing samples for cross-validation.
cvpart = cvpartition(Violence, 'holdout', .3);
XTrain = COVRData(training(cvpart),:);
YTrain = Violence(training(cvpart),:);
XTest = COVRData(test(cvpart),:);
YTest = Violence(test(cvpart),:);
sum(YTrain)/size(YTrain,1) %BRtrain
sum(YTest)/size(YTest,1) %BRtest
MELR Model
MELR = fitglm(COVRData(:,1:18), Violence, 'distr', 'binomial');
%95% CI
coefCI(MELR)
%odds ratio
OR = exp(MELR.Coefficients.Estimate);
UBor = exp(UB);
LBor = exp(LB);
%estimated probabilities
probs = MELR.Fitted.Probability
%ROC analysis
[fpr, tpr, ˜, auc] = perfcurve(Violence, probs, 1);
C.2.3 Discriminant Analysis
%linear discriminant analysis
LDAmodel_lin = ClassificationDiscriminant.fit(COVRData, Violence);
%error measures
resubLoss(LDAmodel_lin)
cvmodel = crossval(LDAmodel_lin, 'leaveout', 'on');
kfoldLoss(cvmodel)
%predictions
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[label, score, cost] = predict(LDAmodel_lin, COVRData);
%ROC analysis
[fpr, tpr, ˜, auc] = perfcurve(Violence, score(:,2), 1);
%quadratic classifier
LDAmodel_quad = ClassificationDiscriminant.fit(COVRData, Violence, ...
'DiscrimType', 'quadratic');
C.2.4 Decision Trees
%defining categorical predictors
CatVars = [6:7, 9:10, 13:25, 30];
%single tree
ctree = ClassificationTree.fit(COVRData, Violence, 'MinLeaf', 42, ...
'CategoricalPredictors', CatVars, 'PredictorNames', VarNames);
%TreeBagger model
%fitting 1000 trees
ctreeBag = TreeBagger(1000, XTrain, YTrain, 'MinLeaf', 10, ...
'CategoricalPredictors', CatVars, 'nprint', 100);
%OOB (Out-Of-Bag; observations not used in contruction of model)
ctreeBagOOB = TreeBagger(1000, COVRData, Violence, 'OOBVarImp', 'on', ...
'MinLeaf', 10, 'CategoricalPredictors', CatVars, 'nprint', 100');
%determining importance of variables using OOB permuations
[sortedPermutedVarDeltaError, sortedVars] = ...
sort(ctreeBagOOB.OOBPermutedVarDeltaError, 'descend');
%keeping most important variables based on OOB errors
topVars = sortedVars(sortedPermutedVarDeltaError > .01);
%final model
ctreeBagFinal = TreeBagger(10000, XTrain(:,topVars), YTrain, 'MinLeaf', 10, ...
'OOBPred', 'on', 'CategoricalPredictors', CatVars(topVars), ...
'nprint', 1000, 'PredictorNames', VarNames(topVars), ...
%applying costs
BR = sum(Violence)/length(Violence); %base rate
twoBR = (1-2*BR)/(2*BR);
costMatrix = [0 1; twoBR, 0]; costs
%e.g.,
ctreeBagCosts = TreeBagger(1000, XTrain, YTrain, 'MinLeaf', 10, ...
'CategoricalPredictors', CatVars, 'nprint', 100, ...
'cost', costMatrix);
%ROC analysis
[fpr, tpr, ˜, auc] = perfcurve(YTest, YTestPredScores(:,2), 1);
%estimated cost function
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[fpr, ecost, t] = perfcurve(YTest, YTestPredScores(:,2), 1, 'ycrit', ...
'ecost', 'cost', [0, 1; 1, 0]);
SPSS Syntax
The following syntax was used in SPSS Version 21.0 to construct a CHAID decision
tree model.
* Decision Tree.
TREE Violence [n] BY BISnp [s] BPRSa [n] BPRSh [n] BPRSt [s] ChildAbuse [s] Emp [n] DadDrug [n]
PriorArr [s] GranDel [n] LegalStatus [n] SNMHP [s] NASb [s] Consc [n] PCL [n] DrugAbuse [n]
tco [n] FantEsc [n] FantSing [n] RecViol2 [n] SubAbuse [n] Suicide [n] DadArr [n]
HeadInj [n] FantTarg [n] Schiz [n] Age [s] Function [n] PropCrime [n] PCS [n] Threats [n]
NegRel [s]
/TREE DISPLAY = TOPDOWN NODES = STATISTICS BRANCHSTATISTICS = YES NODEDEFS = YES SCALE = AUTO
/DEPCATEGORIES USEVALUES = [VALID]
/PRINT MODELSUMMARY CLASSIFICATION RISK
/METHOD TYPE = CHAID
/GROWTHLIMIT MAXDEPTH = 100 MINPARENTSIZE = 100 MINCHILDSIZE = 50
/VALIDATION TYPE = CROSSVALIDATION(10) OUTPUT = BOTHSAMPLES
/CHAID ALPHASPLIT = 0.05 ALPHAMERGE = 0.05 SPLITMERGED = NO CHISQUARE = PEARSON CONVERGE = 0.001
MAXITERATIONS = 100 ADJUST = BONFERRONI INTERVALS = 10
/COSTS EQUAL
/MISSING NOMINALMISSING = MISSING.
To add misclassification costs to the model, the following line replaced the penultimate
line from the above syntax: /COSTS CUSTOM= 1 1 [0] 1 2 [1] 2 1 [1.67] 2 2 [0]
C.3 Brier Score Decomposition
From Chapter 6.
The R function below provides the Brier score and its decomposed parts as the output
when provided a two-category dataset with the first column being the assigned probabilities
and the second and third columns being the frequencies in the first and second category,
respectively.
347
BrierScore <- function(forecastData) {
#Brier Score decomposition for 2 category dataset
#data should be in matrix with form
#[predprob Y N]
nr = rowSums(forecastData[,2:3])
n = sum(nr)
rep10 <- function(times)
rep(c(1,0), times = times)
y = unlist(apply(forecastData[,2:3], 1, rep10))
yhat = rep(forecastData[,1], times = nr)
pbar = sum(forecastData[,2])/n
#Brier Score
BS = sum((y - yhat)ˆ2)/n
#BS Decomposition
#reliability
Rel = sum(nr*(forecastData[,1] - forecastData[,2]/nr)ˆ2)/n
#resolution
Res = sum(nr*(forecastData[,2]/nr - pbar)ˆ2)/n
#uncertainty
Unc = pbar*(1-pbar)
#uncertainty is minimal Brier score using naive prediction (i.e., using base rates)
#check
ifelse(round(BS - (Rel - Res + Unc), 10) == 0,
return(list = c(BrierScore = BS, Reliability = Rel, Resolution = Res,
Uncertainty = Unc)), "Brier score decomposition failed")
}
C.4 Kelley True Score Estimation
From Chapter 6.
The R code below simulates sensitivity values for eleven hypothetical prediction methods.
The reliability is estimated using Hoyt’s method (Hoyt, 1941) and Kelley’s True Score Es-
timator (Kelley, 1923) is used to estimate the sensitivities and the mean squared error is
compared to estimation using the observed values. For this example, the number of obser-
348
vations is set at 20.
require(MASS)
#hypothetical sensitivities of violence prediction methods
sens = matrix(seq(60, 80, 2)/100)
rsuccess <- function(p) sample(1:0, 20, replace = TRUE, prob = c(p, 1 - p))
set.seed(917)
data = apply(sens, 1, rsuccess)
#Hoyt, C. 1941. Test reliability estimated by analysis of variance.
n = nrow(data); k = ncol(data)
StudMean = matrix(rep(colMeans(data), each = n), n, k)
ItemMean = matrix(rep(rowMeans(data)), n, k)
OverMean = matrix(mean(data), n, k)
Y = data - ItemMean - StudMean + OverMean
S0 = sum(Yˆ2)
S1 = sum((data - ItemMean)ˆ2)
S2 = S1 - S0
(r = ((n-1)*S2 - S0)/((n-1)*S2))
#Kelley True Score Estimation
X = StudMean[1,]
T = r*X + (1 - r)*mean(X)
#Mean Squared Error (Kelley True Score Estimator)
mean((T - sens)ˆ2)
#Observed Score Estimator
mean((X - sens)ˆ2)
C.5 Ridge Logistic Regression
The R code below fits the VRAS data using a logistic regression model fit using
maximum likelihood estimation with and without a shrinkage penalty (i.e., ridge regression
estimator). The variable names refer to those created in the script above (under Preprocess-
ing the Data).
LogRegData = cbind(Violence, BISnp, BPRSa, BPRSh, BPRSt,
ChildAbuse, Emp, DadDrug, PriorArr, GranDel, LegalStatus, SNMHP, NASb,
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Consc, PCL, DrugAbuse, tco, FantEsc, FantSing)
LogRegData = as.data.frame(scale(LogRegData, center = F))
colnames(LogRegData) = c('Violence', 'BISnp', 'BPRSa', 'BPRSh', 'BPRSt', 'ChildAbuse',
'Emp', 'DadDrug', 'PriorArr', 'GranDel', 'LegalStatus', 'SNMHP',
'NASb', 'Consc', 'PCL', 'DrugAbuse', 'tco', 'FantEsc', 'FantSing')
#logistic regression model without shrinkage penalty
MainEffectsLogisticModel = glm(as.factor(Violence) ˜ ., data = LogRegData,
family = binomial(logit))
#10 fold CV for GLM
require(boot)
#estimated probability of violence greater than 50%
MEMcost.5 = function(r, pi=0) mean(abs(r-pi) > 0.5)
cvMELR10 = cv.glm(LogRegData, MainEffectsLogisticModel, MEMcost.5, K = 10)
cvMELR10$delta[1] #K=10-fold error
RLMcvMER$cvm[which.min(RLMcvMER$cvm)] #K=10-fold error
#logistic regression model with shrinkage penalty
require(glmnet)
RidgeLogisticModel = glmnet(as.matrix(LogRegData[,2:19]), as.factor(Violence),
family = 'binomial', alpha = 0, standardize = F)
#10 fold CV for ridge model
#misclassification error
RLMcvMER = cv.glmnet(as.matrix(LogRegData[,2:19]), as.factor(Violence), family = 'binomial',
type.measure = 'class', alpha = 0, standardize = F)
#min cv error
RLMcvMER$lambda.min
#model using CV lambda
RidgeLogisticModel = glmnet(as.matrix(LogRegData[,2:19]), as.factor(Violence),
family = 'binomial', alpha = 0, standardize = F,
lambda = RLMcvMER$lambda.min)
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